TSISKARA KARDAVA Applicant v. THE MINISTER OF, 2016 FC 159

Date: 20160209 Docket: IMM-2334-15 Citation: 2016 FC 159 Ottawa, Ontario, February 9, 2016 PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Southcott BETWEEN:TSISKARA KARDAVAApplicantandTHE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATIONRespondent ORDER AND REASONS I.

Background [1] The Respondent filed a motion record on January 13, 2016 in support of a motion in writing under Rule 369 of the FederalCourt Rules [the Rules] to dismiss the Applicant’s application for judicial review and to vacate the hearing date of January 27, 2016; [2] The Applicant’s underlying application seeks judicial review of the decision of the Refugee Protection Division [RPD] ofthe Immigration and Refugee Board dated April 27, 2015 that the Applicant had abandoned his claim for status as Convention refugeepursuant to

section 96 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA] or a person in need of protection pursuant tosection 97 of IRPA. [3] The grounds for the motion are that the application is moot, because on July 27, 2015 the Applicant filed an application withthe RPD to have his claim reopened, and on July 30, 2015 the RPD allowed that application. [4] The Applicant, who is self-represented, did not file any response to the Respondent’s motion within the time provided by theRules.

Because I did not wish to rule on the motion without the benefit of submissions from the Applicant, I issued an Order under Rule369(4) on January 25, 2016, scheduling the Respondent’s motion to proceed by way of oral hearing when the parties appeared for thehearing of the application for judicial review. [5] After hearing the parties’ oral submissions on the motion on January 27, 2016, I ruled from the bench that the motion wasgranted, the application dismissed, and the hearing date vacated, with an Order with Reasons to follow. This is that Order and Reasons. II.

Issue [6] The sole issue to be considered on this motion is whether the Applicant’s application for judicial review should be dismissedas moot. III. Positions of the Parties A.

Respondent’s Submissions [7] The Respondent recognizes that the Court is generally reluctant to dismiss applications for judicial review on motion butcites authority that mootness represents a ground for finding no possibility of success and striking out or dismissing an application (seeRahman v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 137 at paras 8-10 [Rahman]). [8] The Respondent then refers to the principles surrounding the analysis of mootness as advanced in Borowski v AttorneyGeneral of Canada, (SCC), [1989] 1 SCR 342 [Borowski].

The Respondent notes that the test for mootness involves atwo-stage analysis.

At the first stage, the Court must consider whether its decision will have a practical effect on the rights of the parties.At the second stage, the Court must consider whether to exercise its discretion and make a determination on the merits, notwithstandingthat the matter is technically moot. [9] The Respondent argues that a decision on the merits in this case will not have the effect of resolving a controversy betweenthe parties, as the Applicant has already been granted by the RPD the relief that he is seeking in his judicial review application.

TheRespondent further submits that the Court should not exercise its discretion to hear and decide the matter notwithstanding that it is moot.Its position is that judicial economy militates against this. It is preferable to determine disputes in a genuine adversarial context unlessthe circumstances suggest that the dispute will always disappear before it is ultimately resolved, and this is not a case where it is in thepublic interest to address the merits in order to settle the law or to avoid some social cost.

B. Applicant’s Submissions [10] At the hearing of the motion, the Applicant communicated with the Court through a Russian-English interpreter. I explainedthe nature and basis of the Respondent’s motion to the Applicant and asked if he opposed the motion. It appeared from his responses thathe did.

Accordingly, I asked him to explain if there were any benefits that he thought would be achieved if I were to hear and decide hisjudicial review application, in the context of his claim for refugee protection having already been reopened, and whether there were anyother submissions he wished to make in response to the motion. [11] The Applicant referred to concern that the “other court”, by which I understood him to be referring to the RPD, had notbelieved him in the past and would not believe him in the future.

He referred to having advised the RPD at his abandonment hearing thathe saw devils present and stated that the RPD disbelieved him and thought he was lying or trying to buy time. IV.

Analysis [12] As a preliminary point, I note and rely on the decision in Rahman, as authority for dismissing an application for judicialreview on motion, without hearing the application itself, where the application is without any possibility of success because it is moot. [13] In the recent decision in Harvan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1026, Justice Diner succinctlyoutlined the principles relevant to a mootness analysis, as derived from Borowski: [7] The test for mootness comprises a two-step analysis.

The first step asks whether the Court's decision would have any practicaleffect on solving a live controversy between the parties, and the Court should consider whether the issues have become academic, andwhether the dispute has disappeared, in which case the proceedings are moot. If the first step of the test is met, the second step is —notwithstanding the fact that the matter is moot — that the Court must consider whether to nonetheless exercise its discretion to decidethe case.

The Court's exercise of discretion in the second step should be guided by three policy rationales which are as follows: i. the presence of an adversarial context; ii. the concern for judicial economy; iii. the consideration of whether the Court would be encroaching upon the legislative sphere rather than fulfilling its role as theadjudicative branch of government. (See Borowski v Canada (Attorney General), (SCC), [1989] 1 SCR 342 (S.C.C.) at paras 15-17, and 29-40 [Borowski]) [14] My decision is to grant the Respondent’s motion and dismiss the Applicant’s application for judicial review, on the basis thatit is moot and that the relevant factors do not warrant an exercise of discretion to hear the application despite such mootness. [15] The application seeks to set aside a decision of the RPD that the Applicant had abandoned his claim for refugee protection.The application is moot because the Applicant has applied to the RPD to have his claim re-opened, and that application was granted onJuly 30, 2015.

The Respondent’s counsel advised at the hearing that she had checked with the Immigration and Refugee Board theprevious day and confirmed that the Applicant’s claim was re-opened and that the Applicant would have an opportunity to put forth hisentire claim for refugee protection, although that had not yet been scheduled. As such, a decision on the application for judicial reviewwould not have any practical effect in solving a live controversy between the parties. [16] Turning to the second step of the Borowski analysis, I have considered the relevant factors in the context of the Applicant’ssubmissions.

Any concerns he has about the RPD believing him in his re-opened refugee proceeding will have to be addressed before theRPD in that proceeding. The present judicial review application is not capable of addressing those concerns. As such, I find that thisapplication does not represent an adversarial context in which his concerns can be addressed.

For the same reasons, I see no compellingreason why judicial resources should be expended on hearing and adjudicating this application. [17] On the subject of the third Borowski factor, I do not consider that deciding the application would raise concerns about theCourt encroaching upon the legislative sphere as opposed to fulfilling its adjudicative role.

However, I also note the analysis in Sogi vCanada (Minister Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 108, which considers, as part of third factor, whether performing theadjudicative function to decide a matter that is otherwise moot would generate new law that is needed from the Court.

I see no scope forsuch a benefit arising from the case at hand. [18] As such, having taken into account the Borowski factors, I have not identified any basis for an exercise of discretion to hearthe application notwithstanding that it is moot. [19] My Order accordingly grants the Respondent’s motion, dismisses the application, and vacates the hearing date for theapplication. The Respondent did not seek costs, and none are awarded. ORDER THIS COURT ORDERS that 1. The Respondent’s motion is granted;

2. The Applicant’s application for judicial review is dismissed and the hearing date of January 27, 2016 for such application is vacated; and 3. No costs are awarded. “Richard F. Southcott” Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-2334-15 STYLE OF CAUSE: TSISKARA KARDAVA AND THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF HEARING: Ottawa, Ontario DATE OF HEARING: January 27, 2016 REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER: SOUTHCOTT J. DATED: February 9, 2016 APPEARANCES : Tsiskara Kardava For The APPLICANT (Self-represented Applicant) Aleksandra Lipska For The Defendant SOLICITORS OF RECORD : William F. Pentney Deputy Attorney General of Canada Toronto, Ontario For The RESPONDENT