ANDRE LUIS AGGI DE OLIVEIRA Applicant v. MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND, 2013 FC 488

Date: 20130509 Docket: IMM-10560-12 Citation: 2013 FC 488 Ottawa , Ontario , May 9, 2013 PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Harrington BETWEEN: ANDRE LUIS AGGI DE OLIVEIRA Applicant and MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS OR MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondents REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER [ 1 ] Mr. Aggi de Oliveira is Brazilian. He is a lawyer. He speaks flawless idiomatic English. He is gay. [ 2 ] He has sought protection in Canada because he fears persecution in Brazil based on his sexual orientation.

The final event which caused him to leave Brazil was an attack in the early morning hours by two “hoodies” who at knife point threatened to kill him if he did not change his “faggot” ways. He went to the police to file a complaint. They told him to come back in the morning. Instead, he came here. [ 3 ] The board member of the Refugee Protection Division, of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, who heard his case found him to be credible and to have a genuine subjective fear of persecution should he be returned to Brazil. He analyzed the claim under

section 96 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) on the basis that Mr. Aggi de Oliveira was a member of a “particular social group”; gay men. As a result, the member was only required to find a serious possibility of persecution of similarly situated individuals. Had he considered Mr. Aggi de Oliveira to be simply a victim of crime, the analysis would have been under

section 97, which requires an applicant to prove on the higher standard of the balance of probabilities that he would be subjected personally to a danger of torture or to a risk to life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. The board member determined that Mr. Aggi de Oliveira’s claim was not objectively well-founded because there was adequate state protection in Brazil, which protection was not sought. In this judicial review, Mr.

Aggi de Oliveira, who was self-represented at his refugee hearing, but who is now represented by counsel, alleges not only that the board member’s analysis of state protection was unreasonable, and actually incorrect in law, but also that there is a reasonable apprehension of bias in that he did not get a fair hearing because of remarks of the member which he took to be homophobic.

DECISION [4] I find that there is no basis for alleging bias on the part of the board member. I find further that he applied the correct legaltest regarding state protection and that his decision was reasonable. The application shall therefore be dismissed. BIAS [5] Natural justice dictates that a party be given a reasonable chance to make his or her case or defence before a neutral decisionmaker. Bias, real or apprehended, taints the actual or perceived objectivity of the decision maker and violates natural justice.

Faced withsuch a situation, the general rule, as laid down by the Supreme Court in Cardinal v Kent Institution, (SCC), [1985] 2SCR 643, [1985] SCJ No 78 (QL), is that the reviewing court is not to consider what the decision would have been, had there been a fairhearing. A new hearing is required. [6] The test to ascertain bias, as set out by Mr. Justice de Grandpré in Committee for Justice and Liberty et al v National EnergyBoard et al, (SCC), [1978] 1 SCR 369, has universally been followed. He said at page 394: The proper test to be applied in a matter of this type was correctly expressed by the Court of Appeal.

As already seen by the quotationabove, the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and right minded persons, applying themselves to thequestion and obtaining thereon the required information. In the words of the Court of Appeal, that test is “what would an informedperson, viewing the matter realistically and practically—and having thought the matter through—conclude. Would he think that it ismore likely than not that Mr.

Crowe, whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly.” He added that the grounds of the apprehension must be substantial and not based on a “very sensitive or scrupulous conscience.” [7] Natural justice, including procedural fairness, is beyond the pale of judicial review. No deference whatsoever is owed to thedecision maker (Canadian Union of Public Employees (C.U.P.

E) v Ontario (Minister of Labour), 2003 SCC 29, [2003] 1 SCR 539,[2003] SCJ No 28 (QL)). The hearing was conducted on 12 June 2012, and the decision rendered 26 September 2012. It was only afterthat decision that Mr. Aggi de Oliveira complained about the board member’s behaviour during the hearing. Indeed, at the conclusion hetold the board member: Thanks for hearing me… Thanks for especially making me feel comfortable because I thought it would be sort of – I don’t know. I read– I was reading yesterday ‘cause the nature of this hearing is non-adversarial – adversarial right?

Non-adversarial, that’s the word I read[...] I thought [...] there would be someone here trying to prove the opposite of what I am seeking. [8] The Ministers submit that had there been any apprehension of bias on the part of the board member, Mr. Aggi de Oliveirawaved same. As I have found that there is no reasonable basis for apprehending bias in the first place, I do not have to consider whetherhis silence over a three and a half month period constituted a waiver. [9] The allegations against the board member are that he was disrespectful, too casual and confrontational.

In stating thatVancouver was a gay-friendly city, while some of the environs were not, some of his language may have been taken to indicate that hewas not gay himself. He also referred to Mr. Aggi de Oliveira’s spouse as his “boyfriend” rather than as his “husband” or “spouse”. Thereference to his spouse as “boyfriend” is not demeaning. Mr. Aggi de Oliveira himself referred to him as his “partner” not his “spouse”.No marriage certificate was produced. [10] During the hearing, he inquired how he had met his spouse, which was on a website. The board member said “that is kind ofromantic”. Mr.

Aggi de Oliveira said this was stated in a sarcastic tone. However, not only a transcript of the hearing, but a recordingthereof was produced as well. There was no sarcasm whatsoever in the statement. Rather, in context, “romantic” means full-hardy, risky,certainly not cool and calculated. [11] Mr. Aggi de Oliveira has the impression that the board member has a personal bias against or non-impartiality towardshomosexual men, in part because he referred to them as “dude”.

[12] The board member was commenting upon changes in Vancouver, and identified areas that “are very gay positive parts oftown…but you get out to the Valley, Abbotsford, Langley…”, at which point Mr. Aggi de Oliveira himself added “New Westminster”.The board member continued “I wouldn’t hold hands with a dude down there. I wouldn’t kiss a dude down there. They’re veryconservative, so it’s just…you know…one hour out of Vancouver, you’re going to be in homophobic land.” [13] The word “dude” came up because of the conversational tone of the hearing.

This was not a case of an applicant testifyingthrough an interpreter. Mr. Aggi de Oliveira speaks flawless idiomatic English, which lent itself to a more relaxed hearing. Perhaps,“dude” was not the best word, but any word would do if one is looking to take offence. Nobody enlightened me as to whether “dude” hasa meaning other than that set out in the dictionary. [14] His point was that Canada is not universally accepting, and this led to an analysis of the situation in Brazil, where major citiesare gay friendly, at least in specific areas.

He may have had an internal flight alternative in mind, but instead decided on state protection. [15] The alleged confrontation was when the member said that Mr. Aggi de Oliveira may have blown off his chances by decliningto return to the police station in the light of day. The member’s tone was not aggressive; Mr. Aggi de Oliveira was not intimidated andreplied in kind. The member is entitled to cross-examine. The remark fell far short of that and simply was fair comment on the concept ofstate protection. [16] It would have been relatively easy for the board member to camouflage any bias on his part.

He mentioned, but did not givemuch weight, to two incidents. The first is that after having been attacked by the “hoodies”, even before reporting to the police heprepared and sent a long email to Canadian officials saying he was on his way here. The second is that he had developed an onlinerelationship with a French national and they agreed to meet in Vancouver where they subsequently married. These incidents could haveput his subjective fear into question, a fear which the board member nevertheless fully accepted. STATE PROTECTION [17] Mr.

Aggi de Oliveira recounted a number of incidents over several years, none of which alone, or in the aggregate, could beconsidered persecution, save and except the incident involving the “hoodies”. Being told by a waiter not to kiss his boyfriend in aBrazilian restaurant is hardly a sign of persecution, particularly since no evidence was led that passionate kissing between male andfemale would have been acceptable. [18] Mr. Aggi de Oliveira speculates as to why, after the attack by the “hoodies” he was told to come back during the day shift. Itmay well have been that there was only a skeleton staff in the station.

In any event, he was unable to identify his attackers. [19] The test for state protection is well known. The burden is on the applicant and the more democratic the country the morelikely we are to presume that state protection is available. The board member found that state protection for gays and lesbians in Brazil isfar from perfect, but applying the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) vVillafranca (1992), (FCA), 18 Imm LR (2d) 130, [1992] FCJ No 1189 (QL), concluded that, based on the review ofthe country conditions, protection was adequate.

That is the test. One cannot insist upon perfection. [20] Brazil is a democracy. Those who finally caused him to leave Brazil were not state actors. In Hinzman v Canada (Minister ofCitizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 171, 382 NR 1, [2007] FCJ No 584 (QL), after referring to Kadenko v Canada (SolicitorGeneral) (1996), (FCA), 143 DLR (4th) 532, [1996] FCJ No 1376 (QL) and Minister of Employment andImmigration v Satiacum (1989), 99 NR 171 (FCA), [1989] FCJ No 505 (QL), Mr.

Justice Sexton, speaking for the Court of Appeal, saidat paragraph 57: Kadenko and Satiacum together teach that in the case of a developed democracy, the claimant is faced with the burden of proving that heexhausted all the possible protections available to him and will be exempted from his obligation to seek state protection only in the eventof exceptional circumstances: Kadenko at page 534, Satiacum at page 176.

Reading all these authorities together, a claimant comingfrom a democratic country will have a heavy burden when attempting to show that he should not have been required to exhaust all of therecourses available to him domestically before claiming refugee status. In view of the fact that the United States is a democracy that hasadopted a comprehensive scheme to ensure those who object to military service are dealt with fairly, I conclude that the appellants haveadduced insufficient support to satisfy this high threshold.

Therefore, I find that it was objectively unreasonable for the appellants to havefailed to take significant steps to attempt to obtain protection in the United States before claiming refugee status in Canada.

[ 21 ] So it is in this case. ORDER FOR REASONS GIVEN; THIS COURT ORDERS that: 1. The application for judicial review is dismissed. 2. There is no serious question of general importance to certify. “Sean Harrington” Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-10560-12 STYLE OF CAUSE: AGGI DE OLIVEIRA v MPSEP ET AL PLACE OF HEARING: VANCOUVER, BRITISH COLUMBIA DATE OF HEARING: APRIL 29, 2013 REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER: HARRINGTON J. DATED: MAY 9, 2013 APPEARANCES :

Fritz C. Gaerdes FOR THE APPLICANT Jennifer Dagsvik FOR THE RESPONDENTS SOLICITORS OF RECORD : Elgin Cannon & Associates Barristers & Solicitors Vancouver , British Columbia FOR THE APPLICANT William F. Pentney Deputy Attorney General of Canada Vancouver , British Columbia FOR THE RESPONDENTS