CHUN KONG HUI Applicant v. THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP, 2014 FC 666

Date: 20140709 Docket: IMM-970-14 Citation: 2014 FC 666 Ottawa, Ontario, July 9, 2014 PRESENT: The Honourable Mr.

Justice Mosley BETWEEN: CHUN KONG HUI Applicant and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondent JUDGMENT UPON an application, pursuant to s 72 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA], and s 18.1 of theFederal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7, for judicial review and a writ of mandamus in relation to the applicant’s application under theFederal Immigration Investor Program; AND UPON reading the material filed and hearing the oral representations of counsel for the parties at Vancouver, BritishColumbia on June 4, 2014 and reserving judgment; AND UPON considering that Bill C-31,

An Act to Implement Certain Provisions of the Budget Tabled in Parliament on February 11, 2014 and Other Measures, 2nd Sess, 41st Parl, 2014, also known as the Economic Action Plan 2014 Act, No.1 or the BudgetImplementation Act 2014, received Royal Assent on Thursday June 19, 2014 and that

section 303 of Bill C-31 which came into force onRoyal Assent amends the IRPA to terminate any application by a foreign national for a permanent resident visa as a member of theprescribed class of investors or of entrepreneurs if, before February 11, 2014, it has not been established by an officer whether theapplicant meets the selection criteria and other requirements applicable to the class in question; AND UPON considering the Reasons for Judgment of Madam Justice Gleason in Jia v Canada (Minister of Citizenship andImmigration), 2014 FC 596 [Jia] issued on June 23, 2014 respecting 95 similar applications for permanent residence as members of theinvestor class provided for in

section 90 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227. The coming into force of Bill C-31 has rendered the application for judicial review and for mandamus in this matter moot as theunderlying application for permanent residence in Canada has been terminated by the statute. While the Court may exercise its discretionto hear and determine a matter that is moot applying the principles set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Borowski v Canada(Attorney General), (SCC), [1989] 1 SCR 342 [Borowski], I am not satisfied that this is such a case.

The issues havebeen thoroughly canvassed by Justice Gleason in her reasons in Jia, above. Other than with respect to the constitutional issues, whichwere not argued before me and on which I express no opinion, I substantially agree with Justice Gleason’s reasons. I have recently expressed views on the question of delays in relation to investor class applications in relation to a similar case:Mersad v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 543.

Having regard to the concern for judicial economy discussedin Borowski, I do not consider that there is anything useful that I might add to those views in this case. No questions were proposed forcertification in this matter. IT IS THE JUDGMENT OF THIS COURT that: 1. the application is dismissed; and 2. no question is certified. “Richard G. Mosley” Judge