JIAHONG YU v. JIAWEN ZHANG, 2015 FC 61

Date: 20150115 Docket: IMM-3220-14 Citation: 2015 FC 61 Vancouver, British Columbia, January 15, 2015 PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Shore BETWEEN: JIAHONG YU AND JIAWEN ZHANGApplicantsand THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATIONRespondent JUDGMENT AND REASONS I. Overview [1] In order to establish a well-founded fear of persecution, for the purposes of

section 96 of the IRPA, Applicants mustdemonstrate both a subjective and an objective fear. An individualized fear of persecution must be established (Canada (AttorneyGeneral) v Ward, (SCC), [1993] SCJ 74). II. Introduction [2] This is an application for judicial review under subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c27 [IRPA] of a Refugee Protection Board’s [RPD] decision, wherein the Applicants are found to be neither Convention refugees norpersons in need of protection under sections 96 and 97 of the IRPA. III. Background [3] Ms. Zhang [the principal Applicant] and Mr.

Yu are a married couple, who have two children born on October 23, 2011 andJanuary 13, 2013 respectively. At the time of the hearing before the RPD, the principal Applicant was expecting a third child. [4] As registered urban residents of China in the Province of Guangdong, the Applicants are subject to the Chinesegovernment’s Family Planning Office’s [FPO] one-child policy.

As such, the principal Applicant was required to wear an IntrauterineDevice [IUD], a form of birth control, and to attend routine checkups at a government clinic to ensure that the IUD remained in place. [5] In April 2012, the principal Applicant discovered that she was pregnant with her second child. Fearing that governmentofficials would force her to abort her child or undergo forced sterilization, the Applicants fled the city of Guangzhou.

With the help of apeople smuggler, the Applicants arranged their travel to Canada through the United States. [6] The Applicants arrived in Canada on August 19, 2012, and claimed refugee protection on September 4, 2012. A hearing washeld before the RPD on January 22, 2014. IV. Impugned Decision [7] In its decision dated April 3, 2014, the RPD finds that the Applicants failed to establish an objective basis to their claim. [8] The RPD finds the Applicants’ allegations that upon return, Ms. Zhang would be forced to undergo sterilization or abortion,and that Mr.

Yu would be instrumentalized by Chinese officials to force Ms. Zhang’s return to China, to be inconsistent, speculative andunsubstantiated by the evidence. The RPD also assigned little probative value to the letters submitted by the Applicants, for reason oflack of credibility. [9] The RPD concludes that upon return to China, the Applicants may be subjected to a monetary fine for “unauthorizedchildren”, pursuant to the family planning regulations of the Province of Guangdong.

Relying on the jurisprudence of the Court, the RPDconcludes that the levying of such a fee or fine does not amount to persecution for the purposes of

section 96 of the IRPA.

V. Issue [ 10 ] Are the RPD’s findings that the Applicants did not establish a well-founded fear of persecution unreasonable? VI. Relevant Legislative Provisions [ 11 ] The following provisions of the IRPA are applicable: Convention refugee Définition de « réfugié » 96 . A Convention refugee is a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, 96 .

A qualité de réfugié au sens de la Convention — le réfugié — la personne qui, craignant avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion, de sa nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses opinions politiques : (

a) is outside each of their countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of each of those countries; or

a) soit se trouve hors de tout pays dont elle a la nationalité et ne peut ou, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de chacun de ces pays; (

b) not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of their former habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to return to that country.

b) soit, si elle n’a pas de nationalité et se trouve hors du pays dans lequel elle avait sa résidence habituelle, ne peut ni, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut y retourner. Person in need of protection Personne à protéger 97 .

(1) A person in need of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their country or countries of nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality, their country of former habitual residence, would subject them personally 97 .

(1) A qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et serait personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle a la nationalité ou, si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel elle avait sa résidence habituelle, exposée : (

a) to a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the meaning of

Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or

a) soit au risque, s’il y a des motifs sérieux de le croire, d’être soumise à la torture au sens de l’article premier de la Convention contre la torture; (

b) to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if

b) soit à une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements ou peines cruels et inusités dans le cas suivant : (

i) the person is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of that country, (

i) elle ne peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de ce pays, (ii) the risk would be faced by the person in every part of that country and is not faced generally by other individuals in or from that country, (ii) elle y est exposée en tout lieu de ce pays alors que d’autres personnes originaires de ce pays ou qui s’y trouvent ne le sont généralement pas, (iii) the risk is not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in disregard of accepted international standards, and (iii) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de sanctions légitimes — sauf celles infligées au mépris des normes internationales — et inhérents à celles-ci ou occasionnés par elles, (iv) the risk is not caused by the inability of that country to provide adequate health or medical care. (iv) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de l’incapacité du pays de fournir des soins médicaux ou de santé adéquats.

(2) A person in Canada who is a member of a class of persons prescribed by the regulations as being in need of protection is also a person in need of protection.

(2) A également qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et fait

partie d’une catégorie de personnes auxquelles est reconnu par règlement le besoin de protection. VII. Analysis [ 12 ] The RPD’s determination of whether the Applicants established a well-founded fear of persecution must be reviewed on the deferential standard of reasonableness ( Dunsmuir v New Brunswick , 2008 SCC 9 at para 47 ; Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board) , 2011 SCC 62 at para 16 ; Li v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 2011 FC 610 at para 8 [ Li ]). [ 13 ] The Applicants submit the following grounds for judicial review:

i) The RPD failed to apply the correct standard of proof required to establish a well-founded fear of persecution;

ii) The RPD failed to adequately assess the risk faced by the Applicants; iii) The RPD failed to consider evidence directly contradicting its findings. [14] The Court considers that the Applicants’ arguments find no basis. The Court’s intervention is therefore unwarranted. [15] In order to establish a well-founded fear of persecution, for the purposes of

section 96 of the IRPA, Applicants mustdemonstrate both a subjective and an objective fear. An individualized fear of persecution must be established (Canada (AttorneyGeneral) v Ward, (SCC), [1993] SCJ 74). [16] In its reasons, the RPD recognizes that although forced sterilization and forced abortion are illegal in China, such practices dooccur. Relying on evidence of country conditions, the RPD nonetheless concludes to the existence of sufficient safeguards against forcedsterilization and abortions in Guangdong.

The RPD notes that although evidence shows that certain categories of migrant workers whodo not observe the family planning policy in Guangdong may be liable to lose their jobs and housing, the Applicants, who testified thatthey earn a comfortable living in Guangzhou, are not targeted by such measures. (If the Applicants, on the merits, were in a situationother than that, the reasoning may have turned in a different direction; however, each case must be taken on its own subjective andobjective evidence.) [17] Furthermore, as evidenced by the country conditions documentation, citizens who have “unauthorized children” such as theApplicants are required to pay a monetary fine known as the “social maintenance fee”, which is determined by individual provincialgovernments.

Relying on the jurisprudence of this Court, the RPD concludes that economic sanctions, as a means to enforce compliancewith the law, do not amount to persecution (Li, above; Lin v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), (1993), 66 FTR 207 atpara 6). [18] The Court finds that the RPD carefully considered and weighed the subjective and objective evidence in assessing theApplicants’ claim. In sum, the RPD’s findings are grounded in the evidence and deemed reasonable. VIII. Conclusion [19] In light of the foregoing, the application is dismissed. JUDGMENT THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that: 1.

The application for judicial review is dismissed; 2. There is a question of general importance to be certified (see below). Question for Certification The Court specifies the following question of general importance for certification; and, therefore, submits the following question to theFederal Court of Appeal: “Does the one-child policy, when, in fact, executed by a State qualify as one of “persecution” as interpreted by the Refugee Convention,if, and when, a couple would want to have, have conceived, or have more than one child?” “Michel M.J.

Shore” Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-3220-14 STYLE OF CAUSE: JIAHONG YU AND JIAWEN ZHANG V THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIPAND IMMIGRATIONPLACE OF HEARING: Vancouver, British ColumbiaDATE OF HEARING: January 15, 2015

JUDGMENT AND reasons: SHORE J. DATED: January 15, 2015 APPEARANCES : Iven K.S. Tse For The Applicants Ryan Dawodharry For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : Iven K.S. Tse Law Corporation Barristers & Solicitors Vancouver, British Columbia For The Applicants William F. Pentney Deputy Attorney General of Canada Vancouver, British Columbia For The Respondent