INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELEVATOR CONSTRUCTORS, LOCAL 102 APPLICANT - v. -, 2023 SKKB 234

KING ’S BENCH FOR SASKATCHEWAN Citation: 2023 SKKB 234 Date: 20 23 11 01 Docket: KBG-RG-00160-2023 Judicial Centre: Regina BETWEEN: INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELEVATOR CONSTRUCTORS, LOCAL 102 APPLICANT - and - KONE INC. RESPONDENT - and - ARBITRATOR ANNE M. WALLACE, K.C. RESPONDENT Counsel: Gregory D. Fingas for the International Union of Elevator Constructors, Local 102 Allison E. MacIsaac and Artimes Ghahremani for Kone Inc. JUDGMENT BROWN J.

NOVEMBER 1, 2023 INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] Kone Inc. [Kone] is an elevator industry servicing company which has both residential and commercial projects in Canada including in Saskatoon and Regina, Saskatchewan. International Union of Elevator Constructors, Local 102 [Local 102] is the bargaining agent for a unit of elevator constructors employed by Kone in Brandon and Winnipeg, Manitoba, Thunder Bay, Ontario, Saskatoon and Regina. [ 2 ] The National Elevator and Escalator Association [NEEA] bargains the collective bargaining agreement on behalf of its employer members, one of whom is Kone. This matter involves the

interpretation of a collective agreement [CBA] bargained for Kone by NEEA which governs the relationship between the parties to this application. Background [ 3 ] In the course of performing elevator services in Saskatoon in 2020, on two occasions Kone had two employees from Regina attend in Saskatoon to perform such work. On both occasions there were union members who form part of the bench who reside in the Saskatoon area who were available to perform the work Kone undertook in Saskatoon. The result was that Local 102, given its

interpretation of the CBA, told the two Regina employees they were not to attend in Saskatoon to perform the work, as workers from the Saskatoon bench would need to do it. [ 4 ] Kone adheres to a different

interpretation of the CBA than Local 102 regarding the Regina employees attending in Saskatoon on the two occasions in 2020. As a result, Kone initiated the grievance that resulted in the arbitrator’s decision which is the subject of this review.

[5] In a decision dated June 6, 2022, (Sask LA), the arbitrator Anne M. Wallace, K.C.[Arbitrator] held in favour of Kone regarding Kone’s grievance filed on March 5, 2020, determining that Kone’s

interpretation of theCBA was the preferable one and that it was appropriate for Kone to have instructed the Regina employees to attend in Saskatoon toperform the requisite work Kone had undertaken there. [6] The applicant Local 102 applies for judicial review of the Arbitrator’s decision dated June 6, 2022. By thetime the matter reached this Court it was agreed that the Arbitrator had undertaken to provide a declaration interpreting Articles 2.03 and16.02(3) of the CBA. [7] In

summary, Local 102 says the only reasonable

interpretation is the one which it advanced at the arbitration.Naturally, therefore, any other

interpretation not in line with that, and in this case the Arbitrator’s

interpretation, is unreasonable and mustbe struck down. [8] Kone says there may be differing

interpretations and the one settled on by the Arbitrator was within the rangeof those that are reasonable; therefore there is no basis to alter it via judicial review. [9] For the reasons that follow I conclude that the Arbitrator’s decision is not unreasonable. Relief Sought [10] The applicant, Local 102, seeks an order: (

a) Quashing and/or setting aside the decision of the respondent arbitration and (

i) denying the respondent employer’s grievance, or(ii) in the alternative an order directing the grievance to be remitted to the respondent Arbitrator to be decided in accordance with the lawand any directions from the court. (

b) Costs. ISSUE [11] The issue in this matter is whether the Arbitrator acted reasonably in concluding that the grievance was properlyallowed. This is further narrowed to being a question of whether interpreting the local worker priority provisions of the CBA such that itapplies to new hires but not short-term work projects is reasonable. Standard Of review [12] Both parties agree that the standard of review is to be viewed in accordance with what was set out in Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 SCR 653 [Vavilov].

Here, that means the standard ofreasonableness ought to be applied to the Arbitrator’s decision. There is no reason it should be otherwise, and therefore thereasonableness standard will be applied. Mason v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21 [Mason], being decided by theSupreme Court of Canada between the time this matter was argued and this decision being rendered, must also be considered. It does not,however, change that result; reasonableness is still the standard to be employed here.

Mason does add additional explanation to theapplication of the reasonableness standard to this scenario. bACKGROUND FACTS [13] There exists a lengthy history of collective bargaining here. It is slightly unusual in the sense that it is somethingof an industry wide negotiation through NEEA as opposed to just one employer and one union.

The current CBA, effective from March1, 2020, through to February 2025, governs the relationship the parties enjoy, and includes very specific provisions related to type ofwork, how it is scheduled and the priorities of each of the two groups: owner and labourer. [14] At the arbitration one witness, Rick Flaman, was called by Kone. Two witnesses, Colin Dauphinais and DannyAmmazzini, were called by Local 102. The Arbitrator laid out a

summary of all the evidence she considered of note in her decision. Itconstitutes some 21 single space pages of her decision. [15] In relation to the findings and determination of the Arbitrator, of particular note are the following conclusions: 26. The parties agree that the modern method of

interpretation, first applied to the

interpretation of statutes, is equally applicable to theinterpretation of contracts, including collective agreements. . . 42 . . . The modern principle of

interpretation is a method of

interpretation rather than a rule, but still encompasses the many well-recognized

interpretation conventions. The modern principle directs interpreters: 1 to consider the entire context of the collective agreement 2 to read the words of a collective agreement · in their entire context · in their grammatical and ordinary meaning 3 to read the words of a collective agreement harmoniously

· with the scheme of the agreement · with the object of the agreement, and · with the intention of the parties. 1 What is the “entire context of a collective agreement” 43 The “entire context” includes · the collective agreement as a whole document. One provision of a collective agreement cannot be understood before the whole document has been read because what is said in one place will often be qualified, modified or excepted in some fashion, directly or indirectly, in another · reading one provision of the collective agreement keeping in mind what is contained in other provisions.

In the first instance it must be assumed negotiators knew not only the provisions specifically bargained but all the others contained in the collective agreement. An example is the use of words that have defined meanings. Those meanings must be applied whenever the defined word is used in the collective agreement · keeping in mind the legislative framework within which collective agreements exist and keeping that framework in mind as part of the entire context. 2 Reading the words 44 Words in a collective agreement are to be read (

a) within their entire context in order to figure out the scheme and purpose of the agreement and the words in a particular

article must be considered within that framework, (

b) in their grammatical and ordinary meaning. Typically this involves taking the appropriate dictionary definition of a word and using it, unless the dictionary meaning is modified by a definition, by common usage of the parties or by the context in which the word is used, and (

c) harmoniously with · the scheme of the agreement (which could include the arrangement of provisions and the purpose of the agreement or a particular part of the agreement) · its object · the intention of the parties, assuming an intention can be discerned. The intention is to be found in the words used, but evidence of intention from other sources may be appropriate in order to decide on what the words used by the parties actually mean. 3 The meaning of “context” 45 The word “context” itself means the circumstances that form the setting … for [a] statement …, and in terms of which it can be fully understood.

Concise Oxford Dictionary (10 th ) and the Merriam-Webster Dictionary includes in its definition of context: the weaving together of words; the parts of a discourse that surround a word or passage and can throw light on its meaning; the interrelated conditions in which something exists or occurs. 46 And so, entire context in terms of a collective agreement and the

interpretation of the words used in it includes considering · how words have been weaved together · how those words connect with other words · the discourse (other information) that can throw light on the text to uncover the meaning · any conditions that exist or may occur that might affect the meaning to be given to the text. [ 16 ] After setting out the approach to interpreting the words in their context harmoniously, relying on Unifor, Local 892 and Mosaic Potash Esterhazy LLP, Re, 2020 CarswellSask 18 (WL) (Sask Arb) and S.E.I.U. v Saskatoon Regional Health Authority , 2010 CarswellSask 891 (WL) (Sask Arb) (Article 6 Grievance), the Arbitrator noted that testing of the

interpretation is also important: 26 …

47 Once an

interpretation is settled upon, it should be tested by asking these questions: · is the

interpretation plausible—is it reasonable? · is the

interpretation effective—does it answer the question within the bounds of the collective agreement? · is the

interpretation acceptable in the sense that it is within the bounds of acceptability for the parties and legal values of fairness and reasonableness? It is the modern principle of

interpretation that I have used to analyze the collective agreement, evidence and argument and to make a decision on the grievance. [ 17 ] The Arbitrator noted that in cases of ambiguity, past practice evidence may assist in uncovering the intentions of the parties (see paras. 33, 34, 35). [ 18 ] The Arbitrator then analysed the facts and CBA in this particular circumstance beginning at para. 29. She identified the issue as being whether

Article 16.02(3) of the CBA prohibits Kone from assigning work in one jurisdiction (Saskatoon) to employees from another jurisdiction (Regina) if the union has unemployed members on the bench in Saskatoon: The interpretive analysis 30. The answer to this question involves

interpretation of the CBA as a whole and in particular the language of

Article 16.02(3). The Employer says the words “these men shall have local preference whenever possible on any work covered by this Agreement” in

Article 16.02(3) means when the Employer is increasing its workforce, the Employer is required to hire off the local bench if possible. The Union says the words mean that whenever there is any Elevator Constructor work available in a named city, if there is someone on the bench, the Employer must take that person off the bench to do that work. [ 19 ] The Arbitrator then specifically recognized that there are different possible meanings in relation to

Article 16.02(3) as it is not clear on its face what “local preference” means, what “whenever possible” means or what “any work covered in this Agreement” means. This ambiguity would need resolution as the outcome could be applicable to “work when the Employer hires someone new to expand the workforce” or alternately “every bit of work within the work jurisdiction of the Elevator Constructor”. [ 20 ] In considering the authorities advanced by the parties, the Arbitrator found them to be distinguishable and not of direct assistance, concluding that she would need to proceed with

interpretation of the CBA based on the evidence before her and the unique language of that specific CBA. [ 21 ] In relation to past practice in this matter, the Arbitrator concluded there was one aspect of past practice that decisively directed one version over the other: 35. The one past practice that is important here, and on which the parties agree, is that whenever the Employer has expanded its workforce, the Employer has given preference in hiring to any Union members on the bench in a named city where the Employer is hiring. . . [ 22 ] In application of the modern method of

interpretation to the language of this CBA, the Arbitrator considered and thereafter concluded: (1) “The Agreement is one of many in the construction industry where unions and employers agree to carve out the work to be done by the specific trades.” (para. 36). (2) “The Agreement itself is lengthy and detailed and has been in existence for many decades”. During that time “the parties have turned their minds to numerous topics and bargained significant detail on many of them.” (para. 37). (3) “A review of the Agreement reveals that in the

definitions the “Employees” covered by the Agreement are Elevator Constructor Mechanics and Elevator Constructor Helpers. By

Article 2.01, the Employers recognize Local 102 as the exclusive bargaining agent for all Elevator Constructor Mechanics and Elevator Constructor Helpers engaged in the installation, repair, maintenance and servicing of all equipment referred to in

Article 4.02.” (para. 38).

(4) That by “Article 2.02 … the Employer [is] responsible in the interest of the “purchaser, the Employers and the Employees, to maintain the highest degree of operating efficiency and to continue technical development to obtain better quality, reliability and cost of its product.” And that “article [2.02] … say[s] the provision is not intended to affect the “work jurisdiction” specified in

Article 4 and other articles of the CBA.” (para. 39).

(5) That “Article 2.03, the management rights clause, gives the Employer, subject to the other provisions of the CBA, the right among other things to select personnel, hire, assign work or duties, transfer, lay off and recall employees. Unless something in the CBA restricts these rights...” (para. 40). (6) “The “highest degree of operating efficiency” required of the Employer by

Article 2.02” could not be interpreted “to take away any of the Elevator Constructor work delegated to the Elevator Constructors by

Article 4” as

Article 4.01 (which contains a detailed and comprehensive list of work to be performed by Mechanics and Helpers) “requires the work set out in

Article 4.02 to be performed exclusively by Mechanics and Helpers in the employ of the Employers.” (para. 41).

(7) That “Article 4 is all about the Union ensuring that all Elevator Constructor work be kept within the “work jurisdiction” of the Union to be performed by Mechanics and Helpers.” (para. 42).

(8) The concept of efficiency in

Article 2.02 was buttressed through

Article 4.08 which says that “The industry, including its

employees and customers, will be served best by full utilization of the latest methods, techniques, technologies, tools and equipmentavailable including communications equipment. Therefore, no restrictions shall be imposed on their use.” (para. 43).

(9) Confirmation that the parties spent considerable time negotiating significant detail about their relationship rather than leavingthings to implication can be found in a number of other provisions of the CBA. Examples included “Article 4—Work Jurisdiction,Article 7—Construction Work,

Article 8—Repair Work,

Article 9—Maintenance Work,

Article 10—Designation of Helper’s Work,Qualifications & Privileges, and

Article 13—Travelling Expenses and Transportation, contain detailed provisions about how and whenwork will be done, the hours to be worked, when and how travel time and living allowances are to be paid, and much more.” (para. 44).

(10) Article 10(A), titled Increase and Reduction of the Work Place, contains

Article 10.01(

A) and 10.02(

A) which “cover variousscenarios when the Employer is increasing its workforce.” Through those provisions, “the Employer agrees to give preference ofemployment to unemployed Union members”. The employer has the right to act reasonably in rejecting a union member. “The Employeris not required to hire a Union member the Employer has previously discharged for just cause.” However, other than such a situation, theEmployer is required to “take the first Mechanic off the Union list and may name hire a second Mechanic, and so on as the articlerequires.” (para. 45).

(11) Nothing in

Article 10(

A) requires “the Employer to increase its workforce by hiring from a local bench in a named city”, thereforeany such requirement would need to be found elsewhere. This leads to consideration of

Article 16.02(3) as “it is the only place in theCBA that could be interpreted as creating the hiring requirements on a named city basis”, which happened to be the practice theEmployer had been following for years at such time as the employer is looking to expand the workforce (para. 46).

(12) Article 10.03(

A) does not fully cover the ground with respect to layoff as it applies to Helpers but not Mechanics. Thus, the layoffprovisions of labour legislation such as, “in Saskatchewan, the Saskatchewan Employment Act [SS 2013, c S-15.1], would apply. In thatevent, the Employer can choose whom to lay off without regard to seniority with the Employer or with the Union because themanagement right is not limited by anything in the CBA on this point.” (para. 47)

(13) The word “jurisdiction” has several meanings as used in different places and circumstances within the CBA. “One sense is inrelation to the “work” performed by Union members. The Union has jurisdiction over Elevator Construction work (Article 4). Anothersense of the word “jurisdiction” is in relation to geographic jurisdiction.” (para. 48). “Article 2.02 refers to work jurisdiction in Article4.02 which covers the jurisdiction of the work to be performed by Union members”, referring to “primary and secondary jurisdiction ofthe Union when speaking to handling and unloading of heavy equipment.” (para. 49).

In that place and circumstance, jurisdiction wouldneed to mean geographic jurisdiction.

Article 4.06 speaks to work “coming under the jurisdiction of the Elevator Constructor” meaningjurisdiction over the Elevator Constructor work (para. 50).

(14) All the references to “jurisdiction” in

Article 13 (travel expenses and transportation when Mechanics and Helpers are sent outsideof the jurisdictional radius of the CBA) “can reasonably be taken to refer to geographic jurisdiction.” (para. 51).

(15) Article 16: “Jurisdictional Territory & Travel Zones” refers to the Primary Jurisdiction of Winnipeg, overlaps with

Article 13 andalso speaks to travel, as well as “Secondary Jurisdiction”. “Subsection (1) sets the Secondary Jurisdiction to be a 65-mile radius ofPortage and Main in Winnipeg” and ss. 2 “sets out how much travel time the Employer must pay to employees within travel zones in theSecondary Jurisdiction.” (para. 52). Subsection (3), however, “has nothing at all to do with travel time, even though it appears right afterArticle 16.01 and the first two subsections of

Article 16.02 all dealing with travel time.” Subsection (3) says that Local 102 hasjurisdiction over: “· men now resident in the City of Saskatoon, Regina, Brandon, and · all men who may be permanently stationed in these areas during the life of this Agreement.” (para. 53)

(16) The word “jurisdiction” here means that “Local 102 represents the men who meet the stated criteria” and as such has jurisdictionover the people within two categories. “First, if an employee was resident in one of the named cities when the parties entered into theAgreement, that employee comes within the jurisdiction of Local 102. Secondly, if someone becomes permanently stationed in a namedcity, that employee will come within the jurisdiction of Local 102.

This suggests that if an Elevator Helper or an Elevator Mechanicpermanently moves to a named city, they come under the jurisdiction of the Local.” (para. 54). The phrase following this: “…and thatthese men shall have local preference whenever possible on any work covered in this Agreement.” refers to the “two categories of menover whom Local 102 has jurisdiction.

Those men are the ones who have “local preference”.” Local preference in this context is assistedby the last sentence of subsection (3) which says: “This recognizes fully the jurisdictional rights of these members and they must becomemembers of Local 102” (as required by

Article 3). Thus, when people are hired, they must become a member, suggesting that the “localpreference” referred to is to occur at hiring (para. 55).

(17) The members’ jurisdictional rights therefore “include the right to be represented by the Union and the right to have preference inhiring in their named city when the Employer is hiring. Local preference in hiring is to be given “whenever possible”.” (para. 56).

In reliance on Ivaco [(1997), (ON LA), 67 LAC (4th) 66 (Ont LA)], and New Vista [(1988), (BCLA), 1 LAC (4th) 227 (BC LA)], a functional meaning must be given to terms like “wherever practicable” or “whenever possible”,which are by nature flexible. “The words “whenever possible” in 16.02(3) in their ordinary meaning would mean when something ispossible as opposed to when something is not possible. It suggests the parties should be able to ascertain when something is or is notpossible. The most logical

interpretation is that whenever it is possible to hire someone off the local bench (i.e., if there is someone onthe local bench and the Employer has not reasonably rejected them or the Employer has not previously discharged them for just cause),then the Employer will hire from the bench. In doing so, the Employer then would have to apply the requirements of

Article 10(

A) to thehiring process but because of

Article 16.02(3) based on the named city bench, not the entire local.” (para. 59).

(18) Article 16.03, like

Article 16.02(3), is not a travel zone provision but is another step in the CBA’s requirements regarding hiring

such that Local 102 members are to be given preference in employment. Thus, if there is no union member on a bench, then other Local 102 members get preference in hiring. If the “Union cannot provide any qualified members within three days, the Employer can look elsewhere for its manpower as long as the employees are members of the IUEC in Canada.” If Local 102 cannot provide the manpower, “the Employer can look outside Local 102 to other IUEC locals to fill its requirements.” (para. 60).

(19) In conclusion, “Local 102 has jurisdiction over its members in Manitoba and Saskatchewan.

Article 10(

A) gives preference in hiring overall to Union members.

Article 16.02(3) carves out special local preference hiring for members in the named cities.

Article 16.03 then says Local 102 members get preference in hiring for all work in the primary and secondary travel zones. If there is no one, then the Employer can look outside Local 102 to other IUEC locals. ” (para. 61). [ 23 ] The Arbitrator then tested her

interpretation starting at para. 62 and found that together, all these provisions create a cohesive scheme with respect to hiring of new employees. The

interpretation gives logical meaning to all of the provisions of the CBA, and it permits clarity with respect to the application of the language. Furthermore, she determined that the

interpretation upholds the employer’s management rights as articulated in

Article 2. Her conclusion was that the language imposes certain requirements on the employer in terms of hiring employees, yet recognizes that, without clear language, the

interpretation should not interfere with the employer’s right to assign work or duties. [ 24 ] Of importance is the Arbitrator’s conclusion that it would require more specific wording than found in this CBA to take away the employer’s right to assign work. This was especially clear in her reasons given

Article 2.02, which requires operational efficiency. [ 25 ] The Arbitrator also found that Local 102’s

interpretation of

Article 10(

A) would have the effect of requiring the employer to hire on a local-wide basis when hiring new employees because

Article 10(

A) does not carve out any local benches. This was directly contrary to what the employer had done with respect to hiring in the past which would clearly go against past practice that had been accepted by both the employer and Local 102. [ 26 ] In addition, Local 102’s

interpretation would not be consistent with the employer’s obligation of efficiency in

Article 2.02. Such efficiency was accomplished when the employer assigns workers when they are needed in the circumstances where there is a lack of work in one city and excess work in another. The Arbitrator noted that there was no evidence that on any occasion when the employer did this there was sufficient work in the city with excess work that would justify hiring additional employees.

She noted that Kone’s records confirmed it had moved workers only 11 times between 2012 and 2020 and that all the examples on the Kone list were short-term ( i.e. primarily less than 100 hours and substantially less than 40 hours). [ 27 ] In her reasons she found that short term movement of employees for short periods of time for business needs met the operational efficiency requirement from the point of view of keeping existing employees working and efficiently serving the customers while the work was still performed by Local 102 members. [ 28 ] The Arbitrator held that this

interpretation of the language of an agreement was sensible when various scenarios were considered. If the employer needed someone for up to 50 hours and did not have sufficient manpower in one city, Local 102’s

interpretation would require the employer to hire someone from the bench and go to the expense of a required two-day safety training. That would not be cost or labour efficient and would take clear language to find such a burden placed on the employer. Likewise, the burden of other necessary training and costs associated with lack of experience or familiarity with the product associated with Local 102’s

interpretation was not found to be the appropriate

interpretation. [ 29 ] Lastly, the Arbitrator concluded that operating efficiency would not be served by the employer being forced to lay off long term employees in whom they have invested significant training because of a short-term downturn in work in one city when there is excess work available in another city. [ 30 ] Given her

interpretation, the Arbitrator concluded that Local 102 was in breach of the CBA when it instructed its members to refuse the employer’s work assignments in Saskatoon and the employer had the right, pursuant to the management rights clause in

Article 2.03 of the CBA, to assign work the way it did.

Article 16.02(3) gives union members on the bench in a named city the right to preference when the employer is increasing its workforce, not with respect to each and every bit of work in the named city. [ 31 ] The Arbitrator also set out a number of the articles of the CBA including from Articles 2, 4, 10, 13, and 16 in her decision:

ARTICLE 2 – RECOGNITION CLAUSE 2.01 The Employers recognize the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative for all Elevator Constructor Mechanics and Elevator Constructor Helpers, in the employ of the Employers engaged in the installation, repair, maintenance and servicing of all equipment referred to in 4.02 2.02 The Unions recognize that it is the responsibility of the Employers, in the interest of the purchaser, the Employers and their Employees, the maintain the highest degree of operating efficiency and to continue technical development to obtain better quality, reliability, and cost of its product, provided, however, that this provision is not intended to affect the work jurisdiction specified in

Article 4 and the work jurisdiction as specified in other Articles of this Agreement. 2.03 Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, and subject to the other provisions of this Agreement, the Employers shall have the right to: (

A) select personnel, hire, assign work or duties, transfer, lay off and recall employees; (

B) discipline or discharge for just cause;

(

C) establish and enforce reasonable rules of conduct to be observed by employees. 2.04 Local 102 to receive a copy of any disciplinary letter(

s) that are given to the employee in a timely manner …

ARTICLE 4 – WORK JURISDICTION 4.01 It is agreed by the parties to this Agreement that all work specified in

Article 4 shall be performed exclusively by Elevator Constructor Mechanics and Elevator Constructor Helpers in the employ of the Employers. 4.02

(1) The handling and unloading of all equipment coming under the jurisdiction of the Elevator Constructor from the time such equipment arrive at or near the building site shall be handled and unloaded by the Elevator Constructors, Mechanical equipment such as a fork life or truck mounted swing boom may be used by the Elevator Constructors or under the supervision of Elevator Constructors. A derrick or crane can be used under the supervision of Elevator Constructors to handle and unload the heavy material described in Paragraph 4.05.0.

Where unusual conditions are expected to exist prior to delivery of equipment at or near the building site in regard to handling and unloading of equipment in the primary or secondary jurisdiction of the Union, the Employers shall contact the Union’s Business Representative to make appropriate arrangements for the handling and unloading of such equipment. In areas outside the jurisdiction of the Union, the Employers shall contact the Regional Director.

(2) The erecting and assembling of all elevator equipment to wit: electric, hydraulic, steam, belt, dumbwaiters, residence elevators, parking garage elevators (such as Bowser, Pigeon Hole, or similar types of elevators), compressed air and handpower.

(3) It is understood and agreed that the preassembly of all escalators, moving stairways and link belt carriers that may be done in the factory shall include the following: 1. Truss or truss sections with tracks, drive units, machines, handrail drive sheaves, drive chains, step chain and steps installed and permanently aligned. 2. Balustrade brackets may be shipped attached but not aligned. 3. Setting of all controllers and all wiring and conduit from the controller.

All other work on escalators, moving stairways and link belt carriers shall be performed in the field by Elevator Constructor Mechanics and Helpers either before or after the truss or truss sections are joined and/or hoisted and placed in permanent position. This includes any and all work not done in the factory. The erecting and assembly of all theatre stage and curtain elevator equipment and guides and rigging thereto, organ consoles and orchestra elevators shall be performed by Elevator Constructor Mechanics and Helpers.

(4) All wiring, conduit and raceways from the main line feeder terminals on the controller to other elevator apparatus and operating circuits. Controllers are not to be shipped from the factory with extended wiring attached thereto.

(5) The erecting of all guide rails.

(6) The installation of all grating and counterweight screens, overhead work, either wood and iron, and all material used for mounting of elevator apparatus in machine rooms, overhead or below.

(7) The drilling of overhead beams for attaching machines, sheaves, kick angles, and all other elevator equipment, when the drilling needs to be done onsite.

(8) The setting of all templates.

(9) The assembly of all cabs complete.

(10) The installation of all indicators.

(11) The erecting of all electrical or mechanical automatic or semi-automatic gates complete.

(12) The hanging of all automatic or semi-automatic elevator hoistway doors, together with the installation of hangers and tracks.

(13) The installation of all devices for opening and closing, and locking of elevator car and hoistway doors and gates.

(14) The drilling of angle supports for mounting of closing devices except one template hole, when the drilling needs to be done onsite.

(16) The operating of all temporary and uncompleted car

(17) The setting of hydraulic power units (power units include motor, pump, drive valve system, internal piping, muffler, internal wiring, controller and tank). Where power units arrive in parts, they shall be assembled at the jobsite. The wiring and piping to and between multiple hydraulic power units shall be performed at the jobsite. 4.03.01 Nothing contained in

Article 4 shall preclude the Employers from pre-assembling and prefabricating the following:

(

i) Temporary elevators (ii) Residence elevators (iii) Dumbwaiters (iv) Dock elevators (

v) Parking garage elevators (such as Bowser, Pigeon Hole or similar types of elevators). (vi) Handicap Lifts (vii) Freight Platform Lifts (viii) Cartveyors A temporary elevator is defined as a non-permanent elevator installed prior to or during construction work inside or outside buildings. The assembly, disassembly and moving or temporary elevators from job to job or area to area may be accomplished in the most economical fashion, provided, however, whatever work is required to be performed at the jobsite in connection therewith shall be performed exclusively by Elevator Constructor Mechanics and Helpers.

Residence elevators shall mean elevators installed solely for the use in a single family residence and not for general public use.

Single family residences may be part of a multi-unit structure. 4.03.02 Pre-assembled plug connectors may be used to interconnect solid state components of the elevator systems, and to connect any component in and on the car. (excluding travelling cables) for instance: Solid State controllers, Power conversion modules, Speed and position monitoring devices, Load measuring devices, Digital data components, When the use of fiber optics is applied to the elevator system, pre-assembled plugs/coupling devices may be used to maintain the integrity of the connection(s).

It is understood and agreed that the connecting and/or coupling of devices will be done by the Elevator Constructor whether accomplished by external wiring or pre-assembly plug connectors as provided in the Paragraph. 4.03.03 It is understood and agreed that the pre-assembly and/or prefabrication of electric walks, travelators, speed ramps or similar type of moving walks (limited to fifteen degree (15°) degree [ sic ] incline per CSA Code), shall include the following: (

i) Truss sections with drive units, machines, handrail drive sheaves and drive chains installed and aligned. (ii) Truss sections with tracks installed and aligned. (iii) Balustrade brackets may be shipped attached but not aligned. (iv) Setting of all controllers and all wiring and conduit from the controllers. Work to be done in the field shall include setting and aligning of truss sections and supports, installation of pallets (platforms and belting), handrails, handrail idler sheaves, centering guides, combplates, balustrades and trim. 4.05

(1) Where heavy material is to be hoisted or lowered outside of the structure, a derrick or crane can be used under the supervision of Elevator Constructors in the employ of the Employers. Heavy materials under 4.05 (1) is confined to machines, controllers, selectors, generators, trusses or sections of trusses, plungers, cylinders, beams, sheaves and bundle of rails. (Where multiple sections of cylinders and plungers are used, they shall be connected in the field by Elevator Constructors).

(2) Systems Building, Systems modular, industrializes or similar structures are those whose super-structures and components are pre- assembled in sections, rooms or floors, in whole or in part, in areas adjacent to or remote from the permanent site of the structure. In the case of the buildings described herein, it is agreed that the components of the elevator will be assembled by Employees covered by this Agreement, on or remote from the jobsite and such assembled components may be hoisted either outside or inside the structure, by a derrick or crane and placed in final position, under the supervision of Employees covered by this Agreement.

(3) All other material is to be hoisted or lowered by Elevator Constructors without the use of derrick or crane. 4.06 The wrecking and dismantling of elevator plants shall be performed by Elevator Constructor Mechanics and Elevator Constructor Helpers.

Elevator plants as referred to in this paragraph are understood to include elevators, escalators, moving stairways, dumbwaiters, moving walks and all other equipment coming under the jurisdiction of the Elevator Constructor. 4.07 Where Elevator Constructor Mechanics are not available to lay car floor covering, it is agreed that the Employers may employ others to do this work. 4.08 The industry, including its employees and customers, will be served best by full utilization of the latest methods, techniques, technologies, tools and equipment available including communications equipment.

Therefore, no restrictions shall be imposed on their use.

…

ARTICLE 10 (A) – INCREASE & REDUCTION OF THE WORK PLACE 10.01(

A) When the Employers work force is to be increased, the Employers agree to give preference of employment to unemployed members of the Union. The Employers have the right to reject any applicant referred to them by the Union; however, a claim that the Employers have unreasonably rejected an applicant for employment may be proper subject matter for grievance. The Employer shall not be obligated to hire a Union member previously discharged for just cause by the Employer concerned.

When the Employer’s work force is to be increased, the Union will provide the Employer with a current list of unemployed members of the Union. The Employer shall hire the first Mechanic off the Union list and shall name hire the second required Mechanic off the Union List. The process shall continue until the Employer has attained the number of Mechanics necessary, regardless of the length of time between hires. This process shall be the same for the hiring of Helpers and the two classifications (Mechanic and Helper) shall be considered separate. 10.02(

A) When no Union members are unemployed, the Employer shall hire new employees from an open list established by the Joint Examining Committee, of individuals who have apparent potential for training in the elevator industry. In the event that no such individuals are available, the Employer may obtain applicants from any other available source provided such applicants meet the requirements of Articles 3 and 10 of this Agreement. The Employer has the right to reject any applicant referred to him by the Union; however, a claim that the Employer has unreasonably rejected such an applicant may be the proper subject matter of a grievance. 10.03(

A) In the event that a lack of work requires a reduction in the number of Helpers in the employ of the Employer, Helpers will be laid off in the following order (without regard to seniority): 1. Probationary Helpers 2. Helpers 3. Helper one (1) 4. Helper two (2) 5. Helper three (3) …

ARTICLE 13 - TRAVELLING EXPENSES & TRANSPORTATION 13.01 Living Expenses - When men are sent outside of the Primary Jurisdiction, where expenses apply, such expenses, shall be paid at the rate of up to Seventy Dollars ($70.00) per man, per working day, for all days worked, to cover room, board, laundry and incidental expenses, within a zone of 65 miles from Portage and Main. Beyond this zone such expenses, will be paid at the rate of up to Four Hundred and Ninety Dollars ($490.00) per man, per week. In the event men work less than a five (5) day week, the expense rate shall be Seventy Dollars ($70.00) per day.

All zones referred to in the Secondary Jurisdiction covering Travel Times and Expenses shall be designated on an approved map. If at any time it is found that the living allowance provided by this Agreement is not adequate to cover reasonable expenses; the companies agree to increase same proportionately after the increase has been approved by the superintendents in charge, along with the representatives of the Union. It is also understood that where expenses fall below the allowance agreed on, the companies reserve the right to pay only the costs involved.

It is agreed that when Elevator Constructor Mechanics and Elevator Constructor Helpers are sent outside of the jurisdictional radius covered in this Agreement, travelling time will be paid at single time rate for the actual hours traveled, except as laid out in other Articles of this Agreement. Expenses incurred during trip to be paid for by the Employers. Where work is to be performed outside of the Jurisdictional Territory as defined in

Article 16, a Mechanic and Helper shall be sent to a maximum distance of Three Hundred (300) miles and in the event that a Helper is not available to accompany a Mechanic, the Union will permit local Helpers to be employed. For any distance greater than Three Hundred (300) miles, the Employer may, at his discretion, send a Helper with a Mechanic. Nothing in the foregoing paragraph is to be construed as meaning that the Jurisdictional Radius of this Local has been extended to a maximum distance of Three Hundred (300) miles.

If the jobsite is more than Three Hundred (300) miles from the Employee's home, one return fare will be paid to the Employee after sixty (60) calendar days, for jobs that are longer than ninety (90) calendar days. 13.02 Transportation – The method of transportation from job to job during regular working hours, overtime hours, or travelling time authorized by the Employer shall be that for which the Employer will accept responsibility and give monetary recognition.

It is agreed that when men use their own vehicles for transportation as outlined above, they shall receive expenses as per the applicable Revenue Canada Guidelines and Regulations. At no extra expense said vehicle shall be permitted to carry two (2) persons in addition to

the driver, where all are going to the same destination, but no tools or materials which would normally be shipped by the Employer. It is also agreed that men shall not be required to use their own vehicles inside the Primary Jurisdiction, but there shall be no restriction on the use of company owned or leased maintenance vehicles. The Employer shall assume the cost of the differences between the Employee's own all-purpose insurance and necessary business insurance. 13.03 In campsite jobs where commercial accommodations are not available, the Employee shall be accommodated in Foreman's quarters, where possible.

Out-of-Pocket expenses shall be discussed between the Superintendent and Business Representative. Arrangements must be made at least one (

l) week before. 13.04 Review Provisions - It is agreed that the monetary provisions of this

Article may be reviewed annually. On receipt of notice of party requesting such review, the Joint Labour Committee shall meet within sixty (60) days to consider such request. 13.05 An employee assigned to work out of town on construction, modernization, and scheduled repairs, will be provided with reasonable advance expense not to exceed two (2) weeks, upon request. …

ARTICLE 16 – JURISDICTIONAL TERRITORY & TRAVEL ZONES 16.01 Primary Jurisdiction – The Primary Jurisdiction of Local 102, Winnipeg, relative to wage scale and working conditions in which the men will travel their own time, shall include the territory within the area bounded by the Perimeter Highway. Anything over one fare, each way, will be paid by the employer, and it is distinctly understood that the members of Local 102 will work eight (8) hours on the job. 16.02 Secondary Jurisdiction – 1.

The Secondary Jurisdiction of Local 102, relative to the City of Winnipeg, shall be a sixty-five (65) mile radius from Portage and Main. 2. Travel Zones and times within the Secondary Jurisdiction shall be as follows: (

i) From the Primary to a fifteen (15) mile radius – ¼ hour travelling time each way. (ii) From the fifteen (15) mile radius to a twenty (20) mile radius – ½ hour travelling time each way. (iii) From the twenty (20) mile radius to a twenty-five (25) mile radius – ¾ hour travelling time each way. (iv) From the twenty-five (25) mile radius to a thirty (30) mile radius – 1 hour travelling time each way. 3.

It is agreed that Local 102 of the City of Winnipeg has jurisdiction over men now resident in the City of Saskatoon, Regina, Thunder Bay, Brandon and all men who may be permanently stationed in these areas during the life of this Agreement, and that these men shall have local preference whenever possible on any work covered in this Agreement. This recognizes fully the jurisdictional rights of these members and they must become members of Local 102. 4.

The Primary Travel Zone – The Primary Travelling Time Zones for men resident in the cities of Regina, Saskatoon, Thunder Bay, Brandon relative to wage scale and working conditions in which the men will travel in their own time shall include the territory within a ten (10) mile radius from the respective points of radius for each City. Anything over one fare, each way, will be paid by the Employer, and it is distinctly understood that the members of Local 102 will work eight (8) hours on the job.

Points of Radius: Regina shall be Regina City Hall Saskatoon shall be Saskatoon City Hall Thunder Bay shall be the Sports Stadium Brandon shall be the Brandon City Hall The Secondary Travel Zone – The Secondary Travel Zone of Local 102, relative to the cities of Regina, Saskatoon, Thunder Bay and Brandon, shall be that area within a sixty-five (65) mile radius of the respective cities. Travel Zones and times within the secondary shall be: (

i) From the Primary to a fifteen (15) mile radius – ¼ hour travelling time each way. (ii) From the fifteen (15) mile radius to a twenty (20) mile radius – ½ hour travelling time each way. (iii) From the twenty (20) mile radius to a twenty-five (25) mile radius – ¾ hour travelling time each way. (iv) From the twenty-five (25) mile radius to a thirty (30) mile radius – 1 hour travelling time each way. 16.03 The Employers agree to give preference of employment to members of Local 102 for all work in the above mentioned primary and secondary Travel Zones.

If Local 102 are unable to provide qualified Employees within three (3) working days, the Employers retain the right to obtain manpower from any other available source, provided that these Employees are members in good standing of the International Union of Elevator Constructors in Canada.

Provisions for hiring and employment of Probationary Helpers is covered by other

Article of this Agreement. [Emphasis in original] STANDARD OF REVIEW APPLIED [ 32 ] Vavilov as confirmed and refined through Mason sets in place the terms of a judicial review such as this. To summarize the approach set out there, the focus of a reasonableness review is to be on the decision made including the justification offered for it and not on the conclusion the court would have reached if put in the decision maker’s place. Both the reasoning process and the outcome are to be taken into account.

The reasons provided are to be read in light of the record which exists. [ 33 ] A preliminary analysis considering the text, context and purpose of the issues, whether they be legislative or otherwise, so as to understand “the lay of the land” is not appropriate before examining an administrative decision such as this. Rather it is critical that the focus needs to remain on the reasons of the decision-maker, and not on a range of potential conclusions to be determined by a reviewing court in the abstract.

Paragraph 8 of Mason is worth setting out here: 8 Vavilov also explained how a court should conduct reasonableness review. This Court stressed that reasonableness review and correctness review are methodologically distinct (para. 12). Reasonableness review starts from a posture of judicial restraint and focusses on "the decision the administrative decision maker actually made, including the justification offered for it, and not on the conclusion the court itself would have reached in the administrative decision maker's place" (paras. 15 and 24).

When an administrative decision maker is required to provide reasons for its decision, reasonableness review requires a "sensitive and respectful, but robust" evaluation of the reasons provided (para. 12). A reviewing court must take a "reasons first" approach that evaluates the administrative decision maker's justification for its decision (para. 84). An administrative decision will be reasonable if it "is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and ... is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker" (para. 85).

This Court also affirmed "the need to develop and strengthen a culture of justification in administrative decision making" (para. 2). [ 34 ] The purpose of a reasonableness review was reiterated at para. 57 of Mason being to uphold the rule of law while according deference to the decision.

Paragraph 60 affirms that the starting or focal point for the conducting of truly deferential reasonableness review should be the reasons provided by the decision-maker. [ 35 ] It is important to keep in mind that the decision-maker may not necessarily utilize the same approach that a lawyer or judge might use in coming to a conclusion and that alone is not a reason to find the conclusion unreasonable. Rather, a reasonable decision is one that is “justified, transparent and intelligible”.

The decision under review must always be considered within the appropriate legal context considering the relevant facts and the other pertinent issues that might impact such a decision. As noted in Mason at para 61 , the reasons given must not be assessed against a standard of perfection and need not include all the arguments, statutory provisions, jurisprudence or other details the reviewing judge would have preferred. [ 36 ] Nor is the “reasons first” approach to be used as a rubber stamp used to shelter administrative decisions from accountability. Rather, it is to be a robust form of review.

A court should not engage in a disguised correctness review and should generally refrain from deciding the issue itself.

As our Court of Appeal noted in AlumaSafway Inc. v The International Association of Heat & Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers, Local 119, 2022 SKCA 99 at paras 35-36 , [2023] 6 WWR 74: [35] In Service Employees International Union—West v Saskatchewan Health Authority, 2020 SKCA 113 , Barrington-Foote J.A., dissenting but not on this point, summarized the principles from Vavilov that establish the framework for a reasonableness review: [102] ...In...[ Vavilov ], the majority confirmed the reasonableness standard requires the reviewing court to answer two questions; that is, “whether the decision bears the hallmarks of reasonableness — justification, transparency and intelligibility — and whether it is justified in relation to the relevant factual and legal constraints that bear on the decision: Dunsmuir [2008 SCC 9 , [2008] 1 SCR 190 ] , at paras. 47 and 74; Catalyst , [2012 SCC 2 , [2012] 1 SCR 5 ] at para. 13” (at para 99) .

For analytical purposes, the Court described two kinds of fundamental flaws as a convenient way to discuss the issues that may show a decision to be unreasonable (at para 101). First, is there “a failure of rationality internal to the reasoning process”? Second, is the decision “in some respect untenable in light of the relevant factual and legal constraints that bear on it”? (at para 101).

The Court emphasized that in order to justify setting aside a decision, the flaws must be “sufficiently central or significant”, not superficial or peripheral (at para 100). [103] The first category of flaws reflects the principle that a reasonable decision must be based on internally coherent reasoning; that is, reasoning that is both rational and logical. As the majority put the matter, “the reviewing court must be able to trace the decision- maker's reasoning without encountering any fatal flaws in its overarching logic” ( Vavilov at para 102 ).

A decision will be unreasonable if it fails to reveal a rational chain of analysis or exhibits an irrational chain of analysis. While administrative decision makers must not be held “to the formalistic constraints and standards of academic logicians”, a decision may be unreasonable if it exhibits “clear logical fallacies, such as circular reasoning, false dilemmas, unfounded generalizations or an absurd premise” ( Vavilov at para 104 ). [104] As to the second category, “a decision, to be reasonable, must be justified in relation to the constellation of law and facts that are relevant to the decision ...

Elements of the legal and factual contexts of a decision operate as constraints on the decision maker in the exercise of its delegated powers” ( Vavilov at para 105 ). The relevant constraints depend on the facts. In Vavilov , the majority discussed what they characterized as “a number of elements that will generally be relevant in evaluating whether a given decision is reasonable, namely the governing statutory scheme; other relevant statutory or common law; the principles of statutory

interpretation; the evidence before the decision maker and facts of which the decision maker may take notice; the submissions of the parties; the past practices and decisions of the administrative body; and the potential impact of the decision on the individual to whom it applies” (at para 106). The Court cautioned that these elements are not a checklist and vary in significance depending on the context. [105] I would finally note that reasonableness is a deferential standard and must be sensitive and respectful of the role of the delegated decision maker. It is not a “line-by-line treasure hunt for error” ( Vavilov at para 102 ). The court's function is to "ensure the

legality, the reasonableness and the fairness of the administrative process" (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at para 28, [2008] 1SCR 190). However, reasonableness review must also be robust. ... [36] As set out in Barrington-Foote J.A.’s

summary, a review for reasonableness is concerned with three main aspects of anadministrative tribunal’s decision: justification, transparency, and intelligibility. These are, to use the terminology of Vavilov the“hallmarks” of reasonableness. Before an administrative tribunal's decision can be set aside as unreasonable, “the reviewing court mustbe satisfied that there are sufficiently serious shortcomings in the decision such that it cannot be said to exhibit the requisite degree ofjustification, intelligibility and transparency” (Vavilov at para 100).

This means that any identified flaws in the administrative tribunal'sdecision must be more than trifling or superficial. Before interfering with an administrative tribunal's decision, a reviewing “court mustbe satisfied that any shortcomings or flaws relied on by the party challenging the decision are sufficiently central or significant to renderthe decision unreasonable” (Vavilov at para 100; see also Saskatchewan Polytechnic Faculty Association v Saskatchewan Polytechnic,2022 SKCA 30 at paras 23-24). [37] Local 102 argues that there is but one reasonable

interpretation of the CBA here and that is the one theyadvance. Therefore, the

interpretation which the Arbitrator took, is in their submissions, unreasonable and the court’s decision must besubstituted for the Arbitrator’s. [38] Kone submits that the

interpretation taken by the Arbitrator may not be the only reasonable one, but it is one ofthe reasonable ones and therefore deference is required. This view is supported by Joseph v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023FC 1067 at para 22: 22 The fact that Ms. Joseph suggests a different

interpretation, or wishes that the Officer had adopted an approach similar to JusticeGleeson's in Ma [2016 FC 1283], does not suffice to demonstrate that the Officer's

interpretation of the evidence is unreasonable. Thequestion before the Court is not whether another result or another

interpretation could have been possible. The question is whether theconclusion drawn by the Officer is itself reasonable and falls within the range of possible acceptable outcomes in the circumstances. Thefact that there might be other plausible

interpretations and that one of them might support a more favourable outcome to Ms. Joseph doesnot imply that the one determined by the Officer was unreasonable. In fact, reasonableness review recognizes the legitimacy of multiplepossible outcomes, even where they are not the court's preferred solution. Evidence can be reasonably assessed in different ways. This isthe crux of judicial review under the standard of reasonableness.

As the Supreme Court of Canada emphasized in Vavilov, "[i]t is tritelaw that the decision maker may assess and evaluate the evidence before it and that, absent exceptional circumstances, a reviewing courtwill not interfere with its factual findings" (Vavilov at para 125). [39] Kone points to paras. 75 and 85 of Vavilov to frame the level of deference to be owed here: [75] We pause to note that our colleagues’ approach to reasonableness review is not fundamentally dissimilar to ours.

Our colleaguesemphasize that reviewing courts should respect administrative decision makers and their specialized expertise, should not ask how theythemselves would have resolved an issue and should focus on whether the applicant has demonstrated that the decision is unreasonable:paras. 288, 289 and 291. We agree. As we have stated above, at para. 13, reasonableness review finds its starting point in judicialrestraint and respects the distinct role of administrative decision makers.

Moreover, as explained below, reasonableness review considersall relevant circumstances in order to determine whether the applicant has met their onus. … [85] Developing an understanding of the reasoning that led to the administrative decision enables a reviewing court to assess whetherthe decision as a whole is reasonable.

As we will explain in greater detail below, a reasonable decision is one that is based on aninternally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker.The reasonableness standard requires that a reviewing court defer to such a decision. [40] This was affirmed in Mason at paras 64-66. [41] Kone also hearkens to Mosaic Potash Esterhazy Limited Partnership v Unifor Local 892, 2015 SKQB 391 atpara 32, [2016] 6 WWR 780 [Mosaic Potash] for further support on the high level of deference to be granted in this situation; anexperienced labour arbitrator taking the correct approach to an issue squarely within her expertise: 32 It has long been understood, even before the articulation of the "standard of review analysis" in New Brunswick (Board ofManagement) v Dunsmuir, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190 [Dunsmuir] that reviewing courts will generally afford considerabledeference in the context of matters relating to labour law.

This was particularly so in the review of consensual arbitration awards. InSaskatchewan, the pre-Dunsmuir decisions in Shalansky v Regina Pasqua Hospital, (SCC), [1983] 1 SCR 303; CanadaPost Corp. v P.S.A.C. (1990), (SK CA), 93 Sask R 92 (CA); Yorkton Union Hospital v S.U.N. (1993), (SK CA), 109 Sask R 198 (CA) and Intercontinental Packers Ltd. v U.F.C.W., Local 248-P (1995), (SK KB),133 Sask R 133 (QB) are indicative of this. These cases essentially stood for the proposition that, in the absence of issues related tojurisdiction, procedural fairness or the

interpretation of the laws of general application, such arbitration awards were to be judged on thestandard of patent unreasonableness. [42] I am not in agreement that Mosaic Potash stands for the proposition that once the reasonableness standard hasbeen ascertained as appropriate, that within the context of the review there are differing degrees of deference. The level of deferenceaccorded cannot impinge on the standards identified in Vavilov as confirmed via Mason through that particular deference lens at play.Mosaic Potash was decided in advance of both Vavilov and Mason, which should be kept in mind.

In addition it does not purport tocreate standards within the reasonableness realm of review which differ one from the other. [43] It may be appropriate to consider the context including the involvement of an experienced labour arbitratorwhen the issue is whether the standard of review is reasonableness or correctness. Such an inquiry may ultimately assist in thecharacterization of the standard of review.

But where the deference accorded a decision-maker meets the criteria of being“reasonableness”, as identified in Vavilov and Mason, it is not appropriate to further subdivide the degree of deference applied to that

reasonableness standard based on the identity of the decision-maker. Rather, of critical importance is employing the criteria established in Vavilov and confirmed in Mason in any such analysis. To accede to the argument advanced by Kone here and give additional deference based on the decision-maker’s credentials would be to create a new sub-category of deference. It would differ in kind from the parameters a reasonableness review should take as described in Vavilov and now Mason . [ 44 ] Nor is some form of enhanced deference necessary for this decision to be found reasonable.

The Arbitrator did not gloss over important considerations or simply trot out a bottom-line conclusion based on a simplistic

interpretation of the words in the CBA. She took the specific facts, considered the CBA’s provisions in detail, and took a deliberate, considered and informed view of the entire situation. She applied the modern approach to

interpretation, weighed the

interpretation Local 102 and Kone advanced. Ultimately, after carefully setting out the chain of logic based on this approach, she checked it for internal consistency, overall purpose and intent objectively assessed within the context of these parties and this CBA. Her conclusion regarding the application of

Article 16.02(3) as applied to the hiring and short-term work of the employees was readily understandable, intelligible, and within the realm of reasonable. [ 45 ] I am in agreement with Kone that there is not just one

interpretation that is reasonable here. While it is entirely possible that different

interpretations advanced are reasonable, I reject the view that only one is in that category and that the singular view which is reasonable is that which Local 102 advances. [ 46 ] Local 102 argued that the characterization of the issue by the Arbitrator was in error and constituted a vast oversimplification of the issue. I reject this view. The characterization is a reasonable one. In concluding as she did she did not ask herself the wrong question at para. 60 of the decision. She considered the objective intent of the parties properly.

Reliance is placed on Sobeys Capital Inc. v Saskatchewan Joint Board, Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Locals 454, 480, 496 and 950, 2022 SKQB 85 at paras 64 and 69 in that respect. [ 47 ] Local 102 also argued that she strayed from her task when she accepted one of two views advanced rather than forming her own conclusion. I reject this as a fatal flaw as she was not required to create something unique and thereby show that she only drew her own conclusion. Her task is to make a decision which is reasonable. This she did.

It may draw substantially, moderately or not at all from the submissions of the parties. When taking a reasons first approach, as one must, examining those reasons is the proper vantage point, regardless of whether such reasons are influenced by or similar to arguments advanced. [ 48 ] Local 102 says the Arbitrator’s award is untenable in light of the express terms of the CBA and that the limitation of rights clearly conferred on the members and that her decision was an egregious error. I disagree.

It has a clear rationale, is internal consistent, it logically applies the provisions within the framework of the CBA and the relationship of the parties, and it properly chose the historical context which mattered so as to ascertain that conclusion.

The decision provides a rational chain of analysis in considering the CBA as a whole, its language, the fact that it applies in several cities in three provinces and concluding that it has the effect Kone submitted, not the effect Local 102 desires. [ 49 ] Local 102 says that the Arbitrator’s analytical process was not transparent and intelligible and therefore needs to be remitted back for application of those indicia. I find no such fatal flaws in the Arbitrator’s reasoning. Her conclusions are justified with reference to the reasons she gave.

The overarching logic relied upon is laid out clearly and understandably and has no leaps or gaps. It is transparent, it is intelligible and adds up quite readily when considered in light of the facts. [ 50 ] Nor do I find that the limitation Local 102 says was placed on the rights of workers of a local bench contrary to the express terms of the CBA. Local 102 alleges the Arbitrator’s conclusion that

Article 2.02 does not protect local work allocation but only new hires to the employer is reviewable error. Local 102 argues that local principles can apply to both hiring and to work availability. Thus, in their submission, it is not reasonable to conclude it applies only to hiring as the Arbitrator did. [ 51 ] I find that the Arbitrator’s decision could have included both, as Local 102 submits.

Interpretation of “whenever possible” and “work” could lead to Local 102’s version. However, my task is not to decide the matter and measure the Arbitrator’s decision against my own. Rather it is to consider the reasons provided, paying respectful attention to what was written, seeking to understand the process. In applying a wholistic and contextual assessment, I find no such problem with the Arbitrator’s decision. Her logic, including with respect to the scope given to the phrases “whenever possible” and “work” makes full use of the facts put before her, the applicable past practice which confirms her conclusion, and the various aspects of the CBA within that milieu. Her

interpretation is in fact the most logical and most readily defensible and therefore reasonable

interpretation and decision. [ 52 ] Nor do I agree that the Arbitrator’s

interpretation have the effect of reading out of the CBA provisions which drive the only reasonable conclusion; that the provisions protect local bench work of short duration as well as new hires. That presupposes the words carry that meaning, rather than asking the question of whether they do and approaching the answer as the Arbitrator did. [ 53 ] The Arbitrator’s decision is justified in light of the legal and factual context before her. It is reasonable. CONCLUSION [ 54 ] The Arbitrator’s decision is rational, clearly reasoned, justifiable, transparent and contains no gaps in logic or process.

I do not find that the Arbitrator’s decision suffers from any core fundamental defects. The conclusion she arrives at considers the various possible

interpretations within the context of the parties, those affected, and the terms of the CBA. She applied the correct legal approach and applied relevant authorities accurately. Her decision is justified in relation to the applicable law and the facts relevant to her task. [ 55 ] The review of the Arbitrator’s decision brought by Local 102 is dismissed. COSTS [ 56 ] Kone is entitled to its costs calculated on column 2.

J. D.J. BROWN