DR. SATYAM PATEL PLAINTIFF - v. -, 2023 SKKB 209

KING’S BENCH FOR SASKATCHEWAN Citation: 2023 SKKB 209 Date: 2023 08 22 Docket: QBG-RG-03105-2019 Judicial Centre : Regina BETWEEN: DR. SATYAM PATEL PLAINTIFF - and - SASKATCHEWAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CANADIAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, DR. WERNER OBERHOLZER, DR. SUSAN SHAW, DR. ALLAN WOO DEFENDANTS CORRECTED FIAT: The text of the original fiat has been changed per the corrigendum released October 4, 2023. (A copy of the corrigendum is appended to this corrected fiat.) Appearing: Dr. Satyam Patel self represented plaintiff Danielle Royal and Leslie Mercer for the applicant Canadian Medical Association FIAT KLATT J.

AUGUST 22, 2023 I. INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] The plaintiff [Dr. Patel] filed his statement of claim on November 25, 2019. On May 25, 2020, Dr. Patel amended the claim in part to include the Canadian Medical Association [CMA] as a defendant. [ 2 ] CMA applied to strike Dr. Patel’s second amended statement of claim against it on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action against CMA, and was frivolous, vexatious, scandalous and an abuse of the court’s process. [ 3 ] Dr. Patel responded to that application by applying to strike the affidavits filed in support of CMA’s striking application.

Alternatively, he sought an order permitting him to cross-examine one of the affiants, John Feeley, the Executive Vice- President, “Engagement and Partners for the CMA”. [ 4 ] I dismissed Dr. Patel’s application to strike the affidavits but granted an order permitting him to cross-examine Mr. Feeley on the discreet and narrow point of the reasons for CMA’s refusal to intervene on Dr. Patel’s behalf at his appeal of the dismissal of his application for judicial review of the suspension of his privileges. This related particularly to his claim of bad faith.

[5] With cross-examination complete, CMA renews their application to strike Dr. Patel’s claim against it. II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK [6] Applications to strike pleadings are governed by Rule 7-9 of The Queen’s Bench Rules which provides: 7-9(1) If the circumstances warrant and one or more conditions pursuant to subrule (2) apply, the Court may order one or more of thefollowing: (

a) that all or any part of a pleading or other document be struck out; (

b) that a pleading or other document be amended or set aside; (

c) that a judgment or an order be entered; (

d) that the proceeding be stayed or dismissed.

(2) The conditions for an order pursuant to subrule (1) are that the pleading or other document: (

a) discloses no reasonable claim or defence, as the case may be; (

b) is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; (

c) is immaterial, redundant or unnecessarily lengthy; (

d) may prejudice or delay the fair trial or hearing of the proceeding; or (

e) is otherwise an abuse of process of the Court.

(3) No evidence is admissible on an application pursuant to clause (2)(a). [7] The question as to whether a claim discloses a reasonable cause of action, as required by Rule 7-9(2)(a), hasbeen considered in numerous cases. The principles applicable to this Rule are summarized in Harpold v Saskatchewan (Corrections andPolicing), 2020 SKCA 98 at paras 25-26: [25] A useful

summary of the governing principles with respect to an application to strike a pleading for failing to disclose areasonable cause of action is found in Swift Current (City) v Saskatchewan Power Corporation, 2007 SKCA 27, [2007] 5 WWR387 [Swift Current]: [18] These general principles were summarized by Gunn J. in the case of Collins v. McMahon, 2002 SKQB 201, [2002] S.J. No. 318(QL): [11] The principles which apply to an application to strike a plaintiff’s claim under Rule 173(

a) are the following: (

i) The claim should be struck where, assuming the plaintiff proves everything alleged in the claim there is no reasonable chance ofsuccess. (Sagon v. Royal Bank of Canada et al. (1992, (SK CA), 105 Sask. R. 133 at 140 (C.A.)); (ii) The jurisdiction to strike a claim should only be exercised in plain and obvious cases where the matter is beyond doubt. (Sagon, at140; Milgaard v. Kujawa et al. (1994), (SK CA), 123 Sask. R. 164 (Sask.

C.A.)); (iii) The court may consider only the claim, particulars furnished pursuant to a demand and any document referred to in the claim uponwhich the plaintiff must rely to establish its case (Sagon, at p. 140); (iv) The court can strike all, or a portion of the claim (Rule 173); (

v) The plaintiff must state sufficient facts to establish the requisite legal elements for a cause of action. (Sandy Ridge Sawing Ltd. v.Norrish and Carson (1996), (SK KB), 140 Sask. R. 146 (Q.B.)). As noted, see Sagon v Royal Bank of Canada (1992), (SK CA), 105 Sask R 133 (CA) at para 16 [Sagon]. [8] The legal framework for applications based on an assertion that the claim is “scandalous, frivolous orvexatious” or an “abuse of process” is set out in Rule 7-9(2)(

b) and (

e) of The Queen’s Bench Rules. [9] This avenue is summarized in Yashcheshen v Canada (Attorney General), 2020 SKQB 188 at paras 27-28: [27] Rule 7-9(2)(

b) authorizes the striking of a pleading if it is “scandalous, frivolous or vexatious”. [28] In Siemens [Siemens v Baker, 2019 SKQB 99], the court elaborated on the application of this Rule as follows at paras. 23-25: [23] Although these terms are often used interchangeably, it is helpful to differentiate among them. A pleading will qualify as“scandalous” if it levels degrading charges or baseless allegations of misconduct or bad faith against an opposite party. See: Paulsen vSaskatchewan (Ministry of Environment), 2013 SKQB 119 at para 45, 418 Sask R 96 [Paulsen] and the authorities cited there.

Courts inBritish Columbia, for example, have described a scandalous pleading as “one that is so irrelevant that it will involve the parties in uselessexpense and prejudice the [pursuit] of the action by involving them in a dispute apart from the issues”. See: Turpel-Lafond v British Columbia, 2019 BCSC 51 at para 23, 429 DLR (4th) 131 [Turpel-Lafond] quoting from Woolsey v Dawson Creek (City), 2011 BCSC

751, at para 28. [24] A pleading will qualify as “vexatious” if it was commenced for an ulterior motive (other than to enforce a true legal claim) ormaliciously for the purposes of delay or simply to annoy the defendants. See: Paulsen, at para 46. Put another way, it is vexatious if itdoes not assist in establishing a plaintiff’s cause of action or fails to advance a claim known in law. See: Turpel-Lafond, at para 23. [25] A pleading will qualify as “frivolous” if it is plain or obvious or beyond reasonable doubt the claim it advances is groundless andcannot succeed.

See: Hunt v Carey Canada Inc., (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 959 at 980; Paulsen at para 47; and WayneroyHoldings Ltd. v Sideen, 2002 BCSC 1510 at para 17. III. DISCUSSION [10] Dr. Patel advances claims against CMA under the following headings: 1. Vicarious Liability; 2. Breach of Fiduciary Duties; 3. Breach of Duty of Fair Representation; 4. Tort of Breach of Confidence; 5. Breach of Contract; 6. Negligence; 7. Violations under The Saskatchewan Human Rights Code; 8. Bad Faith. [11] I will deal with these in turn. 1. Vicarious Liability [12] In para. 3 of his claim, Dr.

Patel claims that CMA is a professional association for physicians in all of Canadaand the Saskatchewan Medical Association [SMA] is the provincial division of CMA in Canada.

Therefore, he says, CMA is vicariouslyliable for the actions of SMA. [13] There is a three-step process involved in determining whether vicarious liability should be imposed. [14] First, the court must determine whether the issue has been unambiguously settled by authority. [15] If the issue has not been unambiguously determined by authority or precedent, the court must analyze theremaining two questions to determine if vicarious liability should be imposed in light of its broader policy rationales: 1) Has the plaintiff shown that the relationship between the alleged tortfeasor (here, SMA) and the party against whom liability issought (CMA) is sufficiently close; and 2) Has the plaintiff shown that the wrongful act is sufficiently connected to the conduct authorized by the party against whomliability is sought.

See: Fullowka v Pinkerton’s of Canada Ltd., 2010 SCC 5 at paras 142-150, [2010] 1 SCR 132. [16] As I understood his argument, Dr. Patel does not assert that the issue has been unambiguously determined byprecedent. He did not file any authorities, and nor did I find any, to support the proposition. [17] The second question is whether the relationship between SMA and CMA is sufficiently close. In other words,there must be some sort of nexus or relationship between SMA and CMA. [18] Most, if not all, of Dr. Patel’s assertions are aimed at SMA.

His amendments involve merely the addition of theCMA without any explanation as to CMA’s actual role in his grievances. His only attempt to explain the basis for CMA’s liability is atpara. 3 of the claim as referred to above. [19] Although I must assume that all Dr. Patel asserts in his statement of claim are true, I am not obliged to accept asa matter of law that the relationship between CMA and SMA supports the imposition of vicarious liability. It is not enough for Dr. Patelto stipulate merely that “SMA is the provincial division of CMA in Canada” to launch his claim of vicarious liability.

The mere assertionthat one defendant is vicariously liable for the acts of another is not enough. [20] Dr. Patel has plead no facts as to the nature of the relationship between the CMA and SMA, whether CMAexerts any control over SMA or whether CMA even performs the same or similar functions as SMA. [21] As to the third question, Dr. Patel has also failed to establish that the alleged wrongful acts were sufficientlyconnected to any authorization by CMA. He has plead no facts at all that speak to CMA authorizing any conduct of SMA that forms thebasis for his action.

[22] The same applies to Dr. Patel’s claims of vicarious liability against CMA for the actions of the individualdefendant physicians [Drs. Oberholzer, Shaw, and Woo]. At para. 78 of his claim, Dr. Patel simply states that CMA is vicariously liablefor the actions of the individual physicians. [23] Dr. Patel has plead facts that relate to the relationship between the physician defendants and SMA but nothingabout the relationship they have with CMA. His claim against CMA is based on the bald assertion that as a national body, it isvicariously liable for the actions of SMA and the physician defendants. [24] I conclude this claim against CMA must be struck pursuant to Rule 7-9(2)(

a) of The Queen’s Bench Rules asdisclosing no reasonable cause of action. [25] I make one final observation. In many instances, a plaintiff facing a motion to strike a claim will seek to amendtheir claim to provide better particulars. In the face of CMA’s application to strike, I granted Dr. Patel’s application to cross-examine Mr.Feeley, a vice-president of CMA, in discreet areas so that he may explore the decision made by CMA not to intervene on his behalf. Thefact that Dr.

Patel did not seek to amend his pleadings after the examination was concluded implies that he can plead no other facts thatwould enable a finding of vicarious liability. 2. Breach of Fiduciary Duties [26] At para. 53 of his claim, Dr. Patel alleges that the SMA and CMA have a fiduciary duty and a legal obligation offairness and fair representation to the physicians. He states that the SMA and CMA have a duty to assist him as a member. [27] At para. 54 of his claim, Dr. Patel also alleges CMA owes him a fiduciary duty “through failure to safeguardconfidential information”. [28] Dr.

Patel has plead no facts that support the assertion that CMA owes him a fiduciary duty of any kind. The factsplead to underpin his claim appear to relate only to SMA. For example, at para. 59, Dr. Patel states that although SMA representedindividual physicians in some cases to ensure that they were treated fairly, SMA refused to assist him. [29] It is not sufficient for a plaintiff to assert that there is a fiduciary duty and that it has been breached.

Theplaintiff must plead enough facts to form a basic foundation for the allegation: C & J Hauling Ltd. v Mistik Management Ltd., 2010SKQB 60 at paras 26-27, 351 Sask R 199 [Mistik]. [30] In assessing whether a pleading was sufficient to proceed with a breach of fiduciary claim, Popescul J. (as hethen was) in Mistik stated: [29] In order to examine the sufficiency of the pleadings alleging a breach of fiduciary duty in the context of a "no reasonable causeof action" application it is useful to examine, in some detail, the essential elements of the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action.In Norberg v.

Wynrib , (SCC), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226 , McLachlin J. (as she then was) provided the following crisp andclear direction respecting the criteria for the imposition of a fiduciary relationship. At page 292, McLachlin J. states: 97 The criteria for the imposition of a fiduciary duty already enunciated by this Court in cases such as Frame, [ (SCC),[1987] 2 S.C.R. 99 ], Lac Minerals , [ (SCC), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574] and Guerin , [ (SCC), [1984] 2 S.C.R.335] provide a good starting point for the task of defining the general principles which determine whether such a relationship exists.

Aswe have seen, an imbalance of power is not enough to establish a fiduciary relationship. It is a necessary but not sufficient condition.There must also be the potential for interference with a legal interest or a non-legal interest of "vital and substantial 'practical' interest."And I would add this. Inherent in the notion of fiduciary duty, inherent in the judgments of this Court in Guerin and Canson , [ (SCC), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 534], is the requirement that the fiduciary have assumed or undertaken to "look after" the interest ofthe beneficiary.

As I put it in Canson at p. 543, quoting from this Court's decision in Canadian Aero Service Ltd. v. O'Malley, (SCC), [1974] S.C.R. 592, at p. 606, "[t]he freedom of the fiduciary is diminished by the nature of the obligation he or she hasundertaken - an obligation which 'betokens loyalty, good faith and avoidance of a conflict of duty and self-interest'". It is not easy to bringrelationships within this rubric.

Generally people are deemed by the law to be motivated in their relationships by mutual self - interest.The duties of trust are special, confined to the exceptional case where one person assumes the power which would normally reside withthe other and undertakes to exercise that power solely for the other's benefit. It is as though the fiduciary has taken the power whichrightfully belongs to the beneficiary on the condition that the fiduciary exercise the power entrusted exclusively for the good of thebeneficiary.

Thus the trustee of an estate takes the financial power that would normally reside with the beneficiaries and must exercisethose powers in their stead and for their exclusive benefit. Similarly, a physician takes the power which a patient normally has over herbody, and which she cedes to him for purposes of treatment. The physician is pledged by the nature of his calling to use the power thepatient cedes to him exclusively for her benefit.

If he breaks that pledge, he is liable. [Emphasis in original] [30] It is clear from the above that the foundation of a fiduciary obligation is distinct from that of contract and tort. In negligence andcontract, the parties are taken to be independent and equal actors concerned primarily with their own self interests. The essence of afiduciary relationship, by contrast, is that one party exercises power on behalf of another and pledges himself to act in the best interestsof another.

These "special relationships" include a client entrusting one's lawyer with power over ones [sic] legal affairs or a patiententrusting one's doctor with authority over one's body. [31] Dr. Patel has not plead any facts to support the breach of a fiduciary duty by CMA. The statement of claim doesnot disclose a reasonable cause of action grounded in a breach of fiduciary duty by CMA. 3. Breach of Duty of Fair Representation [32] Dr. Patel added CMA to the claims he asserted against SMA that it failed in its duty to fairly represent him.

Specifically, he claimed that the SMA and CMA are akin to a union with the corresponding duty to represent its members’ interests andto fairly represent them. He also claimed that SMA and CMA have a duty to fairly represent all members, “particularly when negotiatingan emergency contract that has dual roles of financially supporting physicians who are currently unable to run their private practice dueto SARS-COV2 and providing for emergency staffing for the pandemic”. [33] CMA points out, correctly in my view, that Saskatchewan physicians are not unionized. It is not sufficient forDr.

Patel to assert that CMA is tantamount to a union in order to impose a duty to fairly represent its members on it. SMA is acorporation established pursuant to The Saskatchewan Medical Association Act, SS 1999, c 04 and by virtue of s. 7(2)(

i) of that statute,the SMA has the authority to: 7(2) … (

i) act for members of the medical profession practising in Saskatchewan, or any of them or any group or

section or division of them, asagent to negotiate for and on their behalf: (

i) with respect to conditions of medical services and remuneration; (ii) in any matter affecting the practice of medicine or any branch or aspect of the practice of medicine; and (iii) in any matter in any way affecting or related to the medical profession or any group,

section or division thereof; … [34] There is no statute that gives the CMA the same corresponding authority to act for any of its members. Dr. Patelpleads no facts in his claim that establishes that CMA had a duty to represent its members. The fact that SMA had, on rare occasions,intervened to advocate on behalf of a physician does not amount to a duty to do so in all cases. [35] I find there is no reasonable cause of action grounded in a breach of duty by CMA to fairly represent him. 4. Tort of Breach of Confidence [36] Dr.

Patel includes CMA among the several defendants that he alleges are liable for breach of confidence. Thetest for breach of confidence has been set out in what is still the leading authority of Lac Minerals Ltd. v International Corona ResourcesLtd., (SCC), [1989] 2 SCR 574 (WL) at para 10 [Lac Minerals]. There are three elements of a breach of confidence: 1)that the information conveyed was confidential; 2) that it was communicated in confidence; and 3) that it was misused by the party towhom it was communicated (Lac Minerals). [37] Dr. Patel asserts facts that relate only to Dr. Shaw and SMA.

As to CMA’s role in this affair, he simply assertsthat CMA is liable for the actions of employees “of its division”. Dr. Patel does not plead any facts that relate to CMA itself in terms ofany of the elements of the test for breach of confidence. [38] For the reasons I have referred to above in the context of various liability, I find there is no reasonable cause ofaction grounded in a breach of confidence by CMA. 5. Breach of Contract for Failure to Advocate and Breach of Contract in Relation to Confidential Information [39] Dr.

Patel asserts claims for breach of contract in two ways: (1) breach of contract for failing to negotiate; and (2)breach of contract regarding confidential information. [40] As to the allegation of breach for the failure to negotiate, Dr. Patel claims, at para. 64 of his claim that there isan implied contract between SMA and CMA and their members that “is expressed in their position statements”. He went on to plead thatSMA is the exclusive bargaining unit for all physicians in Saskatchewan. [41] Dr.

Patel refers to SMA’s contractual obligations but does not plead facts or refer to any particular CMAdocument that sets out any contractual obligation it has to its members to advocate on their behalf. He says the fact that the CMAreceives dues collected by the “SHA” means that the SMA and CMA are one entity. [42] Dr. Patel has not plead facts that would support a reasonable cause of action for a breach of contract for failingto advocate. [43] As to the breach regarding confidential information, at para. 72, Dr.

Patel claims that there was an express orimplied term of the contract that confidential information would not be disclosed to third parties without prior consent. He further citesthe CMA’s Code of Ethics, as adopted by the SMA as: Avoid, minimize, or manage and always disclose conflicts of interest that arise, or are perceived to arise, as a result of any professionalrelationships or transactions in practice, education, and research. [44] The actions that are at the root of his allegation of breach of contract in relation to confidential informationrelate only to Dr. Oberholzer, Dr. Shaw and SMA.

I take it from his pleadings that he holds CMA vicariously responsible for the actionsof SMA and the physician defendants. As I said before, there is no basis to hold CMA vicariously liable for the actions of SMA. [45] It is difficult to ascertain Dr. Patel’s purpose in referring to the CMA’s Code of Ethics. I cannot find that theinclusion of an excerpt from the Code of Ethics sufficiently pleads facts that support a contractual relationship between CMA and him. [46] Thus, there is no reasonable cause of action grounded in breach of contract relating to confidential information.

6. Negligence [ 47 ] Dr. Patel added CMA to his alternative claim that SMA, Dr. Oberholzer and Dr. Shaw were liable for negligence. He grounds the negligence claim in an assertion that they owed a duty of care “to assist [him] and to ensure that information remained confidential”. Dr. Patel pleads that SMA, CMA, Dr. Oberholzer and Dr. Shaw knew or ought to have known that their breach of the duty of confidentiality would cause serious damage to him. [ 48 ] Dr.

Patel has plead no facts at all to support an allegation that CMA received or disclosed confidential information from him. [ 49 ] Thus, I find there is no reasonable cause of action that CMA breached a duty of care in relation to his confidential information. 7. Violations under The Saskatchewan Human Rights Code [ 50 ] Dr. Patel alleges that the defendants, including CMA, violated ss. 17 and 18 of The Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, 2018 , SS 2018, c S-24.2 [ Code ]. In particular, he alleges that CMA discriminated against him because of his race. [ 51 ]

Section 17 of the Code provides: Every person and every class of persons has the right to membership, and to all the benefits appertaining to membership, in any professional society or other occupational association without discrimination on the basis of a prohibited ground. [ 52 ]

Section 2 of the Code defines “occupational association” as “an organization, other than a trade union or employers’ organization, in which membership is a prerequisite to carrying on a trade, occupation or profession”. [ 53 ] Dr. Patel has not plead any facts that membership in the CMA is mandatory or a pre-requisite to practicing medicine in Saskatchewan. Even if it could be said that some of the fees paid to the SMA go to the CMA, this is insufficient to bring the CMA within the ambit of s. 17 of the Code . [ 54 ] Even if I am wrong about that, Dr.

Patel has plead no facts to support his claim that he was discriminated against because of race. [ 55 ] Dr. Patel relies on s. 18 of the Code which applies to trade unions. For the reasons I stated previously, this does not apply because the CMA is not a trade union. [ 56 ] I cannot find that there is a reasonable cause of action against CMA in relation to violations under the Code . 8. Bad Faith [ 57 ] Dr. Patel alleges that SMA, CMA, Dr. Oberholzer and Dr.

Shaw acted in bad faith by using confidential information and failing to advocate on his behalf. [ 58 ] As CMA correctly submits, the law does not recognize a stand-alone action for “bad faith”: Alberta v Elder Advocates of Alberta Society, 2011 SCC 24 at para 78 , [2011] 2 SCR 261. Dr. Patel has plead bad faith as a stand-alone tort and it must be struck. [ 59 ] Even if Dr. Patel intended to allege bad faith on the part of CMA in relation to his other causes of action, he plead no facts to support an assertion of bad faith on the part of CMA under any of the headings.

More to the point, I found that there was no reasonable cause of action against CMA contained in the pleadings. [ 60 ] If I am wrong in concluding that the claims against CMA should be struck under Rule 7-9(2)(

a) of The Queen’s Bench Rules , I would nonetheless conclude that the claims are frivolous in the sense that it is plain and obvious that the claim is groundless and cannot succeed. In considering whether the claims are frivolous (or vexatious or an abuse of process), I am entitled to consider other material including the affidavits filed by the parties. [ 61 ] An alleged cause of action will be frivolous if the pleadings fail to disclose a reasonable cause of action and the affidavit evidence filed confirms that there is no chance of success. When I look at the affidavit evidence filed, particularly that of Mr.

Feeley, it is plain and obvious to me that Dr. Patel’s claims against CMA cannot succeed. [ 62 ] For example, while the SMA is a provincial division of CMA, the two are distinct and have different roles to play. As Mr. Feeley stated in his affidavit:

(1) CMA does not have the authority to direct or control SMA in any way;

(2) The services CMA offers do not include legal representation to individual physicians;

(3) CMA is not authorized to engage in or be responsible for negotiations between fee-for-service physicians and the Government of Saskatchewan;

(4) CMA is not involved in physician disciplinary proceedings, physician competency, licensing or hospital privileges. [ 63 ] In relation to Dr. Patel’s disciplinary proceedings, CMA had no involvement in the decision-making process and nor could it. Dr. Patel asserted most of the causes of action on the basis of vicarious liability and the affidavit evidence satisfies me that the causes of action have absolutely no chance of success on this footing. [ 64 ] There is also nothing in the CMA’s bylaws that supports a claim that it was bound to advocate on any physician’s behalf.

One of the criterion for intervention by advocacy was whether the proceeding raised national issues. It was clear from Mr. Feeley’s material that CMA considered Dr. Patel’s request for advocacy but declined because it did not meet any of the criteria. [ 65 ] Thus, I conclude that the claims Dr. Patel alleges against CMA disclose no reasonable cause of action. They are also frivolous and have no chance of success. The claim is to be struck against CMA. [ 66 ] Given that Dr. Patel has had an opportunity to cross-examine Mr.

Feeley and has not sought to amend the pleadings a fifth time, I will not make an order granting leave to amend. It is notable that Dr. Patel has not indicated a desire to amend in any event. [ 67 ] CMA is entitled to costs in the amount of $1,500 payable forthwith. J. B. L. KLATT KING’S BENCH FOR SASKATCHEWAN Citation: 2023 SKKB 209 Date: 2023 08 22 Docket: QBG-RG-03105-2019 Judicial Centre: Regina BETWEEN: DR. SATYAM PATEL PLAINTIFF - and - SASKATCHEWAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CANADIAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, DR. WERNER OBERHOLZER, DR. SUSAN SHAW, DR. ALLAN WOO DEFENDANTS Appearing: Dr.

Satyam Patel self represented plaintiff Danielle Royal and Leslie Mercer for the applicant Canadian Medical Association

CORRIGENDUM TO THE FIAT DATED AUGUST 22, 2023 KLATT J. OCTOBER 4, 2023 [ 68 ] Paragraph 5 of the decision of August 22, 2023 is amended by removing the word “determined”. The sentence will now read: “With cross-examination complete, CMA renews their application to strike Dr. Patel’s claim against it.” J. B. L. KLATT