Laduke v Lee, 2023 ABCJ 225

In the Alberta Court of Justice Citation: Laduke v Lee, 2023 ABCJ 225 Date: 20231204 Docket: FF901022768 Registry: Calgary Between: Gerald Patrick Laduke Applicant - and - Janice Lee Respondent Oral Decision of the Honourable Justice D. Mah Introduction [ 1 ] [Orally [1] ] The Applicant Father, Mr. Laduke, has made an application seeking: 1. An order terminating all ongoing spousal support or adult interdependent partner (AIP) payments to the Respondent Mother, Ms. Lee; 2. An order rescinding, suspending, or reducing maintenance arrears; and 3.

Costs. [ 2 ] Although personally served with the Father’s application, the Mother has failed or refused to file any Response in reply, nor has Ms. Lee provided any of the financial information sought by the Father. She did not appear in Court. History of the Proceedings [ 3 ] The origin of Mr. Laduke’s AIP obligations can be traced back to 1984 when the Mother sought support under the Ontario Family Law Reform Act, RSO 1980, c 152. Amazingly, through the efforts of Steven Dare, one of the Court’s clerks, a transcript of the 1984 Ontario proceedings was located.

The transcript sets out the Mother’s testimony wherein she stated that she was in a relationship with the Father from January 1982 until May 1983. The Mother ended the relationship by leaving the Father and returning to Ontario where her parents resided. Prior to the Mother's move, the couple had resided together in Calgary. The couple’s daughter was born in February 1983. [ 4 ] On January 30, 1984, Judge M.D.

Morton of the Provincial Court of Ontario granted the Mother’s aforesaid application and made an Order requiring the Father to pay the Mother $100 per month in child support and a further $100 per month in what was then

known as “Dependent” support (the “Morton Order”). The Order stated that it was “provisional only and has no effect until it is confirmed by the Court in the reciprocating state”. [ 5 ] The matter then found its way to Alberta where Court endorsements show that the Father first appeared in Court on April 5, 1984, pursuant to a Summons.

On that occasion, the matter was adjourned to July 10, 1984, with a notation that the adjournment was due to the Father being “unemployed”. [ 6 ] On July 10, 1984, the Father was again present, but the matter was adjourned a second time to September 25, 1984, ostensibly due to the Father being “on Public Assistance”. [ 7 ] The Father did not attend Court on September 25, 1984, and a Confirming Order was granted by Judge Litsky of the Provincial Court of Alberta, as it was then known (the “Litsky Order”). Notably, the Order stated that it was to commence “on the 1st day of November 1984 and monthly thereafter”.

There was no stipulation setting out when and if the spousal support was to terminate despite the relatively brief period of the Parent’s cohabitation. Facts and Analysis Father’s Argument [ 8 ] In his sworn written materials, the Father claims that he did not receive a copy of the aforesaid Litsky Order. There is no evidence before the Court that Mr. Laduke was ever served with such an Order. He was presumably unaware of its existence until he was first contacted by the Maintenance Enforcement Program (MEP) in May 2001, 17 years after the Litsky Order was granted.

By that time, the Father had already experienced several years of suffering from various physical ailments. Mr. Laduke indicated that as of 1999, he was on social assistance due to his many illnesses and the prohibitive effect they had on his ability to find employment. In 2004, the Father began receiving Assured Income for the Severely Handicapped (AISH) due to his inability to work.

The Father’s ailments included osteoporosis, osteoarthritis, fibromyalgia, irritable bowel syndrome, anemia and most prominently, Ankylosing Spondylosis: a painful inflammatory disease which causes the spinal bones to fuse together. [ 9 ] Unfortunately, Mr. Laduke’s health has not improved. He has spent the last several years battling Multiple Myeloma, a bone marrow cancer, as well as bladder cancer. He is on numerous medications simply to manage his pain.

At the time when the Father swore his Affidavit on May 29, 2023, his sole means of supporting himself were through Canadian Pension Plan (CPP) payments, AISH, and the kindness of friends. He has been advised that his AISH payments will cease this month due to his age of 65 years. [ 10 ] Mr. Laduke currently resides in a studio suite owned by a non-profit charitable entity which assists in the provision of housing for seniors and people with disabilities. He does not purchase many of his prescribed medications due to his inability to afford the same.

Can and should the Court terminate the Father’s current spousal support obligations? [ 11 ] S 77(2) of the Family Law Act , SA 2003, c F-4.5 ( FLA ), permits this Court to make an Order varying, suspending or terminating a support order or any part of that order, prospectively or retroactively. [ 12 ] S 77(5) (

a) states that prior to the court making a variation order, I must be satisfied that there has been a change in the condition, means, needs or other circumstances of either the Applicant Father or the Respondent Mother and that such change has occurred since the making of the Support Order. [ 13 ] LMP v LS, 2011 SCC 64 ( LMP ) addressed the threshold of change which must be met prior to such a variation taking place.

The SCC indicated at para 32 that any such change must: … be a “material” one … that, “if known at the time, would likely have resulted in different terms” … [ 14 ] In ascertaining the materiality of the change, the Court needs to examine the actual circumstances of the parties at the time the Order was granted.

It must also ask whether the material change has some degree of continuity and that it does not merely constitute a temporary set of circumstances [ LMP at paras 34 and 35] . [ 15 ] I am satisfied that there has been a significant change in the condition, means and needs of the Father since 1984 when Judge Morton’s Ontario Order for support was first granted. At the time, Mr. Laduke was a young man whose health permitted him to seek and maintain employment. However, Mr. Laduke has provided evidence, including correspondence from physicians, that he has been very ill since 1999.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the Father’s poor health has continued and, indeed, has notably worsened over time as he is now fighting two different forms of cancer. Mr. Laduke’s reliance on AISH strongly corroborates the long-standing nature of his medical ailments as well as his inability to work as a result. [ 16 ] S 58(

a) of the FLA mandates that in making any AIP support order, the Court shall consider the conditions, means, needs and other circumstances of each AIP. Respectfully and simply put, Mr. Laduke has struggled and continues to struggle in supporting himself. His sworn written materials aptly demonstrate that he has difficulty affording proper accommodations, medication and at times, food.

He depends entirely on the generosity of friends in order to have access to a cell phone and computer, items which most people find absolutely necessary in today’s technologically reliant world. [ 17 ] Having found a material change in Mr. Laduke’s circumstances and after consideration of the factors which need to be examined in the making of any AIP support order, I find that the Father’s AIP support obligations to the Mother, Ms. Lee, should be

immediately terminated. Can the Court retroactively vary or terminate the Father’s spousal supportobligations? [18] I must still, however, address my mind as to whether the Court can retroactively vary or terminate those same spousal supportobligations. [19] I find that the Court can retroactively vary or term the Father’s spousal support obligations for three reasons. 1. As indicated previously, s 77 of the FLA gives this Court the authority to, inter alia, vary or terminate a support order retroactivelyupon finding that there has been a change in the condition, means or other circumstances of the Father.

I have already found that such achange has occurred. 2. I find that at the time the Litsky Order was granted, the Court contemplated a review of the Father’s support obligations takingplace. [20] In Bonaparte v Wolfe-Tellstone, 2019 ABPC 80 (Bonaparte), my brother, LaGrandeur, J. dealt with an analogous type ofsituation as the case at bar. In Bonaparte, it was determined that the payor-Father had not been properly served with notice as to whenthe matter of support was being heard by the Court.

In the end, a Final Order of child support was granted in the Father’s absence.Nevertheless, the Father was found to have been provided with some information that the payee-Mother was seeking support from himas the MEP had contacted him prior to the application date and due to his receipt of Mother’s claim, albeit without the information as towhen the matter was scheduled to be heard. Inexplicably, the Father took no steps to look further into the matter until over a year later atwhich time he asked the Court to terminate the support and to vacate any arrears which had occurred.

The Father stated that he did notrealize that any orders had been made against him. [21] LaGrandeur, J. found that notwithstanding the Court’s ‘Final’ Order of support, it was clear that the Court had intended to usethe Order as a mechanism in order to get the Father to Court and to obtain financial information from him. I find that Judges Morton andLitsky had a similar intention.

It is telling that Judge Morton granted his Order conditional upon the same being confirmed by theAlberta Courts and that Judge Litsky’s Confirming Order recognized that: … the Respondent [Father] was summonsed to appear in this Court to show cause why the said Provisional Order should not beconfirmed ... [emphasis added] [22] In approaching the matter before him, LaGrandeur, J. stated: [61] In my view, the Court’s purpose, given its absolute lack of any financial information at the time the order was made, was toachieve a review of the Order if proper evidence was presented.

The Court itself contemplates reconsideration of support upon thatevidence being provided.

Accordingly, no “change of circumstances” would be required in this case in any event: (see Schmidt v Schmidt (1999), 1999 BCCA 701 , 1 RFL (5th) 197 (BCCA); Bergeron v Bergeron (1999), (ON SC), 2 RFL (5th) 57 (Ont Sup Ct J)). [62] Clearly, there was a genuine and material uncertainty at the time of the original Order as to the Respondent’s finances at thattime, and in the immediate future thereafter, and as such, a review was contemplated by the Court and allows variation without change incircumstances, (see Leskun v Leskun, 2006 SCC 25). [23] I am persuaded that this is a proper approach to use in the very unique set of circumstances facing me in the case at bar. 3.

With the greatest of respect to Judges Morton and Litsky, I further find that an inadvertent omission occurred in their originalOrders. In Hart v Ensign, 1998 ABCA 13 , reference was made to Paper Machinery Ltd v JO Ross Engineering Corp (SCC), [1934] SCR 186, wherein it was stated: [Page 188] … that there is no power to amend a judgment which has been drawn up and entered, except in two cases:

(1) Where therehas been a slip in drawing it up, or

(2) Where there has been error in expressing the manifest intention of the court...” [24] To be clear, this is not an instance where a clerical error has occurred, nor is the Litsky Order alleged to be an inaccuratereflection of what the learned Judge said.

Rather, I find this to be an instance where the Order does not accurately set out the intention ofthe Court. [25] In the case at bar, the parties resided together for a period of 17 months which would qualify their time together as a short-term relationship. (See instances wherein the Court found similar lengths of relationship to be short term: • SCJ v TSS, 2006 ABQB 777: an on-off relationship of five to six years; • Stevenson v Winkler, 2011 ABQB 693: a common-law relationship of four years; and • Witt v Johnson, 2022 ABQB 105: a relationship of five months.) [26] The brief nature of the parties’ relationship was known to Judge Morton at the time he granted the original Order, but theOrder failed to address the length of time for which Mr.

Laduke was to pay spousal support. I can find no Canadian jurisprudence whichsuggests that a former adult interdependent partner of a short-term relationship should be responsible for financial support to the other onan indefinite basis, whether the need for such support was compensatory or non-compensatory.

[27] In making my comments, I am mindful that significant jurisprudence on the issue of spousal support has been developed sincethe Morton and Litsky Orders. Nevertheless, I find that an omission has been made in the Litsky Order and that the proper intent of theCourt was to set a time period for Mr. Laduke’s spousal support obligations notwithstanding that a review was also contemplated. [28] In making this finding, I am well aware that it would be improper for me to set aside or change a final judgment.

I am alsowell aware that the Alberta Court of Justice does not have any inherent jurisdiction and that we derive our powers from statute only. Tobe clear, I am operating from the presumption that learned Judges Morton and Litsky found a basis for the spousal support award madeagainst Mr. Laduke, however, when one considers both the statutory and case law which exists, the Court could not have intended Mr.Laduke’s obligation to Ms.

Lee to continue on an indefinite basis. [29] R 9.12 of the Alberta Rules of Court (Rules) allows the Court to correct a mistake or error in a judgment or order arising froman accident, slip or omission. I am permitted, through s 8 of the Provincial Court Act, to apply or modify as needed the said Rules if Ifind it expeditious or cost effective to do so. In this case, I find that it would be expeditious and as such, r 9.12 shall be implemented.

Should the Court vary or terminate the Father’s AIP support obligations? [30] As articulated by the Court earlier, there are three different mechanisms by which the Court can vary the Father’s AIP supportobligations. Each of these mechanisms stand on their own merit, however, there is also some overlap in the Court’s considerations. [31] First, while s 77 of the FLA allows me to retroactively vary or terminate an Order, a material change in circumstances is notsufficient on its own to grant an application to vary. The Court must also consider whether a change is warranted.

In Klein v Wolbeck,2016 ABQB 28 (Klein), Renke, J. provides an overview of the analysis which should be used when determining whether a spousalsupport order should be varied. It stands to reason that J. Renke’s rationale also applies to applications involving a termination of one’sspousal support obligations.

As a termination, by definition, is a variation. [32] Klein stated that the Court must: [63] ... consider the same factors, pursue the same objectives, and use the same method to determine support with respect to anapplication to vary a support order as it does with respect to an application for a support order. [33] The Court’s first consideration should be entitlement as set out in s 56 of the FLA: 56 Subject to this Division, every spouse or adult interdependent partner has an obligation to provide support for the other spouse oradult interdependent partner. ... [34] S 58 of the Act sets out the factors which are to be considered in the making of any support order: 58 In making a spousal or adult interdependent partner support order, the court shall consider (

a) the conditions, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse or adult interdependent partner, including (

i) the length of time the spouses or adult interdependent partners lived together ... [35] It is important to note that the FLA does not impose on the payor-spouse, an obligation in perpetuity. Rather, it qualifies thesame by setting out the objectives of spousal support in s 60: 60 A spousal or adult interdependent partner support order should (

a) recognize any economic advantages and disadvantages to the spouses or adult interdependent partners arising from therelationship or its breakdown, (

b) apportion between the spouses or adult interdependent partners any financial consequences arising from the care of any child ofthe relationship over and above the obligation apportioned between the spouses or adult interdependent partners pursuant to a childsupport order or a child support agreement, (

c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses or adult interdependent partners arising from the breakdown of the relationship,and (

d) insofar as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse or adult interdependent partner within a reasonableperiod of time. ... [36] The seminal spousal support case of Bracklow v Bracklow, (SCC), [1999] 1 SCR 420 (Bracklow),articulated the three bases for conceptualizing entitlement to spousal support: contractual, compensatory, and non-compensatory. In thecase at bar, I have limited information about the parties. There is, however, enough evidence for me to conclude that there was nocontractual entitlement between the parties.

One then examines whether the basis for the original support order was compensatory ornon-compensatory in nature. [37] In discussing compensatory claims, Moge v Moge, (SCC), [1992] 3 SCR 813 recognized that economic

advantages and disadvantages can arise from one’s common-law relationship or marriage, as well as from the dissolution of the same. In order to determine whether such an advantage or disadvantage exists, the Court should examine the roles played by each of the parties during the course of the relationship. Put another way, the Court must ask whether or not a spouse suffered financial disadvantages while the other gained economic benefits during the course of the relationship.

Common markers include the payee being at home with the children (including during the post-separation period) or instances where one party facilitated the other’s education and training. [ 38 ] Bracklow focussed primarily on non-compensatory claims. These claims examine the ability of a former spouse or AIP to meet his or her basic needs post-separation. Common factors which are examined include the length of the parties’ relationship; whether there has been a decrease in one’s standard of living since the separation, as well as any economic hardship experienced post break-up.

At para 40, the case also: ... invite[s] an inquiry that goes beyond compensation to the actual situation of the parties at the time of the application … [ 39 ] As the Respondent Mother, Ms. Lee has not provided any information to the Court about her current state of affairs or what hardships, if any, she endured post-separation, I cannot conclude that her claim for AIP support was based on non-compensatory grounds. [ 40 ] I am, therefore, left with question of whether her spousal support was grounded on a compensatory basis. It is clear to me that by virtue of Ms.

Lee’s relocation to Ontario with the child of the relationship that she was responsible for the day-to-day care of that child. It is also clear, based on the Father’s own sworn materials, that this responsibility continued until such time as the child became an adult. Accordingly, it appears that Ms. Lee’s AIP support was based on a compensatory need. [ 41 ] Given that the child reached the age of majority in February 2001, I find that any compensatory need of Ms. Lee ended at that time. To put the same in perspective, the child is now over 40 years old.

As such, any disadvantage arising from the care of the child surely would have ended years ago, especially when one considers the brief period of time in which the parties resided together, as well as the onus on Ms. Lee to be economically self-sufficient within a reasonable period of time. [ 42 ] Second, despite the length of time that it has taken the Father to seek a review of the Litsky Order, he has now done so which, in turn, allows the Court to engage in the review which was originally contemplated by Judges Morton and Litsky.

The Father’s delay in acting may be explained, in part, by his assertion that he was unaware that a Court Order had been granted. This lack of awareness may be attributable to his experience in Court when the latter declined to do anything due to the Father’s unemployment at the time, as reflected in the endorsements. Regardless, while Mr.

Laduke’s laches could affect the timing of how far back one goes in determining when his spousal support obligations should be varied or terminated, it does not have a bearing on the Court’s right to review the support which had been previously ordered. [ 43 ] Third, now that Mr. Laduke has brought his file to the Court’s attention, I am in a position where I can address the inadvertent omission made by Judges Morton and Litsky in failing to address the length of the Father’s AIP obligations.

From what point in time can the Father’s spousal support obligations be terminated? [ 44 ] In Arnault v Arnault , 2022 ABQB 176 , Lee J. discussed the similarities and differences in the reasoning which is applied by the Court when dealing with child support versus spousal support.

The case dealt specifically with retroactive variation of spousal support arrears and cited Kerr v Baranow, 2011 SCC 10 ( Kerr ) wherein the Court stated: [207] While D.B.S . was concerned with child as opposed to spousal support, I agree with the Court of Appeal that similar considerations to those set out in the context of child support are also relevant to deciding the suitability of a “retroactive” award of spousal support.

Specifically, these factors are the needs of the recipient, the conduct of the payor, the reason for the delay in seeking support and any hardship the retroactive award may occasion on the payor spouse. However, in spousal support cases, these factors must be considered and weighed in light of the different legal principles and objectives that underpin spousal as compared with child support.

I will mention some of those differences briefly, although certainly not exhaustively. [ 45 ] DBS v SRG , 2006 SCC 37 ( DBS ) was a seminal case wherein the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) indicated that, generally, retroactive child support should not be ordered for any time period which precedes the date of effective notice by three years or more. In Mr.

Laduke’s case, he is seeking a variation or termination of his spousal support from the earliest date possible, which, arguably, could involve a consideration of variance in excess of the three-year period cited in DBS . [ 46 ] More recently, the SCC has clarified the Court’s reasoning in DBS , through Colucci v Colucci, 2021 SCC 24 ( Colucci ): [114] It is also helpful to summarize the principles which now apply to cases in which the recipient applies under s. 17 to retroactively increase child support:

a) The recipient must meet the threshold of establishing a past material change in circumstances. While the onus is on the recipient to show a material increase in income, any failure by the payor to disclose relevant financial information allows the court to impute income, strike pleadings, draw adverse inferences, and award costs. There is no need for the recipient to make multiple court applications for disclosure before a court has these powers.

b) Once a material change in circumstances is established, a presumption arises in favour of retroactively increasing child support to the date the recipient gave the payor effective notice of the request for an increase, up to three years before formal notice of the application to vary. In the increase context, because of informational asymmetry, effective notice requires only that the recipient broached the subject of an increase with the payor.

c) Where no effective notice is given by the recipient parent, child support should generally be increased back to the date of formal notice.

d) The court retains discretion to depart from the presumptive date of retroactivity where the result would otherwise be unfair. The D.B.S. factors continue to guide this exercise of discretion, as described in Michel . If the payor has failed to disclose a material increase in income, that failure qualifies as blameworthy conduct and the date of retroactivity will generally be the date of the increase in income.

e) Once the court has determined that support should be retroactively increased to a particular date, the increase must be quantified. The proper amount of support for each year since the date of retroactivity must be calculated in accordance with the Guidelines . [emphasis added] [ 47 ] While Colucci addressed retroactive increases in child support, the Court acknowledged that the presumption could apply to retroactive decreases as well.

Specifically: [96] The court retains discretion to depart from the presumptive date of retroactivity where the result would otherwise be unfair in the circumstances of a particular case. In this section, I explore how the D.B.S. factors — adapted to suit the retroactive decrease context — help the court reach a fair balancing of the three interests at play, namely the child’s interest in a fair standard of support, the payor’s interest in flexibility, and the interest of the child and recipient in certainty.

There is no fixed formula; none of the factors is determinative and they must be viewed holistically ( D.B.S. , at para. 99 ) [emphasis added]. [ 48 ] In the case at bar, I find it important to acknowledge that while considerations made by the Court in dealing with spousal support applications bear some similarity to considerations in child support cases, there is a difference between the two. Cromwell, J recognized this difference in Kerr , wherein he commented at para 208 that: Spousal support has a different legal foundation than child support.

A parent-child relationship is a fiduciary relationship of presumed dependency and the obligation of both Parents to support the child arises at birth … [whereas] there is no presumption that one is entitled to spousal support. [ 49 ] While child support is wholly dependent on the Payor’s income, spousal support requires a balance of means and needs. [ 50 ] And as pointed out by McLachlin, in Bracklow (para 32 ): 32 ... Parliament and the legislatures have ...[required] courts to consider not only compensatory factors, but the “needs” and “means” of the parties.

It is not a question of either one model or the other. It is rather a matter of applying the relevant factors and striking the balance that best achieves justice in the particular case before the court. [ 51 ] While the Court in Colucci speaks of the presumptive date to be applied in cases where retroactive support is being considered, it also encourages the Court to take a fulsome view of the situation. More importantly, it gives the Court discretion to deviate from the said presumptive date in instances where the resulting Order would otherwise be unfair.

In examining the means and needs of the parties, I have no info about Ms. Lee’s situation, but Mr. Laduke has provided unrefuted evidence of his past state of affairs as well as his current circumstances. [ 52 ] In his Affidavit, Mr.

Laduke reviewed his historical income “to the best of my memory” as follows: a. 1980 – 1985 – The Bay – Delivery driver - $18,000 – $20,000 per year; b. 1985 – 1987 – Unemployment / disability – Fridge fell on top of Gerry while delivering - $6,000 per year; c. 1987 – 1990 – Enerflex Ltd – shipping and receiving - $20,000 per year; d. 1990 – 1992 – unable to work for health reasons – unemployment - $7,000 per year; e. 1992 – 1999 – Bar Manager – New Castle Hotel, Drumheller - $18,000 per year; f. 1999 – 2004 – Social Assistance - $7,000 per year; and g. 2004 to present – unable to work – AISH – between $18,000 – $20,000. [ 53 ] His situation is, with the greatest of respect, dire.

He cannot afford many necessities, including some of his medications; he is entirely reliant on government assistance and the kindness of his friends; and he lives in humble surroundings – made possible through a charitable non-profit association. [ 54 ] There exists an argument that the Father should have known that there was likely a support order which he had to satisfy. After all, Mr. Laduke was well aware that he had a child with Ms. Lee and should have been cognizant that he owed a financial duty to this child.

Further, records show that the Father attended court on two occasions in 1984, and by his own admission, MEP contacted him back in 2001. He could have taken steps to vary or terminate his support order earlier and I acknowledge the same. I do not know why the Father failed to do so; however, it does not affect my findings. As set out by Macklin, J in Thomas v Thomas , 2014 ABQB 481 (at para 56 ). [56] ...

The courts have emphasized, in particular, that fault plays no role in the adjudication of applications for retroactive reduction of support, and therefore there is no need to examine the reasons for the payor's failure to seek a timely variation order. [ 55 ] When one examines Mr. Laduke’s overall situation, I find that it would be patently unfair to burden him with a lifetime of AIP support obligations for a brief relationship which ended nearly four decades ago. This lack of fairness is exacerbated even further by Mr. Laduke’s ill health and modest means.

[ 56 ] Legally, Mr. Laduke owed a fiduciary duty to his daughter to support her until she was no longer a child. She turned 18 in February 2001. I find that any compensatory obligation owed to the Mother ended upon the child legally becoming an adult. I further find that the Father’s circumstances had materially changed by that date as he was already on social assistance and could not work. Finally, I take this opportunity to correct the omission of Judges Morton and Litsky and add as a term to the latter’s Order that: The dependent support shall end February 3, 2001.

Calculations [ 57 ] I note that the Father has provided documentation from MEP which shows a “charge activity” from the period between May 2, 2001 and April 27, 2023 wherein the Father owes the Mother $63,100. I take this amount to be the monetary total of both his child support and AIP support since the granting of the Litsky Order. In representations made to the Court by Mr. Laduke’s lawyer, I am told that her client has attempted to obtain more clarity about the manner in which the charge activity was calculated from MEP.

Not surprisingly, MEP has indicated that the age of this file precludes it from providing accurate historical information about the calculations which were made preceding the 2001 date set out in the Statement of Account. [ 58 ] A rudimentary calculation of the Father’s child support responsibilities under the Litsky Order show that Mr. Laduke’s financial obligations to his daughter, calculated from the date of the parties’ separation (in May 1983) until her 18th birthday, would total $20,100. As the Father was also ordered to pay dependent support to Ms.

Lee at the same rate of $100 per month, it would stand to reason that he would owe the Mother the same amount. The total of his child and AIP support would therefore be $40,200. [ 59 ] MEP calculations (as of the end of April 2023) have exceeded that amount by $23,000. With the transpiring of two more months, MEP presumably would now show a total amount owing of $23,200. Thus, I find that the Father has overpaid his support obligations by $23,200. Any closing enforceable balance should be amended to $0.

I also find that the monetary difference between $23,200 and MEP’s owed amount to be a spousal support overpayment owed by the Mother to the Father and respectfully seek their assistance in enforcing this amount, failing which Mr. Laduke and his counsel have the option of registering this judgment at the Court of King’s Bench and attempting enforcement in that manner. Delivered Orally on the 5 th day of July 2023. Dated at the City of Calgary, Alberta this 4 th day of December 2023. Appearances: V. Juvinao for the Applicant Self-Represented Respondent D. Mah A Justice of the Alberta Court of Justice