JACQUELINE NGOMNKAP Applicant v. THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP, 2021 FC 899

Date: 20210830Docket: IMM-5724-21 Citation: 2021 FC 899Toronto, Ontario, August 30, 2021PRESENT: The Honourable Mr.

Justice LafrenièreBETWEEN: JACQUELINE NGOMNKAP ApplicantandTHE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION AND THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS Respondents ORDER [1] This is a motion dated August 25, 2021 for a stay of the execution of the Removal Order made against the Applicant, under whichOrder the Applicant is to be removed from Canada to Cameroon on August 31, 2021 at 11:00 a.m., until such time as her pendingApplication for Leave and for Judicial Review has been dealt with by the Court. [2] In the underlying proceeding, the Applicant seeks leave to bring an application for judicial review of a decision dated August 17,2021 by the Inland Enforcement Officer [Officer] of the Canada Border Services Agency [CBSA] who denied the Applicant’s request todefer her removal [the Decision]. [3] The evidence filed by the Applicant in support of the present motion is fraught with imprecision, however the following backgroundfacts are not in dispute. [4] The Applicant is a citizen of Cameroon who entered Canada on May 23, 2006.

She filed a refugee claim seeking protection becauseshe feared persecution in Cameroon due to her affiliation with the South Cameroon National Council and her identity as an Anglophone. [5] The Refugee Protection Division [RPD] found that the Applicant lacked credibility. It was not persuaded that she had been a politicalactivist in Cameroon, or that she had ever been detained there. The Applicant sought leave to challenge the RPD’s decision; however, theapplication was dismissed by this Court on May 14, 2008. [6] The Applicant then failed to report for removal.

She was located and arrested by CBSA on January 21, 2009. The Applicant wasreleased on conditions and offered a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment [PRRA]. [7] On June 1, 2009, the Applicant submitted an application for landing in Canada on humanitarian and compassionate grounds [H&C]. [8] In 2010, a negative PRRA decision was issued and her H&C application was rejected. The Applicant then remained in Canadawithout status for the following decade. [9] In August 2020, the Applicant submitted a second H&C application.

After the application was rejected on May 14, 2021, theApplicant was called in for a pre-removal interview on June 11, 2021. [10] During a removal interview held on July 23, 2021, the Applicant was advised that CBSA would be arranging a removal date for theweek of August 30, 2021. [11] On July 27, 2021, a Direction to Report for removal was served on the Applicant to depart Canada on August 31, 2021. [12] The Applicant submitted a second PRRA some time in early August 2021 and sought a deferral of her removal on that basis. [13] The Officer found insufficient evidence of personalized risk to the Applicant to warrant a deferral for a further risk assessment.

TheApplicant’s request to defer her removal was accordingly refused on August 17, 2021. [14] This Decision is the basis for the present motion and the underlying proceeding. [15] There is no dispute between the parties about the appropriate standard for granting a stay, which is enunciated in the oft-quoteddecision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Toth v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), (FCA). Anapplicant must satisfy each branch of the following tri-partite test: (

a) whether there is a serious question to be determined by the Court; (

b) whether the party seeking the stay would suffer irreparable harm if the stay were not issued; and (

c) whether on the balance of convenience the party seeking the stay will suffer the greater harm from the refusal to grant the stay. [16] The test for a serious issue is heightened when challenging a deferral decision. The threshold for serious issue is higher than merely“not frivolous or vexatious.” There must be some realistic chance of success. This is because the granting of the Applicant’s motion

would effectively grant the relief sought in the underlying application. As a result, an applicant must be able to put forward “quite astrong case” due to the limited discretion of subsection 48(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA], andthe deferential standard of review applicable to these decisions: Baron v.

Canada (Minister of Public Safety and EmergencyPreparedness), 2009 FCA 81. [17] I see no reason to deal with the serious issue or balance of probabilities branches, even though they were fully argued, given myfinding that the Applicant has failed to establish any irreparable harm in the present case. [18] It is well settled that the test for irreparable harm is strict. In the context of stays of removal, it implies a serious likelihood ofjeopardy to the applicant’s life, security or safety.

It requires clear, convincing and non-speculative evidence going beyond the inherentconsequences of deportation. [19] The Applicant argues that the evidence she submitted in support of the deferral request (which appears to be limited to the materialcontained in the most recent PRRA application) satisfies subsection 113(

a) of the IRPA. The submissions related to the recent civil unrestin Cameroon, editorial articles expressing opinions regarding deportations to Cameroon as well as submissions regarding the Applicant’smedical condition and potential stigma she may face if returned to Cameroon.

The Applicant did not pursue the issue of the Applicant’smedical condition at the hearing. [20] According to the Applicant, the evidence of worsening strife and unrest in Cameroon is squarely new evidence that arose after therejection of her refugee claim and the first PRRA, and that was not reasonably available and could not have been reasonably expectedwhen the risk assessment took place more than a decade ago. [21] However, as pointed out by the Respondent, the Applicant has had multiple opportunities to seek a risk assessment before she wasnotified of the date of her removal.

First, she could have raised the issue of personalized risk in her recent H&C application. Second, shecould have raised the issue of personalized risk during her pre-removal interview on June 11, 2021.

The third opportunity was during thecourse of the subsequent removal interview on July 23, 2021. [22] The Applicant filed no evidence regarding how or when the information and documents now raised in her second PRRA applicationcame to her attention, why they were not previously identified during the H&C process or why they were not formally put forward at anytime until early August 2021. [23] The risk allegations in this case are strikingly similar to those advanced by the applicant in Sheron v. Canada (Citizenship andImmigration), 2018 FC 1221 [Sheron]. In that case, Mr.

Justice Sébastien Grammond concluded as follows: [18] The situation in the two English-speaking provinces of Cameroon is obviously very serious. Nevertheless, to be able todemonstrate that her removal to Cameroon would expose her to irreparable harm, Ms. Gariba Sheron must also show that shewould be personally affected by the armed conflict (see, for example, Bouaza v Canada (Sécurité publique et Protectioncivile), 2018 CF 1028 , 2018 FC 1028 at para 22). [19] The evidence in this regard is quite slim. There is a statement in Ms.

Gariba Sheron’s affidavit to the effect that she haslost contact with her family members and that their houses have been sacked. No further details are provided, in particular asto how she learned of those events. There is no evidence whatsoever that Ms. Gariba Sheron would be perceived as asupporter of the separatist movement or that she would be targeted by anyone. [20] Moreover, the documentation in the record shows that the conflict is limited to the two mainly English-speakingprovinces of Cameroon. In this regard, Ms. Gariba Sheron alleges that she would be at risk anywhere in Cameroon.

Sheargues, in her PRRA application and before this Court, that it would be challenging for an Anglophone to live in the French-speaking parts of Cameroon. Her PRRA application includes the following statement: Finally, because of the present crisis, it is suicidal and dangerous for an Anglophone Cameroonians [sic] to move to anotherpart of Cameroon.

There are 100% chances that she will be arrested, detained, harassed, tortured or killed. [21] These statements, apart from being grossly inflated, are not supported by the evidence, which does not deal with thesituation in other parts of Cameroon. [24] The facts in Sheron are indistinguishable from the ones the present case.

The Applicant has failed to establish that there was anynew objective evidence of personalized risk before the Officer in the event she was removed to Cameroon. [25] The Applicant submits that she will suffer irreparable harm in the event that she is removed as scheduled, as she faces persecution,risk of torture, and threat to her life in Cameroon on the basis of her identity as an Anglophone minority, and on the basis of her real orperceived political opinion that the Anglophones in Cameroon should have greater independence. [26] However, the Applicant’s claim of being politically active was previously rejected by the RPD.

She has not established any changein circumstances that would have elevated her risk profile since then. [27] I agree with Justice Grammond’s reasoning that the situation in the North-west and South-west regions does not establish a risk ofirreparable harm to everyone in Cameroon. [28] The Applicant states in her affidavit that the civil war has directly affected her family in Cameroon, that her family has beendisplaced by the conflict, and that her father was recently attached and died “due to the brutality he suffered”.

However, I place littleweight on this evidence given that it is based on hearsay and the source of the information has not been identified. [29] Given the paltry and confusing state of the material before me, I conclude that the Applicant has not shown that irreparable harm islikely to occur if she is removed to Cameroon.

[ 30 ] In the circumstances, the motion to stay the execution of the Removal Order is denied. THIS COURT ORDERS that the motion is dismissed. blank “Roger R. Lafreniѐre” blank Judge