2023 FC, 2023 FC 1657

Date: 20231207 Docket: IMM-7598-22 Citation: 2023 FC 1657 Toronto, Ontario, December 7, 2023 PRESENT: Associate Judge John C. Cotter BETWEEN: Pegah PARSANIA Mohammadreza TORKAMAN Applicants and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondent ORDER AND REASONS [ 1 ] T he applicants have brought a motion in writing pursuant to Rule 369 of the Federal Courts Rules , SOR/98-106 ( " “ Rules ” " ) for: “a. Leave of court to allow applicant counsel to depose to an affidavit and use it to present the evidence on behalf of the applicant. b. An order revoking deemed discontinuance. c.

An order extending the time to file applicants’ record; and d. Such further and other relief as this Honorable Court deems just.” [ 2 ] The applicants filed an application for leave and for judicial review on August 9, 2022 ( " “ ALJR ” " ) under subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , SC 2001, c 27 . The ALJR states: " “The applicants have not received written reasons from the tribunal.” " The present motion was necessitated by the failure of the applicants to perfect their application for leave within the time period provided for in Rule 10(1) (

b) of the Federal Courts Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules , SOR/93-22 ( " “ FCCIRPP ” " ), as well as the ALJR being subject to the deemed discontinuance practice. As per Rule 10(1) (b), the deadline to perfect the application for leave in this case is determined by when the " “tribunal’s written reasons” " ( " “ Reasons ” " ) were received by the applicants. As explained below: (

a) the recorded entries in this matter indicate that the Reasons were received by the Registry on November 18, 2022; (

b) the affidavit evidence filed by the respondent states that the Reasons were sent by email on November 18, 2022 to applicants’ counsel and includes the covering email of that date; and (

c) the evidence from applicants’ counsel is that he did not receive the Reasons until March 13, 2023. I. History of this Motion [ 3 ] The history of this motion is as follows: (

a) The applicants’ motion record was filed June 8, 2023. (

b) In response, the respondent’s motion record was filed on June 19, 2023. (

c) No written representations in reply were filed by the applicants. (

d) The motion was sent to the Court on August 4, 2023 for disposition. (

e) Pursuant to a direction dated August 18, 2023, a case conference was held on August 22, 2023. (

f) An Order dated August 23, 2023 issued following the case conference, noting that: (

i) the only evidence included in the applicants’ motion record is an affidavit from counsel for the applicants, namely the affidavit of Oluwadamilola Asuni sworn June 6, 2023 ( " “ First Affdavit ” " ); and (ii) the respondent opposed the motion, including the granting of leave to applicants’ counsel to depose and rely on his own affidavit in support of this motion. The Order provided the applicants with the opportunity to serve and file further affidavit evidence by no later than September 8, 2023, and scheduled a further case conference for September 19, 2023. (

g) A further affidavit on behalf of the applicants was sworn on September 6, 2023 and subsequently filed on September 7, 2023 ( " “ Second Affidavit ” " ) . It was another affidavit from applicants’ counsel, Oluwadamilola Asuni. (

h) At the case conference held on September 19, 2023, respondent’s counsel noted the lack of evidence from the applicants themselves, and indicated that the respondent’s position on the motion remained unchanged – the respondent continued to oppose the motion, including applicants’ counsel both providing affidavit evidence and arguing the motion. II. Applicants’ Evidence on the Motion [ 4 ] The evidence served and filed by the applicants on this motion is the First Affidavit and the Second Affidavit.

[ 5 ] The First Affidavit includes the following evidence from applicants’ counsel: 1. That he received all communication from the Registry and the respondent through his Gmail email account (paragraph 1). 2. “The website of the Federal Court indicates that the Rule 9 Reasons for the Decision in file number IMM-7598-22 was served on me on November 18, 2022 but I did not receive it.

I discovered the error in the service on March 10, 2023 when I browsed the Federal Court’s website for information and updates on the Rule 9 Reasons for the Decision” (paragraph l). 3. “Immediately I discovered the error, I took action by contacting the Federal Court registry on March 10, 2023 to request for a copy of the Rule 9 Reasons for the Decision but the registry was unable to send it to me on that day.

I called the registry again on March 13, 2023 to request for a copy of the rule 9 reason as well as to request that the date for sending the Rule 9 Reasons for the Decision should be changed on the Federal Court’s website to reflect that it was sent on March 13, 2023 as that is the date it was eventually received” (paragraph m). [ 6 ] In the Second Affidavit, applicants’ counsel states that: “1. I am the lawyer to the applicants so I am aware of the facts of this case 2.

As the applicants’ counsel, it is my duty to receive communication and correspondence from the court and the respondent on behalf of the applicant. 3. I practice alone and I have no staff so there is no one else that is aware of the facts of this motion. Hence, no other person could depose to an affidavit in support of the motion before the court. 4.

My client is not deposing to this affidavit because it will amount to hear-say evidence which might be admissible in affidavits but might also make the case weaker since I am the person who has all of the facts and my client would have to repeat what I told them.” III. Respondent’s Evidence on the Motion [ 7 ] In response to the motion, the respondent relies on the affidavit of Aaron Zhou affirmed June 19, 2023 ( " “ Zhou Affidavit ” " ), who states, among other things, that: (

i) he is a Litigation Coordinator for the Centralized Network of Immigration Refugees and Citizenship Canada in Ottawa; (ii) in that capacity, he is responsible for responding to requests for written reasons pursuant to Rule 9 of the FCCIRPR; and (iii) he responded to the request for written reasons in this application. The affidavit goes on to indicate that on November 17, 2022 an email was sent to applicants’ counsel and attaches as an exhibit a copy of the November 17, 2002 email and the written reasons which Aaron Zhou states were sent to applicants’ counsel.

The top portion of that email is reproduced below: From: "CPC O Litigation / Litiges O CTD (IRCC)" < IRCC.CPCOLitigation-LitigesOCTD.IRCC@cic.gc.ca> To: 'Oluwadamilola Asuni' < asunisan22@gmail.com > Subject: IMM-7598-22 Reasons Thu 2022-11-17 11:01 PM A tt achme n ts: IMM-7598-22 R easons.pdf IV. Rule 82 Issue [ 8 ] A preliminary issue to be determined is whether leave should be granted to permit applicants’ counsel to both depose the affidavits that have been filed in support of the motion and to argue the motion.

This flows from Rule 82 of the Rules that provides as follows: 82 Except with leave of the Court, a solicitor shall not both depose to an affidavit and present argument to the Court based on that affidavit. 82 Sauf avec l’autorisation de la Cour, un avocat ne peut à la fois être l’auteur d’un affidavit et présenter à la Cour des arguments fondés sur cet affidavit. [ 9 ] The evidence in the First Affidavit and the Second Affidavit explains that applicants’ counsel is a sole practitioner with no employees.

While that may provide an explanation as to why applicants’ counsel is providing evidence on when he says the Reasons were received, he provides no explanation as to why other counsel could not have been engaged to argue the motion. Further, as indicated elsewhere in these reasons, there is no explanation as to why the applicants could not have provided evidence on this motion, particularly on the question of whether the application has merit. However, it is not necessary to determine whether leave should be granted under Rule 82 .

That determination is unnecessary because, even if leave were granted, the applicants’ evidence on this motion, which consists only of the First Affidavit and the Second Affidavit, does not support the granting of an extension of time for the reasons set out below. V. Deadline for Perfecting the ALJR [ 10 ] Given the nature of this motion, it is useful to consider what the applicable deadline for perfecting the application for leave

( " “ Deadline ” " ) was in this case, as determined by Rule 10(1)(

b) of the FCCIRPR, which states: " 10

(1) The applicant shall perfect an application for leave by complying with subrule (2) " " " " 10

(1) Le demandeur met sa demande d’autorisation en état en se conformant au paragraphe (2) : " " … " " " " … " " " " (

b) where the application sets out that the applicant has not received the tribunal’s written reasons, within 30 days after receiving either the written reasons, or the notice under paragraph 9(2) (b), as the case may be. " " " "

b) s’il indique dans sa demande qu’il n’a pas reçu les motifs écrits du tribunal administratif, dans les 30 jours suivant la réception soit de ces motifs, soit de l’avis envoyé par le tribunal administratif en application de l’alinéa 9(2)b). " [ 11 ] Accordingly, it is the date the applicants received the Reasons that starts the clock running on the 30 day time-period for perfecting their application for leave by filing the applicants’ record that is detailed in Rule 10(2).

If the Reasons were received by applicants’ counsel on November 17, 2022 as per the Zhou Affidavit, the Deadline to serve and file the applicants’ record was December 19, 2022 (December 17, 2023 fell on a Saturday). Alternatively, if the Reasons were received by applicants’ counsel on March 13, 2023, as per the Second Affidavit from applicants’ counsel, the Deadline was April 12, 2023. As a result, regardless of whether the Reasons were received by applicants’ counsel on November 17, 2022 or March 13, 2023, the deemed discontinuance practice (discussed further below) was in effect.

In addition, it is not necessary to decide whether the Reasons were received by applicants’ counsel on November 17, 2022 or on March 13, 2023 for the purposes of deciding whether or not an extension should be granted of the deadline to perfect the application for leave. This is because even if applicants’ counsel did not receive the Reasons until March 13, 2023, which is the best case for the applicants, the applicants do not satisfy the test for an extension of time to perfect their application for leave for the reasons set out below. VI.

Deemed Discontinuance [ 12 ] A Notice to the Profession was issued by the Chief Justice on December 6, 2022 (amended December 2022), titled “ " Deemed Discontinuance of Incomplete Applications for Leave and Judicial Review in Proceedings under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and the Citizenship Act ” " ( " “ Deemed Discontinuance Practice ” " ).

The Deemed Discontinuance Practice is aptly described by Associate Judge Duchesne in Abikan v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 149 as follows: [6] On December 6, 2022, the Chief Justice issued the Deemed Discontinuance Practice and caused it to be published on the Court’s website. The Deemed Discontinuance Practice was amended on December 22, 2022, to include Applications for Leave and for Judicial Review (“ALJR”) involving the Citizenship Act .

The content of the Deemed Discontinuance Practice was otherwise unchanged by the December 22, 2022, amendment. [7] The thrust of the Deemed Discontinuance Practice is that the Court has adopted the administrative practice of deeming applicants to have discontinued their ALJR pursuant to Rule 165 of the Rules if they fail, after December 6, 2022 (or December 22, 2022, as the case may be) to have perfected their applications by serving and filing their Application Record within the time set out by Rule 10 of the FCCIRPR.

The time period for perfection set out in Rule 10 of the FCCIRPR may vary depending on whether the applicant has received a copy of the written reasons of the decision for which judicial review is sought, but the time for perfection is calculable in every case and is fixed.

This administrative practice, as set out in the practice itself, has been adopted to address the diversion of court resources to deal with potentially abandoned ALJRs and to devise a fair and just manner by which to manage them. [8] The mere passage of time and the failure to perfect an ALJR by its perfection date triggers the deemed discontinuance of the ALJR pursuant to the Deemed Discontinuance Practice.

It also triggers the requirement for the applicant to promptly bring a motion to revoke the deemed discontinuance, to reopen the proceeding and to obtain an extension of time to perfect their ALJR if they wish to revive and continue their discontinued proceeding.

The Deemed Discontinuance Practice provides that an ALJR will be deemed discontinued, “[…] without the need for formal notice by the Applicant or a Court Order.” The Deemed Discontinuance Practice continues to state that, “The Registry will provide notice to the parties by way of a recorded entry in the online docket on the Court website.” The Deemed Discontinuance Practice does not contemplate that a recorded entry of a deemed discontinuance in the online docket on the Court website is a triggering event for the deemed discontinuance to be have occurred or a condition of the deemed discontinuance having occurred.

The docket entry is but a record of the deemed discontinuance having been effected by the passage of time and an applicant’s failure to perfect in a timely manner.

It follows that a deemed discontinuance can occur and be effective prior to any docket entry confirming it. [ 13 ] Although the Deemed Discontinuance Practice was terminated by the Practice Direction and Order dated May 9, 2023 (amended May 25, 2023) regarding " “Proceedings under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and the Citizenship Act " Termination of Administrative Practice: Deemed Discontinuance and Simplified Process for Extension of Time”, the applicants’ ALJR was subject to it, and deemed discontinued.

This is the situation regardless of whether the 30-day time period for the applicants to perfect the application for leave began on November 17, 2023 or March 13, 2023. [ 14 ] Two different approaches have been taken on the test to be applied on a motion to revoke a deemed discontinuance (see: Virk v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 143 , at paras 35 and 42 (“ Virk ”); and Singh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 380 at para 23 ( " “ Singh 380 ” " )).

However, the difference between the two tests is not significant for present purposes because an essential feature of both approaches is applying the test on a motion for an extension of time to perfect an application for leave and

judicial review, and in this case, that is determinative since the applicants do not satisfy that test. VII. Extension of Time [15] The considerations that apply on a motion to allow an extension of time under Rule 8 of the Rules are well known. As stated by theFederal Court Appeal in Alberta v Canada, 2018 FCA 83: [44] In Canada (Attorney General) v. Hennelly (1999), (FCA), 244 N.R. 399 (F.C.A.) (Hennelly), thisCourt listed four questions relevant to the exercise of discretion to allow extension of time under Rule 8:

(1) Did the moving party have a continuing intention to pursue the proceeding?

(2) Is there some merit to the proceeding?

(3) Has the defendant been prejudiced from the delay?

(4) Does the moving party have a reasonable explanation for the delay? [45] These questions are helpful to determine whether the granting of an extension is in the interest of justice, because theoverriding consideration or the real test is ultimately that justice be done between the parties (Grewal v. Minister ofEmployment and Immigration, [1985] 2 F.C.R. 263 at 277-279 (F.C.A.)).

Thus, Hennelly does not provide an extensive listof questions or factors that may be relevant in any given case, nor is the failure to give a positive response to one of the fourquestions referred to above necessarily determinative (Canada (Attorney General) v. Larkman, 2012 FCA 204, at para. 62). [16] As explained by the Federal Court of Appeal in Canada (Attorney General) v Larkman, 2012 FCA 204: [62] These questions guide the Court in determining whether the granting of an extension of time is in the interests of justice:Grewal, supra at pages 277-278.

The importance of each question depends upon the circumstances of each case. Further, notall of these four questions need be resolved in the moving party’s favour. For example, “a compelling explanation for thedelay may lead to a positive response even if the case against the judgment appears weak, and equally a strong case maycounterbalance a less satisfactory justification for the delay”: Grewal, at page 282. In certain cases, particularly in unusualcases, other questions may be relevant. The overriding consideration is that the interests of justice be served.

See generallyGrewal, at pages 278-279; Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development) v. Hogervorst, 2007 FCA 41 at paragraph33; Huard v. Canada (Attorney General), 2007 FC 195, 89 Admin LR (4th) 1. [17] Similarly, in Whitefish Lake First Nation v Grey, 2019 FCA 275, the Federal Court of Appeal stated: [3] The decision to grant or refuse an extension of time in which to bring an application for judicial review is a discretionaryone typically based on the four factors identified by this Court in Hennelly.

The Hennelly factors are not, however, to beapplied in a rigid fashion, and it is not always necessary that the party seeking the extension of time be able to satisfy all fourfactors.

The overriding consideration is whether it is in the interests of justice that the extension of time be granted. [18] While it is clear that Canada (Attorney General) v Hennelly (1999), (FCA), 244 NR 399 (FCA) (Hennelly) doesnot provide an extensive list of questions or factors that may be relevant in any given case, and that it is not necessary that all fourquestions be answered in the moving party’s favour "“because the overriding consideration or the real test is ultimately that justice bedone between the parties,”" the applicants’ problem in this case is that there is essentially no evidence on any of the four questions, evenif the First Affidavit and the Second Affidavit are considered, and even if the March 13, 2023 date is used as the date of receipt of theReasons.

Each of the four questions is discussed below. A. Did the moving party have a continuing intention to pursue the proceeding? [19] There is no evidence on this point. Also, and of significance on this factor, there is no evidence from the applicants themselves onthe question of whether they have a continuing intention to pursue this proceeding (and no evidence from them at all).

The lack ofevidence from the applicants themselves on this point is significant, and there is nothing in either the First Affidavit or Second Affidavitproviding any explanation as to why the applicants could not have provided this evidence.

I pause to note that the Second Affidavit, inparagraph 4, purports to provide an explanation as to why the "“client”" is not providing evidence, stating that: "“My client is notdeposing to this affidavit because it will amount to hear-say evidence which might be admissible in affidavits but might also make thecase weaker since I am the person who has all of the facts and my client would have to repeat what I told them.”" Leaving aside thatportions of this statement are argumentative and/or opinion, applicants’ counsel may be the person with first-hand knowledge relating tosuch things as the timing of receipt of the Reasons and how his office is staffed, however, that that does not justify a lack of evidencefrom the applicants themselves on the question of whether there is a continuing intention to proceed.

As stated by Justice Manson inSingh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 878 ("“Singh 878”"), a case also dealing with a request for an extension of timeto file the application record pursuant to Rule 10 of the FCCIRPR in circumstances where that application was deemed discontinuedpursuant to the Deemed Discontinuance Practice: [15] With respect to a continuing intention to proceed, evidence of continuing intention must come from the Applicanthimself, unless the Applicant can satisfy the Court that he was unable to do so for reasons outside of his control.

Theaffidavit from the Applicant’s counsel fails to disclose any reason why the Applicant has not provided evidence speaking tohis continuing intention to proceed (Virdi v Canada (Minister of National Revenue), 2006 FCA 38 at para 3). On this point, see also: McKinney v R, 2008 FCA 409 at para 18.

B. Is there some merit to the proceeding? [ 20 ] There is no evidence permitting any assessment of the underlying merits of the ALJR, including no proposed application record. The present situation is similar to that faced by Associate Judge Duchesne in Abikan v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 149 , where the following was stated: [23] It is impossible for me to determine on the evidence whether there is any potential merit to the Applicant’s ALJR or to the submissions made in its regard because the Application Record sought to be served and filed is not included as an exhibit on this motion.

The written submissions made about the merits of the application are of no assistance to me or to the Applicant as they are not supported by any filed evidence. [24] Given the absence of evidence as to the merits of the underlying application other than bald statements of merit in the Applicant’s affidavit, I must find that there is no demonstrated potential merit to the application. [ 21 ] A similar type of shortcoming was noted by Justice Manson in Singh 878 : With respect to the merit of the underlying application, the applicant has provided evidence in the solicitor’s affidavit to support this motion.

The Court was not provided with copy of the decision under review, nor the alleged errors believed to exist in the decision. [ 22 ] Likewise, in Singh 380 , Associate Judge Tabib stated: [46] The applicant was required to demonstrate, in his motion record, that his application has a reasonable chance of success.

However, all the applicant does is to make general assertions relating to the existence of hostility issues between the RPD member and counsel for the applicant, and to the effect that that the RPD should have allowed the applicant to make amendments. [47] Like my colleague in Abikan (at paras 23–24 ), it is impossible for me to determine whether there is any merit to these contentions or to the ALJR because the applicant did not submit any evidence supporting these claims.

Hostility between the RPD member and counsel, even if its existence is acknowledged by the Appeal Division, does not by itself constitute grounds for judicial review. It all depends on the circumstances and on the reasons provided by the RAD. In failing to submit, in support of his motion, the application record that he would like to file or even the decision that is the subject of the judicial review, the applicant is denying the Court the ability to assess the reasonableness of these grounds.

The same is true with respect to the RPD’s alleged refusal to allow amendments, the nature of which is not even specified. [48] The applicant’s decision not to submit his application record in support of his motion is all the more perplexing given that the applicant’s attention had been drawn to the reasons given in Abikan , which emphasize the importance of providing this evidence.

I find that the applicant has not demonstrated that his ALJR has potential merit. [ 23 ] I pause to note that it is surprising in the circumstances of this case, including the passage of time from March 13, 2023 to when this motion was filed on June 8, 2023, that the applicants have not provided the Court with their proposed application record. C.

Has the defendant/respondent been prejudiced from the delay? [ 24 ] The only evidence on the question of whether or not there is prejudice is from the applicants and is found in one sentence in the First Affidavit, which states that: " “The Respondent will not and has not suffered any prejudice if the motion is granted” " (see paragraph s). A bald assertion such as this is insufficient and is given no weight. As stated in Virk at para 43 : " “Bald statements in evidence are insufficient to address any of the questions at issue in the applicable steps and tests.” " D.

Does the moving party have a reasonable explanation for the delay? [ 25 ] The evidence from applicants’ counsel focuses solely on explaining the passage of time from November 17, 2022 to March 13, 2023 when, according to the First Affidavit, applicants’ counsel discovered the information on the Federal Court’s website indicating that the Reasons were received on November 17, 2022. Leaving aside the factual issue as to when applicants’ counsel received the Reasons, there is no explanation at all for the passage of time from March 13, 2023 to June 8, 2023, when the present motion was filed.

Viewed most favourably, if the 30-day time period for the applicants to perfect their application for leave began on March 13, 2023, the deadline for the applicants’ record to be served and filed would have been April 12, 2023. Surprisingly, there is no explanation for the passage of almost eight weeks from April 12, 2023 to June 8, 2023 when the present motion was filed. The passage of time of eight weeks is significant in the circumstances of this case and problematic for the applicants.

As was stated by Associate Judge Tabib in Singh 380 : [36] It should also be noted that the obligation to justify the delay applies to the entire period of the delay, including the time between the moment when the party realizes that the prescribed time limit could not be or was not met and the moment when the motion is filed.

A party who discovers that a procedural step was not completed in a timely manner must act promptly in order to remedy the default (see, for example, Canada (Attorney General) v Tran , 2008 FC 297 at paras 24–28 and Abikan , above, at para 28 ). [Emphasis added.] [ 26 ] The letter that applicants’ counsel wrote to the Court on March 13, 2023 ( " “ March 13 Letter ” " ) is also deserving of a few comments as it receives some attention in the First Affidavit where applicants’ counsel states: “m.

Immediately I discovered the error, I took action by contacting the Federal Court registry on March 10, 2023 to request for a copy of the Rule 9 Reasons for the Decision but the registry was unable to send it to me on that day. I called the registry again on March 13, 2023 to request for a copy of the rule 9 reason as well as to request that the date for sending the

Rule 9 Reasons for the Decision should be changed on the Federal Court’s website to reflect that it was sent on March 13, 2023 as that is the date it was eventually received. n. The registry officer told me to either write a letter or bring a formal motion. I submitted a letter on March 13, 2023 but the letter is still pending a decision until a registry officer called me to inform me that the applicant needs to bring a formal motion due to the lapse of the deemed discontinuance rule.

The letter has not been ruled upon till date.” [ 27 ] That letter is not an exhibit to the First Affidavit, although it is in the Court file. In that letter, applicants’ counsel stated: “I am counsel for the applicant in this file. On March 10, 2023 I discovered from the Court’s website that the rule 9 reasons was sent on November 18, 2022, but unfortunately, I did not receive it. I called the Winnipeg registry office immediately after the discovery on March 10, 2023 to request a copy of the rule 9 reasons but the registry officer was unable to send it to me immediately.

I called the registry office again on March 13, 2023 and the registry officer immediately sent me a copy of the rule 9 reason. I asked the registry officer if today March 13, 2023 will be the effective date of service but the registry officer said they are not able to change the date indicated on the website so they advised me to write a letter to the court for direction to change the date of the service of the rule 9 reason to today March 13, 2023 so that the count down to submit the application record starts today.

I ask that my request be granted in the interest of justice.” [ 28 ] There are a few important points to note regarding the March 13 Letter: (

a) In that letter the applicants were not seeking an extension of time. Rather, the request was to modify the date noted in the Court’s recorded entries as to when the Reasons were received so as to indicate March 13, 2023 rather than November 18, 2023. As a result, the March 13 Letter provides no explanation or justification for the delay between the date of that letter (March 13, 2023) until the date of the filing of the current motion (June 8, 2023). This is also leaving aside whether this was an appropriate request, presented in an appropriate manner, and whether or not there was any response to it.

Even if the request made in the March 13 Letter was granted, the net result would be that the 30-day period would begin to run on that date. As explained above, using the March 13, 2023 date is of no assistance to the applicants on the request for an extension of time given the delay until June 8, 2023 when the present motion was filed. (

b) In any event, the letter did not fall within the an ambit of an informal request for interlocutory relief as provided for in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Consolidated General Practice Guidelines , dated June 8, 2022. Notably, the letter did not meet the requirements set out in paragraph 5(

a) or (d). (

c) The March 13 Letter does not justify a lack of any action from the date of that letter until the present motion was filed on June 8, 2023. VIII. Conclusion on Extension of Time [ 29 ] As there is essentially no relevant evidence on the four factors, and there is no evidence of any other exceptional circumstance, there is no basis upon which to conclude that the interests of justice would be served by granting the extension of time.

A similar conclusion was reached in Virk where Associate Judge Duchesne stated that: [46] … no evidence has been led to address the Hennelly factors more generally or to explain each period of the lengthy delay between the perfection date of April 8, 2022, and the date of the motion before me. There is no basis for an extension of time. ORDER in IMM-7598-22 THEREFORE, THIS COURT ORDERS that the applicants’ motion, including the request to revoke the deemed discontinuance, and the request for an order extending the time to file the applicants’ record, is dismissed. blank "John C.

Cotter" blank Associate Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-7598-22 STYLE OF CAUSE: PEGAH PARSANIA ET AL v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF HEARING: hELD BY WAY OF VIDEOCONFERENCE DATE OF HEARING: October 19, 2023

ORDER and REASONS: COTTER A.J. DATED: December 7, 2023 APPEARANCES : Oluwadamilola Asuni For The Applicants Alicia Dueck-Read For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : Oluwadamilola Asuni Barrister and Solicitor Saskatoon, Saskatchewan For The Applicants Attorney General of Canada Winnipeg, Manitoba For The Respondent