ATTILA FARKAS Applicant v. MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, 2018 FC 658

Date: 20180624 Docket: IMM-2893-18 Citation: 2018 FC 658 Ottawa, Ontario, June 24, 2018 PRESENT: Mr. Justice Grammond BETWEEN: ATTILA FARKAS Applicant and MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS Respondent ORDER AND REASONS [ 1 ] The applicant, Mr. Attila Farkas, brings a motion for a stay of his removal from Canada scheduled for tomorrow, June 25, 2018. The motion was heard earlier today by teleconference. These are my reasons for granting the motion. I. Facts and Underlying Decisions [ 2 ] Mr. Farkas is a citizen of Hungary of Roma ethnicity.

He came to Canada with his wife in 2011 and claimed asylum on the basis of persecution because of their Roma ethnicity. However, because of his wife’s illness, they returned to Hungary in 2013 and abandoned his claim for asylum. They stayed in Hungary for less than a year and then went to Germany, where he also encountered difficulties with his Hungarian employer. They decided to come back to Canada in 2015, obtaining visas for that purpose. [ 3 ] Mr. Farkas then retained the services of Mr. Macdonald Scott, whom he believed was a lawyer, but was in reality an immigration consultant. Mr. Scott assured Mr.

Farkas that his Canadian visa would be renewed and that there was no need to worry. He also advised Mr. Farkas to wait before submitting an application on humanitarian and compassionate [H&C] grounds. [ 4 ] In October 2017, Mr. Farkas and his wife were detained by immigration authorities. As they had overstayed their visas, they were subject to removal. They were then offered the opportunity to ask for a pre-removal risk assessment [PRRA]. They retained Mr. Scott for the purposes of preparing their PRRA application. [ 5 ] Mr. Farkas now says that Mr.

Scott failed to file relevant documents in support of his PRRA application, including police reports from Hungarian and German authorities. He also faults Mr. Scott for drafting an incomplete affidavit for his signature, which did not include details about his story that would have been relevant to the PRRA application. He filed a complaint against Mr. Farkas with the Immigration Consultants of Canada Regulatory Council. [ 6 ] Mr. Scott provided an affidavit, dated June 21, 2018, that was filed in support of the present motion. He says that he prepared Mr.

Farkas’s PRRA application based on country documentation and not on any documents pertaining to Mr. Farkas’s personal situation. While he acknowledges that this departs from his usual practice and was " “substandard,” " he asserts that this may be due, at least in part, to a " “breakdown in […] communication and relationship” " with Mr. Farkas. [ 7 ] Mr. Farkas’s PRRA application was denied on March 22, 2018. He was informed of the decision on May 1 st , 2018, and was given a direction to report to Pearson airport for his removal to Hungary on June 2, 2018. Mr.

Farkas applied to this Court for judicial review of the PRRA decision (file no. IMM-2534-18). He also made a motion for a stay of his removal to Hungary. On June 1, 2018, my colleague Justice Henry Brown dismissed that motion. [ 8 ] Yet, Mr. Farkas did not report for his removal on June 2, apparently on account of illness. It appears that he later reported voluntarily to the Canadian Border Services Agency [CBSA]. He was given a new direction to report for his removal on June 25, 2018. On June 20, he applied to the CBSA Enforcement Officer for a stay of his removal. That application was refused on June 22, 2018.

On the same day, Mr. Farkas brought this application for judicial review against the Enforcement Officer’s negative decision. In the context of this application, he brought a motion for the stay of his removal. II. Analysis [ 9 ] The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , SC 2001 c 27 [the Act], does not require a judicial authorization to remove a foreign national from Canada. In that sense, a stay of removal is an exceptional remedy, as it interferes with the normal administrative process. [ 10 ] The statutory basis for a stay of removal is found in

section 18.2 of the Federal Courts Act , RSC 1985, c F-7, which provides that this Court may make interim orders pending the final disposition of an application for judicial review. In granting such relief, we apply the same test as for interlocutory injunctions. The Supreme Court of Canada recently restated the test as follows: At the first stage, the application judge is to undertake a preliminary investigation of the merits to decide whether the applicant demonstrates a “serious question to be tried”, in the sense that the application is neither frivolous nor vexatious.

The applicant must then, at the second stage, convince the court that it will suffer irreparable harm if an injunction isrefused. Finally, the third stage of the test requires an assessment of the balance of convenience, in order to identify the partywhich would suffer greater harm from the granting or refusal of the interlocutory injunction, pending a decision on themerits. (R v Canadian Broadcasting Corp, 2018 SCC 5 at para 12, references omitted) [11] This three-pronged test is well-known.

It had been set out in earlier decisions of the Supreme Court (Manitoba (Attorney General) vMetropolitan Stores Ltd., (SCC), [1987] 1 SCR 110; RJR — MacDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney General), (SCC), [1994] 1 SCR 311 [RJR]). It was also applied in the immigration context in Toth v Canada (Minister of Employment andImmigration), (FCA). Of course, the application of this test is highly contextual and fact-dependent. A. Specific Procedural Situation [12] The procedural situation before me is somewhat unusual and complex. It results from Mr.

Farkas’s recent realization of the errorscommitted by his former immigration consultant and subsequent attempts to retain new counsel. As a result, two separate applicationswere made to this Court, with this one including a more comprehensive record with respect to the errors made by the immigrationconsultant and the materials he failed to submit to the PRRA officer. [13] An unusual aspect of this case is that I am asked to order a stay of removal while Justice Brown refused to do so barely three weeksago.

Justice Brown referred to the three-part test for granting a stay, explained below, and concluded that there was a serious question tobe tried, but that Mr. Farkas had not shown irreparable harm. There are no detailed reasons in support of those conclusions. I understand,however, that Justice Brown did not have the full record that is now before me. I cannot speculate as to what his reasoning would havebeen had he had the benefit of that record. While I have great respect for my colleague, I must come to my own conclusions on the basisof the record before me. B.

Serious Question to be Tried [14] In RJR, the Supreme Court stated that the "“serious question to be tried”" criterion is a relatively low threshold (RJR at 337).

In theadministrative law context, this must be assessed while keeping in mind that the applicable standard of review is reasonableness. [15] Where an application for judicial review is brought against a decision of an Enforcement Officer refusing to defer removal, theFederal Court of Appeal stated that the burden is higher and the applicant must show "“quite a strong case”" (Baron v Canada (Ministerof Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2009 FCA 81 at paras 66-67 [Baron]). [16] This is because, in such a situation, the previous steps in the immigration process are not challenged and the granting of a staywould give the applicant what he or she asks in the underlying application for judicial review.

The situation is different where there areconcurrent applications for judicial review against a PRRA decision and a refusal to defer removal. In such a situation, it is artificial toapply one test in the first case and a different test in the other. Thus, it is sufficient to show a serious question to be tried. [17] Given the urgency of the matter, I will not undertake a detailed analysis of the arguments put forth by Mr. Farkas.

In any event, ourusual practice is to refrain from making detailed comments on the merits of the underlying application, in order to preserve the freedomof the judge who will hear the merits. I will simply say this. In a motion for stay of removal based on a challenge to a PRRAdetermination, there is a large degree of overlap between the first and second prongs of the RJR test. This is because the PRRA processis geared towards the assessment of a form of "“irreparable harm,”" even though these specific words are not used in the Act.

Thegrounds for finding irreparable harm, which I discuss below, thus go a long way towards establishing a serious question to be tried. C. Irreparable Harm [18] The second prong of the RJR test relates to irreparable harm. Mr. Farkas asserts three types of harm: (1) he will be again subject topersecution if he is forced to return to Hungary; (2) the potential mootness of his application for a reopening of his PRRA decision; (3)irreparable harm to Mr.

Farkas’s niece and wife, of whom he is the sole economic support. [19] I would not give effect to the second and third arguments. [20] With respect to the potential mootness of his application to reopen his PRRA decision and his application for judicial review ofsame, I note that the Federal Court of Appeal has repeatedly stated that this does not, in and of itself, constitute irreparable harm (ElOuardi v Canada (Solicitor General), 2005 FCA 42 at para 8; Baron v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and EmergencyPreparedness), 2009 FCA 81 at para 50, [2010] 2 FCR 311; Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v Shpati, 2011 FCA286 at paras 35-39, [2012] 2 FCR 133; Lewis v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2017 FCA 130 at paras 56-57). [21] With respect to the consequences of Mr.

Farkas’s removal on his wife and niece, I would observe that a certain degree of hardshipis inherent in removal from Canada (Kanthasamy v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 SCC 51, [2015] 3 SCR 909 at para 23).Such hardships may not be considered as irreparable harm, lest the entire scheme of the Act be defeated. [22] Mr. Farkas’s first argument, however, is more substantial.

Of course, a motion for stay of removal is not the appropriate forum toreargue harms that have been adequately assessed by previous decision-makers (see, e.g., Goshen v Canada (Public Safety andEmergency Preparedness), 2011 FC 1380 at para 6). In particular, as I noted above, the PRRA process is designed to assess a form ofirreparable harm. Thus, where an applicant on a motion for a stay of removal alleges a risk that has already been assessed in the PRRAprocess, we usually defer to the findings of the PRRA officer, unless there is a serious flaw in the officer’s analysis.

[23] There are such serious flaws in this case. These flaws relate to the PRRA officer’s failure to address Mr. Farkas’s individualsituation, which may be due to Mr. Farkas’s immigration consultant’s mishandling of the matter. More fundamentally, they relate to theofficer’s flawed analysis of the persecution of the Roma in Hungary and the lack of state protection. I will deal with the latter issue first.

(1) State Protection for Hungarian Roma [24] The bulk of the PRRA officer’s reasons are devoted to an analysis of country information concerning Hungary. In

summary, theofficer notes the following: Roma suffer discrimination in almost all fields of life, including employment, health, housing and education; Roma face systematic violence from extremist groups; Hungarian police fail to investigate hate crime against minority group members, including the Roma, as found, in particular, by theEuropean Court of Human Rights (RB v Hungary, 12 April 2016); Moreover, the Roma are disproportionately penalized by the police for petty offences; Municipalities have resorted to various tactics to discourage Roma to settle in their territory and, in some cases, have conductedeviction campaigns or raid-like inspections; With respect to education, Roma children are often segregated in special schools without basis; Hungary was condemned by theEuropean Court of Human Rights (Horváth and Kiss v Hungary, 29 January 2013) and as of 2016, had not complied with thejudgment. [25] The officer went on to analyze the question of state protection and noted the following: It is unclear that the government has adopted the anti-Roma policies of a right-wing party; There is an independent police complaints board that may make recommendation in case of police misconduct; The Hungarian government has undertaken initiatives aimed at improving the situation of Roma with respect to employment,schooling and housing; While the Hungarian courts have declared that the actions of certain municipalities are illegal, these actions continue without legalauthorization; in particular, "“the raids often involved large numbers of government police, government inspectors and otherofficials descending on homes in segregated living areas populated mostly by Roma.”" [26] The officer then concluded that Mr.

Farkas had provided little evidence of persecution against him personally.

He then found thatstate protection was available in any event: With respect to the notion of state protection, the documentary evidence is uneven amongst the various sources considered.However, the preponderance of the objective evidence shows that while state protection may not be perfect, it is adequatefor Roma who are victims of crime, police abuse, discrimination or persecution. [27] In AB v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 237 [AB], I reviewed certain principles that must be borne in mind whenanalyzing the issue of state protection for the Roma in Hungary: [17] Where a claimant has provided evidence that state protection may not be available, this Court has held that a decision-maker must do more than simply point to efforts made by a foreign country to address shortcomings in the areas of policingand criminal justice, such as the enactment of new legislation or other measures.

Those efforts must translate intooperationally adequate measures (Garcia v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 79, [2007] 4 FCR385 at paras 15, 18, 20; Meza Varela v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1364 at para 16; Majoros v Canada(Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 421 [Majoros]; Beri v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 854; Juhaszv Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 300). [18] Failure of state protection is rarely a purely individual issue. It usually has a systemic dimension (see Majoros at paras13-16).

In certain cases, the effectiveness of the police apparatus as a whole is impugned. In other cases, biases againstparticular groups are alleged to be prevalent among police officers. For that reason, evidence of systemic failures will oftenbe highly relevant. What matters is how the police are likely to treat complaints from members of a specific group in thefuture. The manner in which the police treated a specific individual in the past may be a relevant predictor, but it is notdeterminative. Systemic evidence is rarely within the reach of individual claimants.

This is why the RPD and the RAD relyextensively on information compiled by governments and NGOs about the human rights situation in refugee claimants’countries of origin. [19] Undue focus on individual situations may distract from the forward-looking and systemic aspects of the state protectionanalysis. For example, it is sometimes said that state protection need not be perfect, and that individual failures of the policeto protect a certain individual do not constitute insufficient state protection (see Canada (Minister of Employment andImmigration) v Villafranca (1992), (FCA), 99 DLR (4th) 334 (FCA)).

It is certainly true that the policeare not required to solve each and every crime; state protection does not mean that criminality has to be completelyeradicated. Yet, assertions that perfection is not the appropriate yardstick should not be allowed to obscure documentedsystemic problems. Individual policing failures do not prove that state protection is inadequate, and neither does the fact thatthe police took some action in an individual case prove the adequacy of state protection.

[ 28 ] In this case, there is compelling evidence that the Roma in Hungary are systematically subjected to persecution, either at the hands of non-state actors such as extremist groups, or as a result of the actions of municipalities or right-wing political parties. When non-state actors are involved in persecution, the issue becomes the availability of state protection. That protection is expected to be provided by the police. While laudable, initiatives related to employment, housing or schooling, described at length by the PRRA officer, are irrelevant to this inquiry.

To state things bluntly, if extremist groups are throwing Molotov cocktails at Romani persons’ houses with impunity, it matters little that the Hungarian state provided scholarships to 128 Romani postsecondary students. The fact that the government offers services intended to improve the socio-economic situation of the Roma is of no moment if the persecution continues unabated. [ 29 ] The only question is whether Hungarian police are effectively combating hate crime directed at the Roma.

The test is not one of good intentions, but operational effectiveness: AB at para 17; Lakatos v Canada (Immigration and Citizenship) , 2018 FC 367 . [ 30 ] In this regard, the evidence shows that the police are unable or unwilling to counter persecution against the Roma. In this regard, the European Council against Racism and Intolerance [ECRI] stated, in its 2015 report on Hungary: Racist violence against Roma has been described as one of the most important problems faced by Hungary today. This is committed both by extremist groups and by individuals motivated by racial hatred.

Between January 2008 and September 2012, there were 61 separate attacks against Roma and/or their property, with the use of Molotov cocktails, hand grenades and guns. The attacks took nine lives, including two minors and left dozens injured. […] ECRI notes that paramilitary groups have been marching and organising demonstrations in villages since 2006. In March 2011, such groups marched and patrolled in Gyöngyöspata over several weeks, harassing and intimidating the Roma community and threatening them with weapons and dogs. Human rights NGOs called on state authorities to take immediate actions.

As a result, Roma women and children were relocated due to the threat of violence. Similar activities continued in 2012, when demonstrations were organised in Devecser, Cegléd and Miskolc. All these incidents were characterized by intimidation of Roma in their own neighbourhoods, illegal patrols, the chanting of anti-Roma slogans, death threats, and sometimes damage to Roma property. ECRI notes that the situation appears to have improved since 2013. [ 31 ] ECRI noted that certain measures were taken to improve police response to hate crimes against Roma.

However, it also noted that crime prevention strategies adopted in 2013-15 were silent about hate crimes. [ 32 ] A 2016 response to an information request by the Research Directorate of the Immigration and Refugee Board mentioned that Amnesty International reported in 2016 that the " “Roma continued to be… inadequately protected against hate crimes.” " A Hungarian NGO stated that Roma were not adequately protected against hate crime.

It wrote: " “Our clients did not get protection from police even when members of well-known right-wing paramilitary organizations were threatening and harassing them for weeks and they reported this on a daily basis to the police.” " The Research Directorate also contacted the Hungarian embassy in Ottawa, which simply reported that training programs had been put in place to raise awareness of hate crime issues among police forces. [ 33 ] I would also draw the attention to the following conclusions of the European Court of Human Rights in RB v Hungary , a case noted in the materials reviewed by the PRRA officer: 90.

Having regard to the specific and substantiated allegations made by the applicant during the investigation and the factual circumstances of the incident, the competent authorities had evidence at their disposal suggesting a racist motive for the verbal violence directed against the applicant. However, the legal provisions, as in force at the material time, provided no appropriate legal avenue for the applicant to seek remedy for the alleged racially motivated insult. 91.

In the Court’s view, this state of affairs did not provide adequate protection to the applicant against an attack on her integrity and showed that the manner in which the criminal-law mechanisms were implemented in the instant case were defective to the point of constituting a violation of the respondent State’s positive obligations under

Article 8 of the Convention. [ 34 ] In this context, I do not think that one can seize upon references to some improvement in 2013 or training programs offered in 2016 to detract from the obvious conclusion that Hungarian police forces do not afford adequate state protection to Roma who are victims of hate crime. I would also add that state officials are sometimes the agents of persecution themselves, which renders the issue of state protection irrelevant. Hence, in the context of a motion for a stay of removal, I conclude that Mr.

Farkas has shown that, upon his removal to Hungary, he would face a serious risk of irreparable harm because of his Romani identity. [ 35 ] My conclusion is bolstered by a recent report of the United Nations Human Rights Committee regarding the situation in Hungary, which states, in its relevant part: Roma exclusion 15.

While noting the adoption of various strategies and programmes to improve the situation of the Roma community and the progress made in certain areas, such as school attendance by Roma children, the Committee is concerned about reports that the Roma community continues to suffer from widespread discrimination and exclusion, unemployment and housing and educational segregation.

It is particularly concerned that, notwithstanding the Public Education Act of 2012, segregation remains prevalent in schools, especially church and private schools, and the number of Roma children placed in schools for children with mild disabilities remains disproportionately high (arts. 2, 24 and 26). 16. The State party should increase its efforts to promote non-discriminatory access to opportunities and services in all fields for members of the Roma community.

It should adopt measures to monitor and effectively eradicate the educational segregation of Roma children, and ensure that standardized procedures based on scientific methods are

used by all experts assessing whether children have disabilities and that education is provided to all Roma children on a non-discriminatory basis. Hate speech, hate crimes, racism and discriminatory behaviour by the police 17. While acknowledging that hate crime is included in the Criminal Code , the Committee is concerned about the prevalence of hate crimes and about hate speech targeting minorities, notably Roma, Muslims, migrants and refugees, in political discourse, in the media, on the Internet and even in Government-sponsored campaigns.

The Committee notes the information provided by the State party about the measures taken to promote Jewish life in Hungary, but expresses its concern about the prevalence of anti-Semitic stereotypes and the negative historical associations arising out of the manner in which high-ranking officials have nurtured conspiracy theories relating to George Soros. The Committee also notes with concern allegations that the number of registered hate crimes is extremely low because the police often fail to investigate and prosecute credible claims of hate crimes and criminal hate speech.

Moreover, the Committee is concerned about reports of the persistent racial profiling of Roma by the police (arts. 2, 18, 20 and 26). 18. The State party should regularly, publicly and effectively reaffirm that any advocacy of ethnic or racial hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence is prohibited by law and should act promptly to bring perpetrators of hate crimes to justice.

It should take effective measures to improve the reporting, investigation, prosecution and punishment of hate crimes and criminal hate speech, in accordance with its obligations under the Covenant, and should strengthen its efforts to eradicate stereotyping and discrimination against migrants, refugees, Jews and Roma, among others, by conducting public awareness campaigns to promote tolerance and respect for diversity and to highlight the unacceptability of racial profiling.

It should also ensure that State officials responsible for discriminatory behaviour towards Roma and other minority groups are held accountable in all instances. (Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Hungary , UN Doc. CCPR/C/HUN/CO/6, 9 May 2018, emphasis in original) [ 36 ] It is also instructive to quote from a very recent decision of the European Court of Human rights dealing with an anti-Roma demonstration that took place in 2012: 80.

The cumulative effect of those shortcomings in the investigations, especially the lack of a comprehensive law enforcement approach into the events, was that an openly racist demonstration, with sporadic acts of violence (see paragraphs 11-12 and 25-26 above) remained virtually without legal consequences and the applicants were not provided with the required protection of their right to psychological integrity.

They could not benefit of the implementation of a legal framework affording effective protection against an openly anti-Roma demonstration, the aim of which was no less than the organised intimidation of the Roma community, including the applicants, by means of a paramilitary parade, verbal threats and speeches advocating a policy of racial segregation.

The Court is concerned that the general public might have perceived such practice as legitimisation and/or tolerance of such events by the State. ( Király and Dömötör v Hungary , 17 January 2017) [ 37 ] To this, I would simply add that other recent decisions of this Court have found that Roma face irreparable harm if removed to Hungary: Csoka v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) , 2016 FC 746 ; Danyi v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) , 2016 FC 730 ; Sebok v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) , IMM-591-16, order of Justice Manson dated February 10, 2016; Serban v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) , IMM-1552-17, order of Justice Elliott dated April 6, 2017.

(2) Mr. Farkas’s Individual Situation [ 38 ] The record before me also comprises enough information for me to conclude that Mr. Farkas has faced incidents of persecution while in Hungary, which makes it likely that he would be again at risk if removed to Hungary. [ 39 ] In his affidavit, Mr. Farkas states that he was attacked by skinheads in 2009 or 2010 and that a police officer to whom he complained told him that he may have started the fight. When he complained to a police station, no action was taken. He recounts a number of incidents where ethnic Hungarians harassed him and spit on his face.

He also states that during his stay in Germany in 2014, he worked for a Hungarian employer and lost his job after claiming payment of his salary. He asserts that he was beaten by a hit-man hired by his employer, whom he discovered was associated with the Hungarian mafia. He complained to the German police, which laid charges against the perpetrators. Mr.

Farkas recently obtained German police and court reports confirming the incident. [ 40 ] In any event, where an ethnic group is systematically subjected to prejudice, harassment and persecution, membership in that group is the most relevant indicator of the risk of persecution in the future. In the context of a motion for a stay of removal, this risk translates into irreparable harm. [ 41 ] In the result, I conclude that Mr. Farkas has shown that irreparable harm is likely to occur if a stay of removal is not granted. D.

Balance of Convenience [ 42 ] At this last stage of the RJR test, prejudice to the applicant must be balanced against prejudice to the respondent who is prevented from enforcing the law. It has sometimes been said that " “[w]here the Court is satisfied that a serious issue and irreparable harm have been established, the balance of convenience will flow with the Applicant” " ( Mauricette v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) , 2008 FC 420 at para 48 ). Nevertheless, balance of convenience is not a purely formal criterion.

The conduct of the applicant, for example where the applicant has a significant criminal record or has a history of evading immigration authorities, may strengthen the interest of the state in enforcing the removal.

[ 43 ] However, none of these factors are present in this case. While Mr. Farkas was detained in October 2017 for overstaying his visa, he explains that this is due to misrepresentations by his immigration consultant, who admitted in his affidavit that he did " “substandard” " work and had problems of communication with Mr. Farkas. Likewise, Mr. Farkas did not report for the removal on June 2, but CBSA apparently accepted that this was legitimately due to illness and counsel for the respondent did not rely on that incident. Hence, I conclude that the balance of convenience favours Mr.

Farkas. [ 44 ] In conclusion, the three RJR criteria are met and I will issue an order staying Mr. Farkas’s removal from Canada. ORDER in IMM-2893-18 THIS COURT’S ORDER is that the motion for a stay of the removal of the applicant is granted. “Sébastien Grammond” Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD Docket: IMM-2893-18 STYLE OF CAUSE: ATTILA FARKAS v MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MOTION HELD BY TELECONFERENCE ON JUNE 24, 2018 FROM ottawa, Ontario order AND REASONS: GRAMMOND J.

DATED: june 24, 2018 ORAL AND WRITTEN REPRESENTATIONS BY : Anna Shabotynsky For The Applicant Christopher Crighton For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : Lewis and Associates Barristers and Solicitors Toronto, Ontario For The Applicant Attorney General of Canada Ottawa, Ontario For The Respondent