2022 MBKB 242, 2022 MBKB 242

Date: 20221220 Docket: FD 20-01-25297 (Winnipeg Centre) Indexed as: Smith v. Smith Cited as: 2022 MBKB 242 COURT OF KING’S BENCH OF MANITOBA FAMILY DIVISION B E T W E E N: DORIS ANNE SMITH, ) petitioner, ) Carla B. Paul ) for the petitioner - and - ) ) DARIN TODD SMITH, ) ) ) ) Marcia Knight for the respondent William Gange respondent. ) for the Marcia Knight ) ) JUDGMENT DELIVERED: ) December 20, 2022 ANTONIO J. BACKGROUND [ 1 ] This decision relates to the petitioner, Ms. Doris Smith’s, motion for costs against Ms. Marcia Knight personally. Ms. Knight represents the respondent, Mr. Darin Smith. Mr.

Gange represents Ms. Knight in respect of this motion. [ 2 ] The Court heard argument, totaling approximately four hours, and reviewed significant affidavits filed by both Ms. Knight and Ms. Paul’s paralegals, as well as the cross-examination of Ms. Knight’s paralegal. On the evening before the second date of argument, the Court received supplemental written argument with legal authority to support Ms. Knight’s invitation to this Court to consider, on its own motion, an order of costs payable by Ms. Paul personally. [ 3 ] The motion of Ms. Smith concerns Ms.

Knight’s conduct including, inter alia, failure to release settlement funds given to her by Mr. Smith on July 22, 2022, until September 1, 2022, the date she finally released the monies to Ms. Paul. Ms. Smith argues that Ms. Knight’s refusal to communicate with Ms. Paul about the funds owed to her, and her delay and interference with finalizing the divorce in this matter, is actionable conduct that warrants costs personally against Ms. Knight in the amount of $20,000 or more. [ 4 ] Ms. Knight submits that the motion for costs against her should be dismissed for the following reasons: 1.

She says that she made considerable efforts to finalize the final court documents in this proceeding; 2. She submits that she did not delay this proceeding or drive up costs for the parties; 3. She claims that she placed trust conditions on the settlement funds because Mr. Smith’s bank required it; and

4. She submits that Ms. Paul acted improperly by sending Ms. Knight a false affidavit of her paralegal, Ms. McLaughlin. [ 5 ] The parties settled all terms of a final agreement on June 9, 2022, as transcribed, including a term that Mr. Smith pay Ms. Smith $40,000. The transcript notes that Ms. Paul read into the record the following statement, which was not objected to by Ms. Knight: “And the expectation is that those funds will be paid on or before July 1 st to the best of his ability. And, of course dependent upon us providing the documents necessary for him to obtain the financing.” [ 6 ] Ms.

Knight received the $40,000 settlement funds on July 22, 2022. She did not send the funds to Ms. Paul until August 11, 2022, and when she did, she sent the monies on trust conditions that they not be released until steps were taken to conclude the final court documents with the Court of King’s Bench. On September 1, 2022, with no change to any relevant facts, Ms. Knight suddenly removed the trust conditions. [ 7 ] The Divorce Judgment and Final Order were submitted to the Court on July 19, 2022, and rejected by Thomson J. on July 20, 2022. [ 8 ] On July 27, 2022, Ms. Paul wrote to Ms.

Knight enclosing new documents that she proposed be filed with Thomson J., which she believed would address the one paragraph in the Affidavit of Petitioner’s Evidence that Thomson J. noted to be deficient. She sought to provide the Court with new copies of outstanding Interim Orders with both lawyers’ signatures on them, whereas the materials filed with Thomson J. had only one lawyer’s consent noted on the Interim Orders. [ 9 ] As the Final Order, previously signed by both counsel and submitted to Thomson J. did not reference the Affidavit of Ms. McLaughlin, as it was not needed at the time, Ms.

Paul updated the Final Order to refer to Ms. McLaughlin’s affidavit and she also filled in a blank space where the date of the Affidavit of Petitioner’s Evidence was originally left off the Final Order. Ms. McLaughlin’s affidavit, provided to Ms. Knight for her consideration, was already affirmed and stated that the updated version of the Final Order, containing reference to the new affidavit, was consented to. It was not at the time she affirmed it. Ms. Knight was given the updated Final Order and asked to consent to the new version and to the Affidavit of Ms.

McLaughlin, proposed to be filed with Thomson J. [ 10 ] What ensued after this was a series of emails between counsel concerning what would be sent to Thomson J. There was no agreement reached as to what should be resubmitted to seek pronouncement of the Final Order and Divorce Judgment. [ 11 ] The matter ultimately came before me as trial judge on September 13, 2022. On that date, I pronounced the Final Order and Divorce Judgment after hearing submissions of counsel who were consenting to the form of Final Order. Additionally, Ms. Paul sought to set down her motion for costs against Ms.

Knight personally and the matter was adjourned for Ms. Knight to seek counsel, and also to consider filing her own motion against Ms. Paul for costs personally. She did not file a motion but did retain Mr. Gange to represent her. [ 12 ] For the present motion, Ms. Knight argues that Ms. Paul’s conduct, concerning the Affidavit of Ms. McLaughlin, constitutes perjury under

section 17 of the Manitoba Evidence Act, C.C.S.M. c. E150 , and conduct prohibited by the Law Society of Manitoba, Code of Professional Conduct, effective January 1, 2011. [ 13 ] Ms. Paul submits that this is irrelevant. She argues that there is no motion for costs being advanced against her and says that the Court should reject Mr. Gange’s invitation to order costs against Ms. Paul on its own motion. The Court agrees with Ms. Paul’s position. The circumstances relating to Ms. Paul’s handling of Ms. McLaughlin’s affidavit are not relevant to the motion for costs against Ms. Knight.

The Court will turn to the request for costs against Ms. Paul below. [ 14 ] The Court finds that this is an appropriate case for costs to be ordered against Ms. Knight personally. The parties settled their claims early on. Mr. Smith secured the funds quickly and Ms. Knight interfered with the timely release of the funds to Ms. Smith. Ms. Knight failed to correspond with Ms. Paul about her refusal to provide the funds. The delay in sending the funds, with the imposition of trust conditions, resulted in Ms. Smith not receiving her funds until 40 days after the date Ms.

Knight first obtained the funds and two months after the date Mr. Smith was to make best efforts to pay Ms. Smith. [ 15 ] Ms. Knight’s explanation to this Court in closing argument, that she was required by Mr. Smith’s bank to impose the trust conditions, is not logical. She does not address why, without any change in the facts following the imposition of the trust conditions, she suddenly removed the trust conditions. She never explained in response to Ms. Paul’s half-dozen requests for the money, or at any point during the cross-examination, why she held back the funds from Ms.

Smith, nor why she refused to withdraw her trust conditions for four and one-half weeks. She argues that her actions do not justify an order of costs payable personally, which require “compelling circumstances that cry out for the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the court to control or prevent the abuse of its own process” (Rule 57.07(1)). The Court disagrees. LAW [ 16 ] The Court considered King’s Bench Rule 57.07(1):

Order against lawyer 57.07(1) Where a lawyer for a party has caused costs to be incurred without reasonable cause or to be wasted by undue delay, or otherdefault, the court may make an order requiring the lawyer personally to pay the costs of any party. [17] The Court considered the decision of Yard J., Eblie v. Yankoski, 2007 MBQB 106 (Eblie): [11] Ordinarily costs are as between parties to a litigation and are compensatory in nature.

While costs may be ordered against counselthis is out of the ordinary and should not be done unless justified within the parameters of Rule 57.07(1) or in compelling circumstanceswhich cry out for the exercise of the courts inherent jurisdiction to control or prevent the abuse of its own processes. The jurisdictionshould be exercised sparingly, with care and caution and only in clear cases. In Young v. Young 1993 C.J.

No. 112; (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3 McLachlin J. (as she then was) in reasons concurred in by the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada expressed it this wayat paragraph 254: The basic principle on which costs are awarded is as compensation for the successful party, not in order to punish a barrister. Anymember of the legal profession might be subject to compensatory order for costs if it is shown that repetitive and irrelevant material andexcessive motions and applications, characterize the proceedings in which they were involved, and that the lawyer acted in bad faith inencouraging this abuse and delay.

It is clear that the courts possess jurisdiction to make such an award, often under statute and, in anyevent, as part of their inherent jurisdiction to control abuse of process and contempt of court…. Courts must be extremely cautious inawarding costs personally against a lawyer, given the duties upon a lawyer to guard confidentiality of instructions and to bring forwardwith courage even unpopular causes.

A lawyer should not be placed in a situation where his or her fear of an adverse order may conflictwith these fundamental duties of his or her calling. [12] This statement of law was quoted with approval by the Manitoba Court of Appeal in Hunter v. Hunter 2000 MBCA 138 atparagraph 6. There the court also approved of MacInnes J.’s reliance in R. v. Smith (1999), 133 Man.R. (2d) 189 (Q.B.) on the House ofLords’ decision in Meyers v. Elman (1940), A.C. 282 (H.L.) at p. 319 (“Meyers”).

There Lord Wright wrote: The underlying principle is that the court has a right and a duty to supervise the conduct of its solicitors, and visit with penalties anyconduct of a solicitor which is of such a nature as to tend to defeat justice in the very cause in which he is engaged professionally. … Thematter complained of need not be criminal. It need not involve peculation or dishonesty.

A mere mistake or error of judgment is notgenerally sufficient, but a gross neglect or inaccuracy in a matter which it is a solicitor’s duty to ascertain with accuracy may suffice. … It is impossible to enumerate the various contingencies which may call into operation the exercise of this jurisdiction. It need not involvepersonal obliquity. The term professional misconduct has often been used to describe the ground on which the court acts.

It wouldperhaps be more accurate to describe it as conduct which involves a failure on the part of a solicitor to fulfill his duty to the court and torealize his duty to aid in promoting in his own sphere the cause of justice. … The jurisdiction is not merely punitive but compensatory.… (Emphasis added) [18] Mr. Gange provided the Court with a copy of Rule 5.1-2 of the Law Society of Manitoba’s Code of Professional Conduct: 5.1 THE LAWYER AS ADVOCATE 5.1-2 When acting as an advocate, a lawyer must not: … (

e) knowingly attempt to deceive a tribunal or influence the course of justice by offering false evidence, misstating facts or law,presenting or relying upon a false or deceptive affidavit, suppressing what ought to be disclosed or otherwise assisting in any fraud, crimeor illegal conduct; … [19] Mr. Gange provided the Court with the two following cases to support the proposition that Ms. Knight should not be made to paycosts personally when Ms. Paul sent a false affidavit to Ms. Knight for consideration: 1. Medpak Ltd. v. Matz et al., 1978 CarswellMan 96 (Medpak); and 2. Yale Shaffer v.

Harley Greenberg and Zane Tessler, 1994 CarswellMan 56 (Yale) [20] The Court considered Medpak, where Hamilton J. set aside a pre-judgment garnishing order that was grounded on a falseaffidavit that did not substantially comply with the Rules. The affidavit had been filed in support of the garnishing order, stating thatthere was an action pending when in fact the statement of claim had not yet been filed. As it was then, Queen’s Bench Rule 526(1)required an affidavit that deposed that an action was pending.

The subject there was whether the garnishing order could stand based uponHamilton J. exercising the Court’s curative jurisdiction to find that the affidavit was in substantial compliance with the Rules. [21] Yale was a decision of Schulman J. involving similar facts to Medpak, where a notice of garnishment was set aside, as it wasobtained based upon a false affidavit. The affidavit of the plaintiff falsely stated that he was owed monies, which were not yet due.

Schulman J. set aside the garnishing order,as the affidavit was false in a “material way” and it also omitted a “material fact”, that it was a condition of the agreement that theplaintiff would not be entitled to enforce the judgment until a fixed date had passed. ANALYSIS [22] Ms. Knight asks the Court to accept that her efforts towards finalizing the final court documents to bring this matter to a close isjustification for the delay in paying the $40,000 owed to Ms. Smith.

[ 23 ] She suggests that this, coupled with the letter from CIBC, was justification for holding back the funds. The letter from CIBC confirmed that the bank had a hold on the $40,000 Mr. Smith secured until such time as “the separation agreement is signed by Ms. Smith and the final order is consented to by counsel”. The letter is dated July 5, 2022 and addressed “To Whom It May Concern”. [ 24 ] This argument asks the Court to ignore the following: 1. Ms. Knight received the $40,000 settlement funds owed to Ms. Smith on July 22, 2022. She chose not to send the funds to Ms. Paul until August 11, 2022.

When she did, she sent the funds to Ms. Paul on trust conditions, which prohibited Ms. Paul from releasing the settlement funds to her client until certain steps were taken to resubmit the consented to Final Order and divorce documents, and confirm that same was done. The first time Ms. Paul received unconditional authorization from Ms. Knight to release the funds to Ms. Smith was on September 1, 2022, where she simply stated in an email to Ms.

Paul: “I am removing the trust conditions imposed by my office to client.” There were no intervening facts between August 11 and September 1 to alter the position taken by Ms. Knight about the trust conditions, other than she says she was exasperated; 2. Also in the background, on July 13, 2022, Ms. Knight sent Ms. Paul the Separation Agreement signed by Mr. Smith, and also a form of Final Order for Ms. Paul to consent to (sign) and return to Ms. Knight; 3. On July 15, 2022, Ms. Paul provided Ms.

Knight with a copy of the signed Separation Agreement, signed Final Order, her client’s affidavit in support of the divorce, form of Divorce Judgment, and the outstanding Interim Orders which she also endorsed; 4. On July 15, 2022, Ms. Paul alerted Ms. Knight that the Separation Agreement required slight changes to address an error and each party would need to initial those changes. The interlineations and initials were completed by both parties on July 19, 2022; 5. On July 18, 2022, Ms. Knight sent an email to Ms.

Paul that reads: Further and in relation to the undertakings and once you have confirmed that it is only my clients initials to interlineations that are required on the agreement I’ll provide correspondence to CIBC and will request payment to be made to my office on behalf of Mr. Smith. I will provide correspondence to CIBC and request payment to be made to my office on behalf of Mr. Smith. I cannot undertake to have Mr. Smith request a payment. Mr. Smith has already attended at his financial institution and made the appropriate arrangements.

Lastly I confirm that once the funds are received in my office I will provide the funds to Levine Tadman Carla Paul Law Corporation. The undertaking that you have included that your office provide confirmation of receipt of same is not appropriate. Your correspondence is asking for my undertakings. I am not waiting for communication from your office. 6. On July 19, 2022, Ms. Knight confirmed with Ms. Paul that all of the above noted final divorce documents were submitted to the Court for filing and to request that the Final Order and divorce be pronounced; [ 25 ] The Court does not accept that Ms.

Knight was justified in sending the funds with trust conditions as she did, nor that there was reasonable cause for the delay or additional expenses incurred to finalize this proceeding. [ 26 ] Ms. Knight is correct that she wrote several times to Ms. Paul about addressing the Court’s Notice of Rejection of the divorce documents. She wrote with fervor and persistence. Sadly, however, the focus of her correspondence only complicated a very simple matter, introducing new issues where none had been raised by Thomson J., and delayed completion of this matter and drove up costs for Ms. Smith.

Each time she wrote to address the proposed solution of Ms. Paul, she added new terms or plans to finalize the divorce. She wrote several times to Ms. Paul and did not answer the issue raised by Ms. Paul relating to the settlement funds held back by Ms. Knight, although a half dozen requests for the funds were sent by Ms. Paul. She had an obligation not to obstruct her client’s attempt to honour the agreement to pay the settlement funds “on or before July 1 st , to the best of his ability.” [ 27 ] Further, Ms. Knight distracted the Court with complaints, claiming a lack of integrity by Ms.

Paul pertaining to the proposed Affidavit of Ms. McLaughlin that was sent to Ms. Knight in an effort to have the Final Order and Divorce Judgment pronounced by Thomson J. [ 28 ] Ms. Paul asked Ms. Knight for the settlement funds on August 2, 3, 4, and 5. Ms. Knight only replied on August 5, 2022 and wrote that she was out of the office and would reply the following week, however, she took the opportunity to ask Ms. Paul for an update on the status of a real estate transaction/disbursal of sale proceeds. [ 29 ] On Monday, August 8, 2022, Ms. Paul asked Ms. Knight again about the status of the settlement funds. Ms.

Knight did not address the funds until August 11, 2022, at which time she sent the $40,000 cheque in trust that Ms. Paul comply with her trust conditions. [ 30 ] Ms. Paul, still unable to finalize the Final Order and divorce following the rejection of the initial documents filed, sought a motion for

summary judgment from Thomson J., but it was denied, as the matter was close to the trial. Ultimately, Ms. Paul was still unable to get the funds without condition until September 1, 2022, when Ms. Knight suddenly removed the trust conditions. [ 31 ] Ms. Smith’s inability to obtain her settlement monies until September is considerably worse in the context that the June 9, 2022 terms of settlement included a term that interim spousal support payable to Ms. Smith was terminated. Ms. Knight’s duty not to stand in the way of Mr.

Smith carrying out his obligations under the settlement is heightened by the support termination. [ 32 ] In the words of Lord Wright, in Meyers v. Elman , (1940), A.C. 282 (H.L.) , the actions of Ms. Knight can be described as a failure to fulfill her duty to the Court and to realize her duty to aid in promoting in her own sphere the cause of justice.

[ 33 ] Ms. Knight’s position is that the Court should consider costs payable by Ms. Paul personally because the Affidavit of Ms. McLaughlin misstated that she consented to the new draft of Final Order. There is no motion for costs pending against Ms. Paul in this proceeding. The Court considered the case law submitted by Mr. Gange and

section 17 of the Manitoba Evidence Act . [ 34 ] Ms. Paul sent Ms. McLaughlin’s affidavit to Ms. Knight on July 27, 2022 with a copy of the Notice of Rejection and correspondence trying to resolve the issues raised by Thomson J. on the Notice of Rejection of the Final Order and Divorce Judgement. The Notice of Rejection had noted that the paragraph in the Affidavit of Petitioner’s Evidence that stated that the Interim Orders attached were consented to by counsel, however, Ms. Paul noted that the orders had only been signed by one lawyer. Ms.

Paul was seeking to repair this very narrow issue with the documents filed. [ 35 ] In an email dated July 27, 2022, Ms. Paul enclosed an updated Final Order, because the version previously consented to did not refer to the Affidavit of Ms. McLaughlin filed to address the deficiency in the previous affidavit. Ms. Paul also inserted the date of the Affidavit of Petitioner’s Evidence, which had been left blank previously. Those changes in the

preamble were noted by Ms. Paul in her email to Ms. Knight and she asked her if she could send these documents to Thomson J. [ 36 ] Rather than signing the Final Order, or seeking a clean copy of the Final Order to sign separate from Ms. McLaughlin’s affidavit, if she required that, or signing the Final Order shortly after July 27, 2022, what unfolded was a series of delays by Ms. Knight which she suggests were her attempts to conclude the Final Order and divorce, seemingly an explanation for withholding the settlement funds. [ 37 ] Rather than signing the Final Order that referred to the new affidavit, Ms.

Knight wrote back to Ms. Paul, on July 30, 2022, “suggesting” that Ms. Paul amend Ms. McLaughlin’s affidavit to add a copy of the parties’ Separation Agreement with the interlineations (not directed to be done by Thomson J.) and then resend it to her again to review before filing with Thomson J. [ 38 ] On August 5, 2022, eight business days later, Ms. Knight wrote to Ms. Paul again, indicating that it was incorrect for Ms. McLaughlin to state in her affidavit, prepared to address the deficiencies that Ms. Knight had consented to the Final Order.

She stated: “Please send the Final Order as revised by your office for my review. In the event that the order revised by your office meets my approval as to form and content I will note my consent.” She had the updated version of the Final Order on July 27, 2022. [ 39 ] On August 8, 2022, Ms. Knight wrote again. She complained that Ms. Paul had emailed her on July 27, 2022 to ask her to review the updated version of a Final Order, which she proposed be sent to Thomson J., together with the proposed affidavit to address the deficiency.

She also restated her view that Thomson J. should receive the Separation Agreement of the parties with interlineations, although she argues that she said in that email “I will not insist on the point”. In this email, she added two new requests/plans that were, she says, to try to finalize the matter:

a) she asked Ms. Paul to amend Ms. McLaughlin’s affidavit to remove a copy of the proposed Final Order; and

b) she advised that she would be updating her own draft of the Final Order after she received the updated affidavit she is seeking from Ms. McLaughlin, rather than using the one prepared by Ms. Paul. [ 40 ] On August 10, 2022, Ms. Knight sent a further email, this time to indicate that she has prepared an affidavit of her paralegal and her own updated version of the Final Order. On August 11, 2022, she provided a copy of those new documents to Ms. Paul. [ 41 ] Ms. Paul, still unable to obtain the funds unconditionally for Ms. Smith, and Ms. Knight not consenting to the documents prepared by Ms. Paul to conclude the matter, brought this matter to Thomson J.’s attention, seeking to

schedule a

summary judgment motion. As the matter was too close to trial, the request was denied. [ 42 ] During this motion, significant time was spent in argument on Ms. Knight’s invitation to the Court (through her counsel) to order costs personally against Ms. Paul because she sent the Affidavit of Ms. McLaughlin to Ms. Knight which attached the Final Order with the added reference to Ms. McLaughlin’s affidavit to the

preamble of the Final Order. Ms. Knight relies upon

section 17 of the Manitoba Evidence Act and the above-noted decisions in Yale and Medpak. [ 43 ] The Manitoba Evidence Act states that any witness who gives evidence, whether by an oath, declaration or by being sworn, is liable for the same penalties for perjury.

Section 17, relating to affirmed statements, should be read in context of finding its place in sections of the Manitoba Evidence Act ( ss. 14 to 18 ) that delineate the manners in which a witness may give evidence (

section 14 , oath on the Bible, “Old or New Testament; allowing for an alternate to an oath, such as use of an Eagle Feather; section 15(2) “ administered in such manner and form, and with such ceremonies, as he declares to be binding”; or section 16(1) “a solemn affirmation or declaration”). [ 44 ] Ms. Paul asked Ms. Knight if she will consent to the Affidavit of Ms. McLaughlin being affirmed for the divorce. It would have been more prudent for Ms. Paul to send Ms. Knight an unsworn Affidavit of Ms. McLaughlin; however, Ms. Paul is not suborn perjury as is being suggested.

The proposed affidavit, to be filed with Thomson J., is a circumstance easily distinguishable from Yale and Medpak , where false affidavits were filed with the Court in support of the garnishing orders at issue. Here, Ms. Knight was privately being asked if she agreed to finalize the matter by having Ms. Paul file the Affidavit of Ms. McLaughlin. In mid-July, Ms. Knight and Ms. Paul already agreed to the forms of Final Order and Divorce Judgment submitted and considered by Thomson J. Ms. Paul was proposing a method to address the Notice of Rejection that was issued after the order was already consented to. Ms.

Paul could have sent the affidavit in unsworn form for consideration by Ms. Knight, to be more prudent in her dealings with Ms. Knight. That said, Ms. Paul did not act without integrity as is suggested. These are very different facts than in Yale and Medpak. [ 45 ] The evidence filed satisfies this Court that Ms. Knight engaged in conduct that had the effect of causing additional expense without cause and wasted costs by undue delay. Costs against Ms. Knight are warranted in the case at bar. [ 46 ] Ms.

Paul argues for an amount exceeding $20,000 on the basis that her fees exceeded that amount, and on the basis of the further accusation by Ms. Knight that Ms. Paul has perjured herself and engaged in conduct contrary to the Code of Professional Conduct.

[ 47 ] Mr. Gange correctly points out that Ms. Paul’s legal fees, from the date when the Final Order was signed by counsel (July 18, 2022), does not amount to $20,000. However, the amount is approximately $18,000, and therefore, Ms. Paul’s request for cost of $20,000 “or more” would amount to costs that exceed solicitor-client costs. [ 48 ] Ms. Paul says her invoices are submitted as only one factor for the Court to consider. They were provided to support her argument that many unnecessary, additional steps were taken following the settlement agreement being reached. [ 49 ] Ms.

Paul asks for costs of “more than $20,000” taking into account the extraordinary amount of work done following receipt by Ms. Knight of the settlement funds, the refusal to release the funds to Ms. Paul without condition, and Ms. Knight’s decision to write to Ms. Paul but continue to refuse to address the issue of the funds owed to Ms. Smith. CONCLUSION [ 50 ] The Court considered Ms. Knight’s actions following the settlement reached, including refusing to send the settlement proceeds, or deal with counsel’s attempt to communicate about same.

The Court considered the extraordinary amount of evidence filed and argument submitted, which focused on Ms. Knight’s emails regarding the Final Order that only served to further delay resolution of this proceeding, the time spent on counterargument, which focused on Ms. Paul providing Ms. McLaughlin’s affidavit to Ms. Knight, and significant work done for this motion. There were two appearances necessary to address voluminous affidavits and the cross-examination transcript filed. In the circumstances, this is an appropriate case for Ms.

Knight to pay costs personally in the amount of $10,000. ________________________ J.