2022 MBKB 186, 2022 MBKB 186

Date: 20220929 Docket: FD 15-01-12598 (Winnipeg Centre) Indexed as: Emes v. Emes Cited as: 2022 MBKB 186 COURT OF KING’S BENCH OF MANITOBA (FAMILY DIVISION) B E T W E E N: ) Appearances: JUDITH LYNN EMES, ) petitioner, ) S. NORMAN ROSENBAUM ) for the petitioner - and - ) ) WILLIAM TODD EMES, ) WILLIAM TODD EMES ) on his own behalf ) respondent. ) ) JUDGMENT DELIVERED: ) September 29, 2022 THATCHER J. [ 1 ] The petitioner moves for a Final Order of spousal support pursuant to s. 15.2 of the Divorce Act , ( R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp .)) (the “ Act ”).

During the course of their separation, the parties entered into an all-encompassing separation agreement which provided for property division and a defined term of spousal support that did not allow for variation or review. Subsequent to the agreement, two amending agreements were executed during which time the parties had dramatically different financial realities and bargaining positions. A Miglin analysis was undertaken in the face of a serious and seemingly intentional lack of accurate financial disclosure. Background [ 2 ] The parties met when they were 29 years old.

The petitioner was working as a hairdresser and the respondent was a farmer. They began to cohabitate in May of 1989 and married on June 30, 1990. They have two children who are long since grown and independent. [ 3 ] In or about 1997, the parties commenced a construction business which would later be incorporated into 6191763 Manitoba Inc. operating under the business name “Emes Construction”. The construction company’s expertise was due to the respondent’s familiarity with the operation of heavy machinery.

The company came to specialize in road and infrastructure construction in new subdivisions. [ 4 ] In or about 1998, the parties commenced what would become a successful property development business. The parties incorporated Silver Seal Investments Ltd. (“Silver Seal”) towards this end. [ 5 ] Between 1997 and approximately 2006, the parties worked hard to build these companies from virtually nothing. The parties lived a frugal lifestyle and re-invested everything they could back into the businesses. They frequently went without in support of their

fledgling businesses. [ 6 ] The aforesaid corporations were ran as separate entities but often complimented one another. The respondent acted as the onsite presence for both corporations. He was a heavy equipment operator for the construction company, and acted in all of the various roles one would expect of an on-site project manager in a property development corporation. The respondent would hire and fire employees, arrange regular meetings with the municipality and their representatives, meet with the architects and the engineers, and monitor the phases of construction and property development as required.

Further, the respondent was responsible for the acquisition of heavy equipment and formed personal relationships in the construction and property development industries. [ 7 ] The petitioner was also heavily invested in the parties’ two corporations. She quickly acquired skills necessary to provide the front office functions required of the two corporations. She obtained her GED, learned how to maintain books and was responsible for the day to day banking of the corporations. She became educated on issues related to marketing and land conveyancing.

She obtained her real estate certificate and would regularly draw up paperwork for zoning variations and applications to municipalities regarding the creation of subdivisions. [ 8 ] While the parties struggled to grow their businesses in the early years, their collective standard of living increased greatly prior to separation. They began to regularly use limousines to go for dinner. The petitioner testified that they would invite people that they knew to dinner and be very generous, sometimes having tabs of over $1,000 that the parties would cover.

The petitioner testified that she would go to the salon every other month to have her nails done. The parties would regularly go to sun destinations in the Dominican Republic, Mexico and Cuba. They owned two time shares in Las Vegas. They regularly went to San Diego, California, and at other times would rent lake cabins, sometimes just for themselves and sometimes for others as well. They holidayed in Banff at the Banff Springs Hotel one Christmas.

By any measure, the parties enjoyed a high standard of living from their mid marriage onwards. [ 9 ] Truly, both of these parties were very gifted in their respective areas of operation. The parties’ co-operation ended when they separated on March 20, 2014. [ 10 ] The petitioner commenced divorce proceedings in 2015 and eventually the divorce was severed from all other relief and was pronounced June 28, 2019. In 2016 and 2017 there was interim litigation between the parties regarding the disposal of corporate property and interim spousal support.

On February 17, 2017, Johnston J. pronounced an interim award of spousal support to the petitioner of $5,662.07 per month. The order was on a

summary judgment basis, enforcing a prior agreement as opposed to a factual investigation centered on the Act . The Separation Agreement [ 11 ] The parties resolved all issues between them by virtue of a separation agreement dated January 12, 2018. During all stages of the negotiation of and the execution of the separation agreement, both parties were represented by counsel. The agreement provided, inter alia , that the respondent would pay to the petitioner spousal support in the amount of $4,000.00 per month on the first day of each month commencing February 1, 2018 up to the final payment of December 1, 2038.

The agreement did not contemplate a variation or review of support. The agreement also contained provisions wherein the petitioner could file a caveat, encumbrance or other charge against any and all lands of the respondent. Further, the petitioner was able to register a security interest pursuant to The Personal Property Security Act , C.C.S.M. c. P35 , against any of the chattel assets of the respondent, Silver Seal and Emes Construction. It is not clear if those security interests were ever registered. [ 12 ] The separation agreement of the parties also contained a final and conclusive property settlement.

The respondent was to pay to the petitioner $2,300,000.00 as an equalization payment. The

schedule of payments was to be $75,000.00 payable on June 1 of each year from 2019 to 2028. A further May 1 payment of $75,000.00 was due in 2029. Commencing in 2029, further payments on each June 1 of $125,000.00 were due up to an including June 1, 2038. The last payment to have come due was $125,000.00 due on May 31, 2039. [ 13 ] Finally, the agreement extinguished the petitioner’s shareholder interest in the aforesaid corporations. As a result, the petitioner had no further notice of transactions involving the businesses going forward.

The Amending Agreements [ 14 ] Notwithstanding said agreement, the respondent failed to make a single property equalization payment, either in whole or in part. Further, the respondent did not make a single voluntary payment of spousal support under the agreement despite the fact that the petitioner was entirely financially dependent on him and had no income of her own. Just nine months later, the parties executed an amending agreement which greatly reduced the respondent’s spousal support obligation, effectively cutting it in half to $2,000 per month. Further, the

schedule of agreed upon payments towards the property provisions of the agreement were amended so as to lower the payments for the first ten years from $75,000.00 per year to $50,000.00 per year. [ 15 ] Notwithstanding the amending agreement, the respondent, who was by now representing himself, continued his refusal to pay spousal support. Further, the respondent did not make any of the scheduled payments under the property portions of the agreement or the amending agreement. [ 16 ] The parties entered into a second amending agreement on February 12, 2019.

The only material effect of the second amending agreement was to recalculate spousal support arrears, providing the petitioner with an additional $24,000.00 of arrears which were to be collected by the Manitoba Maintenance Enforcement Program. [ 17 ] While the petitioner was represented by counsel during the negotiation of an execution of all three agreements, the respondent was only represented by counsel with respect to the execution of the first agreement. He represented himself with respect to the two amending agreements and signed a waiver of independent legal advice with respect to each.

[ 18 ] When taken together, the effect of the two amending agreements was to cut ongoing spousal support under the original agreement in half, although the second amending agreement did create some spousal support arrears. It made no difference as the respondent still has yet to make a voluntary payment due under the agreements outside of an administrative suspension of enforcement by Manitoba Maintenance Enforcement. With respect to property, the amending agreements back loaded the property settlement such that the payments due over the first decade were reduced and pushed to the final years of the agreement.

The Act [ 19 ] The respondent seeks a variation of the separation agreement and subsequent amending agreements on the basis that he has suffered a major financial reversal in that neither Emes Construction nor Silver Seal are still operating. The respondent testified that he has “lost everything” as a result of being cheated on a land deal.

The respondent claims that he is now a salaried employee of his adult son, earning $38,400.00 per year and that an appropriate quantum of spousal support is an order of $500.00 per month. [ 20 ] The petitioner takes the position that this is not a variation but rather a first instance claim of spousal support under s. 15.2 of the Act . [ 21 ] I agree with the petitioner. This action is not a variation, but rather a hearing of first instance, and accordingly, s. 15.2 of the Act applies.

Spousal support order 15.2(1) A court of competent jurisdiction may, on application by either or both spouses, make an order requiring a spouse to secure or pay, or to secure and pay, such lump sum or periodic sums, or such lump sum and periodic sums, as the court thinks reasonable for the support of the other spouse. Interim order

(2) Where an application is made under subsection (1), the court may, on application by either or both spouses, make an interim order requiring a spouse to secure or pay, or to secure and pay, such lump sum or periodic sums, or such lump sum and periodic sums, as the court thinks reasonable for the support of the other spouse, pending the determination of the application under subsection (1). Terms and conditions

(3) The court may make an order under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2) for a definite or indefinite period or until a specified event occurs, and may impose terms, conditions or restrictions in connection with the order as it thinks fit and just. Factors

(4) In making an order under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2), the court shall take into consideration the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, including (

a) the length of time the spouses cohabitated (

b) the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and (

c) any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse. Spousal misconduct

(5) In making an order under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2), the court shall not take into consideration any misconduct of a spouse in relation to the marriage. Objectives of spousal support order

(6) An order made under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2) that provides for the support of a spouse should (

a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown;

(

b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over andabove any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage; (

c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and (

d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time. [22] The approach in Miglin v. Miglin, 2003 SCC 24 , applies as the respondent is seeking an order of statutory supportinconsistent with his contractual support obligation under a pre-existing agreement. [23] In Blair v. Stewart-Blair, 2013 BCSC 927 , Bernard J. helpfully summarized the applicable legal principles andanalytical framework found in Miglin by reproducing the most salient passages: [26] I turn, then, to the merits of Dr. Blair’s application.

As noted above, the applicable legal principles and analytical framework arefound in Miglin, supra.

I draw from the comprehensive reasons for judgment of the majority, the following particularly appositestatements: [51] It is settled that Parliament has vested in the courts the discretion to review and reject the terms of a pre-existing agreement … [52] The objective listed in s. 15.2(6) … are not intended to dictate by themselves the precise terms of an enforceable negotiatedagreement dealing with spousal support … the language of s. 15.2(6) is suggestive only … Nothing in these provisions indicates a duty on the court to subject a comprehensive agreement to scrutiny based solely on the objectivesin s. 15.2(6) or to assume that any agreement by the parties will be enforceable only when its provisions substantially mirror what a trialjudge, unfamiliar with the parties’ motivations and subjective understanding of their relationship, would have awarded on the basis ofthese criteria alone. [54] … [M]ore must be shown than a mere deviation from what a trial judge would have awarded in an order before it is appropriate forthe court to disregard the parties’ pre-existing agreement.

Without some degree of certainty that the agreement will be respected by thecourt, parties have little incentive to negotiate a settlement and then to comply with the terms of the undertakings. [55] … To impose on all separating or divorcing persons an obligation to adhere strictly and exclusively to the statutory spousal supportobjectives denies them the autonomy to organize their lives as they see fit and to pursue their own sense of what is mutually acceptable intheir individual circumstances. … [56] … [W]hat is “fair” will depend not only on the objective circumstances of the parties, but also on how those parties conceive ofthemselves, their marriage and its dissolution, as well as their expectations and aspirations for the future. [57] … [T]rial judges must consider the agreement more broadly in light of all the objectives of … the Act as a whole … Theselegislative objectives require the trial judge to consider the extent to which the agreement represents a final settlement of the issues,negotiated under unimpeachable conditions, to which both parties agreed and on which each of them intended to rely.

It is only then thatthe judge will consider whether the agreement must nevertheless be set aside in full or in part because it is not in substantial compliancewith the broader objectives of the Act. … [63] [C]hanges to the parties’ circumstances after completion of a separation agreement are obviously not wholly irrelevantconsideration in assessing the weight to be given to a pre-existing agreement at the time of the application. … the court should focus noton change as a threshold matter, leading to the setting aside of an agreement, but rather on the totality of the circumstances, of which achange in the parties’ circumstances will likely be an element.

Put another way, it is not the existence of change per se that matters butwhether, at the time of the application, all the circumstances render continued reliance in the pre-existing agreement unacceptable. [64] An initial application for spousal support inconsistent with a pre-existing agreement requires an investigation into all thecircumstances surrounding that agreement, first, at the time of its formation, and second, at the time of the application. …

… [78] … [I]n searching for a proper balance between consensus and finality on the one hand, and sensitivity to the unique concerns that arise in the post-divorce context on the other, a court should be guided by the objectives of spousal support listed in the Act . In doing so, however, the court should treat the parties’ reasonable best efforts to meet those objectives as presumptively dispositive of the spousal support issue.

The court should set side the wishes of the parties as expressed in a pre-existing agreement only where the applicant shows that the agreement fails to be in substantial compliance with the overall objectives of the Act . These include not only those apparent in s. 15.2 but also, as noted above, certainty, finality, and autonomy. … (

a) Stage One [80] In an originating application for spousal support, where the parties have executed a pre-existing agreement, the court should first look to the circumstances in which the agreement was negotiated and executed to determine whether there is any reason to discount it. … (

b) Stage Two [87] Where negotiation of the agreement is not impugned on the basis set out above and the agreement was in substantial compliance with the general objectives of the Act at its time of creation, the court should defer to the wishes of the parties and afford the agreement great weight. Nevertheless, the vicissitudes of life mean that, in some circumstances, parties may find themselves down the road of their post-divorce life in circumstances not contemplated.

Accordingly, on the bringing of an application under s. 15.2 , the court should assess the extent to which enforcement of the agreement still reflects the original intention of the parties and the extent to which it is in substantial compliance with the objectives of the Act . [88] … the applicant must nevertheless clearly show that, in light of the new circumstances, the terms of the agreement no longer reflect the parties’ intentions at the time of execution and the objectives of the Act .

Accordingly, it will be necessary to show that these new circumstances were not reasonably anticipated by the parties, and have led to a situation that cannot be condoned. [89] We stress that a certain degree of change is foreseeable most of the time. The prospective nature of these agreements cannot be lost on the parties and they must be presumed to be aware that the future is, to a greater or lesser extent, uncertain. … … [91] … Parties must take responsibility for the contract they execute as well as for their own lives.

It is only where the current circumstances represent a significant departure from the range of reasonable outcomes anticipated by the parties, in a manner that puts them at odds with the objectives of the Act , that the court may be persuaded to give the agreement little weight. [ 24 ] It should be noted that the separation agreement and the two subsequent amending agreements were “final” agreements in that none of them contained an allowance for variation or review. Rather, the agreements contained a

schedule of defined payments over time with a start date and end date. Credibility [ 25 ] There were only two witnesses called to trial, the petitioner and respondent. The petitioner testified in a careful and thorough manner, at times going back to correct her evidence on minor evidentiary points which gave the impression of one wanting to be as accurate as possible. Where she was not sure of a date or number, she would indicate where she was estimating. Conversely, the respondent gave his evidence in vague and general terms only.

He made very few specific references and entered very little documentary or financial evidence. As is often the case, in order to assess the evidence in this case, a determination of credibility is required so as to assess conflicting evidence. In undertaking this examination, I note the following:

a) There is clear and convincing evidence that the respondent had begun to divest Emes Construction of assets even before the separation agreement was executed. In his capacity as president, he gifted a semi-trailer truck to his son-in-law and another two semi- trailer trucks and a 20-tonne Volvo excavator to his adult son whom, around that time, suddenly became involved in the property development business.

b) The timing of the adult son’s entry into the property development business is surprising as the uncontroverted evidence is that the adult son is an electrician by trade, is not a heavy equipment operator, and at the time lacked experience in the area of property development. Further, he is employed on a full-time basis as an electrician where he manages a commercial project completely unrelated to property development.

On multiple occasions, the respondent was put on notice that his financial relationship with his son was in issue and that a failure to call his adult son to testify could lead to an adverse inference by the court. Notwithstanding, the respondent elected to not call his son. He did not provide an explanation.

c) The respondent testified that he is currently employed by his adult son at a wage of $38,400.00 per year, working on his son’s property development project. Based on that income that the respondent obtained a six month administrative reduction in support enforcement from the Manitoba Maintenance Enforcement Program in exchange for making support payments of $500.00 per month to the petitioner. The respondent denied the suggestion that he was capable of earning far more if he simply worked as a heavy equipment operator.

He testified that he was not a terribly skilled heavy equipment operator, notwithstanding the fact that he had been so since 1997, had been instrumental in building a construction company from scratch, and that this was the stated reason for his son to hire him in the first place. Further, the respondent testified that his current employment required him to meet with engineers on his son’s project, as well as representatives of the rural municipality every two weeks.

The respondent testified that he was the one with the knowledge and experience to deal with those individuals, particularly considering that his adult son had full-time employment elsewhere. The respondent testified that he would regularly brief his son on the progress of the development, arrange for the purchase of machinery, and hire and fire staff. The respondent agreed that he was essentially acting as a project manager, despite his title.

In fact, there seems to be very little difference between the work that the respondent does for his adult son and the work that he undertook as one of two controlling minds for Emes Construction and Silver Seal.

d) Prior to trial, the respondent was served with a demand for financial information which included the disclosure of tax materials (personal and for the two corporations) and sought particulars of dispositions of land and equipment through both sale and gift. The responding tax materials included the Silver Seal returns and indicated no revenues or capital proceeds. The unrealized gains/losses and the capital gains or losses lines were left blank.

In fact, the corporation had disposed of 22 lots in the “Northern Edges” project in 2018 and by virtue of a statement of adjustments that was tendered by the petitioner, Silver Seal received $1,760,751.50 as cash to close. The respondent was not able to explain the discrepancy between the statement of adjustments and the tax return.

e) Of the nine semi-trailer trucks in the business at separation, the respondent admitted to transferring two to a third party in exchange for approximately $30,000.00 of shop rental. The respondent conceded that the value of the trucks was likely $90,000.00 in total and claimed that his intent in transferring the additional $60,000.00 was to secure a subcontract on a provincial highway project.

f) The respondent testified that he had no interest, either personal or corporate, in a 2016 property development project known as “The Creeks”. He testified that his sole involvement in that project was being retained to dig a ditch. However, in a civil action with other principals of “The Creeks” project, the respondent asserted that he owned 10 of 60 shares in the large commercial project. The respondent was unable to explain why he would be listed as a shareholder.

g) Following the interim

summary judgment order requiring the respondent to pay spousal support to the time of trial, the respondent conceded that he had not made any voluntary payments of spousal support. Notwithstanding, his Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) Notice of Assessment for 2017 indicated that he had paid $28,000.00 of spousal support. The evidence is clear that no such payments were made in 2017. [ 26 ] Many of the assertions of the respondent at trial are demonstrably false. He testified that he has “lost everything” but is unable to explain what happened to the $1,760,751.50 payable to Silver Seal in 2018.

Further, he was unable to explain why those earnings were not reflected on the Silver Seal tax return. The respondent did concede that it might be related to ongoing action by the CRA. [ 27 ] Taken as a whole, I find the petitioner to be far more credible than the respondent. Where their evidence conflict, I choose the evidence of the petitioner whose veracity and evidence as a whole was at no time seriously challenged either by cross-examination or the introduction of contrary evidence.

The Miglin Test [ 28 ] It is not one agreement that must be reviewed by the court, but rather the original separation agreement and the two amending agreements. With respect to the original separation agreement of January 12, 2018, both parties were represented by counsel and neither impugnes the separation agreement, either in its substance or the circumstances of its execution.

Neither party alleges that the agreement did not comply with the factors and objectives of the Act , and nor is there a suggestion that the agreement did not reflect an equitable sharing of the economic consequences of the marriage and its breakdown at the time it was executed. [ 29 ] The same may not be said of the two amending agreements. The petitioner testified, and the respondent conceded, that the respondent never voluntarily paid spousal support to the petitioner, even under the interim order.

The only payments made were during the temporary administrative pause of Maintenance Enforcement when he paid $500.00/month in exchange for a pause in enforcement. The petitioner testified that prior to the first amending agreement, she was living out of her car, begging the respondent to pay her support. The petitioner testified that the respondent said that he would pay her support but only if she agreed to lower the quantum. The amending agreement was executed on October 19, 2018, but still the respondent did not pay.

The reasons for the second amending agreement are quite unclear in that the only substantive difference from the first amending agreement is to create an additional $24,000.00 of arrears of support while delaying the start date of ongoing support.

There was little evidence from either party around the basis for the second amending agreement, but on a review of the evidence, it may be that by moving part of the support obligation to arrears rather than ongoing support, the enforcement priority of that obligation may have been affected. [ 30 ] Taken as a whole, it is difficult to describe either or both of the amending agreements as being fairly entered into. The respondent was engaged in a tactic once known as “starving out” the petitioner. For a time she was living out of her car and completely unable to support herself.

The skills that she had obtained while the parties grew their corporations together were not, according to the petitioner’s unchallenged evidence, transferrable to a new workplace. The amending agreements were not the product of a fair and equitable bargaining process rooted in the objectives of the Act , but rather, were a product of one party using their vastly superior financial resources to economically crush the other. [ 31 ] Accordingly, I find that the amending agreements do not pass stage one of the Miglin test and may not be afforded any weight in an examination under s. 15.2 of the Act .

[32] Based on the foregoing, it is only necessary to apply stage two of the Miglin test to the original separation agreement. As neitherparty has impugned the circumstances around the formulation of and execution of the separation agreement, one must consider theparties’ financial position at the time of trial.

When executed, it was fair and reflected the objectives of the Act, but what of today? [33] Looking at the financial circumstances of the petitioner, line 150 of her income tax returns show a definite ongoing need forsupport even in the absence of a contractual entitlement: - 2017 - $12,000.00 - 2018 - $6,405.95 - 2019 - $24,061.79 - 2020 - $19,261.79 [34] The petitioner testified that she is currently working at the Souris Hotel doing a variety of jobs, but that she is likely to be soon inthe position where she will have to leave that job as her health simply does not allow her to continue.

She testified that she is withoutsavings or assets and as such, she would likely have to apply for social assistance. [35] The respondent filed his 2017 – 2020 income tax returns.

His line 150 indicates the following: - 2017 - $0.00 - 2018 - $7,000.00 - 2019 - $20,333.00 - 2020 - $38,400.00 [36] The respondent testified that he continues to work for his adult son at a rate of $38,400.00 and provided a letter from hisemployer to that effect. [37] As the respondent was put on notice at least three times during the trial that a failure to call his son to confirm the circumstancesof the financial arrangement between he and his son, particularly in light of unchallenged evidence of the petitioner to the effect that theconstruction equipment of Emes Construction had somehow found their way to the son’s business, could lead to an adverse inference.

The respondent clearly understood that a failure to call his son would very likely result in an adverse inference being made against him. The respondent could easily have proven his current financial circumstances had he subpoenaed his son. He chose not to and Iaccordingly infer that the respondent felt that his son’s evidence would have been so harmful that an adverse inference was preferable(see Elias et al. v. Western Financial Group Inc., 2016 MBQB 75 ). [38] The respondent’s current financial position is highly unclear. I have little confidence that the respondent’s earnings are truly$38,400.00 per year.

I look at the undisclosed earnings of Silver Seal in 2018 of over $1.7 million dollars. I also consider that it is likelythat the current development project operated by the respondent’s son is in fact the respondent’s project done under the name of his son. The respondent undertakes all of the duties that he did when he was a project manager and it seems, if the respondent is to be believed,without the financial reward. [39] At the end then, the court is left with little or no reliable evidence to suggest that there ought to be an order inconsistent with theoriginal separation agreement after a Miglin analysis.

The respondent has provided little if any credible evidence around his currentfinancial circumstances and certainly no evidence of financial change to justify altering the original support provisions of the agreement. The original separation agreement is final in nature in that it does not contain provisions contemplating either variation or review. Itpasses the two-stage Miglin test and would seem to support the objectives of the Act both at the time of its execution and at the time oftrial. [40] It should be noted that issues related to property were not set for trial.

Further, there was no application with respect to thetransfer of corporate property in the face of an obvious creditor. Conclusion [41] Considering the foregoing, I order:

a) The respondent shall pay to the petitioner periodic spousal support in the sum of $4,000.00 per month, on the first of each monthcommencing February 1, 2018 up to and including the final payment of December 1, 2038. These payments reflect those contained inthe separation agreement;

b) The respondent will receive credit for any and all payments that he has made to the Manitoba Maintenance EnforcementProgram under the agreements, including those payments made pursuant to the administrative suspension;

c) At paragraph 4.04 and 4.05 of the separation agreement, the parties acknowledged that the respondent was in arrears of spousalsupport in the amount of $60,353.19 at the time of the execution of the agreement. Those arrears were to have been paid by June 1,2018, and according to the evidence of the petitioner, those arrears were not paid. There was no evidence adduced by the respondent tosuggest that they were paid. Accordingly, arrears of spousal support owed by the respondent to the petitioner, shall be increased by$60,353.19;

d) Typically there would be an order setting out a repayment

schedule of support arrears. To do so in this case however would further delay the petitioner’s ability to collect support, particularly when the seizure of assets may be required. Accordingly, all arrears of support are now due and payable; and

e) Further arguments may be made with respect to costs. ____________________ J.