2019 FC, 2019 FC 1560

Date: 20191204 Dockets: IMM-7095-19 IMM-7096-19 Citation: 2019 FC 1560 Montréal, Quebec, December 4, 2019 PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Pamel Docket: IMM-7095-16 BETWEEN: BALRAM KUMAR NISHA Applicant and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION AND THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS Respondents Docket: IMM-7096-19 AND BETWEEN: BALRAM KUMAR NISHA Applicant and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION AND THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS Respondents ORDER AND REASONS I.

Nature of the Matter [ 1 ] On December 3, 2019, I heard two urgent motions by the Applicants seeking an Order from this Court staying a valid deportation order issued against them for removal to India, scheduled for December 6, 2019 at 5 p.m. [ 2 ] The present motions relate to two underlying applications for leave and judicial review. [ 3 ] In file IMM-7095-19, the Applicants challenge a decision refusing their application for permanent residence on humanitarian and compassionate [H&C] grounds rendered on May 10, 2019.

The application for leave and judicial review was filed on November 25, 2019. [ 4 ] In file IMM-7096-19, the Applicants challenge a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment [PRRA] decision also rendered on May 10, 2019, rejecting their application. The decision was provided to the Applicants on June 18, 2019. An application for leave and judicial review was also filed on November 25, 2019. [ 5 ] Both applications for leave and judicial review are pending.

A separate motion for a stay of the deportation order was filed in the context of both applications for leave. [ 6 ] For the reasons that follow, I dismiss the two motions for a stay of the deportation order. II. Facts [ 7 ] The Applicants, husband and wife, are citizens of India. They came to Canada in October 2014 and made their refugee claims in December 2014. The Applicants claimed that they were at risk of persecution and that there was risk to their lives at the hands of the local Punjab police in their village.

The Applicants claim that the husband was tortured and targeted by the police for not providing information on his employee who is a known terrorist, and that they were traumatized by the experience. The wife was threatened with rape and serious abuse by the Punjab Police, and fears mistreatment if she is sent back. [ 8 ] The refugee claim was rejected by the Refugee Protection Division [RPD] on March 6, 2015. [ 9 ] The Refugee Appeal Division [RAD] dismissed the Applicants’ appeal on September 21, 2015.

In particular, the RPD found that the Applicants had an Internal Flight Alternative [IFA] in Delhi and in Mumbai, a significant distance from the village where they lived and in which the disturbing events took place. This finding was confirmed by the RAD.

[10] Leave for judicial review of the RAD decision was denied by this Court on January 26, 2016. [11] The Applicants thereafter proceeded with filing the PRRA application as well as the H&C application for permanent resident statusas outlined earlier. [12] In their submissions for both the PRRA and H&C applications, the Applicants repeated the claim that their lives and personalsecurity are at great risk in India because the local police wrongfully suspect the husband of being a terrorist or a sympathizer of certainmilitant organizations.

They say that the risk of torture is real and ongoing, notwithstanding the findings of the RPD and RAD. III. Preliminary procedural issues [13] In its written material, the Respondent notes that the stay application in file IMM-7095-19 [H&C application] was served and filedon November 28, 2019, after the deadline for filing motions to be heard during General Sittings on December 3, 2019. The issue was notargued orally before me, so I take it was not being pursued. [14] Also, the Respondent requests that the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness be added as a Respondent in bothcases.

This Minister is responsible for removals under subsection 4(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27[IRPA]. There was no objection on the part of the Applicants. Accordingly, I will so order. [15] Finally, the Applicants accept that they filed their applications for leave and judicial review late. They claim that there is areasonable explanation for the late filing. As I am not here to determine the merits of those applications, I will not consider their latefiling as affecting the present motions to stay the deportation order. IV.

The Test for Stay Orders [16] In order to be successful on a motion for a stay of the removal order, the applicant must meet the three-part test outlined in Toth vCanada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1988), (FCA), 86 NR 302 (FCA) at paragraph 6 [Toth], namely:(1) there is a serious issue to be tried; (2) the applicant would suffer irreparable harm if the stay is not granted; and (3) that the balance ofconvenience favours granting the stay. [17] The Toth test is conjunctive, meaning that an applicant must satisfy all three elements of the test in order to be entitled to relief:Janssen Inc v Abbvie Corporation, 2014 FCA 112 at paragraph14 [Janssen].

V. Analysis (

a) Serious issue to be tried [18] The bar for establishing whether there is a serious question to be tried is relatively low. In Janssen, Mr. Justice Stratas stated thefollowing as to the test to be applied to satisfy this requirement: [23] On the need for a serious question to be tried, it is true that the threshold is “a low one” and “liberal”: RJR-MacDonald,supra at page 337; 143471 Canada Inc. v. Quebec (Attorney General), (SCC), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 339 at page358, per La Forest J. (dissenting, with apparent concurrence on this point from the majority).

There need only be a showingthat the matter is not destined to fail or that it is “neither vexatious nor frivolous”: RJR-MacDonald, supra at page 337. Butthis cannot be an optional extra.

It would be strange, indeed, if legality could be suspended, even temporarily, in the face ofa laughably weak or hopeless case. [19] That being said, I should also keep in mind that in determining whether a serious issue exists in a case such as this, the Court mustconsider that the discretion of the Officer to defer the removal of a person is limited, and that the standard of review of an enforcementofficer’s decision should the matter proceed to the judicial review stage is that of reasonableness, with the result that an applicant onjudicial review must put forward quite a strong case (Baron v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2009FCA 81 at para. 67 [Baron]). [20] In addition, the issues raised by the applicant must truly be serious issues and not issues that merely have the appearance ofseriousness (Cardoza Quinteros v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 643). [21] I should also make clear that the purpose of the PRRA process is to evaluate the risk to applicants of persecution, torture, risk to lifeor risk of cruel and unusual punishments should they be returned to India.

It is meant to be forward-looking, and is not meant to be anappeal of the RPD or RAD decisions (Kaybaki v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 32 at para 11 [Kaybaki]). [22] In addition, the risks that the PRRA officer must consider are those which are significantly different from those presented beforethe RPD and RAD. In Raza v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1385, Mr. Justice Mosley stated: [22] It must be recalled that the role of the PRRA officer is not to revisit the Board's factual and credibility conclusions butto consider the present situation.

In assessing “new information” it is not just the date of the document that is important, butwhether the information is significant or significantly different than the information previously provided. Where “recent”information (i.e. information that post-dates the original decision) merely echoes information previously submitted, it isunlikely to result in a finding that country conditions have changed. The question is whether there is anything of “substance”that is new.

[citations omitted] [23] Here, the Applicants submit that there are three serious issues to be tried.

However, before dealing with those issues, I wish to firstdeal with the issue of the finding by the RPD, and eventually the RAD and the PRRA officer, of a viable IFA within India. [24] In its decision, the RPD determined that the Applicants benefited from an IFA given that the husband had testified that it would bepossible for the couple to relocate to Delhi or Mumbai. [25] The RAD focused on the evidence regarding the IFA option, and determined that the Applicants would have a viable IFA in Delhior Mumbai, and that this was determinative of their claim to refugee protection. [26] No new evidence was brought forward before the PRRA officer to suggest that the IFA option was no longer viable, the burdenbeing upon the Applicants to show that it would not be reasonable for them to seek refuge in either Delhi or Mumbai (Kumar v Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 30 at para 36). [27] In fact, the finding of a viable IFA was not challenged by the Applicants in their written submissions.

However, in answer to aquestion I put to their counsel, the Applicants’ counsel argued that there is a legal presumption that if one is fleeing the authorities in acountry, there is no IFA option available. [28] It seems to me that even if correct in this case, that is an argument that should have been made before the RAD, and possibly couldhave been made before this Court had this Court granted leave for judicial review of the RAD decision. [29] It also seems to me that the Applicants may have attempted to argue before me that the two-prong test in the identification of anIFA as provided in Rasaratnam v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1992), (FCA), 1 FC 706[Rasaratnam] was not met. (See also Thirunavukkarasu v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1994), (FCA), 1 FC 589 [Thirunavukkarasu]). [30] However, I cannot see that this argument was raised before the RAD or before the PRRA office. [31] The Respondent relies heavily on the fact that there was a determination of a viable IFA option, and argued that the PRRA processis an assessment of risk throughout India in 2019.

In addition, the Respondent further argued that the result of a successful PRRAapplication is to be granted asylum status in Canada. To be granted asylum, there could be no IFA option available to an applicant. [32] In looking at the PRRA decision, the officer considered the RPD’s determination of a viable IFA. The finding of the RPD was tothe effect that the Applicants moved to Delhi for four months to hide from the Punjab police, and left India thereafter.

There is noevidence submitted to the PRRA officer to displace the finding of a viable IFA, nor of any problems experienced by the Applicants whilein Delhi. [33] We cannot isolate the issue of the IFA from the other elements of the PRRA decision. In fact, the importance of the finding of anIFA permeates the entire decision of the PRRA officer.

For example, even if we assume that the statements that the Punjab police havebeen returning to the village looking for the Applicants are correct, that does not assist the Applicants as there continues to be a validIFA option in Delhi, a city in which the Applicants did live, without evidence of any problem, for several months prior to leaving Indiaand without any suggestion that the identification of Delhi as an IFA was not reasonable. [34] The PRRA officer must find risk throughout India, and where there is a viable IFA, there cannot be any granting of refugee status. [35] With leave to seek judicial review of the RAD decision being denied, and with no further evidence presented before the PRRAregarding the IFA option, the Respondent argues that the issue of a viable IFA has been settled, now constitutes res judicata, and that inand of itself should be determinative of this motion.

I must agree (Tapambwa v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FCA 34 atpara 66 [Tapambwa]; Roberto v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 180 at para 19 [Roberto]; Eid v Canada (Citizenshipand Immigration), 2010 FC 639 at para 4 [Eid]). [36] There is, therefore, no serious issue to be tried as regards the availability of an IFA. I should also say that the availability of an IFAwithin India will also weigh heavily in the determination of irreparable harm. [37] That said, the three issues identified as serious and to be tried by the Applicants were as follows: i.

Failure on the part of the PRRA officer to properly consider the evidence [38] First, the Applicants argue that the PRRA decision failed to address documentary and other evidence to the effect that the husbandwas in fact tortured, and faces a real risk of danger in India. A number of documents were put before the PRRA officer. [39] As regards documents which existed and were previously before the RPD and RAD, the PRRA officer refused to consider them asbeing excluded under paragraph 113(

a) of the IRPA. There does not seem to be a serious issue regarding the exclusion of thosedocuments. [40] That said, the PRRA officer did consider other documents which were identified as new evidence dated after the RAD decision in2015.

There is disagreement with the Applicants as to how the PRRA officer assessed the new evidence, but I have not been persuadedthat the Applicants have raised a serious issue as to the manner in which the PRRA officer conducted their review. [41] In Ogbonna v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 2017 FC 93, Madam Justice Roussel stated at paragraphs 7 and 8: This Court has held that in the case of failed refugee claimants, the risk assessment to be carried out at the PRRA stage is nota reconsideration of the RPD’s decision but is limited to an evaluation of new evidence (Raza v Canada (Citizenship and

Immigration), 2007 FCA 385 at para 12 [Raza]; Kulanayagam at para 23; Mbaraga at para 23). The PRRA Officer mayproperly reject evidence adduced by an applicant if it addresses the same risks considered by the RPD and the applicantcannot prove that the relevant facts as of the date of the PRRA application are materially different from the facts as found bythe RPD (Raza at para 17). Accordingly, it was reasonable for the PRRA Officer to look to the RPD decision to ascertain what risks were asserted bythe Applicant before the RPD.

After noting that the risk alleged by the Applicant was considered by the RPD, the PRRAOfficer then properly considered the Applicant’s new evidence and found that the letters written by the Applicant’s friendsand family did not contain any new information which was not already before the RPD. As a result, the PRRA Officer gavethem little weight in demonstrating that the Applicant faced a personalized risk. [Emphasis added] [42] In Ebika v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 82, Mr.

Justice Zinn stated at paragraph 11: As noted by the respondents, a PRRA is not an appeal or reconsideration of the RPD decision. An officer is bound to give itstrong consideration, as this officer did, while taking into consideration any new evidence. This the Officer did.

The Officergave detailed explanation why some of the evidence submitted was not new and why other evidence was not persuasive.The officer’s reasons are clear and intelligible and thus meet the reasonableness test. [43] The new documents that were considered by the PRRA officer included affidavits from individuals living in the village where theApplicants lived and where the incidents of persecution took place, letters from the lawyer who assisted the husband to deal with thelocal police, as well as medical and psychological reports as to the condition of the husband. [44] Applicants’ counsel placed a great deal of emphasis on the fact that, as he stated, the PRRA officer rejected the affidavits from theindividuals in the village out of hand on the grounds that they did not have personal knowledge of the facts to which they were attesting.That is not, however, what the PRRA officer stated in his decision. [45] What was stated by the PRRA officer was that none of the affiants or authors declared having been first-hand witnesses to thethreats made by the police towards the Applicants.

From what I can tell by reading those affidavits and letters, that is an accuratestatement. [46] According to the Applicants’ counsel, strong psychological reports support the husband’s contention of having been tortured wereset aside unjustifiably by the PRRA officer on the premise that the psychologist did not have first-hand knowledge of the facts involved. [47] The Applicants cite Kanthasamy v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 SCC 61 , [2015] 3 SCR 909[Kanthasamy], for the proposition that the PRRA officer cannot set aside the reports because the psychologist does not have first-handknowledge of the events that may have caused the mental state of the patient.

I agree with this proposition, but find that this is not whatthe PRRA officer did. [48] In Kanthasamy, the officer questioned the conclusions of the report itself on the grounds that the medical opinion attested to in thereport rested mainly on hearsay because the psychologist was not a witness to the events that led to the anxiety experienced by theapplicant. [49] However in this case, the PRRA officer did not question the foundation of the opinion that the husband was suffering from PTSDsymptoms and depression, but simply determined that the report itself could not be taken as proof of the events of torture being claimedby the husband, or that the conditions from which the husband is suffering relate to the events that the Applicants are looking to establishto support their refugee claim. [50] In other words, the report itself cannot be used to establish the underlying facts upon which rests the Applicants’ assertion of acontinuing risk if they are returned to India.

I think that it is clear, and thus I cannot see a serious issue to be addressed here. [51] In any event, looking at what the PRRA officer was most concerned with, I cannot see how the psychologist’s report can in anyway be seen as supporting an argument that there is a continued risk to the Applicants should they be returned to India. [52] The Applicants’ counsel went to great length to suggest that the PRRA simply echoed the RPD and RAD findings andunreasonably found that the husband had not been tortured, but that the new evidence bolstered the Applicants’ claim on this issue. [53] As regards the claims of torture and threat of rape to the wife, the PRRA officer stated quite rightly that those identified risks werenot significantly different from those which were presented before the RPD, and that it was incumbent upon the Applicants to prove thatthey are at risk with new and significantly different information that does not simply echo the information previously submitted. [54] Here, the affidavits and documents simply reiterated the facts of the alleged torture of the husband and threat of rape of the wife. [55] The Applicant submits that the PRRA officer did not consider reports of rape and abuse in police detention, and psychologicalevidence related to the Applicant.

Yet, as the PRRA officer states in the decision, this evidence was already addressed by the RPD. ThisCourt has rejected the Applicants’ application for judicial review.

As such, this issue is barred by the doctrine of res judicata (Tapambwaat para 66; Roberto at para 19; Eid at para 4). [56] Consequently, I cannot see here any serious issue to attack the PRRA decision, even at a low level of assessment. [57] As to the new evidence establishing a continuing risk of torture and persecution, the PRRA officer reviewed the documents andfound that although there is mention in a few of the affidavits of the Punjab police having returned to the village to enquire about thewhereabouts of the Applicants, there is no indication as to when such visits took place.

[58] I have not been convinced that these documents could possibly assist the Applicants in establishing a continuing risk to them shouldthey be returned to India. [59] The Applicants argue that their removal to India would violate international legal norms because the Applicants would be subject totorture (citing Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1 , [2002] 1 SCR 3; Chahal v UnitedKingdom (1997), 23 EHRR 413 [Chahal]). [60] The Applicants counsel stressed that there is a real risk to life and security of the Applicants, that the husband is a torture victimand that his wife was threatened with rape.

Sending them back would violate their rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights andFreedoms,

Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being

Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [the Charter], and Canada’sinternational obligations not to remove individuals to areas where there is risk of torture. [61] The Applicants cite the European Court of Human Rights decision in Chahal for the proposition that

Article 3 of the Conventionagainst Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (December 10, 1984, [1987] Can TS No 36[Convention against Torture]) to which Canada has ratified prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment orpunishment, and that whenever substantial grounds have been shown for believing that an individual would face a real risk of beingsubjected to treatment contrary to

Article 3 if deported to another country, the obligation of the country deporting that individual isengaged. [62] However here, the PRRA Officer found there to be no new evidence to seriously suggest that there is a risk that the Applicants mayface likely risk of torture or persecution if they were to be returned to India. That issue was looked at thoroughly by the RPD, RAD andthe PRRA officer.

While the Applicants are correct to point out that removal to torture is contrary to the Charter and norms ofinternational law, the Applicants have failed to show how these norms are applicable in the case at bar, considering that there is nofinding that the Applicants will be removed to torture.

On this point, it is important to note that the Applicants do not contest the RPD’sfinding that Delhi is a viable IFA for the Applicants. [63] As to the H&C application, I should mention that the mere existence of such an application does not bar the execution of a validremoval order: Simcoes v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) (2000) (FC), 187 FTR 219; Baron). [64] Three factors were considered by the immigration officer in denying the application for permanent residence status to theApplicants: (1) the lack of establishment of the Applicants in Canada; (2) the adverse country conditions in India; and (3) the mentalhealth of the husband. [65] Establishment in Canada is usually a significant factor in H&C applications.

However here, there is no evidence of employment ofthe Applicants in Canada, and the Applicants have declared to have no family ties in Canada. One of their sons lives in India along withother family members. The officer gave no weight to the Applicants’ establishment in Canada in the assessment of their application. TheApplicants make no submissions suggesting this was an error on the part of the officer. [66] As to the adverse conditions in India, the officer properly sets out the test for the evaluation of risk.

The officer states that suchevaluation has a broader scope and a different threshold than the risk analysis in a claim for refugee protection. When risk is alleged inan H&C application, it is assessed within the context of hardship. It is not meant as a means to review and re-evaluate previousdecisions, nor is it an appeal mechanism. [67] I agree with the officer’s statement of the applicable test in these circumstances.

As well, my findings as to the Applicants’arguments in relation to the country conditions in India made in the context of the PRRA decision apply equally in the context of theH&C application. [68] As to the husband’s mental state, the H&C officer reviewed the medical and psychological reports but attributed little weight tothem on account of there being no evidence of any follow-up treatments undertaken by the husband, nor that sufficient follow-upservices are not available in India. The Applicants have not argued before me that this finding is unreasonable specifically as regards theH&C application. ii.

The existence of continued impunity for police in India and lack of state protection [69] Second, the Applicants submit that the PRRA officer did not consider the reports of rape and abuse in police detention, andbackground documentation on the human rights situation in India, documentary evidence about police impunity in India.

The Applicantsargue that there is no reason for the PRRA officer to have refused to consider the background documentation on human rights abuses inIndia, for example the recent report from Human Rights Watch, especially where police in India are reported to often be prone to illicitbehaviour with impunity. [70] The short answer is that the PRRA did not refuse to consider this information, and in fact commented that there is clearly evidenceto show that the human rights situation in India remains problematic particularly with respect to police abuses.

However, what the PRRAofficer determined was that the Applicants have not submitted sufficient evidence to demonstrate that they personally face such a risk. [71] Again, I cannot see a plausible argument to support the Applicants’ assertions in relation to this issue. iii. The analysis of risk review by Immigration Canada [72] Third, the Applicants submit that the PRRA officer lacks independence, did not give a fair analysis of the evidence, and is notadequately trained to assess the Applicants’ risk in India. The Applicants then proceed to make a broad institutional critique of theCanadian immigration system.

The Applicants argue that Canada’s immigration system does not allow for a real independent riskanalysis, and does not offer a legal recourse to uphold one’s Charter rights.

[73] The Respondent states clearly that this issue is a policy imperative, and does not in any way relate to the manner in which thePRRA officer rendered his decision. I must agree. The Applicants’ broad institutional critiques have no place in this stay application.

TheApplicants’ submissions on this point relate to the institutional structure of Canada’s immigration system, which raises political questionsthat lack in justiciability (see Operation Dismantle v The Queen, [1985] 1 SCR 441, (SCC); Black v Canada (PrimeMinister), (ON CA); Hupacasath First Nation v Canada (Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada), 2015FCA 4 ; Authorson v Canada (Attorney General), [2003] 2 SCR 40, 2003 SCC 39 ).

Such critiques are best addressedelsewhere. [74] The Applicants have not shown how any shortcomings in the PRRA process, assuming they exist, affected the officer’s ability tomake the determination that was made. [75] Finally, the Applicants suggest that the right criteria were not applied by the PRRA officer to determine if there was a massive,systematic, flagrant human rights violation in India.

However, they did not point to any element of the PRRA decision to show wheresuch a failure on the part of the PRRA officer would have taken place. [76] On the whole, I cannot see here an argument on the part of the Applicants that is not destined to fail on judicial review. (

a) Irreparable harm [77] The Applicants state that the test for irreparable harm is met by applying paragraph 2 of

Article 3 of the Convention against Torturewhich states that when there is substantial and flagrant human rights abuses like we see here and there is evidence that a person istargeted, there is a prohibition in international law against returning that person to the country where he or she will be at risk. They statethat as this was not considered by the PRRA officer, the Applicants have a right to present their arguable case to the Court. [78] However, the availability of two IFA options affects negatively the Applicants’ assertion of irreparable harm.

There is no evidencesubmitted to show that it would be unreasonable for the Applicants to reside in Delhi or Mumbai, the second prong of the test set out inRasaratnam and Thirunavukkarasu. [79] However, as stated, the evidence of ongoing risk of torture and persecution was found lacking by the PRRA officer, and I seenothing in the arguments of the Applicants to suggest that there is a case to make to the contrary that is not destined to failure. (

b) Balance of Convenience [80] The Applicants argues that the balance of convenience favours them due to Parliament’s recognition of the international normsagainst sending a person back to a substantial risk of torture. The Applicants point to the cases in international law and state that thebalance of convenience favours that the issues raised by those cases be determined in Canada by a Canadian court so as to review theevidence and tests that the PRRA officer should have applied.

According to the Applicants, the Canadian domestic system must be giventhe chance to review its processes in line with Canada’s international commitments.

According to them, the PRRA decision is yetanother example of the Canadian system not applying the law correctly. [81] These arguments by the Applicants tend to be policy issues, from my perspective, and I am not convinced that there is any seriousissue to be tried as regards a review of the PRRA decision. [82] For its part, the Respondent focused primarily on the fact that the available IFA option had not been displaced as evidence that thebalance of convenience did not favour the Applicants.

The Respondent argued that the Applicants presented the same arguments beforethe RPD, RAD, PRRA and before this Court in their application for leave for judicial review of the RAD decision, and failed every time. [83] The Respondent further argues that the balance of convenience disfavours the Applicants because the Applicants waited four and ahalf months before accessing the Court system after having knowledge of the PRRA decision. [84] The Respondent also submits that subsection 48(2) of the IRPA favours the quick enforcement of removal orders.

Subsection 48(2)reads: “If a removal order is enforceable, the foreign national against whom it was made must leave Canada immediately and the ordermust be enforced as soon as possible.” [85] I agree with the Respondent on the issue of balance of convenience. VI. Conclusion [86] Overall, and although the test is conjunctive, the Applicants have failed to convince me that any one of the three-part test in Tothweighs in their favour. I would dismiss the stay application.

ORDER in IMM-7095-19 and IMM-7096-19 THIS COURT ORDERS that the two motions for a stay of removal are dismissed and that the Minister of Public Safety andEmergency Preparedness be added as a respondent in both proceedings. "Peter G. Pamel" Judge

FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-7095-16 STYLE OF CAUSE: BALRAM KUMAR, NISHA v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION AND THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND DOCKET: IMM-7096-19 STYLE OF CAUSE: BALRAM KUMAR, NISHA v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION AND THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLACE OF HEARING: Montréal, Quebec DATE OF HEARING: December 3, 2019 ORDER AND REASONS: PAMEL J.

DATED: December 4, 2019 APPEARANCES : Stewart Istvanffy Miguel Mendez For The Applicants Daniel Latulippe For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : Étude légale Stewart Istvanffy Montréal, Quebec For The Applicants Attorney General of Canada Montréal, Quebec For The Respondent