THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP v. IMMIGRATION, 2013 FC 332

Date: 20130403 Docket: IMM-7870-12 Citation: 2013 FC 332 Ottawa , Ontario , April 3, 2013 PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Scott BETWEEN: THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Applicant and MARIA JADE MORA Respondent REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT I. Introduction [ 1 ] This is an application for judicial review by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (the Minister) of a decision rendered by the Immigration Appeals Division (the IAD) on July 5, 2012 to reopen an appeal by Ms. Maria Jade Mora (Ms.

Mora), on the grounds that the initial proceeding was vitiated by a breach of natural justice. [ 2 ] For the reasons that follow this application is allowed. II. The facts [ 3 ] Ms. Mora is a citizen of Canada. Her mother, Ms. Maria Guadalupe Gonzalez, is a citizen of Mexico. [ 4 ] Ms. Mora applied to sponsor her mother under the family class. On June 17, 2011, a Visa Officer from the Canadian embassy in Mexico wrote to both Ms. Mora and Ms. Gonzalez to inform them that the sponsorship application was refused, as Ms. Gonzalez had failed to provide the required documentation.

[ 5 ] Ms. Mora appealed the decision to the IAD. On January 10, 2012, the IAD dismissed the appeal. The IAD found that the Visa Officer provided Ms. Gonzalez with at least three opportunities to provide the missing documentation and that Ms. Gonzalez had failed to take advantage of these opportunities. The IAD found that the Visa Officer’s decision was reasonable. [ 6 ] On January 30, 2012, Ms. Mora sought leave and judicial review of the IAD’s refusal. [ 7 ] On February 29, 2012, Ms.

Mora applied to the IAD to reopen her sponsorship appeal, arguing that the IAD had breached principles of natural justice by failing to inform her that she had a right to pursue her appeal on humanitarian and compassionate [H&C] grounds and also failed to address H&C factors in its decision. [ 8 ] On March 23, 2012, Mr. Justice O’Keefe dismissed leave by Order. [ 9 ] On July 5, 2012, the IAD issued reasons granting Ms. Mora’s motion for reconsideration. III. Issues 1. Did the IAD Member err in reopening Ms. Mora’s appeal? 2.

Did the IAD commit a breach of natural justice when it rendered its initial decision on January 10, 2012? IV. Legislation [ 10 ] Subsections 63(1) and 67(1) and

section 71 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , SC 2001, c 27 [ IRPA ], provide as follows: Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , SC 2001, c 27 Loi sur l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés , LC 2001, c 27 63.

(1) A person who has filed in the prescribed manner an application to sponsor a foreign national as a member of the family class may appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division against a decision not to issue the foreign national a permanent resident visa. 63.

(1) Quiconque a déposé, conformément au règlement, une demande de parrainage au

titre du regroupement familial peut interjeter appel du refus de délivrer le visa de résident permanent.

(1) To allow an appeal, theImmigration Appeal Divisionmust be satisfied that, at the timethat the appeal is disposed of, (

a) the decision appealed iswrong in law or fact or mixedlaw and fact; (

b) a principle of natural justicehas not been observed; or (

c) other than in the case of anappeal by the Minister, takinginto account the best interests ofa child directly affected by thedecision, sufficient humanitarianand compassionateconsiderations warrant specialrelief in light of all thecircumstances of the case. 67.

(1) Il est fait droit à l’appelsur preuve qu’au moment où il enest disposé :

a) la décision attaquée esterronée en droit, en fait ou endroit et en fait;

b) il y a eu manquement à unprincipe de justice naturelle;

c) sauf dans le cas de l’appel duministre, il y a — compte tenu del’intérêt supérieur de l’enfantdirectement touché — des motifsd’ordre humanitaire justifiant, vules autres circonstances del’affaire, la prise de mesuresspéciales.71. The Immigration AppealDivision, on application by aforeign national who has not leftCanada under a removal order,may reopen an appeal if it issatisfied that it failed to observe aprinciple of natural justice. 71. L’étranger qui n’a pas quittéle Canada à la suite de la mesurede renvoi peut demander laréouverture de l’appel sur preuvede manquement à un principe dejustice naturelle. V.

Standard of review [11] The parties disagree on the standard of review to be applied on the first issue. The Minister argues that the issue involvesquestions of law and jurisdiction and should, therefore, be reviewed on a standard of correctness. Ms. Mora argues that the issueconcerns the IAD’s

interpretation of its home statute and should normally be reviewed on a reasonableness standard (see Dunsmuir vNew Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190 at para 54 [Dunsmuir]). Ms. Mora argues that the exceptions to this rule do not apply inthis case. That is to say, the

interpretation of the IRPA in this case does not involve “constitutional questions, questions of law that are ofcentral importance to the legal system as a whole and that are outside the adjudicator’s expertise, […] ‘[q]uestions regarding thejurisdictional lines between two or more competing specialized tribunals’ [and] true questions of jurisdiction or vires” (Alberta(Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2011 SCC 61 at para 30). [12] The Court finds that the standard of review applicable to the first issue raised by this application is correctness.

First, it isclear from the IAD’s decision that determining this issue did not involve interpreting its home statute so much as the common law on the“legal principles governing the jurisdiction of administrative tribunals at large to reopen or rehear a matter already decided” (Nazifpour vCanada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 35 at para 33 [Nazifpour]; and Chandler v Alberta Association ofArchitects, (SCC), [1989] 2 SCR 848 [Chandler]). Second, to the extent that the issue concerns the

interpretation of s. 71of the IRPA, the Court finds that the

interpretation involves a “true question of jurisdiction or vires”. That is a situation where “thetribunal must explicitly determine whether its statutory grant of power gives it the authority to decide a particular matter” and as such,the correctness standard will be applied (Dunsmuir, above, at para 59).

Section 71 constitutes a purely jurisdictional provision limitingthe IAD’s power to reopen an appeal. [13] Both parties and the Court acknowledge that the standard of review to be applied to the second issue is also that of correctness(see Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at para 43). VI. Parties submissions

A. The Minister’s submissions 1. Did the IAD Member err in reopening Ms. Mora’s appeal? [ 14 ] The Minister submits that the IAD’s jurisdiction to reopen an appeal in cases where there was a breach of natural justice is limited by

section 71 of the IRPA to cases where the applicant is 1) a foreign national; and 2) under a removal order but has yet to leave Canada. The Minister points out that Ms. Mora “does not meet either prerequisite, as she is a citizen of Canada and this is a sponsorship application, not a removals case” (Applicant’s Memorandum of Argument, para 18). [ 15 ] The Minister submits that the Member’s reliance on the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Chandler , above, in reopening the appeal was misplaced.

The Minister argues that the Court in Chandler found that the principle of functus officio limited the reopening of matters by administrative tribunals to cases “which are subject to appeal only on a point of law” ( Chandler , above, at para 21 ). The Minister alleges that “[l]eave in the Federal Court may be granted in more circumstances than on a point of law alone - breaches of procedural fairness and erroneous findings of fact are also justifications for judicial intervention” (Applicant’s Memorandum of Argument, para 21).

The Member, therefore, erred in relying on Chandler , in establishing the IAD’s jurisdiction to reopen the appeal of a sponsorship application. [ 16 ] The Minister’s next argument is that the IAD cannot exercise a common law equitable remedy to resolve breaches of natural justice because it is a creature of statute. The Minister relies on the following passage from Nazifpour , above, to justify his contention: “The IAD is a creature of statute, and its implicit power to reopen to consider new evidence is necessarily statutory in origin.

The fact that the courts inferred this power from its express powers does not make the IAD’s pre - IRPA right to reopen a “common-law” right for present purposes” ( Nazifpour , above, at para 60 ). [ 17 ] Finally, the Minister invokes the principle of statutory

interpretation known as expressio unius est exclusio alterius to argue that “[b]y specifically mentioning that reopening is only available to foreign nationals facing removal, it is a logical conclusion that Parliament considered and rejected other situations, such as sponsorship, in which reopening may apply” (Applicant’s Memorandum of Argument, para 25). 2.

Did the IAD commit a breach of natural justice when it rendered its initial decision on January 10, 2012? [ 18 ] In the event that the Court finds that the IAD had the jurisdiction to reopen the appeal for a breach of natural justice in this case, the Minister submits that there was no such breach. The alleged breach of natural justice is that the IAD Member did not consider humanitarian and compassionate grounds [H&C] in deciding whether the appeal should be allowed. The Minister insists that it was Ms. Mora’s duty to raise those grounds but failed to do so.

The IAD Member was not compelled to consider the factors ex officio . The Minister underlines that the Ms. Mora had the option to be represented by counsel but chose not to do so. The Minister invokes this Court’s decision in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Ishmael , 2007 FC 212 at paras 24 and 25 , where Justice Shore explained that: 24

Section 71 of the IRPA , requires that, for the Panel to have the jurisdiction to re-open an appeal, there must be a failure to observe a principle of natural justice for which the IAD itself, is responsible. The breach must be the fault of the IAD, not of the wilful choice (or deemed wilful choice) of the person concerned. 25 If any breach of natural justice occurred from Mr. Ishmael’s wilful choice (or deemed wilful choice) to miss the hearing, then, to allow the request to re-open on the basis, of that wilful choice (or deemed wilful choice) of Mr.

Ishmael to miss the hearing, would be to disregard the purpose for which the right to re-open exists. [ 19 ] Counsel for the Minister also underlined, before the Court, that Ms. Mora had received from the IAD the Information guide- General Procedures for all Appeals to the Immigration Appeal Division, attached to a letter dated September 2, 2011, which clearly set out in

section 2 that “Also in some cases, the IAD Member may be able to consider humanitarian and compassionate reasons to allow your appeal even if the CBSA/CIC or ID decision was correct in law and fact”. The guide also specified, in that same

section 2, that: “To show that the CBSA/CIC or ID decision was wrong, or in some cases, that there are sufficient humanitarian and compassionate reasons, you may need to provide documents to be used at your hearing.”

[20] The Minister concludes that the Ms. Mora’s “choice to proceed without counsel and her choice not to raise humanitarian andcompassionate grounds cannot justify a reopening of her hearing” (Applicant’s Memorandum of Argument, para 31). [21] Finally, relying on Justice Harrington’s decision in Skandrovski v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC341 at para 15 [Skandrovski], the Minister argues that not informing the IAD when seeking to reopen the appeal that the Federal Courthad denied leave for judicial review on the same grounds constituted an abuse of process.

Such a situation could result in “the [IAD]unwittingly and unknowingly in effect review a decision of the [Federal] Court not to grant leave” (Skandrovski, above, at para 15). B Ms. Mora’s submissions 1. Did the IAD Member err in reopening Ms. Mora’s appeal? [22] Ms. Mora argues that the IRPA is silent on the IAD’s jurisdiction to reopen a sponsorship appeal for a breach of naturaljustice.

Section 71 was introduced by Parliament in order “ […] to remove the ability of the [IAD] to reopen a removal order appeal fornew evidence before an appellant was deported as it was previously authorized to do […]” (Respondent’s Memorandum of Argument,para 32). Ms. Mora underlines that this was the

interpretation the Federal Court of Appeal gave to s. 71 in Nazifpour, above, at para 80: “[…] [section 71] implicitly removes the IAD’s jurisdiction to reopen appeals on the ground of new evidence, a jurisdiction which wouldotherwise be judicially inferred from the nature of the statutory discretion to relieve against deportation […]” [23] In arriving at this conclusion, Ms. Mora notes that the Court of Appeal engaged in a thorough statutory

interpretation analysis.It found that the purpose and intent of

section 71 could be discerned from parliamentary debates and documents. One such document was“Bill C-11: Clause by Clause Analysis” prepared to explain to parliamentarians each provision of the Bill. The explanation provided forsection 71 was as follows: “Under the current regime, there is no legislative provision permitting the Immigration Appeal Division to reopen an appeal once it hasrendered a decision on a case. It is a common law principle, however, that a tribunal can reopen a case if there has been a fundamentalerror of justice.

Bill C-11 confirms the authority of the Immigration Appeal Division to re-open an appeal but, in order to prevent thismechanism from being used as a tactic to delay removal, it clearly limits reopenings to instances where there has been a breach of thecommon law principle of natural justice” [Emphasis added by Court of Appeal in Nazifpour, above at para 67]. [24] Ms. Mora contends, therefore, that

section 71 was not intended to remove the general power of administrative tribunals toreopen or rehear a matter for a breach of natural justice as described in Chandler, above, at paras 21-22 and 24-25: 21 To this extent, the principle of functus officio applies. It is based, however, on the policy ground which favours finality ofproceedings rather than the rule which was developed with respect to formal judgments of a court whose decision was subject to a fullappeal.

For this reason I am of the opinion that its application must be more flexible and less formalistic in respect to the decisions ofadministrative tribunals which are subject to appeal only on a point of law. Justice may require the reopening of administrativeproceedings in order to provide relief which would otherwise be available on appeal. 22 Accordingly, the principle should not be strictly applied where there are indications in the enabling statute that a decision can bereopened in order to enable the tribunal to discharge the function committed to it by enabling legislation.

This was the situation inGrillas, supra. […] 24 In this appeal we are concerned with the failure of the Board to dispose of the matter before it in a manner permitted by theArchitects Act. The Board intended to make a final disposition but that disposition is a nullity. It amounts to no disposition at all in law.Traditionally, a tribunal, which makes a determination which is a nullity, has been permitted to reconsider the matter afresh and render avalid decision.

In Re Trizec Equities Ltd. and Area Assessor Burnaby-New Westminster (1983), (BC SC), 147 D.L.R.(3d) 637 (B.C.S.C.), McLachlin J. (as she then was) summarized the law in this respect in the following passage, at p. 643: I am satisfied both as a matter of logic and on the authorities that a tribunal which makes a decision in the purported exercise of its powerwhich is a nullity, may thereafter enter upon a proper hearing and render a valid decision: Lange v. Board of School Trustees of SchoolDistrict No. 42 (Maple Ridge) (1978), (BC SC), 9 B.C.L.R. 232 (B.C.S.C.); Posluns v. Toronto Stock Exchange et al.

(1968), (SCC), 67 D.L.R. (2d) 165, [1968] S.C.R. 330. In the latter case, the Supreme Court of Canada quoted from LordReid's reasons for judgment in Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40 at p. 79, where he said: I do not doubt that if an officer or body realises that it has acted hastily and reconsiders the whole matter afresh, after affording to theperson affected a proper opportunity to present its case, then its later decision will be valid. There is no complaint made by Trizec Equities Ltd. with respect to the hearing held on March 19th.

Accordingly, while the courtexceeded its jurisdiction by purporting to increase the assessments on the morning of March 17, 1982, its subsequent decision of March19, 1982, stands as valid. 25 If the error which renders the decision a nullity is one that taints the whole proceeding, then the tribunal must start afresh. Casessuch as Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40 (H.L.); Lange v. Board of School Trustees of School District No. 42 (Maple Ridge) (1978), (BC SC), 9 B.C.L.R. 232 (S.C.B.C.) and Posluns v. Toronto Stock Exchange, (SCC), [1968] S.C.R.330, referred to above, are in this category.

They involve a denial of natural justice which vitiated the whole proceeding. The tribunalwas bound to start afresh in order to cure the defect. [25] Based on the above passages, Ms. Mora claims that the Minister’s argument on the inapplicability of Chandler to the matter athand is wrong on two fronts. First, an applicant does not have a full right to appeal the IAD’s decision but rather a right to judicial reviewwith leave under ss. 72(1) of the IRPA. The principle of functus officio, therefore, would not apply as strictly to the IAD’s decision (seeChandler, above, at para 21).

Second, the Supreme Court, in Chandler, held that an administrative tribunal may always reopen (i.e.independent of the principle of functus officio) or rehear a case where an error renders its decision null. Chandler, according to Ms. Mora,recognized that a denial of natural justice constituted such an error (see Chandler, above, at para 25). [26] Finally, Ms. Mora submits that the Minister’s contention that interpreting s. 71 using the principle of expressio unius estexclusio alterius would exclude reopening a sponsorship appeal for a breach of natural justice is incorrect. Ms.

Mora points to theapplication of the principle to s. 71 in Nazifpour in support of her position: “The IAD’s jurisdiction to reopen a valid decision to consider new evidence was derived from the particular statutory function andpowers of the IAD on an appeal against a deportation order to which the discretionary or “equitable” grounds apply. In contrast, alltribunals presumptively have the power to rehear a matter for a breach of the principles of natural justice which has rendered the firstdecision a nullity. In my view, the implied exclusion presumption would provide more support to an argument that

section 71 excludesthe IAD’s jurisdiction to reopen a decision rendered a nullity by a jurisdictional error other than a breach of the principles of naturaljustice” (Nazifpour, above, at para 56). [27]

Section 71 was intended to “express the common law principle for the purpose of implicitly excluding the right of the IAD toreopen a removal order appeal on equitable grounds. The question of reopening an appeal on equitable grounds simply does not arisebefore the Appeal Division in this case” (Respondent’s Memorandum of Argument, para 39). 2. Did the IAD commit a breach of natural justice when it rendered its initial decision on January 10, 2012? [28] Ms. Mora argues the IAD Member, in the original proceeding, breached a principle of natural justice by failing to considerH&C grounds before rendering his decision and insists that paragraph 67(1)(

c) of the IRPA requires the Member to consider thosefactors ex officio. Ms. Mora’s sole authority is the IAD Member’s decision of July 5, 2012. The pertinent passage reads as follows: [6] In his decision in the first proceeding the Member thoroughly considered the evidence and submissions as they were presented inrelation to the legal validity of the refusal. He found the visa officer’s decision is valid in law and dismissed the appeal. However, thedecision is silent with respect to consideration of any humanitarian and compassionate factors.

In the first proceeding the Memberappears to have failed to consider one of the two aspects of the appeal, resulting in a denial of natural justice for its failure to exercise itsjurisdiction in the matter (Applicant’s Application Record, p 51). [29] At the hearing, counsel for Ms. Mora directed the Court to the letter sent by the IAD on September 2, 2011, acknowledgingthe appeal and instructing Ms. Mora to provide her written position to the IAD registry and to the Minister’s counsel by September 30,2011. He underlined that said letter was silent on the Appellant’s right to raise H&C considerations.

Counsel also argued that in view ofthe fact that this matter was considered in chambers, the Appellant had not been properly informed that she was entitled to bring forwardH&C reasons to allow her appeal.

[30] Finally, in response to the Minister’s abuse of process claim, the Ms. Mora submits that she discontinued her leave applicationonce she retained counsel and decided to pursue the reopening application. Ms. Mora received endorsement from the Minister’s counselon a Notice of Discontinuance but was unaware that the notice needed to be filed with the Federal Court. The Federal Court subsequentlydismissed the application, not on its merits but rather for failure to file an application record. VII. Analysis 1. Did the IAD Member err in reopening Ms. Mora’s appeal? [31] For the reasons brought forward by Ms.

Mora and those that follow, the Court finds that the IAD has the jurisdiction to rehearan appeal of a sponsorship application that was vitiated or nullified due to a breach of natural justice. [32] The Court disagrees with the Minister’s contention that

section 71 removes the IAD’s presumptive ability, as anadministrative tribunal, to rehear a case for a breach of natural justice as described in paragraph 24 of Chandler, above. This jurisdictionexists despite the principle of functus officio because, in such cases, no disposition is considered to have been made at all since thedecision is null ab initio due to the breach. [33]

Section 71 specifically mentions foreign nationals subject to a removal order because it was intended to eliminate theirpreviously held right to a reopening of an appeal on the ground of new evidence (see Nazifpour, above, at para 80. It was not intended toprevent the IAD from exercising its general jurisdiction to reopen on a breach of natural justice ground for other categories of applicantswho may validly appeal their decisions to the IAD.

Under ss. 63(1) of the IRPA, “[a] person who has filed […] an application to sponsora foreign national as a member of the family class may appeal to the [IAD] against a decision not to issue the foreign national apermanent resident visa”. This Court sees no reason, in either the legislation or the common law, why the IAD should not be able torehear such an Applicant’s case should it have been nullified by a breach of natural justice. 2.

Did the IAD commit a breach of natural justice when it rendered its initial decision on January 10, 2012? [34] The Court finds that the Member’s decision that the original proceeding was nullified by a breach of natural justice wasincorrect. [35] The IAD Member, in the initial proceeding, did not have an obligation to consider H&C grounds because Ms. Mora failed toraise them in her submissions.

The Court of Appeal made a similar conclusion in Owusu v Canada (Minister of Citizenship andImmigration), 2004 FCA 38 at para 5 : 5 An immigration officer considering an H & C application must be "alert, alive and sensitive" to, and must not "minimize", the bestinterests of children who may be adversely affected by a parent's deportation: Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 at para. 75. However, this duty only arises when it is sufficiently clear from the materialsubmitted to the decision-maker that an application relies on this factor, at least in part.

Moreover, an applicant has the burden ofadducing proof of any claim on which the H & C application relies.

Hence, if an applicant provides no evidence to support the claim, theofficer may conclude that it is baseless. [Emphasis added] [36] In Kumari v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 1424 at para 9, Justice O’Reilly explained the issueas follows: 9 Finally, the applicants submit that the officer should have considered humanitarian and compassionate factors in their favour.However, in the absence of an explicit request, the officer was under no obligation to consider the applicants' case on humanitarian andcompassionate grounds: Chen v.

Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1997] F.C.J. No. 871 (QL) (T.D.); Chen v. Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] F.C.J. No. 275 (QL) (T.D.). In his interview with the visa officer, Mr. Chanddescribed circumstances that could have formed the basis of humanitarian and compassionate consideration. The applicants suggest thatthis amounted to an implicit request to which the officer was bound to respond. In my view, the officer was not obliged to respond to animplicit request. [37] There is an exception to this rule, however.

Section 5.27 of the Inland Processing Manual 5 [IP 5] states that an officer: “ […] may use discretion to consider, on their own initiative, whether an exemption on H&C grounds would be appropriate.

When the applicant does not directly request an exemption, but facts in the application suggest that they are requesting an exemption forthe inadmissibility, officers should treat the application as if the exemption has been requested.” [Emphasis added in the original] [38] At paragraph 58 of Brar v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2011 FC 691, Justice Russell interpreted section5.27 to mean that there is a duty to consider H&C factors when the facts or submissions imply that they are being asked to be considered. [39] After reviewing the documents before the IAD Member, in the initial proceeding, the Court finds that the facts submitted byMs.

Mora did not imply a request that H&C factors be considered. The Court acknowledges that the hearing took place in chambers yet,the Information Guide sent to Ms. Mora clearly indicated that H&C reasons could be raised and would be considered. Ms. Mora, havingbeen properly notified in writing of her right to raise such H&C considerations, failed to avail herself of that opportunity. In suchinstance, the IAD Member had no obligation to consider H&C grounds and, as a result, there was no breach of natural justice. VIII. Certified questions [40] Counsel for Ms.

Mora proposed the following two questions for certification: 1. Whether the standard of review of the question whether the IAD has jurisdiction to reopen for a breach of natural justice is basedon reasonableness or correctness? 2.

Whether the IAD has the jurisdiction to reopen a sponsorship appeal on the basis of a breach of natural justice? [41] As counsel for the Minister had not been apprised that questions would be submitted to the Court for certification, as questionsof general interest, he was granted by this Court until March 15 to respond in writing. [42] Having reviewed the written comments sent by the Minister’s counsel, the Court will not certify any questions for thefollowing reasons.

As for the first question, the jurisprudence is well established on the applicable standard of review and, therefore, thequestion fails to meet the required test. More importantly, neither the first nor the second question are dispositive of this case (see Varelav Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FCA 145 , [2010] 1 FCR 129). The answer to either or both questionswill not change the result. JUDGMENT THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that 1. The application is allowed, the decision to reopen the appeal is quashed, and the IAD’s January 10, 2012 decision is maintained. 2.

There is no question of general importance for certification. "André F.J. Scott" Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-7870-12

STYLE OF CAUSE: THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION v MARIA JADE MORA PLACE OF HEARING: Vancouver, British Columbia DATE OF HEARING: March 5, 2013 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT: SCOTT J. DATED: April 3, 2013 APPEARANCES : Edward Burnet FOR THE APPLICANT Andrew Z. Wlodyka FOR THE RESPONDENT SOLICITORS OF RECORD : William F. Pentney Deputy Attorney General of Canada Vancouver , British Columbia FOR THE APPLICANT Wlodyka MacDonald Teng Vancouver , British Columbia FOR THE RESPONDENT