C.S. PETITIONER - v. -, 2023 SKKB 45

REDACTED VERSION KING’S BENCH FOR SASKATCHEWAN Citation: 2023 SKKB 45 Date: 2023 02 27 Docket: FLD-MJ-00014-2021 Judicial Centre : Moose Jaw, Family Law Division BETWEEN: C.S. PETITIONER - and - K.F. RESPONDENT Appearing: C.S. self-represented Timothy S. Hansen for the respondent JUDGMENT RICHMOND J. FEBRUARY 27, 2023 [ 1 ] C.S. and K.F. are the parents of two children: R.F., born August 5, 2011 and J.F., born November 26, 2013. C.S. and K.F. sought the court’s assistance in determining the difficult question of who will have primary care of the children should one of the parents move to another province.

To their credit, C.S. and K.F. resolved that question prior to the commencement of the trial. However, they were unable to resolve the related questions of child support and costs. Background [ 2 ] C.S. and K.F. separated in October 2016. C.S. issued a petition on June 14, 2017. The petition described how the parties had been sharing parenting of the children in alternate weeks since separation. Although the petition expressed the petitioner’s dissatisfaction with that arrangement, parenting did not change. Keene J. granted the parties’ divorce in November 2017.

In December 2020, C.S. brought an application to vary the order of Justice Keene as her new spouse, a member of the Canadian Armed Forces, was being transferred to Kingston, Ontario and she wished to move there with him along with R.F. and J.F. K.F. was opposed to the children being removed from the Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan area. The matter came before Justice Chow in chambers. Chow J. refused to permit C.S. to relocate the children on an interim basis and ordered the parties proceed to pretrial.

In the event C.S. moved, Chow J. ordered the children were to remain with their father, otherwise the shared parenting arrangement was to continue for as long as C.S. remained in Moose Jaw.

[ 3 ] The parties proceeded to pretrial before Justice Chow in July 2021. A child support consent order was signed by the parties. The relevant provisions are as follows: That all extracurricular activities or

Section 7 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines [ Guidelines ] expenses of the Children shall be approved by both parents and shared equally. If not approved the enrolling or approving Party shall pay the whole cost. Receipts shall be required before payment. That there shall be no

Section 3 of the Guidelines support payable by either party, subject to further Order or Agreement of the Parties, due to the expense of access once the Petitioner relocates to Ontario in accordance with Section 10(2) (

b) of the Guidelines . [ 4 ] The parties then proceeded to a binding pre-trial settlement conference before Justice Dawson and an “interim child support order” dated June 30, 2022 was executed by the parties. The relevant provisions of the order are as follows: That each Party shall contribute equally to

Section 7 expenses of the Children, and only to those expenses which have been agreed to by both Parties in advance of the expense being incurred. That Child Support shall flow to the primary resident parent of the Children. [ 5 ] In addition to the interim child support order, the parties also executed an “interim order” which was dated June 30, 2022 which confirmed the children were to remain in the primary care of the respondent until further order or agreement. The order provided as follows: 1.

The Children of the relationship, namely: R.F. born August 5, 2011; and J.F. born November 26, 2013 [the Children] Are the subject of support as between the Parties in accordance with the Federal Child Support Guidelines . 2. That each Party shall contribute equally to

Section 7 expenses of the Children, and only to those expenses which have been agreed to by both Parties in advance of the expense being incurred. 3. That Child Support shall flow to the primary resident parent of the Children. 4. That the Parties consent to Mr. Hansen, Counsel for the Respondent, drafting this Interim Order. [ 6 ] In advance of the scheduled trial, the parties settled the substantive issue of parenting and executed a consent order which provided as follows: 1. The Trial of the above matter scheduled for January 3-6 and January 17-20, 2023 shall, upon approval of the Local Registrar, be truncated and set for two (2) day(

s) of submissions and argument regarding the matter of Child Support and Costs. 2. The Petitioner may appear by video to make her submissions and argument regarding the issue of Child Support and Costs. 3. The Children of the relationship, namely: R.F. born August 5, 2011; and J.F. born November 26, 2013 [the Children] Shall remain in Moose Jaw with the Respondent as their primary residence. 4. That the Parties shall be joint-decision makers for the Children. 5.

That the Petitioner shall have the following ongoing parenting time with the Children subject to the availability and expenses of flights for the Children, to be paid for by the Petitioner: a. In each even year beginning in 2024 during the Children’s summer holiday from school from July 30 th to August 30 th ; and in each odd year beginning in 2023 during the Children’s summer holiday from school from the end of the school year to July 30 th . b.

Over the Children’s Winter Holiday from school from December 22 nd 2022 to January 3 rd , 2023 and in future winter holidays from school, subject to the Children’s school schedule. c. In each year, either the February or Easter school holiday of the Children: namely, in 2023 from February 18 th to 26 th or April 7 th to 16 th . d. The Petitioner shall advise the Respondent no later than January 3, of each year if she is exercising parenting time with the Children for Mother’s Day.

6. That the Respondent shall make all reasonable efforts to provide the Children to Regina International Airport for their flights for parenting time with the Petitioner and shall return them to Moose Jaw from said airport after flights home from said parenting with the Petitioner. 7. That the Petitioner shall enrol the Children in any and all health insurance programmes available to her through her employer, and shall provide direct notice of same insurance to the healthcare providers of the Children, including but not limited to their Family Physician, Pharmacist, Optometrist, and Dentist. 8.

That the Children shall continue their counselling in Moose Jaw under the coverage of the health insurance of the Petitioner. 9. That the Parties shall have reasonable, unfettered, telephone or video-call contact with the Children when they are with the other Party. 10. That communication will take place each Sunday via email or by such other method as may be agreed to by both Parties, to update each other as to the lives and activities of the Children. 11.

That should either Party travel with the Children outside of their respective City of residence for one night or longer, that they shall inform the other Party of their travel plans. [ 7 ] The parties filed an agreed statement of facts at the commencement of the trial which confirmed all issues between them were resolved save and except for the calculation of ongoing child support under s. 3 and s. 7 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines , SOR/97-175 [ Guidelines ] and costs of the action. There was an acknowledgement by K.F. that C.S. suffers from undue hardship within the meaning of s. 10(2) (

b) of the Guidelines due to expenses incurred to exercise parenting time with the children. The agreement confirmed C.S.’s line 150 income to be $55,543 and K.F.’s at $40,311 though there was further acknowledgement that K.F.’s income currently is $51,111.00. [ 8 ] C.S. asks that the cost of exercising her parenting time be considered to reduce or eliminate child support.

K.F. does not dispute that C.S. incurs a large expense to have parenting time with the children and concedes there is undue hardship but suggests C.S.’s household income remains higher than his own and she should therefore, notwithstanding her undue hardship, pay child support based on the Guidelines . Neither party filed a financial statement though they were both invited to do so. There remains gaps in the evidence with respect to expenses incurred in each household. C.S. filed her spouse’s income disclosure when it was asked of her at trial.

K.F. filed information respecting his own household income but neglected to include the amount of child support which was paid to his current spouse for her children. K.F. advised during testimony that $1,000 to $1,200 was paid to his spouse for the support of her children from her previous relationship. K.F. declined the opportunity to file a financial statement and suggested that a financial statement would simply provide further evidence that his household is in a worse financial position than C.S.’s household. [ 9 ]

Section 10 of the Guidelines addresses what is required to establish undue hardship and further cautions that even where undue hardship exists consideration must be given to the standard of living in each household.

Section 10 states: Undue hardship 10(1) On either spouse’s application, a court may award an amount of child support that is different from the amount determined under any of sections 3 to 5, 8 or 9 if the court finds that the spouse making the request, or a child in respect of whom the request is made, would otherwise suffer undue hardship. Circumstances that may cause undue hardship

(2) Circumstances that may cause a spouse or child to suffer undue hardship include the following: (

a) the spouse has responsibility for an unusually high level of debts reasonably incurred to support the spouses and their children prior to the separation or to earn a living; (

b) the spouse has unusually high expenses in relation to exercising parenting time with a child; (

c) the spouse has a legal duty under a judgment, order or written separation agreement to support any person; (

d) the spouse has a legal duty to support a child, other than a child of the marriage, who is (

i) under the age of majority, or (ii) the age of majority or over but is unable, by reason of illness, disability or other cause, to obtain the necessaries of life; and (

e) the spouse has a legal duty to support any person who is unable to obtain the necessaries of life due to an illness or disability. Standards of living must be considered

(3) Despite a determination of undue hardship under subsection (1), an application under that subsection must be denied by the court if it is of the opinion that the household of the spouse who claims undue hardship would, after determining the amount of child support under any of sections 3 to 5, 8 or 9, have a higher standard of living than the household of the other spouse. Standards of living test

(4) In comparing standards of living for the purpose of subsection (3), the court may use the comparison of household standards of living test set out in

Schedule II.

Reasonable time

(5) Where the court awards a different amount of child support under subsection (1), it may specify, in the child support order, areasonable time for the satisfaction of any obligation arising from circumstances that cause undue hardship and the amount payable atthe end of that time. Reasons

(6) Where the court makes a child support order in a different amount under this section, it must record its reasons for doing so. [10] In Reid v Faubert, 2019 NSCA 42, 434 DLR (4th) 287 [Reid], the court summarized the case law respecting s.10 and described the two prong test to be applied: [45] Applying s. 10 engages a two-step process. Firstly, a payor seeking to rely on the provision must establish that the payment ofsupport as otherwise directed by the Guidelines (ss. 3 to 5, 8 or 9) would create an undue hardship as a result of one of the non-exhaustivefactors in s. 10(2).

Only if the court is satisfied that an undue hardship exists, does it proceed to the second step, namely, a considerationof whether the payor's household standard of living is lower than the recipient's (s. 10(3)). [11] Lonsdale v Evans, 2020 SKCA 30, 37 RFL (8th) 251 discussed undue hardship and commented at para. 70: [70] The threshold for establishing undue hardship is not easily met: see, for example, Pelletier v Kakakaway, 2002 SKCA 94 at paras 10-11 and 26, 223 Sask R 305; and Locke v Goulding, 2012 NLCA 8 at paras 36-40, 29 RFL (7th) 115.

The basic tables set out in theGuidelines establish a presumptive rule regarding the amount of child support payable by a person with a given income.

While unduehardship is a circumstance that justifies a departure from the presumptive rule, establishing mere hardship is not enough to reduce orexcuse a payor parent's obligation; the hardship must be "undue", that is, "exceptional", "excessive" or "disproportionate" in all of the circumstances: Hanmore v Hanmore, 2000 ABCA 57 at para 14, 4 RFL (5th) 348; Van Gool v Van Gool (1998), (BC CA), 166 DLR (4th) 528 (BC CA); Reid v Faubert, 2019 NSCA 42 at paras 45-48, 434 DLR (4th) 287. [12] K.F. has agreed, “The Petitioner suffers from undue hardship within the meaning of Section 10(2)(

b) of theFederal Child Support Guidelines due to her expenses required to exercise parenting time with the Children.” (Agreed Statement of Factsat para. 3). It follows that the first step of the analysis, and the biggest hurdle has been addressed by agreement of the parties. [13] In Reid, the court went on to discuss the second step and stated: [49] The second step engages s. 10(3) which directs a court to consider the respective standards of living of the payor's and payee'shouseholds. If the payor enjoys a higher standard of living, then the claim of undue hardship must be denied. Section 10(4) indicates thata court "may" use the Comparison of Household Standards of Living Test in

Schedule II. Although the permissive wording allows acourt to use an alternative approach, the

Schedule is most commonly used (Stoddard v. Atwood, 2001 NSCA 69 at para. 12). [50] I turn now to the application judge's finding of undue hardship. I agree with Ms. Reid's assertion that, from her reasons, it appearsthe application judge misapplied the two-step test, and her reasons are insufficient for determining how she concluded, other than by astraight comparison of income, Mr. Faubert's household standard of living fell below that of Ms. Reid's. [51] I repeat the relevant portions of the application judge's reasons: [40] Has Mr. Faubert established a claim for undue hardship?

In other words, if he is required to pay the table amount would hishousehold standard of living fall below that of Ms. Reid? [41] The Respondent is responsible for an unusually high costs of exercising access. When he comes to Nova Scotia to visit hehas airfare, ground transportation, hotel and food expenses. When he picks up "A" to take her back to Ontario for parenting time, he hasthe expenses of air travel which involves four plane tickets for him and two for his daughter.

He has tried to maintain the relationshipwith his daughter through travelling to Nova Scotia approximately monthly, to either be with her here in Nova Scotia or taking her backto Ontario. Furthermore, the parties have agreed on a parenting

schedule which I conclude to be in the child's best interest. Such aschedule results in significant access costs of approximately $18-20,000 per year. [42] He does not meet the criteria for undue hardship by incurring high access costs alone.

The court must be satisfied that ifgiven those costs, should he be required to pay the table amount of child support would his household standard of living fall below thatof the recipient parent. … [14] The second step requires consideration be given to the respective standards of living in the parties’ respectivehouseholds to determine whether an adjustment should be made to child support. C.S.’s child support obligation based on the Guidelinesis $847 per month based on her current income of $55,543.

K.F. argues that based on the parties’ current incomes and the incomes oftheir spouses, a comparison of household standards of living indicates a higher standard of living in C.S.’s home notwithstanding thecosts of exercising her parenting time with the children and, as such, she should have to pay child support based on the Guidelines. [15] Although the parties have agreed that K.F.’s income is currently $51,111, that does not, however, necessarilymean that is the appropriate level of income to be utilized in assessing support or to do the household income comparison.

K.F. arguedthat he left the position he had as a foreman in construction due to stress resulting from C.S.’s decision to relocate and out of desire andnecessity to full time parent. The evidence was that K.F. was terminated from his position when he was absent from work while he spenttime in the hospital with his stepdaughter. Although K.F. has no formal training in carpentry, he was clearly well respected in his fieldand did well financially as he was earning a six figure income. K.F.’s income has dropped considerably with his choice of work.

K.F.testified that he had been working seasonally in construction and earned approximately $100,000 a year. He worked long hours,however, and had no flexibility. After losing his job, K.F. chose to find a new position out of the construction field and one, he says, that

gives him greater flexibility for the children. C.S., in her brief, argued income should be imputed to K.F. and that he could earnsubstantially more money if he returned to construction. She is undoubtedly correct. [16] The question of underemployment is one of reasonableness. The matter was addressed in the SaskatchewanCourt of Appeal in Pontius v Murray, 2011 SKCA 121 at para 9, 377 Sask R 16 [Pontius]: [9] Section 19(1)(

a) of the Federal Child Support Guidelines reads: 19.

(1) The court may impute such amount of income to a spouse as it considers appropriate in the circumstances, which circumstancesinclude the following: (

a) the spouse is intentionally under-employed or unemployed, other than where the under-employment or unemployment is required bythe needs of a child of the marriage or any child under the age of majority or by the reasonable educational or health needs of thespouse... The term “under-employed” concerns situations where a parent, for whatever reason, chooses to earn less than they are capable ofearning. “Intentionally” does not necessarily mean that the parent in question is attempting to avoid paying child support or does not carefor the child.

A subjective intent to evade or reduce a child support obligation is therefore not necessary. See: Beisel v Henderson, 2004SKQB 280, [2006] 2 WWR 502. [17] Wilson J. considered Pontius in Peterson v Merk, 2013 SKQB 156, 419 Sask R 207: [17] As set out above, a court must look at a decision to change employment and determine whether it was reasonable at the time thedecision was taken. The factors to be considered in determining whether employment is reasonable have been set out in a number ofdecisions. A

summary of those factors is set out in Algner v Algner, 2008 SKQB 132, [2008] 10 WWR 509.

Ryan-Froslie J. states, aspart of para. 18, the following: (ix) The factors to be considered in determining whether employment is reasonable, and in setting the amount of income to be imputedinclude, but are not limited to, the payor's age, education, training, work experience, skills, historical earning capacity, health, themotivation for the change in employment, the availability of job opportunities, the payor's ability to relocate, the number of hours thepayor is reasonably available to work and their support obligations (See: Drygala v Pauli, supra [(2002), (ON CA), 61 OR (3d) 711 (Ont CA)], at para. 38; Van Gool v Van Gool, supra [(1998), (BC CA), 44 RFL (4th) 314 (BC CA)],at para. 30; Donovan v Donovan, supra [2000 MBCA 80, 150 Man R (2d) 116]; Hanson v Hanson, (BC SC), [1999]BCJ No 2532 (QL) (BC SC) at para 17; Martel v Martel, 2000 SKQB 227, 193 Sask R 225; Cholodniuk v Sears, 2001 SKQB 97, 204Sask R 268; Bodanarchuk v Berden (October 31, 2006), Prince Albert, FLD No 204/2006, (Wilkinson J.), unreported)). [18] As set out previously, the mother left her job at Village RV and took a job with RBC.

Her income dropped from $107,000.00 in2011 to $45,000.00 in 2012. Her motivation for the change in employment was, according to the mother, her desire to be more activelyinvolved in the childrens' lives. [19] I understand the mother's desire to work a "normal" work week with evenings and weekends available for her and the children.However, the mother has taken employment which substantially reduced her income. There is no evidence from the mother regarding hereducation and previous work experience.

There is no evidence from the mother to show that the mother looked for employmentopportunities that would have, at a minimum, allowed her to earn the amount she was earning in 2009 and 2010. On all of the evidence, Ihave concluded that the mother is intentionally under-employed. Further, there are no exceptions as set out in subsection 19(1)(a).

I havedetermined that it was not reasonable for the mother to take such a dramatic decrease in income when she has the responsibility, as doesthe father, to provide for the two children of the marriage. [18] K.F. has provided no evidence that he searched for employment that would pay him anything close to his former salary. He chose to change his career dramatically. As a result, as Turcotte J. did in G.L. v K.H., 2020 SKQB 167, 42 RFL (8th) 390, I amimputing income to the respondent.

K.F.’s income for purposes of the household standard of living calculation and comparison is$100,000. [19] K.F.’s counsel filed a DivorceMate calculation to determine the household income ratio for the parties. In hiscalculations, he utilized $51,111 as K.F.’s income. As stated above, K.F.’s income is imputed at $100,000. In addition, as K.F. had done,in his DivorceMate calculation, I included the child support received by his current spouse for her two children in the amount of $14,400and I haveincluded his spouse’s income of $36,411.

I also noted the two children from his new relationship in his household. [20] C.S.’s income is $55,543. C.S.’s offer of employment references union dues but no evidence has been filed toindicate what those union dues might be and I am therefore unable to reduce her income to account for union dues. C.S. produced anotice of assessment for her current spouse at trial when it was requested of her. This was the only information provided respecting herspouse’s income and, again, the notice of assessment does not identify union dues.

There is nothing to suggest in the material filed thatanything other than her spouse’s line 150 income of $95,504 should be used. C.S. argues that only her income and K.F.’s income shouldbe considered but she also wants to claim undue hardship. An undue hardship claim requires a review of household standards of livingand her spouse’s income cannot be ignored. [21] K.F.’s calculation filed with the court accounted for the fact that C.S. has a new child in her relationship but didnot allow for daycare costs for this child.

C.S. produced evidence that establishes the current preschool costs for her youngest child to beas low as $897.75 and as high as $983.25 as the charge is $42.75 per day. An average of the monthly amount would result in an annualcost of $11,286 which I have added into the DivorceMate calculation. K.F. had allowed for $9,000 per year as the “unusually high accessexpenses”. That amount is undoubtedly low though C.S. also used that amount. C.S. testified that yearly costs for gas, flights and travelto and from Kingston including hotels was $7,020 for three trips a year.

However, this ignores the fact that C.S. may wish to travel to

see the boys as is contemplated by the judgment for Mother’s Day. It ignores restaurant costs while traveling and it ignores the wear and tear on vehicles for the lengthy trip between Kingston and the Toronto airport. Having regard to these additional expenses, I have increased the estimated “unusually high access expenses” to $12,000 per year. [ 22 ] K.F.’s

Schedule II DivorceMate calculation disclosed a household income ratio of 5.401 for C.S. and 3.803 for K.F. After making considerable adjustments in C.S.’s favour, including imputing income to K.F. at $100,000, adding in C.S.’s daycare costs for her new child and increasing the costs of her exercising parenting time to $12,000 per year, C.S. and her new spouse still enjoy a higher standard of living than K.F. and his new spouse, though the gap closes considerably with C.S. having a ratio of 5.199 and K.F. of 4.717.

Nonetheless, given the above calculation, it is difficult to justify any deviation from the Guidelines . In fact, there is ample authority to suggest that where the payor’s household standard of living remains higher than the recipients after paying the table amount of support, the undue hardship claim should be denied ( Locke v Goulding , 2012 NLCA 8 , 29 RFL (7 th ) 115 [ Locke ]). C.S. has argued that the ratio and household standard of living do not factor cost of living, nor does it show household expenses and financials accurately.

In Locke the court noted: [38] An optional test for conducting a standards-of-living comparison is found in

Schedule II of the Guidelines . Without attempting to catalogue the factors which inform a standards-of-living comparison, I observe that it involves more than a straightforward comparison of household incomes. Even

Schedule II contemplates imputing income to any member of the household, which includes the spouse of a payor parent. But

Schedule II does not account for all factors relevant to one's standard of living. The value of a two-parent household as opposed to a single-parent household, high medical costs or a multitude of other circumstances could well inform a standards-of-living comparison. [ 23 ] C.S. led very little evidence of her household expenses. She referenced specific expenses of her own but neglected to provide the overall picture of her new family’s income and expenses. Her spouse’s income was only provided when she was advised it was required information when considering undue hardship.

She argues she has a shortfall each month but we do not know the family’s situation as a whole. [ 24 ] In Locke , the court went on to state: [52] Although the section 10(2) list of circumstances inviting undue hardship is not exhaustive, the mere fact that a claimant's income is exceeded or offset by his expenses is not, without more, an independent criterion for consideration of undue hardship. In Green [2005 NLCA 29 , 14 RFL (6 th ) 256 ], this Court concluded that the claimant's heavy expenses were as a result of lifestyle choices which did not relieve him of his child support obligations.

In this case, the Judge did not consider whether Mr. Goulding's finances were so justifiably tight that he could not pay basic support according to the Guidelines , which amounted to approximately $178 more per month. As the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal found in Pelletier v. Kakakaway , 2002 SKCA 94 , 223 Sask. R. 305 at paragraph 13 , "a generic reference to the overall expense of a new household is not enough to support a claim of undue hardship." To fail to examine Mr.

Goulding's expenses and explain why and how they would justify him paying less than basic support is an error of law. [ 25 ] Given the evidence filed, although the parties have acknowledged C.S. suffers undue hardship, the application of the household standards of living test establishes that even after imputing income to K.F. at $100,000, C.S.’s household income remains higher and, as such, deviation from the Guidelines is not justified.

C.S.’s suggestion that her income is exceeded by her expenses is not enough to establish undue hardship, particularly when the entire household financial picture has not been shared. [ 26 ] C.S. shall pay s. 3 child support in the amount of $847 per month commencing February 1, 2023 and continuing on the 1st day of each month thereafter. The parties had been sharing s. 7 expenses equally.

However, after imputing income to K.F., K.F.’s proportionate share of the s. 7 expenses is 64% and C.S.’s share is 36%. [ 27 ] C.S. was previously ordered to enrol the children in any health insurance programs available through her employer and the children were to continue in counselling under C.S.’s health insurance. As C.S. has recently changed employment, particulars of her health insurance are not on file. Pursuant to s. 7(1) (

b) of the Guidelines , K.F. shall be responsible for his proportionate share of the medical and dental insurance premiums attributable to the children. As was the case in previous orders, the parties shall agree in advance to any s. 7 expenses for which they seek contribution from the other, failing which the parent who incurred the expenses without the other parent’s approval in writing shall bear the entire expense. A receipt verifying the cost of the expenses shall be provided to the other parent when requesting reimbursement. [ 28 ] In addition, in keeping with s. 7 (1) (

c) of the Guidelines , “health related expenses that exceed insurance reimbursement by at least $100 annually, including orthodontic treatment, professional counselling provided by a psychologist, social worker, psychiatrist or any other person, physiotherapy, occupational therapy, speech therapy and prescription drugs, hearing aids, glasses and contact lenses” shall be shared in proportion to their incomes.

Unless the health expense is emergent, the parties should agree in advance to the expense. [ 29 ] K.F. had asked that C.S. produce evidence of her expenses for travel by May 1 annually but that is not required if she is paying s. 3 child support.

In the event C.S. wishes to assert an undue hardship claim in the future, those expenses, as well as her income information and that of her spouse, along with their household expenses will be required. [ 30 ] K.F. has ordered that the parties exchange their income tax information and their spouses’ income tax information by May 1 each year, and to adjust child support owed thereafter annually on June 1. The income information of the parties’ spouses is only relevant if C.S. intends to pursue an undue hardship claim in the future.

C.S.’s income information is required to determine s. 3 support and her proportionate share of s. 7 expenses and should be shared annually. Although K.F.’s tax returns are relevant for both an undue hardship claim and a s. 7 expense claim, income has been imputed to him and the filing of his tax return may

not suffice in determining an appropriate income for the purposes of calculating support as the question may arise again as to whether income should continue to be imputed to him. [ 31 ] K.F. has requested costs in the range of $1,135 to $2,430 or in such other amount as the court may deem appropriate. Other than with respect to the appropriate amount of s. 7 expenses to be paid by each, K.F. has been largely successful in this matter and is therefore entitled to costs. C.S. shall pay costs of $800 to be paid in monthly instalments of $50 until paid in full. J. C.M. RICHMOND