Parsons v. Chignecto-Central Regional School Board, 2013 NSSC 170

SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA Citation: Parsons v. Chignecto-Central Regional School Board 2013 NSSC 170 Date: 20130604 Docket: Hfx 393480 Registry: Halifax Between: Jacqueline Parsons Applicant v. Chignecto-Central Regional School Board Respondent Judge: The Honourable Justice Patrick J.

Duncan Heard: November 20, 2012, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Counsel: Jacqueline Parsons, applicant, in person Bryna Fraser, counsel for the respondent By the Court : Introduction [ 1 ] The applicant, Jacqueline Parsons, has initiated this judicial review of certain decisions made by a school principal, the Suspension Review Committee and the Suspension Appeal Committee of the respondent Chignecto-Central Regional School Board to suspend her son, Christopher Parsons, while he was a student at Hants East Rural High School. [ 2 ] Ms. Parsons seeks an order quashing all suspension decisions.

Her argument is based largely on allegations that there was a lack of procedural fairness. No argument has been put forward that the suspensions were unreasonable. [ 3 ] Ms. Parsons also alleges an infringement or denial of rights guaranteed in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms .

Principles of Procedural Fairness [4] The principles of procedural fairness applicable in this case are grounded both in the common law and legislated proceduralrights. Common Law Principles 1. Duty of Fairness Exists [5] There is a duty of procedural fairness lying with every public authority making an administrative decision which is not of alegislative nature and which affects the rights, privileges or interests of an individual.

The decision to suspend a student from schooltemporarily deprives the student of a public education which is his or her right under section 5 (2) of the Education Act S.N.S, 1995-96,c 1. Extended suspension has serious consequences for a student. Decisions to suspend attract a duty of procedural fairness. 2.

Privative Clause does not completely oust jurisdiction of the Court [6] Privative clauses such as Section 124(9) of the Education Act that purport to oust the jurisdiction of the court cannotpreclude judicial review, since "neither Parliament nor any legislature can completely remove the courts' power to review the actions anddecisions of administrative bodies." See, Dunsmuir v New Brunswick 2008 SCC 9, at para. 29. As such, while the presence of aprivative clause is a relevant factor when assessing the standard of review, it cannot foreclose judicial review entirely. 3.

When Judicial Deference to be Accorded [7] If a comprehensive statutory scheme exists to manage issues and that scheme incorporates procedural fairness and ameaningful appeal process, then significant judicial deference will be accorded to the scheme and the decisions made thereunder. 4. Correctness Standard to Be Applied [8] Questions of procedural fairness always attract a correctness standard and there is no need to further assess the standard ofreview. Justice Binnie, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court in Khosa v.

Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)2009 SCC 12, at para. 43, stated: "…procedural issues (subject to competent legislative override) are to be determined by a court on thebasis of a correctness standard of review." [9] The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal has simply noted that where procedural fairness is in issue, "a standard of review analysisis not triggered, per se. Instead, after considering all the circumstances, it simply falls to us to decide if the process was fair." See,Homburg Canada Inc. v. Nova Scotia (Utility and Review Board), 2010 NSCA 24, at para. 66. 5.

Duty of Fairness Can be Flexible [10] Although a duty of fairness may be owed, some decisions attract a lower level of procedural fairness than others. The SupremeCourt of Canada, in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 817, concludedthat the content of the duty of fairness is "flexible and variable, and depends on an appreciation of the context of the particular statute andthe rights affected." See, at para. 22.

[ 11 ] In assessing the level of procedural fairness demanded of a decision maker, the Supreme Court in Baker , supra, said it is helpful to assess the following factors: (1) the nature of the decision; (2) the nature of the statutory scheme; (3) the significance of the interests; (4) the legitimate expectations of the person challenging the decision; and (5) the previous procedural choices of the administrative decision maker.

See, at paras. 23-27. [ 12 ] Although these factors are useful, the Supreme Court in Canada (Attorney General) v Mavi 2011 SCC 30 noted, at para. 42 , that: "[t]he simple overarching requirement is fairness, and this 'central' notion of the 'just exercise of power' should not be diluted or obscured by jurisprudential lists developed to be helpful but not exhaustive." Statutory Procedural Requirements [ 13 ] The Education Act provides: Suspension 122 Where a student enrolled in a public school is persistently disobedient or defiant or conducts himself or herself in a manner likely to affect injuriously the proper conduct of the school or the welfare or education of other students enrolled in the school, the principal, or the person in charge of the school, may suspend the student for a period of not more than five school days. 1995-96, c. 1, s. 122 .

Review of suspension 123

(1) When a student is suspended pursuant to

Section 122 the principal or other person in charge of the school shall immediately notify, in writing, the student, the student's teachers, the school board and the student's parents of the reasons for the suspension.

(2) The student or the student's parents may request a review of the suspension pursuant to

Section 122 by the school board within three school days of receiving the notice pursuant to subsection (1).

(3) The school board shall (

a) confirm the suspension under

Section 122; or (

b) order that the suspension be revoked and that the suspension be removed from the Record of the student. 1995-96, c. 1, s. 123 . Extended suspension 124

(1) Where a student is suspended pursuant to

Section 122 and the principal is of the view that the student should be suspended for a period greater than five school days, the principal may, in writing, make a recommendation with reasons to the school board that the student be suspended for a period greater than five school days.

(2) When a recommendation is made pursuant to subsection (1), the school board shall immediately notify, in writing, the student and the student's parents of the principal's recommendation and reasons.

(3) Within seven days of having received the recommendation of the principal under subsection (1), the school board shall

(

a) dismiss the principal's recommendation; or (

b) extend the suspension of the student for a period of greater than five school days.

(4) Where the suspension of a student begins within two months of the end of the school academic year, the period of time for which a school board may extend the suspension under subsection (3) may include a portion of the next academic year.

(5) The school board shall notify the student, the parents of the student, the student's teachers, the principal or person in charge of the school of its decision under subsection (3) within three days of the meeting at which the decision was made.

(6) Where the school board decides under subsection (3) to extend the suspension of the student, the school board shall include in its notice under subsection (5) (

a) the period for which the student is to be further suspended; (

b) the reasons for the decision to further suspend the student; and (

c) the right of the student and of the student's parents to appeal the decision.

(7) When a student or the parent of a student has been notified of the suspension of the student pursuant to (5), the student or the parent may, within seven days of receiving such notice, appeal the suspension to the school board.

(8) The school board shall, upon receipt of a notice of appeal pursuant to subsection (7) (

a) immediately notify the parent of the student and the student of the time and place of the hearing of the appeal and the right of the student or parent, or both, to appear in person with or without counsel; (

b) within ten days of receipt of the notice of appeal, hold a hearing and confirm, revoke or vary the decision of the school board.

(9) Within three clear days of the hearing, the school board shall notify the student, the student's parent, the student's counsel, the student's teachers and the principal or person in charge of the school of its decision, which decision shall be final and binding. 1995-96, c. 1, s. 124 . Manner of exercising certain powers and duties 125

(1) The powers and duties of the school board set out in subsections 123(3) and 124(3) may be performed (

a) if so directed by the school board, by one or more committees consisting of the superintendent and two members of the school board, one of whom shall act as chair of the committee; (

b) if so directed by the school board, by the school advisory council of the school or a committee of the school advisory council; (

c) with the approval of the Minister, by one or more committees of persons designated by office or named by the school board.

(2) The power and duties of the school board set out in subsection 124(8) may be performed, if so directed by the school board, by one or more committees consisting of the superintendent and two members of the school board, one of whom shall act as chair of the committee. 1995-96, c. 1, s. 125 .

Alternative educational arrangements 126 Where a student is suspended for more than five school days, the school board, in consultation with the student's parent, shall make every reasonable effort to provide alternative arrangements for the education of the student, in accordance with the regulations. 1995-96, c. 1, s. 126 . Facts [ 14 ] On May 2, 2012 Christopher Parsons walked out of a classroom after saying to his teacher, Ms. White: "Fuck this -you're pissing me off- I'm fucking leaving." [ 15 ] Mr. Cassavechia, Coordinator of the Career Exploration Program (in which Mr.

Parsons participated) discussed the incident with Mr. Parsons on May 4, 2012. At that time Mr. Parsons was unrepentant, claiming that it was all Ms. White's fault for interrupting his private conversations. [ 16 ] Mr. Cassavechia referred the matter to the school Vice Principal, Mr. MacKeil. Mr. Parsons was suspended from school for 2 days, being May 7 and 8, 2012. Mr. Cassavechia was present when Mr. Parsons contacted his mother by telephone to advise her of the suspension and the reasons for his suspension. Mr. Parsons did not attend school on May 7 or 8, 2012. [ 17 ] A notice in writing was not given to Ms.

Parsons by the Vice Principal as was required by s. 123 (1) of the Education Act. Ms. Parsons submits that because she was not given that notice she was denied the right of appeal of the suspension to the school board pursuant to s. 123 (2) of the Act. She does not deny the incident occurred and made no complaint when her son did not attend school on May 7 or 8. [ 18 ] In a separate incident Mr. Parsons, while agitated, told Mr. Cassavechia that he wanted to fight another student (second student) . Mr. Parsons also told Mr.

Cassavechia "not to worry; he would pay someone to do it for him." On Monday, May 7, 2012, while serving his suspension from school, Mr. Parsons offered to pay a third student the sum of $100.00 to fight the second student referred to in the conversation between Mr. Parsons and Mr. Cassavechia. Following the offer of money by Mr. Parsons the second student was assaulted and injured. Several witnesses identified Mr. Parsons as the instigator. Mr. Cassavechia referred the incident to Vice Principal MacKeil. [ 19 ] On May 10, 2012 Mr. Parsons and Ms.

Parsons were advised in writing by Vice Principal MacKeil of the decision to suspend Mr. Parsons in relation to this assault for hire incident, for a period of 5 days - from May 11, 2012 to May 17, 2012. Both were notified in writing of their right to request a review of this decision within 3 days in accordance with 123(2) of the Act. [ 20 ] On May 10, 2012 the Parsons were further notified in writing of the Vice Principal's recommendation to the School Board for a lengthier suspension, giving reasons, pursuant to 124(1) of the Act.

Specifically, Vice Principal MacKeil recommended a further suspension from May 18, 2012 to the end of the school year. Ms. Parsons was advised that the Suspension Review Committee would convene within the next seven days and that she could send any pertinent information to them. Ms. Parsons also received a telephone call from Vice Principal MacKeil detailing the suspension, the recommendation for extended suspension and the reasons therefore.

[ 21 ] On May 10, 2012 Ms. Parsons emailed Michael Topshee, Chair of the Suspension Review Committee with concerns about her son's suspension and that she had not received written notice. She asked that her son be allowed to return to school until written notice was given. Written notice was confirmed to have been made that day. She requested a review of the decision. [ 22 ] Ms. Parsons was contacted by Mr. Topshee on May 14, 2012 and was asked to attend the Suspension Review Committee Hearing with her son on May 16, 2012 at 10 a.m. [ 23 ] On May 16, 2012 Ms.

Parsons attended the Suspension Review Committee Hearing. At the outset she was provided with a verbal breakdown of the process, the documents that would be considered and told of her right to appeal any decision of the Committee to the Suspension Appeal Committee within 7 days of the decision. She was given the opportunity to be heard and make submissions. Apparently her counsel had requested an adjournment so he could be represent her at the hearing. This was denied. Ms.

Parsons and her son made representations at the hearing. [ 24 ] On May 16, 2012 the Suspension Review Committee decided to alter the recommendation of Vice Principal MacKeil and to suspend Mr. Parsons until June 1, 2012, resulting in a suspension of 15 days. The Committee determined Mr. Parsons violated

Section 122 of the Act and that his conduct was likely to injuriously affect the proper conduct of the school or the welfare or education of other students enrolled in the school. They found Mr. Parsons incited a violent act against another student. In the circumstances they concluded that a period of extended suspension was warranted. Ms. Parsons was advised of the decision by telephone that day. Notice in writing of the decision was also sent to Ms. Parsons by mail that day.

She was again advised of the right to appeal the decision and that she must advise the school board within 7 days of the receipt of the written decision of her intention to appeal. [ 25 ] On May 17, 2012 Ms. Parsons emailed to Mr. Topshee asking where she could pick up the appeal papers. He provided her with the person and number to contact on May 17, 2012 and again on May 18, 2012. [ 26 ] Following several contacts between School Board officials and Ms. Parsons, School Board officials attempted to set up a Suspension Appeal Committee Hearing for May 29, 2012 and then again for June 4, 2012.

It was ultimately set for June 11, 2012. [ 27 ] Ms. Parsons requested that her partner, Ralph Doncaster (who is not a lawyer) be permitted to represent her at the hearing. Mr. Doncaster was subject to an Undertaking given to the Provincial Court to stay away from the School Board and its employees so the request was denied. [ 28 ] In the interim, in spite of a clear appeal process set out in the Education Act , Ms. Parsons filed an application in the Supreme Court. The documents in the application were provided, at her request, to the Suspension Appeal Committee for the June 11, 2012 hearing.

They formed part of the Suspension Appeal Booklet provided to all participants to the hearing. [ 29 ] Ms. Parsons attended the Suspension Appeal Committee hearing. Her son did not. She was provided with details concerning the process, told she could put evidence before the committee, ask questions of the school representative, and be questioned by the Panel. Ms. Parsons provided documents to the Committee and made oral submissions to the Committee.

She did not request that particular witnesses be produced for cross examination. [ 30 ] Following the hearing, the Suspension Appeal Committee decided to uphold the fifteen day suspension. [ 31 ] During the period of suspension Mr. Parsons received out of school help and completed certain assignments given by his teachers. Mr. Parsons returned to the school on June 4, 2012 and graduated from Grade 12 later that month. [ 32 ] Before this matter came for hearing before this Court Ms. Parsons asked again that Mr. Doncaster (not a lawyer) be permitted to represent her.

He was given permission to sit at counsel table with her, to assist her and provide moral support, but not to question

witnesses. Mr. Doncaster did not attend the Judicial Review hearing, citing other commitments. [ 33 ] Affidavit evidence was filed by both parties in advance of the hearing. The affidavits filed on behalf of the respondent reflected the Record of the proceedings below, and detailed the contacts between Ms. Parsons and officials of the respondent. [ 34 ] In advance of the hearing, Ms. Parsons asked that a number of the affiants be produced for cross-examination. They attended the hearing. In the end she requested only that Mr. Cassavechia be produced.

She questioned him on the basis of his knowledge that her son told her about the initial two day suspension for May 7 and 8 2012. He testified that he was present when her son called her. He described the location of the call and advised that he also spoke with Ms. Parsons briefly at the time, using her son's cell phone. She did not question any other affiants. [ 35 ] Ms. Parsons requested permission to call her son to testify in the hearing. It was explained that her son had not filed an affidavit and it was not appropriate to attempt to call such evidence at the hearing.

This was consistent with directions given to the parties in a recorded telephone conference conducted the week before the hearing. Discussion: Legislated Procedural Rights [ 36 ] As previously set out, there are a number of notice requirements and time limits embedded in sections 123 and 124 of the Education Act . Additionally, section 47(7)(

e) of the Ministerial Education Act Regulations provides that: 47(7) A regional school code of conduct policy shall [be] consistent with the provincial student discipline school code of conduct policy as prescribed in this section, and include all of the following: (

e) a process that gives a student or a student's parent a reasonable opportunity to respond to an alleged breach of the school code of conduct, the regional school code of conduct or the Provincial School Code of Conduct and to respond to the interventions or consequences resulting from the breach. [ 37 ] Although this provision does not necessarily entitle the student and his or her parents to a full hearing at all stages of the process, it does imply that they have the right to know the case to meet and the right to be heard at all stages of the process. [ 38 ] Further, in the case of an appeal of a School Board's decision to suspend the student for more than five days section 124(8) of the Education Act provides: 124 …. 8) The school board shall, upon receipt of a notice of appeal pursuant to subsection (7): (

a) immediately notify the parent of the student and the student of the time and place of the hearing of the appeal and the right of the student or parent, or both, to appear in person with or without counsel;

(

b) within ten days of receipt of the notice of appeal, hold a hearing and confirm, revoke or vary the decision of the school board. [ 39 ] This provision was considered briefly in Potter v. Halifax Regional School Board 2002 NSCA 88 where Justice Oland stated that: "[i]n any review of [a decision to suspend a student], the credibility of the student and witnesses will be a central issue." See, at para. 88. [ 40 ] The effect of section 124(8), together with the inference to be drawn from Potter, supra, is that the student has a right to an oral hearing, conducted de novo , at this final determination. Mr. and Ms.

Parsons were given that right. However, it is still necessary to consider whether these procedural requirements are mandatory or merely directory. As stated in Potter : The initial determination to be made when a procedural irregularity is alleged is not whether any prejudice has resulted. Rather, the initial determination is whether the procedural provision is mandatory or directory […] If the procedural provision is mandatory, compliance is necessary.

However, if it is directory, the irregularity may not affect the validity of what has been done and any prejudice and the extent of that prejudice becomes relevant. (at para. 117) [ 41 ] In this case, each of the procedural rights is prefaced by the word "shall". Section 9(3) of the

Interpretation Act RSNS 1989, c 235, provides that: "[i]n an enactment, "shall" is imperative and "may" is permissive." [ 42 ] However, that is not determinative. In Potter , the Court of Appeal interpreted "shall" as directory where the Education Act did not set out any penalty for failure to observe a procedural right. See, at para. 120. This becomes significant because there is no penalty for failure to observe sections 123 and 124 of the Education Act . Given the absence of a penalty, I am inclined to view the provisions as directory and thus will only invalidate the decision if they have caused prejudice. [ 43 ] Section 47(7)(

e) of the Ministerial Education Act Regulations explicitly permits school boards to create their own process and so to make their own procedural choices. The Chignecto-Central Regional School Board has done so with its School Code of Conduct: Administrative Guide (2008) . [ 44 ] Of particular note is "Appendix C: Procedural Guide for Out-of-School Suspension." With respect to decisions of the Principal, it does not differ from the statute.

However, with respect to the initial review of the decision by the School Board, the Code specifically provides that there shall be a hearing at which "the students/parents must have an opportunity to respond and present their position." It goes on to set out hearing procedures, and it notes that: "[t]he following procedures apply to both the Suspension Review and Appeal Committee[s]." [ 45 ] I turn now to the question of whether these "legislated procedural rights" meet minimum levels of procedural fairness. [ 46 ] With respect to the decision of the Principal, I am of the view that the legislated requirements meet the required duty of procedural fairness. [ 47 ] As to the decisions of the Review and Appeal Committees, legitimate expectations are very important.

In my view, the complainant may hold a reasonable expectation that all of the procedural rights listed in the CCRSB Code will be followed. [ 48 ] The provisions in the Code pertain solely to procedure, and they are clear and unambiguous. Moreover, the complainant does not need to prove that he or she had any actual knowledge of the CCRSB Code , so it is applicable even if it was not raised. Of particular note, the Code provides that the student should have full disclosure of the materials and that no Board member should decide on the case if he or she has a conflict of interest.

Further, the Principal is required to prove his or her case on a balance of probabilities at all levels and the Code specifically notes that "evidence heard on Appeal is not restricted to that presented at the Review Committee level." That

implies that the suspended student and his or her parents have a right to call evidence. [ 49 ] The CCRSB Code expressly discourages adherence to rules of evidence such as the taking of sworn testimony. [ 50 ] Given the nature of the proceedings I accept that these provisions set an appropriate level of procedural fairness. [ 51 ] It is also important to keep in mind that procedural fairness should not be applied mechanically and the overall requirement is fairness. Grounds in Application for Review [ 52 ] The applicant has sought judicial review on the following grounds: 1.

The Chignecto-Central Regional School Board was acting ultra vires its authority. 2. The decisions failed to comply with the Education Act and CCRSB policy ES-G - 05 . 3. The decisions infringe the Applicant's Charter Rights. 4. The manner in which the decisions were made violated the applicant's rights to procedural fairness and natural justice. Analysis Issue 1: The Chignecto-Central Regional School Board was acting ultra vires its authority. [ 53 ] The Education Act provides a comprehensive legislative scheme to manage student conduct and discipline.

In addition to the statutory provisions, there is delegated authority to the Board to put in place policies to respond to complaints of student misconduct, including the establishment of review bodies to provide oversight of school imposed discipline. [ 54 ] It is absolutely clear that in seeking to discipline Mr. Parsons the school and School Board officials were acting within their statutory mandate and their delegated authority. The Applicant has offered no evidence or cogent legal argument to support her submission. [ 55 ] The argument is without merit and this ground of review is dismissed.

Issue 2 : The decisions failed to comply with the Education Act and CCRSB policy ES-G -05. Initial Two Day Suspension [ 56 ] The applicant first points to the failure of the School Board to provide notice in writing of the two day suspension of her son for May 7 and 8, 2012, following the incident with Ms. White. The Board admits that this occurred, but maintains that verbal notice was provided of the suspension. [ 57 ] I am satisfied on review of the Record that Ms. Parsons was not notified in writing of the initial two day suspension, thus

resulting in a violation of

section 123 of the Education Act . [ 58 ] I am also satisfied on review of the Record that Ms. Parsons was fully aware of the suspension before it took effect as outlined by Mr. Cassavechia. Her son did not return to school on those dates and she made no complaint of the suspension until notified of the subsequent suspension. [ 59 ] Students and their parents have interests at stake in any decision to suspend the student. However, the significance of that interest depends in part on the length of time for which the student is suspended. Missing a few days of school is not overly significant, but missing a month is. This is implicitly recognized by

section 126 of the Education Act , which imposes a duty on the School Board to supply alternative arrangements for the education of students that are suspended for more than five days. In my view, decisions of the Principal to suspend a student for less than five days attract a lower level of procedural fairness than decisions of the School Board to extend the suspension. [ 60 ] Written notice should have been given. However, it was a short period of suspension; Ms. Parsons was aware in advance of the terms of the suspension; and she was aware of the reasons for the suspension.

Having regard to these circumstances, I am satisfied that the violation did not prejudice the student and the requirements for procedural fairness were satisfied. Suspension Review Committee [ 61 ] The applicant raises various concerns as to the manner in which the Suspension Review Committee (SRC) conducted its proceedings. 1. The SRC denied the applicant's request for an adjournment when her counsel was unavailable for the hearing. [ 62 ] The SRC is afforded a broad discretion in the conduct of the Review.

The Hearing procedures set out in Appendix C to the School Code of Conduct do not provide for the participation of legal counsel at the Review. There is a high degree of informality contemplated. Proceedings are not recorded. Witnesses are not sworn. [ 63 ] The Code permits adjournments but cautions against violating the fairly short statutory time lines for completion of the review. In this case time was of the essence since the school year was quickly drawing to a close. [ 64 ] The case was not complex and Ms. Parsons was:

(1) Made aware of the case to be met;

(2) Given notice of the hearing;

(3) Provided with the right to be heard, and in fact participated in the hearing;

(4) Given notice of the decision;

(5) Given written reasons for the decision; and

(6) Given assistance in her request to appeal. [ 65 ] I conclude that in all of the circumstances the process was fair. 2. The applicant submits that the Committee failed to comply with section 123(3) of the Education Act. [ 66 ] The applicant takes the position that a review of the second suspension required by section 123(3) of the Act was never "undertaken". (see, Applicant's Brief, page 2, para. 3) . The argument seems to be that since the student sought a review under

section 123, the SRC was required to confine itself to the remedies set out in section 123(3). i.e. , confirm the 5 day suspension, or revoke the suspension. [ 67 ] The SRC review was held in response to the Principal's recommendation to extend the suspension as provided for by

section 124. The Committee decision rendered moot any suggestion of a revocation of the suspension, or confirmation of a 5 day suspension. It is clear that in deciding to extend the suspension a further ten days the SRC did not consider the initial 5 day suspension sufficient. Their decision was reasonable and arrived at following appropriate adherence to necessary requirements of procedural fairness. [ 68 ] This ground of appeal is dismissed. 3.

The applicant submits that she was not provided with full disclosure of the case to be met for the second suspension. [ 69 ] While this has been characterized as a failure to disclose, the applicant's submission is that the SRC relied upon hearsay evidence given by Mr. Casavechia. She argues that there should have been a right to cross examine the students who said they heard Mr. Parsons make the offer of money in return for the assault, not just the recipient of that information, being Mr.

Casavechia. [ 70 ] It falls on the party asserting a lack of procedural fairness to rebut the presumption of procedural fairness. The applicant has not adduced evidence that a request was made, and refused, to examine a person with relevant and material information to the complaint. Specifically, there is no evidence to suggest that Ms. Parsons requested an opportunity to question the reporting students, teachers or the victim of the assault. [ 71 ] There is a right of the accused student to present their evidence in rebuttal.

There is no evidence that such a right was denied to the student. [ 72 ] The review was to assess the investigation and findings of the Principal, or designate. That person was available for cross examination. [ 73 ] A complete review of the Record from the SRC shows no manifest unfairness or actual prejudice to the applicant's right to be heard. [ 74 ] This ground of appeal is dismissed. Issue 3: The Applicant alleges her Charter Rights were infringed. [ 75 ] The applicant seeks to invoke section11 (

d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms , the right of a person charged with a criminal offence to be presumed innocent. Her son was not charged with a criminal offence. This argument has no merit.

[ 76 ] The applicant seeks to invoke

section 11(

a) of the Charter , the right of a person charged with a criminal offence to be informed without delay of the specific offence. Again this has no merit; Mr. Parsons was not charged with a criminal offence. [ 77 ] Finally, the applicant seeks to invoke the Charter

section 7 guarantee of "the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." [ 78 ] The Charter can sometimes be relevant to issues of procedural fairness, since deprivations of life, liberty, or security of the person can only be done in accordance with principles of fundamental justice. As such, it comes into play if: (

i) the legislation expressly limits the procedures; (ii) the administrative decision-maker is one to whom the Charter applies; and (iii) the decision endangers a

section 7 right. [ 79 ] Quite simply no

section 7 right is engaged in this case. and certainly no

section 7 right of the Applicant. This argument is without merit. Issue 4 : The manner in which the decisions were made violated the Applicant's rights to procedural fairness and natural justice. [ 80 ] For reasons already stated, I conclude that there has been no breach of procedural fairness or natural justice. Conclusion [ 81 ] The application is dismissed. If the parties are unable to agree as to costs I will hear their submissions upon request. [ 82 ] I direct that counsel for the respondent prepare the order dismissing the application. J.