ISTVANNE GLONCZI OLIVER GLONCZI Applicants v. MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP, 2019 FC 931

Date: 20190712 Docket: IMM-3004-18 Citation: 2019 FC 931 St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador, July 12, 2019 PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Heneghan BETWEEN:ISTVANNE GLONCZI OLIVER GLONCZIApplicantsandMINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATIONDefendant REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT [1] Ms. Istvanne Glonczi (the "“Principal Applicant”") and her adult son Oliver Glonczi (collectively "“the Applicants”") seek judicialreview of the decision of the Immigration and Refugee Board, Refugee Protection Division (the "“RPD”") dated June 12, 2018. In thedecision, the RPD found that the Applicants were neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection pursuant to

section 96and subsection 97 (1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act S.C. 2001, c. 27 (the "“Act”"). [2] The Applicants are citizens of Hungary. They are Roma. They entered Canada on March 7, 2012. They sought protection on thebasis of their Roma ethnicity. [3] The RPD found that Budapest provided an Internal Flight Alternative to the Applicants.

It also found that state protection wasavailable to them. [4] The Applicants argue that the RPD’s findings in this regard are unreasonable because it failed to consider whether the efforts of thestate in Hungary provide protection to Roma people at the operational level.

They also submit that the RPD disregarded relevantdocumentary evidence of discrimination in Hungary against the Roma people. [5] The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (the "“Respondent”") submits that the decision of the RPD is reasonable and shouldwithstand judicial intervention. [6] The IFA finding is reviewable on the standard of reasonableness; see the decision in Kina v.

Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),2014 FC 284. [7] The finding of state protection is also reviewable on the standard of reasonableness: see the decision in Ruszo v Canada (Minister ofCitizenship and Immigration) (2013), 2013 FC 1004 , 440 F.T.R. 106. The application of the test to the facts is reviewable onthe standard of reasonableness: see the decision in Ruszo v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2013), 440 F.T.R. 106. [8] According to the decision in Dunsmuir v.

New Brunswick 2008 SCC 9 , [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, the standard of reasonablenessrequires that a decision be transparent, justifiable and intelligible, falling within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes that aredefensible on the law and the facts. [9] On the basis of the material submitted and the arguments made, I am satisfied that neither the IFA nor the state protection findingsmeet the standard of reasonableness. [10] I agree with the submissions of the Applicants that the RPD’s decision is unreasonable because it does not show that the decision-maker considered the effectiveness of the programs that were implemented by the state, as a means of providing state protection forRoma people. [11] The RPD referred to the decision in Mudrak v.

Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 188, which found that policeoversight agencies can support a finding that state protection is available. However, the jurisprudence of the Court is divided on the issueof whether administrative programs could provide adequate state protection. The RPD did not acknowledge this division of opinion, asdiscussed by the decision in Balogh v.

Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) (2015), 474 F.T.R. 75. [12] In my opinion, the RPD unreasonably failed to address the conflicting jurisprudence and explain how alternatives to adequate policeprotection results in state protection. [13] The RPD found that the Applicants had failed to show that Budapest was not a reasonable IFA.

It considered the two prong test foran IFA that is that the Applicants would not personally be at risk of persecution and second, that it was not unreasonable for them to seekrefuge in that city. [14] In my opinion, the RPD did not engage with the documentary evidence and explain its conclusion that state organizations wouldprovide better protection to the Applicants in Budapest than elsewhere in Hungary.

[ 15 ] It is not necessary for me to address the other arguments raised by the Applicants. [ 16 ] In the result, this application for judicial review is allowed, the decision of the RPD is set aside and the matter submitted to a differently constituted panel of the RPD for redetermination. There is no question for certification arising. JUDGMENT IN 3004-18 THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that the application for judicial review is allowed, the decision of the Refugee Protection Division is set aside and the matter submitted to a differently constituted panel for redetermination.

There is no question for certification arising. "E. Heneghan" Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-3004-18 STYLE OF CAUSE: ISTVANNE GLONCZI,OLIVER GLONCZI v. MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF HEARING: toronto, ontario DATE OF HEARING: february 13, 2019 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT: HENEGHAN J. DATED: July 12, 2019 APPEARANCES : Peter G. Ivanyi For The Applicant Kareena Wilding For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : Rochon Genova LLP Toronto, Ontario For The Applicant Attorney General of Canada Toronto, Ontario For The Respondent