NATHAN LUCIER APPELLANT - v. -, 2023 SKKB 259

KING’S BENCH FOR SASKATCHEWAN Citation: 2023 SKKB 259 Date: 2023 12 04 Docket: KBG-SA-01204-2023 Judicial Centre: Saskatoon ___________________________________________________________________________ IN THE MATTER OF S. 72(1) OF THE RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES ACT, 2006 BETWEEN: NATHAN LUCIER APPELLANT - and - SASKATOON REAL ESTATE SERVICES INC. and THE OFFICE OF RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES RESPONDENTS Appearances: Tom M. Baldry for the appellant Tammy Vaadeland for Saskatoon Real Estate Services Inc.

No one appearing for the Office of Residential Tenancies ___________________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT ON APPEAL DANYLIUK J. December 4, 2023 ___________________________________________________________________________ Introduction [ 1 ] This is a statutory appeal brought by the tenant under The Residential Tenancies Act , 2006 , SS 2006, c R- 22.0001 [ RTA ]. This appeal engages genuine questions of law. [ 2 ] For the reasons set out below, the appeal must be allowed.

Facts [ 3 ] The RTA hearing was held October 2, 2023 by telephone. Luke A. Coupal was the hearing officer. The landlord was seeking an order for possession pursuant to ss. 68 and 70 of the RTA . The tenant and the landlord’s representative participated in the teleconference. The hearing officer correctly identified that the landlord had the onus of proving its claims on a balance of probabilities. In para. 1 of his decision ( 2023 SKORT 2747 ) the hearing officer refers to damages, but there was no damage claim at issue in this matter.

It is unclear if this was inadvertently transposed from another decision. [ 4 ] In the hearing officer’s decision the recital of the evidence heard is quite thin. I fully appreciate these are

summary hearings. Hearing officers are not expected to write War and Peace on every matter heard. Still, sufficient reasons must be articulated to let the parties know why they won or lost, and to permit meaningful appellate review. See R v Sheppard , 2002 SCC 26 , [2002] 1 SCR 869. [ 5 ] The hearing officer noted the landlord’s concern was that the electrical service had been disconnected by the controlling utility. The tenant asserted he would be able to correct the situation. The landlord’s application was based on the premise that this was an emergency situation, thus s. 68 of the RTA applied.

The hearing officer found on the facts that the landlord had not proven any of the situations enumerated in s. 68 thus relief could not be granted to the landlord on that basis. [ 6 ] However, the hearing officer noted s. 68(4) of the RTA allowed him to consider the matter as if it had been brought under s. 58, and the act of not paying and maintaining electrical service constituted a breach under s. 58(1) (h). Interestingly, when considering the tenancy agreement the hearing officer did not determine an affirmative duty existed for the tenant to pay for the electrical service.

The hearing officer said this at paras. 8 and 9 of his decision: [8] However, s.68(4) of the Act permits the hearing officer to consider the matter as if it had been brought under s.58 of the Act , and the Landlord argues that failure to pay for electricity is a breach of the tenancy agreement, which could be a breach under s.58(1)(h). The tenancy agreement explains that, The rent is due on the first day of each and every month. The utilities covered by the landlord are heat and water. The tenant pays for electricity. Prima facie , the wording used does not place a positive duty on the tenant to use electricity.

The tenant is merely required to pay for any electricity used. Failing to use electricity, without more, does not appear to be a breach of the tenancy agreement. After all, the landlord is not accruing a liability to pay for electricity used by the tenant; the electricity simply isn’t being used. [9] However, the landlord’s genuine concern is the following: without electricity, the thermostat in the unit does not function. And without a thermostat signal, the heat is permanently blowing.

The tenant acknowledges that since the building heater was turned on for autumn, the room has been very hot, and the landlord is concerned about safety of the tenant, damage to property, or other liabilities that might stem from this heating issue. [ 7 ] The hearing officer went on to consider evidence from the landlord that without electricity the thermostat (and therefore the heating system) does not function which means the heat is constantly blowing. This somehow convinced the hearing officer to conclude that the tenancy agreement did in fact require the tenant to provide electricity to the rental unit.

At para. 10 of his decision he found “When negotiating the contract, both parties assumed that electricity would be going to the suite, and because of the thermostat it is clear that both parties were relying upon this assumption”. [ 8 ] What is not clear from the hearing officer’s decision is whether this finding is based on actual evidence before him, or whether the parties agreed to this fact, or whether this is something he was inferring from the wording of the contract or from other circumstances. The decision simply does not explain this. [ 9 ] These are the facts as found by the hearing officer.

Issues [ 10 ] The tenant had counsel on this appeal. In the notice of appeal the following grounds are outlined: 1. Whether the Hearing Officer erred in law in relation to section 68(4) of the Act , by: a. failing to consider or apply the requirement in section 58(2) of the Act that a tenant be provided with reasonable notice or a reasonable period to remedy his alleged breaches of the Act or lease; and b. failing to consider or apply the requirement in section 58(3) of the Act that a tenant be given one months’ [sic] notice of the landlord’s intention to end the tenancy; and 2.

Whether the Hearing Officer erred in law by failing to consider or apply s. 70(6) of the Act . [ 11 ] Accordingly I determine the issues in this appeal to be as follows: 1. What is the appropriate standard of review? 2. Did the hearing officer err in law in his consideration of ss. 58 and 68 of the RTA ? 3. Did the hearing officer err in law by failing to consider s. 70(6) of the RTA in reaching his decision, and in particular what was “just and equitable” in the circumstances? 4. Did the hearing officer err in law by failing to provide sufficient reasons?

Analysis 1. What is the appropriate standard of review? [12] This appeal is brought pursuant to s. 72(1) of the RTA. The appeal must therefore raise an issue of law or ofjurisdiction. This

section has consistently been interpreted such that these are appeals of record and are limited to jurisdictional and legalissues. They are not re-hearings, or trials de novo. [13] In this regard I note Reich v Lohse (1994), (SK CA), 123 Sask R 114 (QL) (CA) at paras 18and 20, where Jackson J.A. stated: 18 Our jurisdiction and that of the Queen’s Bench on an appeal from the rentalsman is simply a supervisory one with respect to theinterpretation of the law and the rentalsman’s jurisdiction.

It is not our task to pass judgment on the behaviour of either tenants orlandlords as it relates to the exercise of that right. That is the function of the rentalsman. … 20 … The jurisdiction previously given to the Rent Appeal Commission has not been given to the Queen’s Bench. There is no longer afull re-hearing on an appeal from the rentalsman’s decisions. On this basis some deference must be shown to those aspects of therentalsman’s decisions which reflect an exercise of discretion. [14] Reich sets out the traditional standard of review.

There has been something of a shift in this regard as a result ofrecent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, notably Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65,[2019] 4 SCR 653. This shift in the standard of review in terms of these statutory appeals was canvassed by Justice Elson in LansdowneEquity Ventures Ltd. v Cove Communities Inc., 2020 SKQB 113. In particular I adopt what Justice Elson noted at paras. 25, 26, 30 and31 thereof: [25] Recently, the Supreme Court of Canada departed from the approach described in Dr. Q. [2003 SCC 19, [2003] 1 SCR 226].

InCanada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 [Vavilov], the Court concluded that reviewing courts, hearingstatutory appeals from an administrative decision-maker, are required to apply “appellate standards of review” when determining thematter under appeal. As to the nature of these appellate standards, the reviewing court must approach the matter in the same way as anappellate court considers an appeal from a judgment at trial.

In this respect, the majority in Vavilov expressly adopted the standards andrelated principles set out in Housen v Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 SCR 235 [Housen]. The Court’s direction in this regard is setout in para. 37 of Vavilov: 37 It should therefore be recognized that, where the legislature has provided for an appeal from an administrative decision to a court, acourt hearing such an appeal is to apply appellate standards of review to the decision.

This means that the applicable standard is to bedetermined with reference to the nature of the question and to this Court’s jurisprudence on appellate standards of review. Where, forexample, a court is hearing an appeal from an administrative decision, it would, in considering questions of law, including questions ofstatutory

interpretation and those concerning the scope of a decision-maker’s authority, apply the standard of correctness in accordancewith Housen v. Nikolaisen …. at para. 8. Where the scope of the statutory appeal includes questions of fact, the appellate standard ofreview for those questions is palpable and overriding error (as it is for questions of mixed fact and law where the legal principle is notreadily extricable): see Housen, at paras. 10, 19 and 26-37.

Of course, should a legislature intend that a different standard of reviewapply in a statutory appeal, it is always free to make that intention known by prescribing the applicable standard through statute. [26] Of course, this direction in Vavilov requires meaningful consideration and analysis of the majority judgment in Housen, jointlywritten by Iacobucci J. and Major J. Particular reference must be given to the paragraphs identified in the above passage from Vavilov.

Atpara. 8 of Housen, the Court stated that pure questions of law require the appeal court to review the subject decision against the standardof correctness. As for questions of fact and questions of mixed fact and law, deference is required. Specifically, an appeal court cannotintervene unless the decision-maker has demonstrated a palpable and overriding error in the finding of any relevant fact.

As posited inHousen, this deferential standard is designed, at least in part, to serve two principal objectives: 1) to promote the economy and integrityof the proceedings at first instance; and 2) to limit the number, length and cost of appeals. It is also rooted in a presumption that thedecision-maker possesses the fitness and the ability to make the required findings of fact without intervention of the court hearing theappeal. … [30] Such is the case in the present appeal. In s. 72(1) of the RTA, the Legislature has expressly limited the scope of an appeal to“questions of law or jurisdiction”.

As such, questions of fact or questions of mixed fact and law are beyond this Court’s jurisdiction toreview. In this respect, it is not simply a question of greater deference than that applied to a question of law. Even if a hearing officermakes a palpable and overriding error in a finding of fact, this Court cannot intervene unless the error of fact takes on the quality of anerror of law. As observed by Cameron J.A., in P.S.S.

Professional Salon Services Inc. v Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission),2007 SKCA 149, 302 Sask R 161 [P.S.S.], a finding of fact will constitute an error of law where it is made on the basis of: 1) noevidence; 2) irrelevant evidence; 3) disregarded relevant evidence; 4) mischaracterized relevant evidence; or 5) an unfounded/irrationalinference. [31] This analysis necessarily presumes a distinction, at least in theory, between an error of fact that discloses a palpable and overridingerror, and an error of fact that actually constitutes an error of law as identified by Cameron J.A. in P.S.S.

How a court describes thatdistinction in a practical way is an issue that, thankfully, does not arise on this appeal. 2. Did the hearing officer err in law in his consideration of ss. 58 and 68 of the RTA?

[ 15 ] I now turn to the appeal proper. The first ground of appeal advanced by Mr. Lucier alleges legal error on the part of the hearing officer in interpreting s. 68 of the RTA . [ 16 ]

Section 68 reads as follows: 68

(1) Notwithstanding

section 55, a landlord may apply for an order of possession pursuant to

section 70 and for an order to end the tenancy on a date that is earlier than the tenancy would end if notice to end the tenancy were given pursuant to

section 58 .

(2) A hearing officer may make an order specifying the date on which the tenancy ends and the effective date of the order of possession if the hearing officer is satisfied that: (

a) the tenant or a person permitted on the residential property by the tenant has done any of the following: (

i) significantly interfered with or unreasonably disturbed another tenant or another occupant of the residential property, the landlord or any persons in any adjacent property; (ii) seriously jeopardized the health or safety or a lawful right or interest of another tenant or another occupant of the residential property, the landlord or any persons in any adjacent property; (iii) put the landlord’s property at significant risk; (iv) engaged in a noxious, offensive or illegal activity that: (

A) has caused or is likely to cause damage to the landlord’s property; (

B) has adversely affected or is likely to adversely affect the quiet enjoyment, security, safety or physical well-being of another tenant or another occupant of the residential property, the landlord or any persons in any adjacent property; or (

C) has jeopardized or is likely to jeopardize a lawful right or interest of another tenant or another occupant of the residential property, the landlord or any persons in any adjacent property; (

v) caused extraordinary damage to the residential property; and (

b) it would be unreasonable to wait for a notice to end the tenancy pursuant to

section 58 to take effect.

(3) If an order is made for the purposes of this section, the landlord is not required to give the tenant any notice to end the tenancy.

(4) If an application for an order of possession pursuant to this

section is denied, the hearing officer may: (

a) make an order ending the tenancy as if the landlord had given notice to end the tenancy pursuant to

section 58; and (

b) make any other order that the hearing officer could make as if the notice mentioned in clause (

a) were a notice to end the tenancy given pursuant to

section 58. [ 17 ] From a purposive reading of the plain language used in s. 68 , it is clear this is an emergency provision to be invoked in exceptional circumstances. Its application must be limited to such situations, where it would be unreasonable or inequitable to follow the general process under s. 58. [ 18 ] From the somewhat sparse decision, I cannot discern the emergency. The articulated “peril” of the tenant failing to pay for electricity or have such service supplied to the unit is that the heat was running almost constantly. True, this causes the landlord additional cost in operating the unit.

But was that an emergency within the ambit of this legislation? I do not believe so; at least, there is nothing in the decision of the hearing officer explaining why that is so. It strikes me that if the landlord had followed the normal eviction process with the concomitant delay, the landlord may have had a damage claim for the extra heating expenses. The landlord could be compensated for such extra costs. [ 19 ] Instead, the short-cut procedure was invoked even though at para. 8 of his decision the hearing officer specifically determined that on the face of it, s. 68 was not engaged.

There was an insufficient factual underpinning to rule as the hearing officer ruled in this case. [ 20 ] This process is entirely a statutory creation. As a result, hearing officers and judges must take care to remain within their “jurisdictional shoebox”. Neither hearing officers in the first instance nor judges on appeal may do whatever they wish pursuant to some inherent discretion or jurisdiction. Strict adherence to the statute is required. [ 21 ] There would have been minimal prejudice to the landlord to have dismissed the application and referred the landlord back to the standard process under s. 58 .

Any potential loss was compensable by a future award of damages. [ 22 ] I note there is a very recent decision of Justice Bardai as to s. 68, Hoth v Myers , 2023 SKKB 231 . While conscious of the principle of comity, I am also of the view that Justice Bardai got this exactly right. In Hoth a hearing officer granted possession to a landlord based on an application brought under s. 68. The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for a new hearing. That decision rests on the insufficiency of the hearing officer’s reasons. However Bardai J. also commented on what was required under s. 68.

I will cite Hoth in more detail later herein, when discussing the insufficiency of the reasons provided by this hearing officer. [ 23 ] Further, on this appeal the tenant cited an unreported decision of Justice Rothery in Kay and Clarke v Yelland (23 February 2023) Saskatoon, KBG-SA-00109-2023 (KB) at paras 7 and 9. There, Justice Rothery found that before s. 68 can be invoked two “crucial pre-conditions” must be met: (1) the landlord must establish that a tenant has contravened any of the grounds set

out in s. 68(2)(a); and (2) the landlord must establish that it would be unreasonable to wait for the usual notice period to expire pursuant to s. 58 . [ 24 ] In its helpful brief filed on this appeal the tenant also cites the unreported decision in Wieder v Saskatoon Housing Coalition Inc. (28 September 2020) Saskatoon, QBG-SA-00906-2020 (Sask QB) at para 14, wherein a passage was approved from Leno Investments Inc. v E.L., 2017 SKORT 7 at para 4 : 14 … [4] Under

section 68 an order for possession may be granted if grounds are proven and if it would be unreasonable to require the landlord to end the tenancy under

section 58 of the Act.

Section 58 requires in most cases a calendar month’s written notice, whereas under

section 68, no such notice is required. Orders pursuant to

section 68 are typically granted only in the more serious cases of tenant misconduct. The Landlord bears the onus of proof and must prove on a balance of probabilities that grounds exist for ending the tenancy. […] [Emphasis added] [ 25 ] Here, the hearing officer expressly found the criteria in s. 68 had not been met. That should have ended the inquiry and the landlord should have started the eviction process under the usual procedure as outlined in s. 58.

Instead, through a convoluted process (I note even reason and logic will yield if tortured long enough) the hearing officer managed to put the square peg of these facts into the round hole of s. 68. In this, he erred. [ 26 ] I find the first ground of appeal succeeds. Despite s. 68(4), there was no basis for allowing the landlord to conduct a “hurry up offence” in this case. There was no irreparable harm flowing from delay. The hearing officer erred in law in ruling as he did. [ 27 ] This ends the appeal.

However, in the event I am in error on this ground of appeal I move on to consider the other main ground, which is that the hearing officer failed to consider s. 70(6) of the RTA , either properly or at all. 3. Did the hearing officer err in law by failing to consider section 70(6) of the RTA in reaching his decision, and in particular what was “just and equitable” in the circumstances? [ 28 ] There is also merit in this ground of appeal. At the core of this ground is s. 70(6) of the RTA , which states: 70 …

(6) After holding a hearing pursuant to this section, a hearing officer may make any order the hearing officer considers just and equitable in the circumstances, including all or any of the following: (

a) an order directing any person found contravening or failing to comply with a tenancy agreement, this Act, the regulations or an order made pursuant to this Act to stop that contravention or failure and to so comply; (

b) an order requiring a tenant to pay to the director all or any part of any instalment of rent otherwise payable to the landlord; (

c) an order requiring the payment of damages, including the payment of any arrears of rent payable to the landlord; (

d) subject to

section 68, an order granting possession of a rental unit; (

e) an order determining the disposition of a security deposit and any accrued interest pursuant to

section 33; (

f) an order determining the validity of a notice of rent increase pursuant to sections 53.1 or 54. [ 29 ] There is nothing novel in this ground. There now exist numerous decisions outlining the obligation of hearing officers to consider what is just and equitable before making any order.

Examples of such authorities include Grey v Storozuk , 2012 SKQB 252 at paras 14 and 17 , 398 Sask R 312 ; Hart v Hunchak, 2015 SKQB 117 at paras 11-14 ; Eastview Housing Association Ltd. v Gerard , 2016 SKQB 98 at para 8 ; Unwin v Bender , 2020 SKQB 116 at paras 31-34 ; Eagle Heart Centre Inc. v Pratt , 2021 SKORT 2222 ; Williams v Elite Property Management Ltd., 2021 SKQB 46 at paras 21-31 ; River Bank Dev. Corp. v Pacquette and Anor, 2021 SKORT 1083 at para 14 ; and James v Saskatoon Housing Authority, 2023 SKKB 135 at paras10-13.

I note there are a great many SKORT decisions wherein these cases, and others, were followed so as to ensure compliance with s. 70(6) . [ 30 ] The appellant notes the hearing officer failed to pass upon these equitable considerations. There is nothing in his decision that suggests he gave the existing equities any consideration at all. He did not even mention s. 70(6) . In this, he erred and his decision cannot stand. 4. Did the hearing officer err in law by failing to provide sufficient reasons? [ 31 ] Again, I am analyzing this in the alternative to my other two findings.

Once again, I find there is merit in this argument. While not an enumerated ground of appeal in the notice of appeal, this issue was argued in chambers. [ 32 ] The obligation of a decision-maker to provide sufficient reasons is well-established and of long standing. There is a duo of Supreme Court cases which instruct decision-makers: R v Sheppard and R v R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51 , [2008] 3 SCR 3.

This principle was canvassed nicely by Justice Dawson in R v Millie , 2021 SKQB 69 at paras 68 to 70 : [68 ] Although not articulated as a ground for appeal in the Notice of Appeal, the Crown, in argument, emphasized the trial judge’s lack of reasons for his decision (see paras. 67-88 of the Crown’s brief).

[69] It is an error of law for a judge to fail to provide an explanation of his or her decision that is sufficiently intelligible to permitappellate review: R v Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26 at para 1, [2002] 1 SCR 869. In R v Gagnon, 2006 SCC 17, [2006] 1 SCR 621, the courtidentified that there are two steps to the analysis when a claim is made that a trial judge’s reasons are so inadequate as to require a newtrial: [13] … Finding an error of law due to insufficient reasons requires two stages of analysis: (1) are the reasons inadequate; (2) if so, dothey prevent appellate review?

In other words, the Court [in Sheppard] concluded that even if the reasons are objectively inadequate,they sometimes do not prevent appellate review because the basis for the verdict is obvious on the face of the record. … [70] Appellate courts are instructed to adopt a functional approach to reviewing the sufficiency of reasons.

In R v Dinardo, 2008 SCC24, [2008] 1 SCR 788, the Supreme Court emphasized that the inquiry “should not be conducted in the abstract, but should be directed atwhether the reasons respond to the case’s live issues, having regard to the evidence as a whole and the submissions of counsel” (at para.25). In R v R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51, [2008] 3 SCR 3 [R.E.M.], the Supreme Court further explained: [15] This Court in Sheppard [2002 SCC 26] and subsequent cases has advocated a functional context specific approach to the adequacyof reasons in a criminal case.

The reasons must be sufficient to fulfil their functions of explaining why the accused was convicted oracquitted, providing public accountability and permitting effective appellate review. [16] It follows that courts of appeal considering the sufficiency of reasons should read them as a whole, in the context of the evidence,the arguments and the trial, with an appreciation of the purposes or functions for which they are delivered (see Sheppard, at paras. 46and 50; R. v.

Morrissey (1995), (ON CA), 22 O.R. (3d) 514 (C.A.), at p. 524). [17] These purposes are fulfilled if the reasons, read in context, show why the judge decided as he or she did. The object is not to showhow the judge arrived at his or her conclusion, in a “watch me think” fashion. It is rather to show why the judge made that decision. Thedecision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Morrissey predates the decision of this Court establishing a duty to give reasons in Sheppard.But the description in Morrissey of the object of a trial judge’s reasons is apt.

Doherty J.A. in Morrissey, at p. 525, puts it this way: “Ingiving reasons for judgment, the trial judge is attempting to tell the parties what he or she has decided and why he or she made thatdecision” (emphasis added [in original]). What is required is a logical connection between the “what” — the verdict — and the “why” —the basis for the verdict.

The foundations of the judge’s decision must be discernible, when looked at in the context of the evidence, thesubmissions of counsel and the history of how the trial unfolded. [18] Explaining the “why” and its logical link to the “what” does not require the trial judge to set out every finding or conclusion in theprocess of arriving at the verdict. … [19] The judge need not expound on matters that are well settled, uncontroversial or understood and accepted by the parties.

This appliesto both the law and the evidence. … [20] Similarly, the trial judge need not expound on evidence which is uncontroversial or detail his or her finding on each piece ofevidence or controverted fact, so long as the findings linking the evidence to the verdict can be logically discerned. … [25] The functional approach advocated in Sheppard suggests that what is required are reasons sufficient to perform the functionsreasons serve — to inform the parties of the basis of the verdict, to provide public accountability and to permit meaningful appeal.

Thefunctional approach does not require more than will accomplish these objectives. Rather, reasons will be inadequate only where theirobjectives are not attained; otherwise, an appeal does not lie on the ground of insufficiency of reasons. This principle from Sheppard wasreiterated thus in R. v. Braich, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 903, 2002 SCC 27, at para. 31: The general principle affirmed in Sheppard is that “the effort to establish the absence or inadequacy of reasons as a freestanding groundof appeal should be rejected. A more contextual approach is required.

The appellant must show not only that there is a deficiency in thereasons, but that this deficiency has occasioned prejudice to the exercise of his or her legal right to an appeal in a criminal case” (para.33). The test, in other words, is whether the reasons adequately perform the function for which they are required, namely to allow theappeal court to review the correctness of the trial decision. [Emphasis in original.] [33] As noted, earlier this year in Hoth Justice Bardai held the reasons provided by a hearing officer to beinsufficient when dealing with an application under s. 68.

He found the hearing officer’s reasons ought to have clearly set out which testwas being used, and what the evidence was that allowed a determination to be made regarding that test. [34] Here, as there, the reasons are woefully inadequate. There is a great “leap” from the briefest factual outline tothe decision, with no ability to determine the hearing officer’s path of reasoning (see Olson v Hergott, 2021 SKQB 11 at para 17). Thatamounts to providing insufficient reasons. [35] This third ground of appeal must also succeed. Conclusion [36] The disposition of this appeal is as follows: 1. The appeal is allowed.

The decision of the hearing officer dated October 5, 2023 is hereby quashed and any order or writ ofpossession issued pursuant to that decision is also quashed. 2. The matter is remitted back to the Office of Residential Tenancies for a new hearing, before a different hearing officer.

“R.W. DANYLIUK” J. R.W. DANYLIUK