J.A. Applicant v. J.H., F.H. Respondents Library Heading Judge: The Honourable Justice Samuel Moreau, 2023 NSSC 243

Supreme Court of Nova Scotia (FAMILY DIVISION) Citation: J. A. v. J.H., F. H. , 2023 NSSC 243 Date: 20230727 Docket: FLBMCA-053306 Registry: Halifax Between: J.A. Applicant v. J.H., F.H. Respondents Library Heading Judge: The Honourable Justice Samuel Moreau Heard: January 30 and 31, 2023 in Halifax, Nova Scotia Written Decision: July 27, 2023 Subject: Unjust Enrichment, child support, special or extraordinary expenses, spousal support.

Summary: Application involving claims for property division under the common law principle of unjust enrichment; child support in the guideline amount; special or extraordinary expenses (university fees); and spousal support. Issues: Division of Assets (unjust enrichment) Child support Special or Extraordinary expenses (university fees) Spousal Support Result: Finding of Unjust Enrichment and the appropriate remedy. Child support ordered in the guideline amount. The Court declined to order special or extraordinary expenses. Spousal support ordered (both a lumpsum amount and ongoing payments).

THIS INFORMATION SHEET DOES NOT FORM PART OF THE COURT'S DECISION. QUOTES MUST BE FROM THE DECISION, NOT THIS LIBRARY SHEET. SUPREME COURT OF Nova Scotia FAMILY DIVISION Citation: J. A. v. J.H., F. H. , 2023 NSSC 243 Date: 20230727 Docket: FLBMCA-053306 Registry: Halifax Between: J.A. Applicant

v. J.H., F.H.

Respondents Judge: The Honourable Justice Samuel Moreau Heard: January 30 and 31, 2023, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Released to the parties: July 27, 2023 Counsel: William Leahey for the Applicant James Violande for the Respondents By the Court: Introduction [ 1 ] This application involves claims for a property division based on the common law principle of unjust enrichment, and for child and spousal support under the Parenting and Support Act , R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 160 . [ 2 ] While this is not an application under the Matrimonial Property Act , R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 275 , it is helpful to approach the claims in the same way that they would be approached under that Act : resolving the property division before spousal support because the allocation of property and debts may have consequences for each party’s need and ability to pay.

After I have resolved the unjust enrichment claim, I will address child support and then spousal support, as required by subsection 3A(1) of the Parenting and Support Act . [ 3 ] The Applicant, J.A. and Respondent, J.H. are the parents of two dependent children; N. born in 2000 and C. born in 2001. [ 4 ] F.H. is the mother of J.H. F.H. was added as a respondent in this matter as she and her son, J.H. hold title in joint tenancy to one of the disputed items; a parcel of real property containing two dwellings. Throughout the remainder of this decision, any reference made to the “parties”, means J.A. and J.H.

Any reference to the “Respondent” means J.H. [ 5 ] The trial was held on January 30 and 31 st , 2023. J.A., J.H. and F.H. were all cross-examined by opposing Counsel. Issues [ 6 ] I have been asked to resolve the following issues: 1. Division of assets (the Applicant advances a claim under the common law principle of Unjust Enrichment); 2. Child support; 3. Special or Extraordinary Expenses (in relation to C.’s university costs); and 4. Spousal support. Division of Assets – Unjust Enrichment [ 7 ] The Applicant advances a claim of unjust enrichment against the Respondent and his mother, F.H.

The Applicant’s claim involves the following assets: - The real property located at 139 Marriott’s Cove Road, Chester, Lunenburg County, Nova Scotia; - The Respondent’s employee pension; - The investment portfolio (BMO Nesbitt Burns); and - The remainder of the assets, including, the cabin cruiser boat, 2008 Honda vehicle, Arctic Cat all terrain vehicle, tools, household appliances and furniture.

The parties agree that these items shall be valued in total at $14,000.00. [ 8 ] The Applicant must prove on a balance of probabilities that the Respondent and F.H. were enriched by her efforts or actions; that she was deprived as a result of the efforts or actions that enriched the Respondent and F.H.; and there is no juristic reason for the Respondent and F.H.’s enrichment and her deprivation. The lack of juristic reason means the enrichment is unjust. Historical Information

[ 9 ] The parties began dating in 1994. The Applicant was 16 and the Respondent 26. They began to cohabit in September, 1996, just after the Applicant graduated from high school. The Applicant attended Mount St. Vincent University with the goal of obtaining a degree in children’s studies. The Respondent attended St. Mary’s University. He finished his business degree in the spring of 1998. [ 10 ] The Applicant completed 1.5 years of her program at Mount St. Vincent. The parties offer differing reasons as to why the Applicant abandoned her studies.

The Applicant says it was a mutual decision so that they could focus on starting a family. The Respondent says the Applicant did not like her field of study, did not feel she would make much money in that field and could not afford the university fees due to an inability to secure funding. [ 11 ] During this period of cohabitation they shared the rental costs of an apartment in the Halifax Regional Municipality (H.R.M.). In 1998 the Applicant began working at a Walmart store as a clerk.

Shortly before N.’s birth in 2000, she took six months off for maternity leave and returned to work at Walmart until approximately two months prior to C.’s birth. [ 12 ] The Respondent and F.H. are joint owners of the residential property located at 139 Marriott’s Cove Road, Chester. F.H. added the Respondent onto the property deed in 1998. [ 13 ] As noted the property at 139 Marriott’s Cove Road contains two dwellings. From 1986 to 2004, F.H. resided in the “cottage”.

The Respondent says that during weekends and the summer months of 1996, 1997 and 1998, he built a two storey garage eventually converting the top floor of the garage into a living area (“the apartment”) which would serve as the parties’ home until 2004. [ 14 ] The parties disagree as to when they began living in the apartment (The Applicant – 1999, The Respondent – 1998).

They also conflict as to the Applicant’s contributions to the construction and ongoing renovations after moving in. [ 15 ] The Applicant describes her contributions to the construction efforts as including trips to building stores to pick up construction materials, unloading of materials and assisting while boards and gyprock were cut and nailed. She says she performed “other general labour”. The Respondent says the Applicant “helped” him complete the work.

During his cross examination he minimized the Applicant’s contributions towards the construction/renovation of the apartment and later the cottage. [ 16 ] In 2004 the Respondent decided to switch residences with F.H. The Applicant, the children and the Respondent moved into the cottage and F.H, into the apartment. The Applicant describes the cottage as being “dilapidated”. She did not wish to move given the work completed on the apartment but complied with the Respondent’s decision. [ 17 ] The parties then began what would be another construction/renovation project.

The Applicant’s Affidavit evidence details the extensive refurbishment. Essentially the cottage was rebuilt including the installation of a new heating system. The Applicant says she “put in literally hundreds of hours of labour, picking up and delivering building supplies, helping to install gyproc, nailing, taping and painting”. The Applicant maintains she was also the children’s primary care provider during the tenure of both construction/renovation projects and in addition looked after two other children (of similar age to N. and C.) from the area until 2006.

She was also responsible for the upkeep of the home including cooking meals. [ 18 ] Moreover the Applicant says throughout the relationship she shoveled snow (including for F.H.), assisted in winterizing the cabin cruiser each year and performed other outdoor tasks around the property as required. [ 19 ] In 2007 the Applicant completed a Veterinary Assistant’s course at the Maritime Business College. Subsequently she began working as a Veterinary Assistant. [ 20 ] The parties separated in April, 2007 and reconciled in April, 2008.

During this first separation the Applicant and the children moved to another residence. The Applicant maintains that the first separation was as a result of the Respondent’s addiction to alcohol and cannabis. The Respondent counters that the Applicant left as she became romantically involved with another person. As per the Family Court Order issued February 14, 2008, the Respondent provided the Applicant with a lumpsum spousal support award in the amount of $13,000.00. The Applicant says that upon reconciling in 2008, most of that money went back into general household spending.

The Respondent disagrees and says the Applicant used the funds for her personal interests. [ 21 ] The Applicant adds that any monies she earned during the relationship were used for family purposes; the purchasing of food, necessary household items and the children’s needs. She maintains that throughout the relationship, the Respondent was the dominant partner. He was the main financial provider and controlled the family’s finances. The Applicant’s name was never on any documents related to their home, including bills.

She says earlier in the relationship, the Respondent floated the idea of executing a prenuptial agreement, however same never materialized. The Respondent disputes the Applicant’s claim that her earnings were used for household purposes and the children’s needs. [ 22 ] The Respondent insists that subsequent to their reconciliation in 2008 he was substantially involved in the lives of the children. [ 23 ] Since the parties separation in December, 2020, the Respondent and N. have continued to reside at 139 Marriott’s Cove Road.

The Applicant shares an apartment with C. in the H.R.M.. [ 24 ] During the Court appearances prior to the trial, the Respondent maintained the position that he and F.H. were not enriched by the efforts of the Applicant and she was not entitled to a share of the assets. During cross examination he maintained his position regarding the unjust enrichment claim but also testified that the Applicant “is probably entitled to a little bit of the net equity” in relation to 139 Marriott’s Cove Road. F.H. took an entrenched stance with respect to the real property.

She was adamant the property belongs to her (F.H.) and J.H.’s name was added to the deed for the purpose of securing financing. F.H. was resolute in her belief that the Applicant is not entitled to any compensation and asserts it was the Applicant who was enriched; by F.H. caring for the children and the Applicant having the opportunity to return to school to obtain her designation as a Veterinary Assistant. Has the Respondent and F.H. been enriched? Has the Applicant been deprived?

[25] I find the Respondent and F.H., were enriched by the Applicant’s efforts and actions. In addition to her assistance on theconstruction/renovation projects, the Applicant cared for the children and looked after the household. I accept F.H. provided somechildcare, however I find that the Respondent would not have been able to complete both projects without the Applicant’s work withinthe home, both in relation to the children and the dwellings. Upon moving into the apartment in 2004, F.H. had the benefit of enjoying arenovated living space.

The Respondent and F.H. were enriched by the Applicant’s unpaid labour. [26] Based on the sum of the evidence I conclude the Applicant’s decision to leave her studies at Mount Saint Vincent was mademutually between her and the Respondent. She did not attain any post secondary certification(

s) until 2007. During the relationship theRespondent upgraded his employment credentials, obtaining his Certified Management Accountant designation in 2012. Throughout therelationship he was/has been able to accumulate retirement savings by way of his employment pension. Despite the Applicant havingobtained her Veterinary Assistant’s certificate in 2007, her annual income was considerably lower than the Respondent’s and she wasnot able to accumulate retirement savings. [27] Post separation, the Respondent retained the vast majority of the assets. The Applicant had only a kayak and the 2020 HyundaiElantra vehicle.

At the conclusion of the trial, Counsel informed that the parties agree to returning/selling the Elantra. The Respondentwill take possession of the vehicle and make the necessary arrangements. [28] At this stage of the analysis, the jurisprudence directs I take a straightforward economic approach. Moore v. Sweet, 2018 SCC52, MacPherson v. Williams, supra. Currently the Respondent and F.H. possess the real property. Also, the Respondent has the entiretyof his employment pension, the assets valued at $14,000.00 and the Investment portfolio. I find the Applicant has been deprived.

Is there a juristic reason for the inequity? [29] Next, I am to determine whether a juristic reason exists for the Respondent and F.H.’s enrichment and the Applicant’sdeprivation. [30] At paragraphs 34 and 35 of MacPherson v. Williams, supra, Justice Jollimore writes: [34] There are two stages in considering whether there is a juristic reason to deny recovery. The first stage is determining whetherthere is an established category that provides a reason for the deprivation and enrichment.

Established categories include contract,disposition of law, donative intent, and obligations found in the common law, equity or statute. Ms. MacPherson has the burden ofproving there is no established category that provides a reason to deny her recovery. If she shows the established categories do notapply, a prima facie case under this stage is made out: Garland v. Consumers’ Gas Co., 2004 SCC 25at paragraph 44. [35] The second stage is determining whether there is a reason - beyond the established categories - to deny recovery. At this stage,Mr.

Williams may rebut the prima facie case by proving there is some other reason to deny recovery. Mr. Williams has the burden ofshowing why he should retain the enrichment: Garland v. Consumers’ Gas Co., 2004 SCC 25at paragraph 45. [31] I am satisfied the evidence discloses no juristic reason for the Respondent and F.H.’s enrichment and the Applicant’sdeprivation. There is no juristic reason for the Respondent and F.H. to retain the assets by gift, contract or disposition of law. Kerr v.Baranow, 2011 SCC 10.

Finding of unjust enrichment [32] I find the Respondent and F.H. have been unjustly enriched: assets were acquired through the parties’ joint efforts and theywere not equitably shared at the end of the relationship. The Respondent continues to retain the real estate, pension, investment portfolioand miscellaneous assets. Remedy [33] Because I have made the finding of unjust enrichment, I must now determine what remedy is appropriate for the Applicant. [34] At paragraph 46 of Kerr v.

Baranow, supra, Justice Cromwell states: [46] Remedies for unjust enrichment are restitutionary in nature; that is, the object of the remedy is to require thedefendant to repay or reverse the unjustified enrichment. A successful claim for unjust enrichment may attract either a “personalrestitutionary award” or a “restitutionary proprietary award”. In other words, the plaintiff may be entitled to a monetary or a proprietaryremedy (Lac Minerals Ltd. v.

International Corona Resources Ltd., (SCC), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574, at p. 669, per La ForestJ.). [35] At paragraph 85 he further states: [85] I conclude, therefore, that the common law of unjust enrichment should recognize and respond to the reality thatthere are unmarried domestic arrangements that are partnerships; the remedy in such cases should address the disproportionate retentionof assets acquired through joint efforts with another person. This sort of sharing, of course, should not be presumed, nor will it bepresumed that wealth acquired by mutual effort will be shared equally.

Cohabitation does not, in itself, under the common law of unjustenrichment, entitle one party to a share of the other’s property or any other relief. However, where wealth is accumulated as a result ofjoint effort, as evidenced by the nature of the parties’ relationship and their dealings with each other, the law of unjust enrichment shouldreflect that reality. [36] The Applicant maintains that the parties were engaged in a joint family venture throughout their relationship. She seeks aremedy reflective of her contributions to the joint family venture. [37] The Applicant seeks the following:

- A monetary award which represents at least one third of the present equity in the 139 Marriott’s Cove Road property, after accounting for real estate commission and legal fees; - Division of the Respondent’s employee pension based on its value as of December 31 st , 2020; - One half of $14,000.00 (which represents the combined value of the remaining assets); and - One half of the value of the investment portfolio managed by BMO Nesbitt Burns. [38] The Respondent disputes that the parties engaged in a joint family venture.

By way of his viva voce evidence and further expressed by Counsel during closing summations, the Respondent conceded that the Applicant did contribute to the construction/renovation projects and as indicated by Counsel is entitled “at best” to a monetary award in the range of $15,000.00 to $20,000.00. [39] Justice Cromwell was clear that there is no presumption of a joint family venture: its existence must be well grounded in the evidence, with an emphasis on “how the parties actually lived their lives”, not on how they describe it after the fact or my view of how they ought to have lived their lives: Kerr v.

Baranow , supra. Justice Cromwell offered headings as a useful way to approach a global analysis of the evidence, and examples of relevant factors that may be taken into account in deciding whether there was a joint family venture, cautioning that these headings are not a checklist. [40] To properly determine the appropriate remedy attributable to the Applicant, I shall now decide on whether the parties engaged in a joint family venture by examining the four factors considered in a joint family venture analysis.

Mutual Effort [41] The Respondent acknowledges the parties were in a long term relationship during which they raised N. and C. and completed the stated construction/renovation projects. He argues but for those exceptions the parties did not work together to contribute to a common family venture. [42] I am satisfied the evidence confirms the mutual effort engaged in by the parties was for a common goal, that being the benefit of the family unit.

In addition to their decision to have and raise children, the evidence corroborates the pooling of efforts and resources for the benefit of the family and their joint endeavors and achievements with respect to the construction/renovation projects. The length of the relationship is also to be considered. [43] They both contributed to the home. The Respondent’s financial contributions were greater, while the Applicant’s provision of domestic services and care of the children exceeded the Respondent’s efforts in those areas.

Economic Integration [44] There was conflicting evidence as to the existence of a joint bank account. The Respondent says the Applicant did not put her earnings into a joint account and used same for her personal interests. From his perspective the parties kept their finances separate. The Applicant says otherwise. [45] The existence of a joint bank account is immaterial to my conclusion on this factor as I am satisfied the Applicant contributed financially to the upkeep of the household.

Her earnings in whole or in part, from Walmart, caring for the two neighborhood children and from her employment as a Veterinary Assistant went back into the family pool. The Applicant made significant financial contributions to N.’s university fees. [46] I am also satisfied the Applicant contributed financially, directly or indirectly to the acquisition of the assets valued in total at $14,000.00. [47] Both parties prioritized the benefit of the family unit over individual interest. There was a high degree of economic interdependence. I find there was economic integration.

Actual Intent [48] Notwithstanding the approximate one year separation, the parties had a long term relationship. The Respondent asserts they chose to keep their assets separate and he chose not to marry the Applicant.

The Applicant says the Respondent was the dominant partner within the relationship and controlled the family’s finances. [49] The evidence in relation to the circumstances of this relationship, in particular at the start of the relationship, reinforces the Applicant’s perspective as to the power dynamic which existed between the parties. [50] As discussed, I accept the Applicant left her studies at Mount St. Vincent as a result of a mutual decision made between the parties. The decision to raise a family was also made mutually.

The Respondent’s choice to maintain any item or component related to the home in his name only was strategic in nature. [51] I conclude and find that the actual intent of the parties was to engage in a stable, mutually beneficial and ongoing relationship. Within that construct the Respondent maneuvered the various elements in order to maintain the power dynamic in his favour. Priority of the family [52] As stated the decision to raise a family and concentration of efforts thereto was mutual. The evidence discloses that both parties placed priority on the family and worked towards a shared future.

[53] While caring for the children, the Applicant also cared for two other children of a similar age in order to contribute to the family’s expenses. The Respondent volunteered his time in relation to the children’s extracurricular sporting activities. They both have contributed (and continue to contribute) financially to N. and C.’s educational pursuits.

The Applicant is still paying on a line of credit from which she withdrew funds to assist with N.’s university expenses in 2018. [54] I am satisfied both parties prioritized the family in relation to their financial sacrifices and choices/decisions made, understanding that those choices/decisions were in furtherance of a shared future. Finding of Joint Family Venture [55] I find the evidence establishes and substantiates that the parties were engaged in a joint family venture and their joint efforts were linked to the accumulation of wealth. Proprietary claim [56] In MacPherson v.

Williams, supra, Justice Jollimore provides a synopsis of the elements to be considered when a proprietary claim is made such as the present one: [76] Ms. MacPherson makes a proprietary claim. As McInnes notes in The Canadian Law of Unjust Enrichment and Restitution (Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 2014) at page 1205, the “most common” ground for making a proprietary claim is where a claimant says that he or she provided money, goods or services that facilitated the defendant’s accumulation of assets, though he or she did not financially contribute to the property’s acquisition.

This includes the claimant using money to pay daily bills while the defendant acquires property or providing unpaid labour or performing services that preserved or enhanced the defendant’s property. [77] Here, Ms. MacPherson provided unpaid labour and worked to enhance the home. Mr. Williams’ retirement savings left Ms. MacPherson to use her funds to meet household needs rather than save for her retirement. [78] An order for proprietary relief requires greater justification than one for personal restitution. McInnes says the same four factors are consistently cited when proprietary relief is claimed: 1.

A monetary order must be inadequate 2. There must be a sufficiently substantial and direct nexus between Ms. MacPherson’s contribution and Mr. Williams’ property 3. The duration of the relationship must make it appropriate to ensure that both parties enjoy proprietary interests that allow them to share in accumulated assets 4. Ms. MacPherson must have acted with a reasonable expectation of receiving an interest in Mr.

Williams’ property McInnes, supra , at pages 1206-1208 I find the circumstances in this case are consistent with and satisfy the criteria set out in the case authority with respect to a proprietary claim. The Appropriate Remedy [57] I find as follows: • 139 Marriott’s Cove Road- The Applicant’s unpaid labour in relation to the construction/renovation projects and her contributions/efforts to the upkeep of the dwellings have been documented.

The Applicant is entitled to an equal one third share of the present net equity after accounting for real estate commission and legal fees; $190,918.25/3 = $63,639.42. • The Respondent’s employee pension – The Applicant is entitled to one-half the value of the Respondent’s employee pension to December 31 st , 2020. He began contributing to the pension well into the parties relationship (the year, 2000) and the Applicant’s ongoing unpaid labour within the household and care of the children enabled him to acquire and continually contribute to this asset.

The Respondent’s designations directly related to his professional status and remuneration were both attained during the relationship. • The assets valued at $14,000.00- The Applicant is entitled to one half the value of these assets; $7,000.00. She either contributed to purchasing of some of the assets (directly or indirectly) and/or her efforts and contributions made the acquisition and retention of these assets possible. • The Investment portfolio with BMO Nesbitt Burns- The funds in this investment are derived from a life insurance pay out that F.H. received on the death of her late husband in 1987.

In or around 1996 F.H. added the Respondent to the investment account. F.H. said she did this so the Respondent could help with transactions, so he could obtain information about the portfolio directly, and for estate planning purposes. I am satisfied the Respondent does not benefit directly from these investments. The interest from the investments is a source of income for F.H. The evidence demonstrates no nexus between the acquisition and/or retention of this item and any contribution made by the Applicant or the Respondent.

The Respondent and F.H. will retain the entirety of the Investment Portfolio in their sole interests. [58] I am satisfied my findings on the Applicant’s share of the parties’ accumulated wealth are consistent with the methodology enunciated by the case authorities. In reaching my conclusions I considered the circumstances in this case including, but not limited to the Applicant’s unpaid labour within the household, her contributions to the construction/renovation of the two dwellings, my finding of a joint family venture and the length of this relationship.

Debts [59] The parties agree that at the time of separation the Applicant’s debts totaled $20,698.40 and the Respondent’s, $23,531.71. The vehicle loan (Hyundai Elantra) is not considered as the parties have agreed to sell the vehicle. To equalize the debt ratio, the Respondent’s payment to the Applicant with regard to 139 Marriotts Cove Road will be reduced by $1416.55. Child Support and Special or Extraordinary Expenses [60] The parties agree that N. and C. are dependent children, despite both being over the age of majority.

They attend post secondary institutions (both enrolled in local universities) and each appear to be one academic year behind in their studies. [61] N. has resided with the Respondent and C. with the Applicant, since the parties separated. [62] The Applicant’s Statement of Income sworn December 12, 2022, indicates a total annual income of $40,572.84. The Respondent’s Statement of Income sworn December 18th, 2022, indicates a total annual income of $87,115.44. [63] The Respondent has been paying child support to the Applicant in the set off amount of $343.00 per month.

The Applicant requests that the child support payments continue in the amount of $750.00 per month until C. completes her university program. [64] The Applicant’s Statement of Special or Extraordinary Expenses sworn January 16, 2023, appears to suggest that the funds received by C. in the form of student loans and grants may be sufficient to cover the costs of her current academic year. I was not provided with any evidence as to C.’s university costs for the 2022-2023 winter term.

Central to my analysis on the issue of special or extraordinary expenses are the circumstances of the parties and the children. [65] The Applicant says C. was contributing $500.00 per month towards their shared rental expenses, however she asked C. to end those contributions. [66] C.’s total earnings for 2022 were $3,622.08 (net) from part time employment.

Through his summer employment N. earned $17,868.66 (gross) and $13,147.90 (net) in 2022. [67] The Applicant maintains that C’s capacity to contribute financially is limited “because of her depression and associated issues.” I was not provided with any other evidence (medical or otherwise) about C.’s health. [68] In Strecko v. Strecko, 2013 NSSC 49 , Associate Chief Justice O’Neil addressed the application of the Federal Child Support Guidelines to children over the age of majority.

At paragraph 16 he writes: [16] Section 3(2) of the ‘CSG’ permits the court to deviate from the Child Support Tables when a child of the marriage is over the age of 19 and the court considers the application of the tables to be inappropriate “having regard to the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the child and the financial ability of each spouse to contribute to the support of the child”. A child support order for a child over 19 may not require any child support in certain circumstances or the order may require the payment of the full table amount.

This might be the case when a child is at university and contributions are being made in the form of education assistance or when the child is at home and attending university. The table amount is the presumptive amount but the presumption is rebuttable ( Pollock v. Rioux 2004 NBCA 98 ). Sub sections 3(1) and (2) of the ‘CSG’ provide: Presumptive rule 3.

(1) Unless otherwise provided under these Guidelines, the amount of a child support order for children under the age of majority is (

a) the amount set out in the applicable table, according to the number of children under the age of majority to whom the order relates and the income of the spouse against whom the order is sought; and (

b) the amount, if any, determined under

section 7. Child the age of majority or over

(2) Unless otherwise provided under these Guidelines, where a child to whom a child support order relates is the age of majority or over, the amount of the child support order is (

a) the amount determined by applying these Guidelines as if the child were under the age of majority; or (

b) if the court considers that approach to be inappropriate, the amount that it considers appropriate, having regard to the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the child and the financial ability of each spouse to contribute to the support of the child. [69] In Johnson v. Johnson, 2019 NSSC 222 , Justice Jollimore examined the factors I should consider when determining child support for a child over the age of majority: How should I calculate child support for Brooklynn? [34] Because Brooklynn is over the age of majority, I must first decide what approach to take in calculating child support: should child support be calculated under subsection 3(1) or under clause 3(2)(

b) of the Guidelines ? Support is to be calculated under subsection 3(1) unless its approach is inappropriate. [35] Neither party objected to calculating Brooklynn’s support under subsection 3(1)(

a) of the Guidelines. [36] The closer a child’s circumstances match those of a child under the age of majority, the less likely the approach in clause 3(2)(

a) will be inappropriate: Rebenchuk, 2007 MBCA 22, at paragraph 30. The relevant circumstances include whether the child lives at home,and whether the child earns an income or is dependent on the parents. If the child lives at home, the parent who provides the homemakes a significant contribution to the child’s support by providing the home: Wesemann, (BCSC) at paragraph 9. [37] Brooklynn does not live with either parent for most of the year. Before she started university, Brooklynn spent most of her timeat her mother’s home.

I have no evidence Brooklynn has any income to contribute to her own support, though I know she has had part-time employment in high school. Ms. Johnson’s evidence shows that she paid for Brooklynn’s university costs, her clothing, and her hairstyling. Mr. Johnson provided no evidence that he paid any of Brooklynn’s expenses. [38] The evidence shows Brooklynn is financially dependent on her mother.

On the evidence I have and in the absence of anyobjection by the parties, I conclude it is not inappropriate to approach Brooklynn’s support under subsection 3(1) of the Guidelines. [70] Currently neither child contributes financially toward their respective living arrangement. The parties prefer that the childrenconcentrate on their studies and neither parent prioritizes financial contribution. [71] According to

section 8 of the Child Support Guidelines, the Respondent would pay the Applicant child support of $625.12. Where each parent has primary care of a child, each would pay the other support based on the table: the Respondent’s annual income of$87,115.44 generates a monthly payment of $1220.57 while the Applicant’s annual income of $40,572.84 generates a monthly paymentof $595.45. [72] In considering the “condition, means, needs and other circumstances” of the children in conjunction with the financialcapabilities of the parents, I am satisfied the set off amount would not be appropriate.

I make this determination for 4 reasons: - The Respondent’s income is more than double the Applicant’s; - The Respondent has the benefit of remaining in the home with all the amenities available to him; - N. is better positioned to make a contribution to the payment of his university fees and/or living costs if required; - Previously the Applicant contributed significantly to N.’s university costs. Some of those funds are still owing to her.

In this instance the presumptive amount is applicable. [73] The Respondent shall pay child support to the Applicant in the guideline amount of $748.02 per month commencing February 1st, 2023. [74] After considering the evidence available to me, I will not exercise my discretion to grant an award of special or extraordinaryexpenses, for the reasons that follow: - There is insufficient evidence as to C.’s inability to contribute to her post secondary educational expenses; - The available evidence suggests C. is able to satisfy her university costs with the aid of student loans and grants; - As they are both over the age of majority it is not unreasonable to expect N. and C. to contribute to their respective post secondaryeducational costs; and - The lack of evidence regarding C.’s university expenses for the 2022-2023 winter term and beyond.

Spousal Support [75] The Applicant seeks spousal support in the lumpsum amount of $20,000.00 and ongoing monthly payments of $750.00 for aperiod of at least three years. [76] After the 2007 separation the parties were subject to an Order from the Family Court of Nova Scotia, issued February 14, 2008.Paragraph 6 of that Order reads: 6.

THAT the Respondent shall pay to the Applicant the sum of $13,000.00 for her support and maintenance on or before the 31st day ofDecember, 2007, and thereafter she shall support herself without any contribution from the Respondent, regardless of any foreseen orunforeseen change in either of the parties circumstances, and whether or nor catastrophic. [77] The Respondent submits that the Applicant is not entitled “to any additional spousal support” and the onus is on her to provethat paragraph 6 should be varied.

His position is premised on the phrasing/terminology of paragraph 6. [78] The language contained in paragraph 6 is similar to language that has been considered in other cases. A review of thejurisprudence reveals that such language does not deprive me of statutory jurisdiction to vary the Order. [79] Many of the cases reviewed considered variation under the Divorce Act. In Barnes v. Barnes, 2012 NSSC 21, Justice Jollimorewrites at paragraphs 13 to 17: [13] Mr.

Barnes’ current application to terminate his spousal maintenance was made on October 5, 2011 and is pursuant to section37(1) of the Maintenance and Custody Act which states that I may “may make an order varying, rescinding or suspending, prospectivelyor retroactively, a maintenance order [ . . . ] where there has been a change in circumstances since the making of the order”. The relevantorder is the order that resulted from the July 25, 2008 registration of the agreement. There are no more current orders addressingmaintenance.

[14] Section 37(1) refers to “a change in circumstances since the making of the order”.

Nothing in life is static: after an order has beenmade there will be many changes in the parties’ lives, however, not every change is sufficient to merit varying an order. [15] In my view, the jurisprudence which has developed with regard to variation applications pursuant to the Divorce Act is applicableto variation applications pursuant to the Maintenance and Custody Act. [16] In a variation application there must be proof of the circumstances at the time of the order sought to be varied and proof of thecircumstances which are alleged to be sufficient to merit varying the order.

In cases decided under the Divorce Act, this is referred to asa “material change” because that’s the phrase used in the Divorce Act. A material change is a change which “if known at the time [of theorder sought to be varied], would likely have resulted in different terms” according to the Supreme Court’s decision in Willick, (SCC) at paragraph 20. While Willick addresses child support under the Divorce Act, in G. (L.) v.

B. (G.), (SCC) both the majority (Justice Sopinka at paragraph 73) and the minority opinions (Justice L’Heureux-Dubé at paragraphs 49 – 51)confirmed that Willick’s analysis is applicable to spousal support variation applications. [17] In L.M.P. v.

L.S., 2011 SCC 64, at paragraph 35, Justices Abella and Rothstein said that “In general, a material change must havesome degree of continuity, and not merely be a temporary set of circumstances.” [80] As established by the case authority, the jurisprudence considered pursuant to the Divorce Act is also applicable to casesconsidered under the Maintenance and Custody Act, now the Parenting and Support Act. [81] In L.M.P. v.

L.S. [2011] SCR 775, Justices Abella and Rothstein writing for the majority state at paragraphs 41 and 42: [41] Finally, an agreement incorporated into a s. 15.2 order may simply include a general term providing that it is final,or finality may be necessarily implied. But even where an agreement incorporated into an order includes a term providing that it is final,the court’s jurisdiction under s. 17 cannot be ousted (Miglin; G. (L.); Leskun). A provision indicating that the order is final merely statesthe obvious: the order of the court is final subject to s. 17 of the Divorce Act.

Courts will always apply the Willick inquiry to determine ifa material change of circumstances exists. [42] Ultimately, courts are tasked with determining if a material change of circumstances has occurred so as to justify avariation of a s. 15.2 order under s. 17. The analysis is always grounded in the actual circumstances of the parties and the terms of the s.15.2 order; what meaning a court will give any general statement of finality found in an order will be a question to be resolved on thatbasis.

As we have explained, in some situations, the agreement incorporated into the order may help shape what is meant by a “materialchange of circumstances”. Where a s. 15.2 order deals with a specific change, it assists courts by answering the Willick inquiry throughits terms. Conversely, when the order is general, or simply purports to be final, these less specific terms provide less assistance to courtsin answering the Willick inquiry.

Sometimes, in such cases, the circumstances of the parties may be such that courts will give littleweight to a general statement of finality and conclude that a material change exists. However, at other times, in such cases, thecircumstances of the parties may also be such that the courts will give effect to a general statement of finality and conclude that amaterial change does not exist. [82] In Adams v. Mustard (ONSC), the subject Order included language similar to the present case: [2] The parties were divorced on 18 April 1997. Mrs. Adams currently has custody of the parties’ one child.

The partiesentered into a separation agreement that was incorporated into the divorce judgment. The order required the husband to pay childsupport in the amount of $1,000 per month and spousal support in the amount of $1,500 per month for “an absolutely fixed period of ten(10) years commencing January 1, 1997”. Paragraph 23 of the order contains a non-variation clause that states: Beyond that annual adjustment, the parties both agree that there shall be no variation of either child support or spousalsupport for any reason.

The parties acknowledge that their respective circumstances may change in the future, andthat changes may be foreseeable or unforeseeable, but nonetheless, the parties agree and acknowledge that resolutionof equalization and property issues has been intertwined with resolution of support issues, and that property issueshave been resolved on the basis of the parties making an absolute commitment that (apart from cost of livingadjustments) neither spousal nor child support shall be subject to either increase or decrease, and spousal support shallnot be subject to either extension or earlier termination.

The payor sought to vary his spousal support obligation. The Court held that the relevant sections of the Divorce Act provided the payor“the right to request a review of the Order.” The Court further held that “parties cannot contract out of the legislation that provides theparty with the fundamental right to access to the court.” The salient issue was whether the payor met “the threshold test to establish amaterial change in circumstances.” [83] In Smith v. Rand, 2013 NSSC 369, Justice Wood, as he then was, considered a variation application.

The Applicant applied tovary the terms of a spousal support order prior to the expiration of the agreed upon five year non-variation period. Citing L.M.P. v, L.S.,supra, Justice Wood states at paragraph 25: [25] As the Supreme Court has indicated, I must first consider whether Mr. Smith has met the burden on him to show a materialchange in circumstances. The language of the separation agreement which was incorporated in the spousal support order must beconsidered in that analysis.

In my view, a negotiated agreement with both parties represented by legal counsel, should be givensignificant weight. [84] In Anderson v. Bernard 2017 MBQB 191, a term of the consent order required the payor to pay spousal support until the deathof either party. The Consent Order included a provision that the Order “shall not be subject to variation by either party in anycircumstances.” The Court’s analysis commencing at paragraph 46 is as follows: V. THE NON-VARIATION CLAUSE

[46] I do not view the non-variation clause at paragraph 5.2 of the final order as usurping the court’s jurisdiction under s. 17(1) (

a) of the Divorce Act to determine whether a variation in support is appropriate. [47] In L.M.P.

Abella and Rothstein JJ. expressed: 41 … But even where an agreement incorporated into an order includes a term providing that it is final, the court’s jurisdiction under s. 17 cannot be ousted ( Miglin; G.(L); Leskun ). … [48] The focus of the judicial lens continues to be whether there has been a material change in the circumstances since the previous order, notwithstanding a non-variation clause. [49] L’Heureux-Dubé J. in G.(L.) commented: 58 … under the 1985 Divorce Act , courts retain a discretionary power the exercise of which will depend on the particular facts of each case and which will be exercised in accordance with the factors and objectives mentioned in the 1985 Act.

The existence of an agreement, final or otherwise, should not have the effect of precluding such an analysis. [Emphasis added] [50] The court is not precluded from exercising its discretionary authority to vary support whether or not the non-variation support clause in a consent order is founded on a written agreement. [51] Abella and Rothstein JJ. noted in L.M.P. that the required analysis under s. 17 is identical, whether or not the court-ordered spousal support provisions have their origin in a written agreement.

They wrote: 36 The threshold variation question is the same whether or not a spousal support order incorporates an agreement. Has a material change of circumstances occurred since the making of the order? (See Willick ; G.(L.); Leskun v.

Leskun, 2006 SCC 25 , [2006] 1 S.C.R. 920.) . . . 46 The examination of the change in circumstances is exactly the same for an order that does not incorporate a prior spousal support agreement as for one that does. … [52] The court must determine whether there has been a material change in circumstances since the previous order regardless of whether the consent order contains a non-variation clause.

If the change is one that was contemplated by the parties, it will not be sufficient to permit a variation. [53] A close examination of the parties’ particular circumstances is critical when considering the proposed change in circumstances in the context of a general or specific statement of finality in the support order. Abella and Rothstein JJ. pointed out in L.M.P that: 39 … Even significant changes may not be material for the purposes of s. 17(4.1) if they were actually contemplated by the parties by the terms of the order at the time of the order.

The degree of specificity with which the terms of the order provide for a particular change is evidence of whether the parties or court contemplated the situation raised on an application for variation, and whether the order was intended to capture the particular changed circumstances. … 42 … The analysis is always grounded in the actual circumstances of the parties and the terms of the s.15.2 order; what meaning a court will give any general statement of finality found in an order will be a question to be resolved on that basis. … [54] The non-variation clause in the final order here is of broad scope.

Even if the non-variation clause is specific, the court must perform the analysis required by s. 17(4.1) of the Divorce Act when faced with a variation application. [85] In particular, I emphasize the Court’s concluding comments at paragraph 54. Material change in Circumstances [86] Section 37(1) of the Parenting and Support Act states: Powers of court 37

(1) The court, on application, may make an order varying, rescinding or suspending, prospectively or retroactively, a support order or an order for decision-making responsibility, parenting arrangements, parenting time, contact time or interaction where there has been a change in circumstances since the making of the order or the last variation order. [87] In addition to the issue of spousal support, the February 14 th , 2008, Order also addressed the issues of custody, parenting time, relocation, access to third party information concerning the children, child support and

section 7 expenses. [88] After separating the Applicant moved to a new residence (within the same area) and maintained primary care of the children. The Respondent’s parenting time was delineated as “liberal access, upon reasonable notice, at reasonable times,” “including but not limited to a minimum of three days/nights per week and an equal sharing of Christmas; Easter; March Break; the children’s birthday and a week block access during the children’s summer vacation”. [89] In April, 2008, the parties reconciled; the Applicant and the children moved back into the residence at 139 Marriott’s Cove Road and proceeded to live as a family for the following 11. 8 years.

[90] The Respondent says the Applicant used the $13,000.00 lumpsum payment for her own purposes. The Applicant says themajority of that sum was kept and put back into the home (household items, food, the children’s needs). Neither party offered any cogentevidence in support. In my view, the manner in which the Applicant used that payment is not pertinent to any determinations I makehere. Clearly the $13,000.00 lumpsum amount was meant to compensate the Applicant for the period encompassing the beginning oftheir cohabitation to separation in 2007. [91] In Clarke v.

Gale, 2009 NSSC 170 the parties were subject to an Order issued in 2005. Subsequently the parties reconciledthen separated permanently in 2007. At paragraphs 12 and 13, Justice Forgeron writes: [12] What affect does reconciliation have on the final 2005 order? [13] The parties reconciled for a substantial time after the 2005 order issued. Unlike an agreement, a court order does not become anullity because of reconciliation. In Fitzell v.

Weisbrod 2005 CarswellOnt 805 (S.C.J.), Mazza, J. held that the parties’ reconciliationdid not terminate a prior support order, but as a general rule, courts will suspend the obligation to pay during the period of cohabitation. A court order can only be varied by a further court order. Parties cannot vary an order by agreement or by virtue of a commonunderstanding. I accept this reasoning.

Therefore the 2005 order is a valid order unless the requirements of s. 37 of the Maintenance andCustody Act have been met. [92] At paragraphs 16 and 17, Justice Forgeron goes on to state: [16] An application to vary is not an appeal of an original order, nor is it an opportunity to retry a prior proceeding. The existingorder must be treated as correct as of the time the order was made.

The existing order can only be varied if a party proves that a materialchange in the circumstances exist, and as a result of that change, the current order no longer meets Adrianna’s best interests: Gordon v.Goertz (SCC), 1996 2 S.C.R. 27. [17] A material change has been described as one where, had the facts existed at the time the order was made, the judge likelywould have made a different order. A material change includes circumstances where something unexpected happens or where somethingthat was expected to happen does not. A material change must be more than a minor or temporary change.

The change must be asubstantial, continuing change which impacts upon the foundation upon which the existing order was made and which affects the childor the ability of the parents to meet the needs of the child. [93] To summarize, I am satisfied the case authorities buttress the statutory jurisdiction provided to me so as to consider variation ofthe Order issued February 14, 2008. [94] I find the evidence establishes that the parties reconciliation and subsequent cohabitation for the following 11.8 yearsconstitutes a material change in circumstances to the Order issued February 14, 2008.

As such I shall consider the Applicant’s claim for spousal support as being for the period May 1st, 2008, to December 31st, 2020. The Law [95]

Section 4 of the Parenting and Support Act sets out the factors I am to consider in the present analysis: Factors considered 4 In determining whether to order a person to pay support to that person’s spouse and the amount of any support to be paid, the courtshall consider (

a) the division of function in their relationship; (

b) the express or tacit agreement of the spouses that one will maintain the other; (

c) the terms of a marriage contract or separation agreement between the spouses; (

d) custodial and parenting arrangements made with respect to the children of the relationship; (

e) the obligations of each spouse towards any children; (

f) the physical or mental disability of either spouse; (

g) the inability of a spouse to obtain gainful employment; (

h) the contribution of a spouse to the education or career potential of the other; (

i) the reasonable needs of the spouse with a right tosupport; (

j) the reasonable needs of the spouse obliged to pay support; (

k) the separate property of each spouse; (

l) the ability to pay of the spouse who is obliged to pay support having regard to that spouse’s obligation to pay child support inaccordance with the Guidelines; (

m) the ability of the spouse with the right to support to contribute to the spouse’s own support R.S., c. 160, s. 4; 1997 (2nd Sess.), c. 3, s.3; 2000, c. 29, ss. 5, 8; 2015, c. 44, s. 6

[96] In Wells v. King, 2015 NSSC 232, Justice Jollimore provides a helpful

summary of the jurisprudence relating to the factorsconsidered in spousal support claims: [35] In Bracklow, at paragraph 21, then-Justice McLachlin made clear that the presumption of mutual support whichexists during a marriage “no longer applies” once the marriage has ended. She identified three bases for spousal support: contractual orconsensual; compensatory; and non-compensatory. Contractual support reflects an explicit or implicit agreement that one spousesupports the other, while compensatory support considers the roles of the spouses in the family and the advantages or disadvantagesconferred by these.

Non-compensatory support looks to a spouse’s “actual ability to fend for himself or herself and the effort that hasbeen made to do so”, according to Justice McLachlin at paragraph 40 in Bracklow, . [36] An entitlement to compensatory support may be established where a spouse’s ability to achieve self-sufficiency has beencompromised by family commitments or where one spouse conferred a substantial career advantage on the other.

Analysis [97] I must first consider whether the Applicant is entitled to receive spousal support from the Respondent for the 11.8 year period. [98] In 2006 the Applicant commenced a veterinary assistant’s course and upon completion obtained a diploma as a VeterinaryAssistant. During the period of separation (2007-2008) she began working as a Veterinary Assistant. Her level of income rose over thefollowing years but was always significantly lower than the Respondent’s. [99] The Applicant’s average income for the years 2008 to 2020, inclusive, was $22,991.00.

In 2007/2008 the Respondent’s incomewas in the range of $61,000.00. Over the years his income increased. In 2018 the Respondent’s income was $78,124, in 2019, $78,717and 2020, $81,319.81. [100] After reconciling in 2008 the Respondent played a more active role in the lives of the children, however I am satisfied theApplicant remained the parent primarily responsible for their care.

I am also satisfied her other responsibilities within the homeremained as described earlier in this decision. [101] I am satisfied the Applicant is entitled to an award of spousal support from the Respondent on both compensatory and noncompensatory grounds for the following reasons: - Her role and function within the relationship and household, including but not limited to her responsibilities as the children’sprimary caregiver; - The disparity in the parties’ incomes; - The Respondent’s ability to upgrade his professional status; - The needs of the Applicant and her circumstances; - The disproportionate alignment of assets subsequent to separation; - The Respondent’s ability to pay spousal support (accounting for his child support obligation); - The reduction in the Applicant’s standard of living and economic hardship suffered (especially in light of her assistance to thedependent child, C.); - The length of the relationship. [102] The Respondent’s Statement of Income sworn December 18, 2022, indicates a total annual income of $87,115.44.

As noted theApplicant’s income is $40,572.84. The Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (SSAG) suggest monthly payments in the range of $497(low), $804 (medium) and $1,115 (high). [103] The Applicant is 45 years old. She is employed at a local Veterinary Hospital. She intends to complete an educational upgradewhich would enable her to obtain employment as a Continuing Care Assistant (CCA). [104] At paragraphs 30 – 38, of her Affidavit sworn December 12, 2022, (contained in Court Exhibit 1) the Applicant states: 30. I am now almost 45 years of age.

I have no pension, no savings and no investments of any kind except for what I may receive as aresult this court action. I have made a decision to upgrade myself by taking the CCA program offered by CBBC Career College, Attached to this my Affidavit and marked Exhibit “D” is a true copy of my letter of acceptance dated September 6th, 2022. 31. The program runs from March 2023 through to September 2023.

The tuition cost is $10,000.00 but because the government is tryingto promote more enrolment in the CCA program, I have received a commitment that if I work in Nova Scotia as a CCA for two yearsimmediately after graduation, the tuition costs will be forgiven. 32. There is, however, no replacement income to cover basic living expenses for myself and C. while I am working to become a CCA. 33. I have been informed by my financial advisor Angelina Kieley (assigned to me by CBBC Career College) that I have three optionswhich are as follows: (

a) Convince my employer to issue me a lay-off notice so that I would be eligible for unemployment insurance benefits. (

b) Live on a private line of credit.

(

c) Apply for a private student loan through a bank. 34. I have a private line of credit through Scotiabank. Attached to this my Affidavit and marked Exhibit “E” is a true copy of a statement from Scotiabank showing the details of my personal line of credit. The credit limit is $30,000.00 and I have been borrowing against it to meet unanticipated living expenses. There is approximately $20,000.00 remaining on that line of credit but I am trying to avoid borrowing against it. I need to have a cushion available to me and C. for unanticipated emergencies. 35.

I doubt that my employer will lay me off as they need all the staff they can get at the moment to make up for a short-fall of skilled staff. I therefore will be asking this Court to order that the Respondent, who has a secure high paying job, to provide me with spousal support to assist me in completing my training and for a reasonable period thereafter. 36. The Respondent has rolled all of his student loan debt into one of the lines of credit now secured against the property.

If the Court recognizes my interest in this property under the law of unjust enrichment it will still be reduced by the amount of debt that the Respondent has run up over the years. 37. Obtaining employment as a CCA is my only realistic prospect of being able to provide myself with some security for the future by way of a pension. 38.

I am also requesting that the Court order the Respondent to maintain me on his medical plan for at least the next several years while I work to establish myself as a CCA. [105] After a careful review of the factors I am to consider including the circumstances present, I fix the Respondent’s periodic spousal support obligation at the amount of $497.00 per month, for a period of 6 years.

The Applicant requests a lumpsum amount which would enable her to achieve a qualification relevant to her ability to realize and sustain self sufficiency. [106] I am satisfied the following payment arrangement is appropriate given the present circumstances: the Respondent shall pay spousal support to the Applicant in the lumpsum amount of $23,856.00 forthwith; commencing February 1 st , 2023, and continuing on the first day of each month thereafter for a period of 24 months he shall pay spousal support to the Applicant in the monthly amount of $497.00, after which the Respondent’s spousal support obligation to the Applicant shall terminate.

Credibility [107] In a number of instances throughout this decision, where the parties’ evidence conflicted, I accepted the Applicant’s evidence over the Respondent’s. In doing so I considered the test set out by Justice Forgeron in Baker-Warren v. Denault, 2099 NSSC 59 . In Wells v. King , supra, Justice Jollimore references this authority: [ 5 ] In Baker-Warren v. Denault , 2009 NSSC 59 at paragraph 19 , Justice Forgeron identified factors to be balanced when assessing credibility.

These factors include: the inconsistencies and weaknesses in the witness’ evidence; whether the witness had an interest in the outcome or a motive to deceive; whether the witness had an ability to observe the factual matters that were the subject of her testimony; the witness’ power of recollection; whether the witness’ testimony was “in harmony with the preponderance of probabilities which a practical and informed person would find reasonable given the particular place and conditions”; whether there was an internal consistency and logical flow to the witness’ evidence, whether the evidence was provided in a candid and straightforward manner; and whether the witness was capable of making an admission against her interest. [108] I accept the Applicant’s evidence over the Respondent’s, not limited to the following: - The Applicant’s reason(

s) for abandoning her studies at Mount St. Vincent; - The Applicant’s contributions towards the 2 construction/renovation projects; and - The manner in which the Applicant’s earnings were utilized during the relationship. [109] Throughout the leadup to this trial, the Respondent maintained that the Applicant was not entitled to a share of the assets as F.H. and himself were not unjustly enriched.

I am satisfied the Respondent’s evidence (both Affidavit and viva voce) on the three points mentioned in the preceding paragraph can be characterized as self serving in nature, and was advanced on the belief that he could be made to financially compensate the Applicant. His apparent concession during cross examination about the Applicant’s entitlement to a share of the equity in the property was strategic and underscores his motive.

Medical Plan [110] I am satisfied the parties’ circumstances are such that the Applicant should remain on the Respondent’s medical plan for so long as he is obliged to pay her spousal support. [111] C, too, will remain on the Respondent’s medical plan until she completes her current academic program. C’s eligibility to remain on her father’s medical plan may be reviewed when she completes her program,. Conclusion [112] Counsel for the Applicant shall draft the Order. The parties may file written submissions addressing costs within 30 days of the Order being issued. Samuel C.G. Moreau , J.