B.Y. v. A.A., 2022 NSSC 112

SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA (FAMILY DIVISION) Citation: B.Y. v. A.A., 2022 NSSC 112 Date: 20220420 Docket: SFHMCA-099763 Registry: Halifax Between: B.Y. Applicant v. A. A. Respondent Judge: The Honourable Justice Cindy G. Cormier Heard : September 13, 2021 Written submissions were filed by A.A. on October 8, 2021, and by B.Y. on October 15, 2021. A reply was received from A.A. on October 22, 2021. Counsel: B.Y. was represented by Donna Franey and A.A. was represented by Judith Schoen until June 24, 2016; by Beth Newton in 2017; then Patrick Eagan from May 27, 2019. By the Court: Introduction 1 .

The parties, B.Y., and A.A., separated after eight years of marriage. They have four children together. They ended their intimate relationship in 2013. 2 . In March 2016, B.Y. filed an application pursuant to the Maintenance and Custody Act requesting the court address custody; access for the respondent; child maintenance involving married parents; spousal maintenance; and mobility, specifically B.Y., was asking to be authorized to move with children back to Australia. B.Y., also sought relief pursuant to the Matrimonial Property Act , and in particular

the division of assets. 3 . B.Y., withdrew her court application in June 2016 and the trial dates were cancelled. 4 . In October 2016, B.Y. filed an Ex-Parte Motion (Family Proceeding), requesting interim sole custody of the parties’ four (4) children; immediate return of the parties’ three (3) sons from Lebanon to Halifax, Nova Scotia; and sole authority to obtain and control travel documents for the four (4) children. 5 .

In March 2017, B.Y. filed an Amended Notice of Application, requesting custody; access for the respondent; child maintenance involving married parents; spousal maintenance; mobility rights to move with the children back to Australia; division of assets; other [sale of the matrimonial home and assets under s.15] . 6 . In June 2017, the parties attended two judicial settlement conferences, and they advised the court they believed they had resolved all matters. Trial dates were cancelled. The agreement was never finalized. 7 .

B.Y. filed a further court application in 2019, requesting : sole custody of the parties’ daughter, M and joint custody of the parties’ sons, R, B, and Az; an order directing A.A., to pay all arrears of child support and spousal support owed; an order setting aside the line of credit secured by the mobile home; an order setting aside the sale of the home; and an order setting aside the lease of the property where the mobile home was located. Preliminary Matters of Evidence 8 .

The solicitor’s affidavits and any attachments, filed with either Ex- Parte Motion (Family Proceeding) filed on October 12, 2016 or on March 28, 2019, sworn by B.Y.’s legal counsel November 29, 2016 and March 28, 2019 are not properly before the Court. 9 . The documents entitled “A Contract of Sale for Manufactured/Mobile Home Without Land and the Land Registration Act (Nova Scotia) Collateral Mortgage (Personal Lending), were not entered as exhibits at trial. 10 .

Paragraph 65 of B.Y.’s unsworn affidavit filed March 18, 2020 (Exhibit 10 and adopted by B.Y. at trial in September 2021) referencing several terms in a tentative partial agreement discussed at two judicially led settlement conferences in June 2017, is not admissible in evidence. 11 . I have not considered the document provided from lawyer Noha Aknan which is attached to A.A.’s lawyer’s brief filed on October 8, 2021. Cases Considered 12 . The parties did not provide me with any cases to consider. Sequence of Multiple Issues 13 . In Brandon v. Brandon , 2010 NSSC 394 , the Honourable J.

Jollimore stated in part at paragraph 3: Approach to issues

[3] Where there are multiple issues, they must be approached in a sequence which places them in the appropriate and logical order. Ifthere is a custody issue, this is addressed first because the parenting arrangement may be relevant to the division of assets, pursuant tosection 13(

h) of the Matrimonial Property Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 275. In some cases, a property division may obviate a spousal supportclaim, as Justice Morrison noted in Harwood v. Thomas (1980), (NS SC), 43 N.S.R. (2d) 292 (T.D.), affirmed atHarwood v. Thomas, (1981) (NS CA), 45 N.S.R. (2d) 414 (A.D.). Alternately, the division of property may play apart in increasing or decreasing expenses that are relevant to spousal support. So, the division of property must precede support claims.

In dealing with support applications under the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985 (2nd Supp.), c. 3, s. 15.3(1), child support must be addressedbefore spousal support. Finally, there may be the issue of costs. Issues Jurisdiction 14. Do I have Jurisdiction to address the outstanding custody issue? 15. Do I have jurisdiction, parens patriae or otherwise to grant custody of the parties’ three male children, R, A, and Az, who have beenin A.A.’s primary care and custody outside of Canada, predominantly in South Lebanon since September 2016, to A.A.?

Or to grant A.A.the authority to obtain or renew passports for the parties’ sons? A.A. has requested an order dispensing with B.Y.’s consent to obtainpassports for R, A, and Az. 16. Do I have jurisdiction, parens patriae or otherwise to grant sole custody of the parties’ female child, M who has been residingalternately in Nova Scotia, or Ontario, or Australia with B.Y., her family or a designate since 2016, to B.Y.? 17. A.A. has stated he is “content to allow B.Y. to have primary care of M.” A.A., did seek third party information related to M. 18.

The parties agreed they should both be entitled to “reasonable access” with the children or child not in their primary care, whichwould include communication via telephone, text, letters, and video-chat. A consent provision can be added to the order specifying bothparties are entitled to “reasonable access” as suggested by B.Y. and agreed by both parties. Parenting 19. Neither party is challenging the other party’s authority to continue as a primary caregiver to the children or the child who has been intheir care since September 2016.

A consent provision can be added to the order recognizing that R, A, and Az are in A.A.’s primary careand M is in B.Y.’s primary care. Child Support 20. Is the issue of child support for R, A, and Az, properly before this Court? Should B.Y. pay child support to A.A. for R, A, and Az? 21. Determine B.Y.’s and A.A.’s annual income for child support. 22. Should A.A. continue to pay child support to B.Y. for M or should child support be terminated, and if so, on what date? 23. Are there any arrears of child support owed by A.A. between June 2017 and September 2021?

If so, should I consider the notionalamount B.Y. would have owed in child support to A.A. for R, A, and Az?

Property Division 24 . B.Y. filed an affidavit with the court on March 18, 2020, and stated she was seeking relief with respect to custody, child support, spousal support, and the following relief as it related to matrimonial property: a. Should I “set aside” the line of credit? (RBC bank of Canada line of credit for $63,000). b. Should I “set aside” the sale of the home? c. Should I “set aside” the lease of the matrimonial property? (The purchase price of $15,950, with payments of $1,300.00 starting March 20 th , 2015) 25 .

In February 2021, B.Y. requested the court discontinue the property aspect of her application. A.A. objected and the matter was not discontinued or dismissed. 26 . In her brief to the Court filed on October 15, 2021, B.Y. advised the Court that B.Y. “seeks to have the property transferred to her name…Once the property is transferred to her name, she would propose any loan be paid out, however, she has not been provided with an accounting of the amount outstanding and would require the same.” Spousal Support 27 . Should A.A. be obligated to pay spousal support to B.Y.?

Are there any arrears of spousal support for the period between June 2017 and September 2021? Should spousal support be terminated? Background 28 . The Parties were married on October 10, 2005 . The parties’ first child, R, was born in September 2006 (15 years old at the time of trial). Their second child, M, was born in March 2008 (13 years old at the time of trial). 29 . The parties moved to Canada in 2009. B.Y. suggested the family moved for A.A.’s work. 30 . Upon arrival in Canada, A.A. purchased land in Chezzetcook, Nova Scotia and a mobile home.

After some landscaping was completed, the mobile home was moved to Pettipas Lane. 31 . The parties third child, A, was born in March 2010 (11 years old at the time of trial). The parties lived together with their children in the mobile home on Pettipas Lane for at least a year. 32 . In 2010 the parties began experiencing marital difficulties. B.Y. alleged A.A. had assaulted her. A.A. was charged criminally. 33 .

B.Y. stated that she contacted the police, and on several occasions she availed herself of services available at a local women’s shelter: she left the home with the children for one day on or about June 13, 2010, and she returned to the parties’ home with the children the next day; she left the home again on or about June 14, 2011, later recanting her statement to the police; and she left the home again on June 15, 2011, returning on or about June 23, 2011.

34 . B.Y. alleged that a further incident occurred on July 21, 2011. She alleged that on that occasion, A.A. threatened that his family would murder B.Y. and burn her body. B.Y. stated that she resided with the children at a women’s shelter until August 21, 2011. 35 . The Minister of Community Services were involved with the parties and various services were offered to the family. Agents of the Minister of Community Services did not provide evidence at trial in September 2021. A.A. denied all allegations stating that the “charges were dismissed long ago.” 36 .

In October 2011, B.Y. left the children with A.A. and she travelled to Syria to be with her mother who was ill. A.A. took the children to Lebanon. 37 . B.Y. stated that while the children were in Lebanon with A.A., between October 2011 and May 2012, she had difficulty staying in contact with the children. 38 . A.A.’s criminal court matter was scheduled to be heard on January 17, 2012. The matter was adjourned to allow the court to fulfill A.A.’s request for an interpreter. 39 . B.Y. stated that she had hoped A.A. would return to Canada with the children to attend trial in January 2012.

B.Y. stated that when A.A. did not return to Canada with the children, she decided to travel to Australia to solicit help from her family. She subsequently flew to Lebanon to reunite with her children and to renew her relationship with A.A. 40 . In June 2012, B.Y. moved from Lebanon to Australia with the children. She found employment with her brother as his assistant in his telecommunications company, she registered the children in school, and she stated that “life was great,” in Australia, whereas in Canada “they were alone.” 41 .

B.Y. reported that while she was residing in Australia, she was receiving $1,500 from the Family Tax Benefit on a bi-weekly basis. B.Y., stated that child support from A.A. was “sporadic and unreliable.” 42 . The parties’ fourth child, Az was born in Australia in July 2012, (he was 9 years old at the time of the trial). In September 2012, A.A. visited with the children in Australia. 43 . B.Y. stated that she allowed A.A. to take their eldest son, R back to Canada with him. She explained that A.A. could work remotely as he was not tied geographically with his work.

B.Y. had understood A.A. wanted to live in Canada to obtain citizenship. 44 . B.Y. stated that she expected their son R. to return to Australia in time for school. B.Y. claimed that A.A. refused to allow R. to return to Australia and that A.A. threatened that B.Y. would never see R. again unless B.Y. moved from Australia back to Canada with the parties’ three other children. A.A. suggested it was B.Y. who disliked living in Australia or had a falling out with her family in Australia. 45 .

There is conflicting information regarding exactly when B.Y. moved back to Canada with the parties’ three youngest children, but it was more likely than not in late 2013. B.Y. stated that A.A. was involved in an intimate relationship with S.C., and that upon her return to Canada from Australia she learned that the mobile home A.A. had purchased in 2009 and the family had lived in for a year or more, was being rented to S.C. 46 . The parties ended their intimate relationship in or around August 2013.

However, A.A. continued to provide some financial support to B.Y. and the children, and the parties lived together at times up until A.A. returned to Lebanon with the parties’ three sons in September 2016 while B.Y. remained in Canada with the parties’ daughter. 47 . B.Y. and the children moved in with A.A. and R. at A.A.’s apartment on Plateau Crescent for approximately 8 months. B.Y. and the children then moved into an apartment on Randall Avenue.

48 . B.Y. has claimed she was a stay-at-home mom throughout the parties’ relationship and that she was the children’s primary caregiver. B.Y. claimed A.A. saw the children sporadically, that A.A. travelled to Lebanon regularly while not maintaining regular contact with the children but that he kept the children’s passports. She suggested A.A. provided very little financial assistance for her and the children. 49 . A.A. claimed that between 2013 and 2015, he was experiencing significant financial difficulties due to the false allegations made by B.Y.

Presumably, A.A. was referring to expenses he incurred due to legal fees and to the cost of providing financial support to B.Y. and to the children, including paying for child-care costs for the parties’ four children. 50 . A.A. claimed he sold the mobile home in 2015, after completing a “religious divorce” from B.Y. in Lebanon. A.A. stated that B.Y. was not required to be a part of the divorce proceeding in Lebanon. 51 .

A.A. claimed that although he did not provide B.Y. with a share of the proceeds from the sale of the mobile home, he had provided for all B.Y.’s and their children’s needs and expenses, and therefore, he argued, he did share the proceeds from the sale with the family. He provided no documentary evidence to support his claim that he paid B.Y.’s bills. 52 . B.Y. stated that A.A. travelled to Lebanon several times: from December 2015 to January 2016; from April to June 2016; and then from July to August 2016.

At one point in her evidence or submissions, B.Y. stated that she learned A.A. had divorced her under Muslim Law in or around February 2016. At another time she stated she received news he had married his new wife, H. 53 . I accept that in 2015, or by early February 2016, A.A. had obtained a “religious divorce” from B.Y. It is more likely than not that news of A.A. divorcing B.Y. precipitated B.Y.’s court application in March 2016. 54 .

In her affidavit filed March 1, 2016, B.Y. stated: In February 2016, my husband informed me that he will be leaving Canada for 6 months to spend time with his new wife since because she is only 14 years of age, he cannot bring her back with him to Canada. Initial Court Involvement (Simplified Process) 55 . On March 30, 2016, the parties appeared before a judge for a simplified process hearing. B.Y. expressed concern that A.A. would take the parties’ children to Lebanon, and A.A. expressed concern that B.Y. would take the parties’ children to Australia.

An Order was granted prohibiting either party leaving the jurisdiction with the children. 56 . On June 15, 2016, the court was notified by facsimile that the matter was being withdrawn. On June 24, 2016, the court received correspondence from B.Y.’s legal counsel, indicating: On behalf of B.Y., we are withdrawing her application and we wish to have this matter removed from the docket, as our client has indicated that a settlement has been reached and she has no interest in any further court proceedings… The trial dates scheduled August 25 and 26, 2016, were taken off the docket. 57 .

B.Y. withdrew her application for the following relief: custody; access for the respondent; child maintenance involving married parents; spousal maintenance; and mobility, specifically B.Y.’s request to move with children back to Australia. Also withdrawn was the relief sought pursuant to the Matrimonial Property Act and in particular the division of assets.

58 . The parties subsequently sent the Court a Consent Varied Order signed by both parties’ legal counsel addressing only one issue: the issue of the parties’ authority to travel with the children internationally with the written consent of the other party. The Consent Varied Order was endorsed by another judge in chambers. 59 . In her affidavit prepared in March 2020, B.Y., stated: I believed that the varied order would give me the ability to visit my family in Australia with the children and that this would be a step towards improving mine and A.A.’s relationship.

I truly believed that we would cooperate for the sake of our children and I did not believe that he would take the children to Lebanon without permission. A.A gave me a consent letter to sign so that he could take the children to Lebanon. He wrote this letter himself in English, which he knows I do not understand well. I believed that by signing this letter I was consenting to the children going to Lebanon for only a visit. Different accounts about the out of court agreement 60 .

A.A. stated that in the fall of 2016 B.Y. wanted to move back to Lebanon due to difficulties she was experiencing with the language barrier in Canada and because she felt it would be better if their children were raised in Lebanon. In his affidavit sworn in April 2017, A.A. stated that B.Y. and M did not leave with the parties’ sons as B.Y. was scheduled for cosmetic surgery in Nova Scotia. 61 . A.A. stated that B.Y. had already deposited $2000.00 towards her cosmetic surgery.

B.Y. stated that it was A.A. who asked her to get the surgery and that ultimately, she did not go through with the surgery, and she returned the money for the deposit to A.A. 62 . A.A. stated that B.Y. gave notice of their departure to Happy Tots Daycare a week before their planned move back to Lebanon. B.Y. stated that she gave notice to the new day care because Az was scheduled to start elementary school. 63 .

A.A. stated that B.Y. sold the rest of the furniture they had left in the home “they had shared.” If the parties were sharing a home at that time, presumably it was the home B.Y. had moved to with the children on Randall Avenue. B.Y. stated that she sold A.A.’s office furniture only. A.A. explained that prior to leaving Halifax, he signed over the two motor vehicles to B.Y., and she later advised him she had sold their Toyota Van for $5,500.00. 64 . A.A. claimed that before he left with the parties’ three boys to move to Lebanon, the parties had packed all the children’s clothing and B.Y.’s belongings.

When A.A. left with the parties’ three boys, B.Y. accompanied them to the Airport and they checked 8 bags of luggage and 15 carry-on bags. 65 . When A.A. travelled from Canada to Lebanon with the parties’ three sons, he had a signed consent letter from B.Y. A.A. provided B.Y., with a signed consent letter to allow B.Y. to travel with M to Lebanon on September 30, 2016. 66 . A.A. claims that in September 2016, B.Y. told him to register the children at school in Lebanon and to be sure “they kept a spot open” for M.

B.Y. acknowledges that in September 2016, she signed a consent letter to allow A.A. to travel to Lebanon with their three sons. 67 . A.A. stated that the children advised him that B.Y. had moved to Ontario in September 2016. B.Y. has acknowledged she was living in London Ontario for a period. 68 . B.Y. claimed that A.A. told her he wanted to travel to Lebanon with the three boys to “teach his new wife that it would be too hard to care for three boys,” and she would want to divorce him. B.Y. stated that she believed A.A. would return to Canada with their sons and they could be a family.

B.Y. indicated that A.A. subsequently advised her that his new wife was pregnant with his child and that he would not be leaving his new wife for B.Y.

69 . A.A. has claimed that it was B.Y. who blocked him from all her “communication apps,” and she would not answer any questions he had about where she was residing with their daughter or where their daughter was attending school. Further, A.A. stated that B.Y. would not follow his suggestion to her about calling the children at a time which was convenient for the children or would invite more interaction at a pre-determined time each day. Each party has blamed the other. 1st Ex parte Motion 70 .

In October 2016, B.Y., filed an Ex Parte Motion (Family Proceeding) wherein she stated in part: This motion is made without notice to any other person because there are circumstances of sufficient gravity: - Three (3) children have been taken without consent and have been relocated to Lebanon, where service is extremely challenging; - Child may be harmed if notice is given; - Notice may lead to violence towards both the children and the Applicant. 71 .

In her affidavit in support of the motion filed in October 2016, B.Y. indicated she had spoken with an official who works for The Vulnerable Children’s Sector of Foreign Affairs Canada. She stated: He has given me some guidance in trying to reunite with my children. He told me to get an Order for sole custody of the children. He said it should also direct the return of the children to Halifax, Nova Scotia and give me ex parte rights to obtain travel documents or passports for the children. He said this should all be done without A.A., being notified.

No letter from the individual was filed with the court and no representative testified. 72 . B.Y. raised concerns with respect to the environment her sons were living in with A.A. in Lebanon. B.Y. suggested she had heard from A.A.’s “maid” that A.A. and his new wife had been “fighting” and the children were asking for her. B.Y. expressed concern about her lack of contact with the parties’ three sons, suggesting her contact was limited to some texts with their eldest son. Neither the “maid” or anyone else provided testimony about A.A. and H’s relationship. 73 .

In January 2017, B.Y. appeared before another judge and she was granted an Ex-Parte Order for Substituted Method of Providing Notice of a Proceeding in the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia (Family Division), to A.A. In February 2017, B.Y. was not present in Court in Nova Scotia, as she was in Ontario. Through her legal counsel, B.Y. expressed to the Court in Nova Scotia that she wanted her children returned to her from Lebanon. 74 .

B.Y. clarified that from her perspective, the issues before the court at that time were: custody, access, child maintenance, spousal support, the division of assets, and possibly mobility (moving to Australia). 75 . A.A. took the position that B.Y. had signed a consent letter for him to travel with their sons to Lebanon and that she and M had planned to join them in Lebanon. In his affidavit filed in April 2017, and adopted by him in September 2021, A.A. stated in part that he: …liked living in Canada (and Australia when we were there) there were (and are) much better job opportunities in Beirut than in Halifax.

I am well educated and am able to secure positions easily with my education and language skills. In addition, we have a house in Lebanon and our money stretches much further there. B.Y. noted that A.A. had always claimed he could work remotely from any location.

76 . On May 23, 2017, an interim hearing was scheduled to address child support and spousal support. An Interim Order was granted finding A.A. had an interim annual income for child support of approximately $33,294.96. I ordered A.A. to pay child support to B.Y. for M of $280.00 per month and spousal support of $300.00 per month to B.Y. beginning June 1, 2017. I granted a request that parcels of land be held as security for maintenance. A.A. suggested he had sold some property. 77 .

In a subsequent affidavit filed by B.Y. in June 2017, she expressed concerns about the amount of time the parties’ children, R, A, and Az, were spending “video gaming,” while residing with A.A. Neither party raised concerns regarding any imminent risk to the children, and as noted previously, after the parties participated in settlement conference discussions on June 22, 2017 and on June 30, 2017, they suggested on the court record that “there was substantial agreement at that time, and a draft order would be circulated”. 78 . No final order was signed or issued. 2 nd Ex Parte Motion 79 .

On April 10, 2019, B.Y. appeared before another judge on a simplified process docket. She was granted another Order for Substituted Method of Providing Notice of a Proceeding to A.A. The matter was placed back on the docket at the Nova Scotia Supreme Court Family Division. 80 . A.A. responded and he sought disclosure regarding B.Y.’s efforts to become self-sufficient following their separation. A.A. sought to have child support and spousal support terminated. He claimed B.Y. owed him child support because three of their children had been residing with him in Lebanon since September 2016. 81 .

With respect to spousal support, A.A. argued that B.Y. owed him child support in an amount sufficient to cover any spousal support which might be owed by him. In the alternative, A.A. argued that B.Y. did not provide sufficient evidence to prove she had any entitlement to spousal support. No calculations were provided by either party. 82 . In July 2019, in addition to B.Y. asking the court to address the issue of the custody of the parties’ daughter M, B.Y. also asked me to address the issue of her parenting time with the parties’ three sons and the division of matrimonial property.

B.Y. was requesting half the value of the property which she suggested was approximately $63,000.00. 83 . On October 21, 2019, the parties confirmed the outstanding issues to be resolved by the Court were: child support; spousal support; and property division. 84 . On March 18, 2020, B.Y. once again raised the issue of her contact with the parties’ three sons. She expressed concern that her last contact with the boys was in December 2019.

The parties raised the following issues related to property division and allocation of debt: - B.Y. claimed she knew nothing about the Line of Credit A.A. took out on the property as collateral.

A.A. says she knew and that she agreed. - Although A.A. swore B.Y. was not a spouse on documents related to the sale of property, he says B.Y. knew about the sale of the property and that she agreed to the sale. - A.A. suggested B.Y. knew, and that she agreed with his plans to lease a property for 12 years, to his former intimate partner S.C. - B.Y. provided information suggesting there is property tax owed on the property in the amount of $10,350.06 in arrears as of March 6, 2020.

85 . B.Y. attached a copy of the Maintenance Enforcement Program (MEP) of Nova Scotia Record of Payments for the period between April 6, 2018, and March 6, 2020. A.A. had notional arrears of $10,550.06 as of March 6, 2020. 86 . As noted previously, A.A. has argued that he should not have had to pay child support to B.Y. for M while he had R, A, and Az in his care. Further, as noted, he argued that B.Y. was not entitled to spousal support on either a compensatory or non-compensatory basis. Jurisdiction and Custody R, A, Az 87 .

Do I have jurisdiction, parens patriae or otherwise to grant custody of the parties’ three children, R, A, and Az, who have been in A.A.’s primary care and custody outside of Canada, predominantly in South Lebanon since September 2016, to A.A.? 88 . A.A.’s legal counsel has stated: I had raised the issue of this Court having the authority, as a superior court, to exercise its parens patriae jurisdiction in order to grant custody of the three (3) children in A.A.’s care in Lebanon to A.A.

That said, as an alternative, we maintain that position, however, it is respectfully submitted that this Court does retain jurisdiction over the children owing to the fact that all four (4) of the children were resident in Nova Scotia when the present Application was commenced by B.Y. 89 . The initial application filed by B.Y. in March 2016, while both parties and all the children were still resident in Nova Scotia, was discontinued by facsimile notice to the court on June 15, 2016.

Follow up correspondence from B.Y.’s legal counsel dated June 24, 2016, confirmed the request to discontinue B.Y.’s application and requested trial dates scheduled August 25, 2016, and August 26, 2016, be taken off the court docket. 90 . At trial in 2021, counsel for A.A. suggested that subsequently, on or about August 2019: …this court issued an order permitting either parent to leave the jurisdiction of Nova Scotia with the children with the written consent of the other party… 91 .

The initial order limiting the parties’ authority to travel with the children without a court order was granted by the Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Family Division) in March 2016. The Varied Order was filed by the parties’ legal counsel, who sent the signed Varied Order to be endorsed by the Associate Chief Justice after they asked that the matter be dismissed. The Varied Order was issued in July 2016, before either party or any of the children left Nova Scotia. 92 .

Even if I had jurisdiction to do so, which I have not determined, at trial in September 2021, I had very little evidence before me regarding the children’s, R, A, and Az’s circumstances in South Lebanon or Beirut. Without sufficient evidence I am unable to determine if the children were at any imminent risk of harm living in their environment. 93 .

In the alternative A.A. suggested that: the parties are both attorning to the jurisdiction of this Court despite living elsewhere at this time, both have retained counsel (B.Y., through legal aid certificate presumably) and given the difficulty bringing this matter before the Court thus far, it would be extremely onerous for the parties to take up their respective custody applications in another jurisdiction, thereby continuing to leave the children in limbo, jeopardizing their safety by having to remain in Beirut while another proceeding in (sic) instituted to dispense with the requirement that B.Y., sign a Lebanese passport application / renewal in order to enable the children to emigrate to Australia.

As an alternative argument, as we suggested above, the three (3) boys are all Canadian citizens and they deserve the protection that this Court could convey upon them by providing an Order under the parens patriae jurisdiction, giving Mr. Ayoub custody with the accompanying incidents to include the right of B.Y., to communicate with the children by any means and to have access to them should she travel to Beirut or Australia, should A.A.,’s family move to Australia.

I have provided a review of the litigation history and will not repeat it here. Suffice to say, if the parties had preferred to have the Court make decisions about the issues in either 2016 or 2017, rather than leave the matters unresolved, the Court was available to do so. 94 . If I did have jurisdiction and if I had sufficient evidence to determine that the parties’ sons were at imminent risk of harm in South Lebanon, I would also find that the parties’ sons are eligible to travel to Canada and/or to reside in Canada.

Further, I would find it was more than likely that B.Y. would consent to A.A. obtaining all travel documents necessary for the boys to return to Canada, which would eliminate any need for me to dispense with her consent to address any risk A.A. had identified. 95 . At trial in this case, B.Y., the parent residing in Canada, did not suggest the children who are residing in South Lebanon, R, A, and Az, were at imminent risk of harm. It is A.A., the parent who has kept the children in South Lebanon, despite the boys’ right to travel to Canada or to live in Canada, who suggested that the children were at risk.

Stating that “the circumstances in Beirut are untenable both economically and in terms of physical safety of the country’s citizens.” 96 . A.A. has stated that B.Y. would need to travel to Lebanon or to Australia (if he moves there), to see their sons, R, A, and Az. However, when A.A. testified, he agreed there was nothing preventing he and the parties’ sons or preventing the parties’ sons alone from moving to Canada or visiting Canada. I find that A.A. has chosen to remain in Lebanon with the parties’ sons and his second family, despite any risk to the children’s safety in South Lebanon.

I am aware of no impediment preventing A.A. from moving back to Canada with the children or sending the children back to Canada to live with their mother. 97 . B.Y. has expressed concern that if this Court grants an order allowing A.A. to obtain passports or renew passports for the parties’ sons, R, A, and Az, without her consent, that A.A. could effectively move anywhere with them and she may never see them again. In other words, I would effectively be granting an order which would decide the issue of custody without an opportunity to weigh the evidence. I agree. 98 .

Apparently, A.A. would like the freedom to move to Australia, but he is content for the children to remain “at risk” in South Lebanon, rather than have the children return to where their mother resides in Canada. A.A.’s suggestion that South Lebanon is not safe for the children, or A.A.’s wife’s stated preference for the sun in Australia, or A.A.’s preference to be near his academic advisor in Australia, do not persuade me that I should grant him the exclusive right to obtain passports or renew passports for the boys. 99 .

If I did have jurisdiction to deal with the issue of A.A. applying or renewing the children’s passports without B.Y.’s consent, I would find that B.Y.’s pleas to see her sons or to have meaningful in person parenting time with them in Canada must be addressed prior to an order being granted which would allow A.A. to move with them to another county. A.A. has not presented me with any plan to ensure B.Y. has continued meaningful parenting time with her sons. 100 .

After five years without a resolution or a viable plan which would allow the other party meaningful parenting time with the child or the children not in his or her primary care, I do not have any confidence that either party will prioritize a resolution if I give them further reason not to. B.Y. is expressing a desire to have meaningful parenting time with R, A, and Az.

Based on what little evidence I have before me about the children’s circumstances in September 2021, I find that granting A.A. sole custody or any exclusive rights regarding R, A, or Az, would only serve to perpetuate the ongoing standoff between the parties. 101 . I am not prepared to grant A.A. sole custody of R, A, and Az, and I am not prepared to grant A.A. an order specifying he has the right to apply for passports for the children, R, A, and Az, without B.Y.’s consent. 102 .

Regardless of what A.A. might have said or not said leading up to his departure with the parties’ sons in September 2016, or what B.Y. thought would happen, the reality is that R, A, and Az, have been residing with A.A. in South Lebanon since September 2016. The current parenting arrangements, rightly or wrongly, have been in place for five years. There is a new status quo, one I have found I know very little about. 103 . B.Y. is no longer asking that R, A, or Az, be removed from A.A.’s care and be returned to her care. Therefore, the boys will be remaining in A.A.’s primary care.

Given that B.Y. acknowledges that A.A. has had primary care of R, A, and Az since September 2016, and she does not oppose an order recognizing R, A, and Az are in A.A.’s primary care, I am prepared to grant that order.

104 . In her affidavit filed March 22, 2017, B.Y., stated: A.A. often tries to negotiate with me to go to Australia. A.A. says he will move to Australia with the boys and we can share custody. I am open to this; however, I feel A.A. will never come to an agreement with me and I do not trust him. Obviously B.Y.’s circumstances may be different today. 105 .

Should the parties agree, I am prepared to endorse any consent order whereby the parties share the care of the children either in Canada (Nova Scotia or Ontario) or in Australia if B.Y. and M are able to obtain their citizenship there (preferably near B.Y.’s family). Custody of M 106 . Do I have jurisdiction, parens patriae or otherwise to grant custody of the parties’ child, M, who has been residing predominantly in Nova Scotia, Ontario, or Australia since September 2016, to B.Y.? As noted above, A.A. has indicated he is “content to allow B.Y. to have primary care of M.” 107 .

In September 2016, A.A. either remained in Lebanon with the parties’ sons contrary to promises he had made to B.Y. or B.Y. changed her mind and wanted to remain in Canada. Regardless, in October 2016, B.Y. made it clear she wanted the parties’ sons to return to Canada. 108 . A.A. chose not to return with the children and not to arrange for the children’s sons to return to live in Canada with their mother or to visit their mother or sister in Canada. I find A.A. chose to prioritize his new family with H over the children’s, R, A, and Az’s, right to see their mother and their sister, M.

This has been the status quo since 2016. 109 . After A.A. left with the parties’ sons, B.Y. decided not to go to Lebanon to see her children, R, A, and Az, and she has chosen not to facilitate A.A.’s in person contact with M in Lebanon. I find it is more likely than not that B.Y.’s circumstances would not have improved had she followed A.A. to South Lebanon where he was residing with his new wife. 110 . There is conflicting evidence with respect to B.Y.’s allegations that A.A. assaulted her or threatened to assault her sometime in or around 2010-2011.

Whatever may or may not have happened in or around 2010 – 2011, the parties subsequently reunited in Lebanon in or around 2012, and then in Australia in or around 2012 – 2013. Further, B.Y. moved back to Canada and lived with A.A. in or around the end of 2013, after they were no longer intimate partners. They lived together at Plateau Crescent, and it appears they also lived together at a home B.Y. established with the children after leaving Plateau Crescent. There is insufficient evidence to suggest B.Y. felt that A.A. was a physical threat to her. 111 .

B.Y. has also suggested that A.A.’s new wife, H’s, father threatened her in or around 2016, and that she received further threats in or around 2020. I am not clear how much of a threat H’s father was or continues to be to B.Y., but I find it is more likely than not that if B.Y. had returned to South Lebanon, she would not have been welcomed with open arms by members of A.A.’s family or H’s family. In any event, I accept that for various reasons B.Y. determined it was in hers and M’s best interests to remain in Canada.

Based on A.A.’s own testimony about the risks of living in South Lebanon, B.Y.’s concerns are justified. 112 . B.Y. is seeking sole custody of M, and joint custody of R, A, and Az and parenting time with the children, or at the very least, “reasonable access” with the parties’ sons until she can have in person parenting time. 113 . In 2021, B.Y. was no longer requesting the parties’ sons be returned to Canada. As noted, she requested “reasonable (virtual) parenting” time with her sons, but she had not given up hope that she would one day be reunited with her boys for in person parenting time.

On the other hand, I find A.A. had either resigned himself to the status quo, or he did not place a high priority on exercising meaningful in person parenting time with M. A.A. did not express an interest for anything more than access to M’s third-party records and “reasonable (virtual) parenting” time with M, as outlined by B.Y.

114 . Although I am unclear where M has specifically resided since September 2016, I accept that M has resided in Canada mostly, if not necessarily always residing in Nova Scotia. Given the parties positions, and especially considering A.A.’s position, I find I do have jurisdiction to deal with the issue of M’s custody. I am prepared to grant B.Y. sole custody of M, with A.A. having a right to third party records and a right to “reasonable (virtual) parenting” time with M. 115 .

A.A. acknowledges that B.Y. has had primary care of M since September 2016, and he does not oppose an order recognizing M is in B.Y.’s primary care, and the term may be added to an order. Reasonable (Virtual) Parenting Time 116 . Neither party is opposed to an order allowing B.Y. to have “reasonable (virtual) parenting time” with the children R, A. and Az, when they are in the care of A.A., or for A.A., to have “reasonable (virtual) parenting time” with M, when she is in the care of B.Y., including communication via telephone, text, letters, and video-chat.

With the consent of both parties, I am prepared to endorse an order including a term for reasonable parenting time for B.Y. with R, A, and Az, and reasonable parenting time for A.A. with M. 117 . If either party is truly interested in ensuring the children’s right to meaningful contact with the non-resident parent, I hope they will provide the other with a written

schedule clarifying “reasonable parenting time” with the child or the children not in their care. Thereafter each party would ensure they made every effort to encourage the children to participate. Child Support 118 . Is A.A.’s request to offset child support for the three children living with him and the one child living with B.Y. properly before the Court? Both parties have attorned to the jurisdiction of the court and I am obligated to consider all four children and to consider both their parents’ obligations to support them financially. 119 .

A.A. argues that he has “greatly overpaid child support” while B.Y. has suggested that A.A. has underpaid child support. Neither have provided calculations. 120 . I find A.A. contributed to the parties’ children’s financial support after the parties’ separated in or around 2013, and he continued to do so while the parties lived together or separately at times, while they were all still residents of Nova Scotia, up until September 2016, when A.A. left Canada for Lebanon with three of the parties’ children. 121 .

B.Y. claimed that after the parties separated physically, that she moved with the children to another apartment, and she was the primary caregiver. A.A. suggested, that although the parties were separated, he was at the children’s place of residence “every day” and the parties shared equally in the care of the children. I find it is more likely than not that A.A. shared parenting with B.Y. when he visited her home or stayed at her home, but that she cared primarily for the four children most of the time. 122 . An interim hearing was held in May 2017.

A.A. was ordered to commence paying interim child support of $280.00 to B.Y. for M. as of June 1, 2017. B.Y. suggests A.A. did not pay the child support he owed. Based on the Maintenance Enforcement Program (MEP) records, as of May 2018, A.A. stopped paying court ordered interim child support ($280.00) and spousal support ($300.00) in May 2018. MEP records confirm that after B.Y. began her application in April 2019, that A.A. did make further support payments. A.A. paid a total of $5,359.44 in child and/or spousal support between August 2019 and September 2021. 123 .

On February 25, 2021, B.Y. requested scheduled trial dates be adjourned. Due to the resulting delay, an Interim Order was granted adjusting child support on an interim basis, finding A.A. had an annual income for child support of $30,000.00 (February 2021), and suspending payment of interim child support until the issue could be decided on the merits. 124 .

At trial in September 2021, B.Y. asked this Court to find that A.A. should pay child support as ordered per the Interim Orders granted in June 2017 up to March 2021, and thereafter at $258.00 per month between March 2021 and August 2021 (per the second interim order granted in February 2021).

125 . In addition to any “arrears” owed, B.Y. is seeking to have A.A. pay child support owed for the period when child support was suspended between March 1, 2021 and August 1,2021, and she is also seeking prospective child support: …child support be reinstated in the amount of $1,290.00 for March 2021, through July 2021. Moving forward she asks that A.A., pay child support for M., pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines and in accordance with the Nova Scotia table, in the amount of $258.00 per month payable on the first day of each month, starting August 1, 2021. 126 .

B.Y., stated in her submissions filed October 15, 2021: A.A., has claimed that he has sent B.Y., e-transfers to comply with his spousal and child support requirements. B.Y., contends that she has not received these e-transfers for the past three years…B.Y., indicates support has not been paid and she seeks to have the support paid through the Maintenance Enforcement Program. 127 . . In response, A.A., has stated in his submissions filed October 22, 2021: as to the claims of unpaid child support by B.Y. in Ms.

Franey’s brief, A.A. has maintained that all of the child support e-transfer payments to B.Y., were cashed up to the date of the last order in March 2021… … …if there are any “arrears” found to exist in this regard, A.A., suggests they be waived on account of the years of unpaid child support to him by B.Y. for the boys. 128 . At trial in September 2021, A.A. provided no conclusive documentary evidence that B.Y. received child support payments via e- transfer at trial in September 2021. 129 .

In the alternative, A.A. has argued that B.Y.’s obligation to pay child support to him for three of their children who reside with him, far exceeds his obligation to pay B.Y. child support for M. He stated: This matter is frankly difficult to reconcile because we have no accurate information by which we could determine what B.Y.,’s income was or should have been imputed to in order to calculate her obligation for the boys. The interim order was made without any reference to B.Y.,’s obligation to pay child support to A.A.

He has greatly overpaid the child support, we say, and that overpayment ought to be a consideration that the Court weighs in determining whether to accept A.A.,’s argument that he has no arrears of either child support or spousal support to B.Y. 130 . Although A.A. suggested B.Y.’s annual income for child support be imputed as full-time minimum wage income, A.A. did not provide any calculations to support his argument. B.Y.’s annual income for child support 131 .

On February 1, 2021, B.Y.’s legal counsel stated she would be sending an updated Statement of Income and an updated Statement of Expenses on behalf of B.Y. by the end of that week. B.Y. did not file an updated Statement of Income or Statement of Expenses for trial in September 2021. 132 . At trial in September 2021, B.Y. relied on the following financial documents: her sworn Statement of Income, Statement of Expenses, and Statement of Property all filed in March 2016; and her unsworn Statement of Income and Statement of Property filed on March 18, 2020; all adopted by B.Y. under oath at trial in September 2021.

The necessary supporting documentation was not attached to any of the documents. 133 . In her Statement of Income filed March 1, 2016, B.Y. claimed she was receiving income from various sources including income assistance in the amount of $1,300 per month and a child tax credit of $1,400, equaling $2,787.50 per month for a yearly total of $33,450.00. The parties claimed, or at least B.Y. claimed, that all four children were residing with her until September 2016. B.Y. did not attach any pay stubs or receipts. Once A.A. left with the parties’ three boys, B.Y.’s child tax credit would have been reduced

significantly. 134 . B.Y. denied receiving proceeds from the sale of the mobile home in Chezzetcook in or around 2015, and A.A. confirmed he did not provide her with any of the proceeds. B.Y. also denied receiving any proceeds from the sale of the condominium in Australia in 2016; she stated that her brother and A.A., received the proceeds from the sale. A.A. did not provide confirmation that the proceeds were released to B.Y. 135 . B.Y. stated that in 2019 she travelled to Australia, and she had received CTB of $11,800.00.

At trial in September 2021, B.Y. stated that between June 2019 and September 2019, she had worked at Fenti (clothing store) part time, and she made $500 “every two weeks or so” ($15,613.00). B.Y. reported that in December 2019, she secured a job at a bank, that she trained for three months, and was paid $18 per hour. 136 . At one point in her evidence, B.Y. stated that she had earned $15,613.00 in 2020. B.Y. later indicated she moved to London Ontario on March 18, 2020.

According to B.Y.’s Statement of Income filed March 6, 2020, she was receiving a monthly income from Income Assistance of $675.00 per month, and from employment of approximately $1,085.00 for several months only, and $50.000 child tax benefit for a possible total of $2,260.00 per month or a possible $27,120 annually. No paystubs or receipts were attached. 137 . B.Y. suggested she earned $26,273.00 (EI $845.00 every two weeks/total income $6000 from Scotiabank) in 2021.

B.Y. stated that throughout the pandemic she chose to stay home, although she did make some inquiries regarding employment, which she stated were mostly focused on the banking industry. 138 .

Given the lack of information generally about B.Y.’s and M’s general circumstances and financial circumstances between September 2016 and September 2021, and the lack of reliable historical and up to date financial information provided by B.Y. for the period between 2017 and 2021, I have imputed to B.Y. an income based on the approximate full time minimum wage in Nova Scotia as follows: a. 2017 approximately $10.65 x. 40 (x 52) = $22,152; monthly payment for 3, $439. (December 2017 $420). b. 2018 approximately $11.00 x 40 (x 52) = $22,880; monthly payment for 3, $450. c. 2019 approximately $11.55 x 40 (x52) = $24,024; monthly payment for 3, $475. d. 2020 approximately $12.95 x 40 (x52) = $26,936; monthly payment for 3, $542. e. 2021 approximately $13.35 x.40 (x52) = $27,768; monthly payment for 3, $564 f. 2022 approximately $13.35 x 40 (x 52 = $27,768, monthly payment for 3, $564.

A.A.,’s annual income for child support 139 . Previous interim determinations in 2017 and in 2021, with respect to A.A.’s annual income for child support were just that, interim only. When determining A.A.’s income on an interim basis in 2017 or in 2021, the Court was not in a position to weigh all the facts as all the evidence was not available. Unfortunately, very little reliable evidence was made available to the Court at trial in 2021. 140 . A.A. has claimed that between 2013 and 2015, he was experiencing significant financial difficulties due to false allegations made by B.Y.

Presumably A.A. was referring to expenses he incurred due to legal fees paid, but he provided no evidence of payment of fees, and/or A.A. was referring to the cost of providing financial support to B.Y. and to the children, including paying for child-care costs for the parties’ four children. A.A. did claim payment of child-care expenses in his tax returns. 141 . A.A. claimed he sold the mobile home in 2015 and that he sold it after completing a “religious divorce” from B.Y. in Lebanon. A.A. stated that B.Y. was not required to be a part of the divorce proceeding in Lebanon.

B.Y. stated and A.A. has not denied that he sold the mobile home to his intimate partner at that time, S.C., and leased land to her for 12 years, ending in 2027. 142 . A.A. claimed that although he did not provide B.Y. with a share of the proceeds from the sale of the mobile home, that he did provide for all B.Y.’s and the parties’ children’s needs and expenses, and therefore, he argued, he did share the proceeds from the sale

with the family. He provided no documentary evidence to support his claim that he paid B.Y.’s bills. Income from all sources / proof of other sources of income 143 . The issue of the sale of the Chezzetcook property and other property was not thoroughly considered when determining A.A.’s annual income for child support. A.A. has never provided a T1 General Tax and Benefit Return for 2015, when the mobile home was sold. A.A. has never provided a T1 General Tax and Benefit Return for 2016, the year he sold the condominium in Australia. 144 .

B.Y. suggested A.A. was earning income from various sources which allowed him to travel overseas, including earning rent from his online business and rent from the Chezzetcook property. B.Y. suggested that A.A. travelled to Lebanon several times: from December 2015 to January 2016; from April 2016 to June 2016; and then between July 2016 and August 2016. B.Y. suggested that when A.A. had been in Lebanon between April 2016 and June 2016 she had difficulty contacting him. 145 .

At one point in her evidence or submissions, B.Y. stated that in or around February 2016 she learned A.A. had divorced her under Muslim Law and at another time she stated she received news A.A. had married his new wife, H. 146 . I accept that A.A. most likely travelled to Lebanon several times: to finalize his divorce from B.Y., for his marriage to H, and to visit his ailing father. I accept that in 2015, or by early February 2016, A.A. obtained a “religious divorce” from B.Y. 147 .

I find it is more likely than not that the news of A.A. divorcing B.Y. and marrying H precipitated B.Y.’s court application in March 2016. In her affidavit filed March 1, 2016, B.Y. stated: In February 2016, my husband informed me that he will be leaving Canada for 6 months to spend time with his new wife since because she is only 14 years of age, he cannot bring her back with him to Canada. Lack of full disclosure 148 . In February 2021, A.A.’s legal counsel agreed to file A.A.’s updated financial information.

On February 19, 2021, A.A. filed: an unsworn Statement of Income (only attaching Notices of Assessment or Tax Assessments for 2018 and 2019, failing to file a T1 General tax Return for any year; and he filed an unsworn Statement of Expenses. Both financial documents were adopted by A.A. under oath at trial in September 2021. Neither document provided sufficient information, and A.A. did not attach supporting documentation as proof of his claims. 149 . There is evidence suggesting that A.A. purchases, leases, and sells property and that he earns a portion of his income in that manner.

A.A. did file an unsworn and undated Statement of Property with the court. When I inquired about the document, A.A. did not remember filing it. The document suggested the values of properties he owned or had an ownership interest in as of June 1, 2016. The document was included as an Exhibit at trial, and I find that the document to be relevant and reliable. Sole - Pettipas Lane, Chezzetcook, as of June 1, 2016, value was $100,000 Sole - Two (2) apartments – Lebanon - $200,000 Jointly with his two brothers – vacant land – Lebanon - $20,000 150 .

In addition to property in Lebanon and in Chezzetcook Nova Scotia, A.A. acknowledged he purchased a condominium in Australia in 2009. A.A. has stated he sold the property in 2016. Documents filed by A.A. in relation to the sale of the condominium in Australia indicates money “received on settlement were in the sum of $392,133.66,” with the balance of $139,694.23 - $174.50, which A.A. indicated he was “prepared to divide the net proceeds with his ex-wife on a 50:50 basis, at $69,759.86 each.”

151 . The documents attached as exhibits to A.A.’s affidavit filed February 19, 2021, were presented as proof that the proceeds of the sale of the condominium in Australia were intended to be shared equally with B.Y. ($69,759.86 each). A.A. suggested the funds were disbursed to B.Y. on February 4, 2016, and February 8, 2016. 152 . B.Y. stated that A.A., had partnered with her brother to purchase the condominium and the proceeds went to her brother. B.Y.’s brother was not called to testify at trial. No banking records were provided to confirm the transfer of proceeds of the sale to B.Y.

I accept B.Y.’s evidence that her brother received a half share of the proceeds. 153 . Sole ownership of property in Lebanon, the purchase and sale of the condominium in Australia, the purchase of land and a mobile home in Chezzetcook and other investment property in Chezzetcook, suggests A.A., has a source of income he has not fully explained to the Court. It also suggests his income is more than $30,000.00 gross, but very conservatively closer to $30,000.00 net. 154 . A.A. failed to file an Updated Statement of Property.

I find that A.A. has not provided a thorough explanation regarding his income from purchasing, leasing, and selling property. Underemployed / Earning capacity 155 . In April 2017, A.A. filed an affidavit, adopted by him in September 2021, wherein A.A. stated in part that he: …liked living in Canada (and Australia when we were there) there were (and are) much better job opportunities in Beirut than in Halifax. I am well educated and am able to secure positions easily with my education and language skills. In addition, we have a house in Lebanon and our money stretches much further there. 156 .

In 2017, just after he left Canada for Lebanon with three of the parties’ children, A.A. claimed it was cheaper to live in Lebanon and that he could more easily find better paying jobs in Lebanon over Canada. In addition, A.A. acknowledged that upon returning to Lebanon, he and the children were living in a house rent free in South Lebanon. 157 . In 2017, A.A. filed a sworn Statement of Expenses and Statement of Income in May 2017, attaching Notices of Assessments for 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015; T1 General Income Tax and Benefit Returns for 2012, 2013. 2014; and a Notice of Reassessment for 2012.

A.A. stated that he had income from: his employer; a financial Investment Firm (Access Capital); tutoring students; and rental properties. 158 . In 2017, on an interim basis, A.A.’s annual income for child support was found to be $33,294.00, based on A.A.’s representations and correspondence filed by A.A., from an employer at that time. Again, this was an interim finding only. 159 . At trial in 2021, A.A. stated that after returning to Lebanon he quit his job with Access Capital, and that he took on work as a part- time tutor.

A.A. acknowledged receiving $230.00 per month or $2,350 per year leasing a lot in Chezzetcook, N.S. 160 . In February 2021, A.A., swore an affidavit indicating: Late last year I completed by (my) PhD in Management Information Systems (MIS) from Curtin University in Western Australia, via correspondence… … I have not found regular employment in my field as of yet, and have been subsisting on private tutoring and assistance from my family. The Applicant and I were divorced religiously and I have remarried in Lebanon. My new partner and I have a child together, age 4 years, with another child due in 3 months.

I support my new wife and child as well as myself and 3 boys with B.Y. …

161 . On August 12, 2021, A.A. confirmed he had completed his PhD in business from an Australian University and he was looking for work. He explained that he was applying for permanent residency in Australia. 162 . The choices A.A. made to start a new family, quit a job, and return to school to complete his PhD in business, were his to make. However, those choices do not absolve him of his responsibility to have paid appropriate child support for M, and spousal support for B.Y. Imputed A.A.’s income at what amount? 163 .

B.Y. did not suggest an appropriate imputed annual income for A.A., for child support and spousal support. However, she did suggest that: a. that a payment by A.A. of $280.00 in child support and $300.00 in spousal support for a total of $580.00 in support was appropriate for the period between June 1, 2017, and February 1, 2021; and b. a payment by A.A., of $258.00 in child support and $300.00 in spousal support was appropriate as of March 1, 2021. 164 .

Section 20 of the Child Support Guidelines directs that when a person is a non-resident of Canada, that person’s annual income is determined as if he or she were a resident of Canada, with a reduction to income made to account for higher tax rates. A.A.’s income, must be converted to Canadian dollars, and his income must be imputed if tax rates on his foreign income are lower than they would be in Canada. Neither party addressed these issues at trial. 165 .

As noted, A.A. had previously suggested it was cheaper to live in South Lebanon and he disclosed that he and the parties’ children had access to rent-free accommodations. No specific information was provided to help me understand the differences or financial implications of living in Canada or Lebanon during the relevant period of 2017 – 2021. 166 . On March 29, 2016, A.A.’s previous counsel wrote to the court and stated that A.A. was self-employed. B.Y. suggested and I accept that A.A. received proprietorship income from his “online business” and/or the purchasing, leasing, and sale of land or other assets.

A cash flow statement demonstrating the sources and the uses of cash throughout any year would have assisted me in evaluating how much income was available for A.A. to pay child support for M, and/or spousal support to B.Y. No such information was provided for 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, or 2021, the years in question. Asset Division 167 .

Any determinations I make related to any matrimonial assets in Nova Scotia Canada does not have any effect on any right B.Y. may have to pursue legal action, upon any evidence of fraud or incomplete disclosure related to the ownership or the sale of matrimonial property in Australia or Lebanon or elsewhere. 168 .

To provide some context with respect to property division, I have quoted the Honourable Justice Jollimore in Brandon , supra, wherein she reminded us: … [6] Under the Matrimonial Property Act , R.S.N.S. 1989, c, 275 , I must first identify the assets and then classify them as matrimonial or non matrimonial. Identifying assets is no more complicated than listing them. Classifying assets requires determining whether they are excluded under section 4(1) of the Act . Once items are identified and classified, they must be valued. The Matrimonial Property Act provides that matrimonial assets are to be divided equally.

In limited circumstances the Act allows for an unequal division of

matrimonial assets and a division of non matrimonial assets… 169 . When B.Y. initially filed her Statement of Property in March 2016, she listed the “Trailer and parcels (Chezzetcook)”, as matrimonial property. In her Statement of Property filed March 18, 2020, B.Y., she more clearly identified the property, suggesting it was all matrimonial property.

B.Y. provided the tax assessed value as of 2017: Property Identification Tax assessed value 2017 : Mobile Home located at Pettipas Lane, sold for $15,950 (02.20.2015) Parcel of land at Pettipas Lane $93,000.00 PID 41315037 Pettipas Lane, East Chezzetcook $6,500.00; PID 41315045 Mines Road, East Chezzetcook $1,300.00; PID 41315052 Mines Road, East Chezzetcook $4,000.00; PID 41315060 Mines Road, East Chezzetcook $2,500.00. 170 . B.Y. stated that she initially understood A.A. had purchased much less property but she later then learned he had purchased 55 acres of land.

In her Statement of Property filed March 18, 2020, B.Y. identified the same properties but included the values she stated were based on two (or three) “realtor appraisals” she suggested were provided by Domus Realty, Royal Lepage, and possibly Remax as of March 29, 2018.

Copies of the appraisals were not filed as Exhibits at trial: Property identification Realtor’s ave March 29, 2018 Mobile Home located at Pettipas Lane, sold for $15,950 (02.20.2015) Parcel of land at Pettipas Lane, $109,900 mobile and garage PID 41315037 Pettipas Lane, East Chezzetcook $14,967; PID 41315045 Mines Road, East Chezzetcook $15,000; PID 41315052 Mines Road, East Chezzetcook $21,667; PID 41315060 Mines Road, East Chezzetcook $15,000.00 ; $176,534.00 171 .

As noted previously, at trial A.A. presented as unaware he had filed an unsworn Statement of Property, listing the following as property and debt as of June 2016: Sole - Pettipas Lane, Chezzetcook, as of June 1, 2016, value was $100,000 Sole - Two (2) apartments – Lebanon - $200,000 Jointly with his two brothers – vacant land – Lebanon - $20,000 Vehicles: Toyota Echo $3,000.00 Toyota Sienna $ 7,000.00 (states she sold for $5,500) Savings RBC $1,500.00 TD, Bank of Nova Scotia, CIBC “nominal”

No business interest listed Debts Line of Credit RBC $63,000.00 Visa CIBC $4,000.00 Visa US RBC $4,000.00 Visa US BOB $3,000.00 Collateral mortgage TBD A.A. did not file any other Statement of Property. 172. A.A., acknowledged that the lots of land and the mobile home located in East Chezzetcook were purchased in or around 2009,while he was still married to B.Y. Both parties indicate they lived in the mobile home together with their children for a period, he saysapproximately one year. B.Y., stated she believed A.A., had purchased much less land than she later learned he had.

I do not believeB.Y., was involved in the purchase of the land or management of the land. 173. A.A., argued that he used his pre-marriage savings to purchase the mobile home and the parcels of land, including the lot wherethe mobile home is located. He stated that the lots were purely business investments to be sold or developed later. 174. In July 2019, B.Y., requested the court find the mobile home and the properties in Chezzetcook were matrimonial assets. Sherequested half the value of the property, which she suggested was approximately $63,000.

I find the mobile home was a matrimonialasset but that the land is not. 175. In Brandon supra, the Honourable Justice Jollimore went on to state in part: … [27] Claims under section 4(4) of the Matrimonial Property Act have been more successful in cases where property owned by thecorporation was a tangible asset that was used for the family. In Green, (1989), (NS SC), 23 R.F.L. (3d) 386 (T.D.),the business owned a car which was used by Ms. Green for work and personal travel. Justice Rogers concluded that shares in thecompany in the amount of the value of the car were matrimonial assets.

He valued these shares at $500.00. (Ms. Green appealed theunequal division of matrimonial assets in her husband's favour and her appeal was dismissed at Green, (1989), (NSCA), 23 R.F.L. (3d) 398 (A.D.).) A similar decision with regard to a corporate owned Jeep was made in Jovcic, 2005 NSSC 183, (at paragraphs 42 - 44), which valued corporate shares representing the market value of the Jeep at $9,000.00 and treated thoseas a matrimonial asset. 176. A.A. provided insufficient information about the assets, in particular the land he claimed to solely own, and the acquisition ofthose assets.

Although I find A.A., has failed to provide full disclosure of all his property and the manner and timing of acquisition orsale of all his property, I find that an equal division of the proceeds from the sale of any property, other than the mobile home, would notbe equitable in this situation.

I do find that A.A., has undisclosed income from his business selling and / or leasing property and thisincome is more properly factored in when considering the quantum and duration of spousal support to be paid by A.A. to B.Y. … [35] In Simmons, (NS S.F.), at paragraph 34, Justice Campbell outlined general principles for determining thedate on which to value an asset: use separation date values for assets which "tend to be consumed by actual usage or whose value hasbeen earned or accrued by reference to the passage of time" and value other assets when the spouses do their accounting.

While a trialdecision, Simmons, (NS S.F.), has twice been lauded by the Court of Appeal: in Moore, 2003 NSCA 116 , atparagraph 24, Justice Hamilton described the decision as "[a] good review of the rationale behind the choice of valuation date" and inMorash, 2004 NSCA 20 , at paragraph 21, Justice Bateman said it provided "a comprehensive discussion of 'valuation date' ".

Justice Campbell's general principles fit well within the context of the Court of Appeal's statement that there is "no requirement in NovaScotia to assign a single valuation date for all matrimonial assets" in Reardon (Smith) v. Smith, 1999 NSCA 147 , at paragraph38. 177. As previously noted, I accept that In or around 2015, A.A., sold the mobile home to S.C., and he leased S.C., the land where themobile home is located.

Although I accept that when A.A., entered into an agreement to sell the mobile home to S.C., that he hadobtained a “religious” divorce from B.Y., I still find B.Y., is entitled to half the proceeds of the sale of the mobile home, $7,975.00, soldfor $15,950 in 2015. Division of matrimonial debt 178.

With respect to debt, in Brandon, supra, the Honourable Justice Jollimore stated in part, and she relied on the following case law: [42] According to Justice Roscoe in Bailey, (NS S.C.), at paragraph 23, when determining if a debt is"matrimonial", I must decide whether it was incurred for the family's benefit, whether it is an ordinary household debt, and, if it aroseafter the couple separated, whether it was necessary to meet basic living needs or to preserve matrimonial assets. This decision wasapproved by the Court of Appeal in Ellis, (NS C.A.), (NS C.A.).

In Cameron, (NS S.C.), at paragraph 24, affirmed at Cameron, 1996 NSCA 86 , (NS C.A.), Justice Goodfellow said thatindebtedness incurred after separation and for the debtor's sole benefit is generally not "matrimonial", but personal. … [46] A credit line was secured against the matrimonial home. The credit line was initially used for a number of family purposes: theroof was replaced on the home; the living room was redone; new siding was installed; some new windows were installed. As well, Ms.Brandon hadn't maximized her RRSP contributions, so money was contributed to her RRSP.

Lastly, a small down payment was made onthe 2006 Hyundai Accent. …. [50] The evidence about the amount of debts is not exact. It is for Ms. Brandon to prove the amount of the debts. The evidence Ihave is that the debts which I have found to be matrimonial (the Sears and Leon's debts) total $2,352.49. 179. With respect to the issue of ownership, in Brandon, supra, the Honourable Justice Jollimore stated in part, and relied on thefollowing case law: [52] Section 12(1) of the Matrimonial Property Act provides that matrimonial assets are divided equally notwithstanding theownership of the assets.

There is no similar treatment of debts. In Cameron, (NS S.C.), affirmed by Cameron, 1996NSCA 86 , (NS C.A.), Justice Goodfellow noted, at paragraph 26, that a debt is not automatically sharedsimply because the debt may be labeled as matrimonial indebtedness. Whether the debt will be shared depends on whether the divisionof matrimonial assets in equal shares would be unfair or unconscionable.

His Lordship did comment, again at paragraph 26, that "Inmost conceivable situations fairness and conscience dictate a sharing of matrimonial indebtedness." [53] Here, if matrimonial assets were divided equally, each spouse would receive approximately $7,500.00 from the assets otherthan the house and the net proceeds from the sale of the house would be divided equally (after Ms. Brandon accounted for her use of$8,647.51 from the credit line). This arrangement would leave Ms.

Brandon entirely and solely responsible for the debts that I havefound relate to the family: the car loan, the Sears credit card debt and the Leon's debt. [54] Ms. Brandon asks me to order an unequal division of property such that matrimonial assets and matrimonial debts would beequally divided between the spouses. The statutory basis for such a claim is found in

section 13(

b) of the Matrimonial Property Actwhich allows me to divide matrimonial assets unequally where I am satisfied that the () equal division of matrimonial assets would beunfair or unconscionable taking into account the amount of the debts and liabilities of each spouse and the circumstances in which theywere incurred.

[55] I am satisfied that this is an appropriate case for such a division. Both spouses and the family enjoyed the benefit of the assets and which resulted from the debts I have found to be matrimonial and they should be shared in equal amounts between the spouses. [56] Consequently, when the matrimonial home is sold, the costs of the sale will be paid (the real estate commission, legal fees and the applicable taxes). The credit line will be retired, 180 . B.Y., asked me to: a. “set aside” the line of credit, RBC bank of Canada line of credit for $63,000. i.

A.A., shall be fully responsible for the line of credit. b. “set aside” the sale of the home. i. I am not prepared to set aside the sale. ii. I find that A.A., notionally owes B.Y., $15,950 /2 = $7,975.00 for her share of the proceeds from the sale of the mobile home. iii. B.Y., sold the family’s van for $5,500 / and she notionally owes A.A., $2,750. If B.Y., has not reimbursed A.A., for his share of the proceeds from the sale of the van then the $7,975 owed by A.A., to B.Y., will be set off by $2,750. c. “set aside” the lease of the matrimonial property. i.

I am prepared not prepared to set aside the lease of the property where the mobile home (matrimonial property) is located. Spousal Support Entitlement 181 . B.Y. is requesting spousal support continue at $300.00 per month starting June 1, 2017. 182 . It appears from the court record (Waiver of Fees Application) that B.Y. was born in May 1983 and she was approximately 30 years old when the parties ended their intimate relationship in 2013. 183 . As noted previously, the parties were married on October 10, 2005, and B.Y. gave birth to the parties’ children in 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012.

The parties’ ended their intimate relationship in or around August 2013, after almost 8 years. However, the parties’ finances continued to be intermingled until September 2016, with B.Y. residing with A.A. and then A.A. residing with B.Y. and the children at times up until September 2016. I find that at times the parties resided together for the financial benefit of the family despite the end of their intimate relationship, his relationship with another woman, and A.A.’s “religious divorce” from B.Y. in or around 2015, or his second marriage to H, in 2016. 184 .

I find that the parties moved to Canada with a focus on A.A. obtaining his citizenship. A.A. has stated that he was proficient in several languages while B.Y. struggled with the language barrier. B.Y. explained that A.A. was not tied geographically to his job. I find the initial move to Canada in 2009 was suggested by A.A. and B.Y. was most disadvantaged by the move to Canada.

185 . A.A. clearly stated he did not struggle with any language barrier. A.A. did not challenge B.Y.’s suggestion that he could work remotely, and that geography was not a barrier to him finding employment. He did not challenge B.Y.’s statement that she was a “stay- at-home” mother while they were married (8 years + 3 years sharing finances and at times a home, before he remarried). 186 .

I find B.Y. moved to accommodate A.A.’s career and business prospects and that B.Y. continued to be a “stay-at-home” mother for the parties four children until September 2016, when A.A. left Nova Scotia for Lebanon with three of the parties’ four children. In March 2017, B.Y. claimed: I am struggling financially as I receive no child or spousal support from A. I need immediate financial assistance. My Child Tax Benefit has also been taken away since the children are no longer in my physical custody. (referring to three of the parties’ children). 187 .

An interim order requiring A.A. to pay child support of $280.00 and spousal support of $300.00 per month, was granted in June 2017. In February 2021, on an interim basis, child support was adjusted to $258.00 and suspended, spousal support was ordered to continue at $300.00 per month. 188 . A.A. has suggested that B.Y. has an obligation to make reasonable efforts to become self-sufficient following their separation in 2013.

Given the parties’ particular circumstances including: B.Y.’s and the children’s move from Australia where she had a job with her brother back to Canada in or around 2013; the circumstances of A.A.’s sale of the parties’ mobile home to his intimate partner; A.A.’s departure with the parties’ three sons to Lebanon in September 2016, after arranging a “religious divorce” from B.Y. and marrying another woman; the challenges B.Y. faced after A.A.’s decision to start a new family in Lebanon; and B.Y.’s likely circumstances and limited prospects in Canada initially and limited prospects if she returned to Lebanon; I find that B.Y. is entitled to compensatory and non-compensatory spousal support. 189 .

In Singh v. Singh , 2013 ONSC 6476 , a decision made on an interim basis in that case, the Honourable Justice Price of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice concluded as follows: CONCLUSION AND ORDER [80] In

summary, Ms. Singh suffered an economic disadvantage from her short-term marriage by reasons of the fact that she left her employment in India, where her credentials were recognized, and came to Canada to join her husband and assume household duties, in a way that compromised her economic self-sufficiency. Ms.

Singh’s inability to achieve a greater degree of self-sufficiency since the parties’ separation should not disentitle her to spousal support at the present time, having regard to the fact that the marital standard of living is, in the circumstances of the present case, an appropriate measure of what self-sufficiency would entail, Ms. Singh’s limited education and training, and the lack of support she has received from Mr. Singh to achieve accreditation in Canada. [81] The impact that the marriage break-down has had on Ms.

Singh has been aggravated by the absence of a matrimonial home or other family property and by Mr. Singh’s failure to pay spousal support since the parties separ

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