B.B. v. K.B., 2018 NSSC 223

SUPREME COURT OF Nova Scotia FAMILY DIVISION Citation: B.B. v. K.B. , 2018 NSSC 223 Date: 2018-09-19 Docket: SFSND No. 1206-6641 Registry: Sydney Between: B.B. Petitioner v. K.B. Respondent Judge: The Honourable Justice Lee Anne MacLeod-Archer Heard: May 14, 15 and 16, 2018, in Sydney, Nova Scotia Final Written Submissions received: Written Release: June 13, 2018 September 19, 2018 Counsel: Damien Barry for the Petitioner Alan Stanwick for the Respondent By the Court: Background [ 1 ] The parties were married on April 18, 2009. They have one child, J.J.B., who is eight years old.

They separated on August 25, 2012 and B.B. filed a Petition for Divorce on February 17, 2014. K.B. filed an Answer on March 20, 2017. [ 2 ] A consent order was issued on April 14, 2014. After hearing evidence at an interim hearing, I issued a further parenting order on July 29, 2014. Divorce [ 3 ] The parties’ marriage is permanently broken down. I am satisfied that all requirements have been met to grant a divorce. B.B. seeks a name change which is granted. Issues [ 4 ] The following are the issues to be decided: 1. What is the appropriate parenting order? 2. What is the appropriate order for child support and

section 7 expenses? 3. Is retroactive child support owing and if so, in what amounts? 4. What is the appropriate division of assets?

Issue 1: What is the appropriate parenting order? [ 5 ] Since July 29, 2014 the parties have shared parenting on a week-about basis. B.B. now seeks to terminate that arrangement, arguing that it is not in J.J.B.’s best interests. K.B. wishes to maintain it. [ 6 ] In any decision involving parenting, the best interests of the child are the primary focus. The applicable sections of the Divorce Act , R.S.C. 1985, c.3 (2 nd supp.) which apply are as follows: 16.

(1) A court of competent jurisdiction may, on application by either or both spouses or by any other person, make an order respecting the custody of or the access to, or the custody of and access to, any or all children of the marriage. …

(5) Unless the court orders otherwise, a spouse who is granted access to a child of the marriage has the right to make inquiries, and to be given information, as to the health, education and welfare of the child.

(6) The court may … impose such other terms, conditions or restrictions in connection therewith as it thinks fit and just. …

(8) In making an order under this section, the court shall take into consideration only the best interests of the child of the marriage as determined by reference to the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the child. …

(10) In making an order under this section, the court shall give effect to the principle that a child of the marriage should have as much contact with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child and, for that purpose, shall take into consideration the willingness of the person for whom custody is sought to facilitate such contact. [emphasis added] [ 7 ] In support of her claim for custody, B.B. relies on the oft-cited Foley factors enumerated by Justice Goodfellow and argues as follows (her arguments are in bold): 16 … there has emerged a number of areas of parenting that bear consideration in most cases including in no particular order the following: 1.

Statutory direction Divorce Act 16(8) and 16(9), 15(5) and 17(6); 2. Physical environment: In the present matter, J.J.L. resides in the matrimonial home with B.B., the home he has known since birth (See Exhibit 6, Tabs 12 and 20). Based on K.B.’s evidence, J.J.B. either lives in * at his mother’s home which was the subject of a previous investigation by Community Services (See Exhibit 1, page 29 of 43) or in * with his common law partner whereas per his girlfriend’s evidence, J.J.B. has no permanent room but rather the children are moved around when he does stay. 3.

Discipline: K.B., as per his own evidence, is struggling to deal with J.J.B. J.J.B. has been urinating on himself over the past 6 to 12 months while in K.B.’s care as per his own evidence . Both B.B. and his teachers stated that J.J.B. did not have any self- wetting issues from their observations. The most telling evidence with respect to discipline is that of Ms. Nadine Marr and Exhibit 1, page 43 of 43. The MPP of excessive discipline was substantiated and K.B.’s recollection or non-recollection of what actually occurred in April of 2018 lacks credibility. 4.

Role model: K.B. has chosen to follow certain parts of the interim order issued in this matter and has effectively concealed or tried to conceal where he actually lives for almost four (4) years now. His communication as per Exhibit 7 Tab 1 is abrupt and confrontational. He called the police on B.B. when she tried to attend her only child’s first day of school. J.J.B. missed his first grading day as K.B. left J.J.B. in the care of his common law partner who had to attend her own children’s grading day in another school, despite the fact that B.B. was available to take J.J.B. that day.

Apart from a brief period post separation, K.B. abandoned his financial responsibilities with respect to the matrimonial debt and the matrimonial home yet was still able to purchase a $20,000.00 Dodge Charger vehicle shortly after separation. He also introduced J.J.B. to a new partner and her children, without informing B.B. and then later left that relationship. B.B. has followed the interim order to the letter, and has only ever acted in J.J.B.’s best interests. She has also shouldered the financial burden of the parties’ separation. 5. Wishes of the children: no evidence was led in relation to this factor. 6.

Religious and spiritual guidance: it is submitted that this factor is non-determinative based on the evidence. 7. Assistance of experts, such as social workers, psychologists- psychiatrists – etcetera: Evidence was led by Ms. Nadine Marr in relation to prior involvement with the parties and in particular in relation to the issue of excessive discipline. 8. Time availability of a parent for a child: Based on the evidence at trial, B.B. has been the primary decision maker with respect to J.J.B. since separation.

She has been the parent who makes all medical appointments, engages with his school and basically organized J.J.B.’s life. Her life outside of work revolves around J.J.B.’s needs. K.B. on the other hand failed to advance any clear or cogent evidence of his availability for J.J.B. On the contrary the evidence shows that K.B.’s time is taken up with his

new family and child and not J.J.B. He couldn’t even ensure that J.J.B. got to his first grading day and Ms. Gaudet in her evidence stated she had never seen K.B. prior to her giving evidence. J.J.B.’s grade primary teacher in her evidence confirmed that J.J.B. was well prepared from her observations when under the care of B.B. whilst he was ill prepared and disorganized when under the care of K.B. 9. The cultural development of a child: it is submitted that little evidence was led on this factor at trial. 10.

The physical and character development of the child by such things as participation in sports: B.B. has enrolled J.J.B. in summer camps and skiing. K.B. failed to advance any evidence in relation to this factor (see Exhibit 6, Tabs 17 – 19). 11. The emotional support to assist in a child developing self-esteem and confidence: B.B. enrolled in the strongest families program and the booster program. She has also engaged the services of Dr. MacDonald. She gave clear evidence on strategies she uses with J.J.B. at home, including the “anger rules”.

K.B. by his own evidence , is dealing with a child who wets himself and his bed consistently, yet this does not happen when J.J.B. is in the care of his mother or at school. K.B. did not advance any clear evidence as to how he can provide emotional support to J.J.B. 12. The financial contribution to the welfare of a child: K.B. abandoned his financial responsibilities to his family after separation. He was required to make full financial disclosure after the interim hearing in this matter as the issue of child support was not determined at that time.

He made some disclosure in March 2017 and provided some income tax summaries at the beginning of trial. He failed to contribute to any daycare expenses incurred for J.J.B. after separation, leaving the financial burden to B.B. He also refused to disclose financial information for his common law partner despite repeated requests for same. 13. The support of an extended family, uncles, aunts, grandparents, etcetera: J.J.B. has the support of extended family on both sides. 14. The willingness of a parent to facilitate contact with the other parent.

This is a recognition of the child’s entitlement to access to parents and each parent’s obligation to promote and encourage access to the other parent. The Divorce Act s. 16(1) and s. 17(9) : K.B. is solely lacking in this regard. His actions in denying access or limiting access to B.B. have been callous and punitive, especially with respect to milestone events for B.B. and J.J.B. such as his first day at school, grading day and his baptism (See Exhibit 7, pages 17, 33 and 40), even going to far as to calling the police on B.B. when she tried to attend J.J.B.’s first day of grade one.

Despite these actions, B.B. has always acceded to K.B.’s demands to have J.J.B. brought to * so that he could exercise access with him. In addition to this, K.B. left J.J.B. in the care of his mother in *, five minutes away from where B.B. lives, for a whole week when his daughter was born and he was in Halifax, in clear contravention of the interim order. 15. The interim and long range plan for the welfare of the children: B.B. is seeking to retain the matrimonial home and continue to provide stability and a loving and nurturing environment for J.J.B.

K.B.’s plan is unclear but it appears he simply wants to continue the artificial status quo currently in place, based on the premise that J.J.B. and he would continue living with his mother. 16. The financial consequences of custody. Frequently the financial reality is the child must remain in the home or, perhaps alternate accommodations provided by a member of the extended family. Any other alternative requiring two residence expenses will often adversely and severely impact on the ability to adequately meet the child’s reasonable needs; and As per Exhibit 18, K.B. has a surplus of $517.20 per month.

Based on K.B.’s 2017 income of $60,293.00, (See Exhibit 14) the table amount of support payable would be $514.46 per month. B.B. provided a detailed statement of expenses and children’s budget showing a monthly deficit of $1,362.57. She was not cross examined on this statement and as such her evidence in this regard is uncontradicted. [ 8 ] I agree with most of these arguments. Shared parenting has not worked in the best interests of the child. [ 9 ] J.J.B.’s teachers describe him as bright and articulate. He does well in school, though he sometimes displays aggression.

He also wets himself when he’s with K.B., and on one occasion ruined a mattress at K.B.’s girlfriend’s home by urinating on it. K.B. believes B.B. is coaching J.J.B. to “misbehave” in order to demonstrate that a shared parenting arrangement doesn’t work. [ 10 ] This suggestion is completely unfounded. There is no evidence that J.J.B.’s behaviours are deliberate. Neither party called the child’s psychologist, physician or pediatrician to provide opinion evidence on the source of the behaviours. The problem occurs when J.J.B. is with K.B., but it could arise from many things.

It doesn’t mean that B.B. is coaching J.J.B. [ 11 ] The parties previously completed the Strongest Families program through the I.W.K. Children’s Hospital to learn methods of coping with J.J.B.’s behaviours. After that, B.B. arranged for J.J.B. to be seen by a child psychologist. K.B.’s suggestion that this is deliberate highlights the hostility K.B. displays towards B.B.

He himself acknowledged that the psychologist is working to figure out what’s going on with J.J.B. [ 12 ] Finally, B.B. is not the type of mother to put these services in place and then deliberately undermine them by coaching J.J.B. to act out. [ 13 ] Further friction between the parties arises from child welfare’s involvement, most recently in relation to scratches / bruising on J.J.B.’s forehead. He told a teacher and social workers that his father pushed his head into the wall during a time out.

The child protection authorities concluded that it was a case of excessive discipline, but recommended no restrictions in terms of K.B.’s parenting. [ 14 ] K.B. says that he was unaware J.J.B. was injured, despite the fact that others readily observed the marks. The incident occurred after K.B. discovered that J.J.B. had urinated on a mattress at his girlfriend’s home. K.B. described himself as “frustrated” and “disappointed” with J.J.B. It’s likely his frustration boiled over, leading him to be impatient and rough with J.J.B.

He shook J.J.B. and should have been aware that the child hit his head. [ 15 ] The parties clearly have different parenting styles. B.B. is very involved and more hands on. K.B. is more hands off. He tends to interpret B.B.’s requests for information as an infringement on his parenting time, or an attempt to control him or the child.

[16] The parties need not share the same parenting style to make shared parenting work. But it does require a basic level ofcooperation and civil communication, which is lacking here. One telling example of their lack of communication and shared parentingvalues involves grading day last year. Had K.B. put the child’s interests first and contacted B.B., she could have taken J.J.B. to hisgrading day ceremonies. He wouldn’t have missed them. [17] Another troubling example involves the Christmas holidays.

K.B. kept J.J.B. overnight Christmas eve last year, despiteagreeing to return him to B.B. that evening (and being required under the order to do so). He did the same thing the Christmas prior tothe interim hearing in 2014. At that time, he said he regretted his actions. Obviously, he didn’t regret them enough to avoid a repeat. [18] K.B. has also been dictating where and when to drop off the child after B.B.’s parenting time.

In addition, there are concernswith basics such as school lunches, late arrivals and missed school days the weeks J.J.B is in his father’s care. [19] J.J.B. has been witness to ongoing hostility between his parents. He can’t have missed the tension between his parents theevening he was eating a late supper, while his father was sitting in the driveway exchanging impatient texts with B.B. about the delay. The aim of the interim order for shared parenting was to re-establish stability for J.J.B. and reduce parental hostility, but it’s clear thathasn’t happened.

K.B.’s assurance that they can communicate better in future rings hollow. [20] Conflict between the parents jeopardized the child’s well-being. J.J.B. has been the subject of his father’s frustration and he isdisplaying concerning behaviours. A stable parenting

schedule with little room for

interpretation is required. In coming to thisconclusion, I have considered the cases cited by B.B. in her final submissions, including Murphy v Hancock, 2011 NSSC 197 ,2011 N.S.S.C. 197; N.D.L. v M.S.L., (2010) 2010 NSSC 68 , 289 N.S.R. (2d) 8 and Hammond v Nelson, [2012] N.S.J. No.35. [21] I find that the best interests of the child in the circumstances of this case require a change to the shared parenting arrangement. The arrangement which best suits the child, and which I am prepared to order, is as set out in

Schedule “A”. Issue 2: What is the appropriate order for child support and

section 7 expenses? [22] K.B.’s 2017 income was $60,293.00, less union dues of $698.00. This requires a payment under the Nova Scotia table of$508.00 per month, which will commence October 1, 2018 and continue each month thereafter until further order. The order willinclude the standard recalculation provisions. [23] B.B. also seeks an order that the parties share equally in

section 7 expenses going forward. While that seems reasonable on itsface, the parties are unable to communicate well enough to discuss and agree on

section 7 expenses. [24] I therefore direct that K.B. pay half of any child care costs or after school program costs incurred by B.B. (discounted by amarginal rate of 37%) on a monthly basis. He will also pay 50% of the child’s registration fees for up to two sports programs per year. Receipts for payments made will be provided to K.B. via e-mail. He will make payment within seven days of receipt.

Records ofpayments must be kept by K.B. [25] Should either parent enroll the child in a summer day camp during their parenting time, that parent shall be responsible for thefull cost of the camp. [26] K.B. will maintain the child on his health (medical & dental) plan and will pay 50% of all uninsured expenses, including co-pays, after the first $100.00 annually. B.B. will provide receipts and insurance statements from her primary plan (if applicable) annually,and K.B. will reimburse her his share within seven days.

Issue 3: Is retroactive child support owing and if so, in what amounts? [27] B.B. argues that K.B. owes retroactive child support for the period after separation to November 14, 2014.

She also claims aretroactive contribution to s. 7 expenses in the amount of $5,498.33 (net of tax benefits to her). [28] K.B. acknowledges that for the period of September 1, 2012 to July 1, 2013 the child was in the primary care of B.B. and thathe owes retroactive child support of $4,785.00. [29] For the period of August 1 – November 23, 2013 he says there was a shared custody regime in place, and based on thecomparable incomes of the parties, no child support should be payable.

B.B. disputes this. [30] K.B. also argues that after November, 2013 when B.B. unilaterally terminated the shared parenting agreement, there should beno retroactive child support payable because the shared custody regime should have continued. B.B. disputes this as well. [31] B.B. argues that considering the DBS factors, K.B. should be required to pay retroactive support of $10,419.97.

The DBSfactors include: 1. whether K.B. has engaged in blameworthy conduct, 2. whether a retroactive award would cause financial hardship, 3. reasons for any delay on the part of B.B., and 4. whether the child would benefit from a retroactive payment. [32] B.B. says that K.B. engaged in blameworthy conduct in failing to disclose his income, and in delaying the filing of an Answerto the Divorce Petition. I dealt with K.B.’s motion to allow late filing of an Answer before the trial and allowed it.

I found that fault forthe late filing lay with his counsel, so I decline to take that factor into consideration at this time.

[ 33 ] K.B. filed a Statement of Income in 2017, along with his Notices of Assessment for 2012 – 2017 and recent paystubs. However, B.B. repeatedly requested copies of his full returns, which he never provided. The late and minimal disclosure by K.B. constitutes blameworthy conduct. [ 34 ] The question of whether it would cause hardship to K.B. to pay retroactive support includes a consideration of whether he is living common-law with his girlfriend. If he’s sharing expenses, that frees up money to pay debt. [ 35 ] K.B. denies that he and his girlfriend are living in a common-law relationship.

He correctly notes that the burden is on B.B. to prove this. He cites a number of facts in support of his denial of a common-law relationship.

These include: • K.B. and his girlfriend reside at separate residences; • K.B.’s girlfriend is solely responsible for the expenses in relation to the maintenance and preservation of her home; • K.B. spends time at his girlfriend’s resident primarily when B.B. has J.J.B. for her week; • J.J.B. spends time at the residence of K.B.’s girlfriend with his father mainly on the weekends; • There have been few occasions when J.J.B. has spent time at K.B.’s girlfriend’s residence on school days including overnight; • K.B. and his girlfriend do not own property jointly; • K.B. and his girlfriend to not have mutual wills; • Neither party has named the other party on his or her medical plan; • Neither party has designated the other party as a beneficiary on his or her employment pension plan; • Neither party has designated the other party as a beneficiary on his or her life insurance policy; • The parties’ relationship is in a state of flux because their respective divorce proceedings are ongoing and unresolved; and • The parties have not made any definite, future plans regarding their relationship due to their ongoing divorce matters. [ 36 ] In her post-trial submissions, B.B. relies upon my decision in MacKinnon v.

Billard , 2017 NSSC 156 in support of her assertion that there is a common-law relationship between K.B. and his girlfriend.

She says: • K.B. and his girlfriend have a two year old child together; • By his girlfriend’s own evidence, K.B. resides at her home at least every weekend and every second week; • K.B.’s mother confirmed to child protection authorities on July 8, 2016 that K.B. lived in *; • The child protection social worker’s notes confirm that J.J.B. was staying overnight at the home of K.B.’s girlfriend as of July 17, 2015; • K.B. and his girlfriend confirmed that they had future plans to marry each other; • K.B. and his girlfriend are in a conjugal relationship; • K.B. claims he pays rent to his mother yet provided no evidence that he pays rent to his girlfriend; • K.B.’s girlfriend confirmed on cross examination that J.J.B. had been enrolled in summer camp in 2016, at the same school her children attend; and • K.B. sought to have J.J.B. baptized with his girlfriend’s family, his family and the child they have together on April 9, 2016. [ 37 ] B.B. argues that the only reasonable inference the court can draw is that K.B. and his girlfriend are a common-law couple who reside together.

She also argues that K.B. is not credible in suggesting that he lives with his mother in *, works in Sydney, and spends the vast majority of his time in *, a 45 minute drive from his mother’s home, where his girlfriend and young child live. [ 38 ] Having considered all of the evidence and considering the onus on B.B., I reject the argument that K.B. is living in a common- law relationship with his girlfriend. That is not to say that they won’t establish a common-law relationship in the near future, as both their divorce proceedings are near completion.

However, despite the evidence that K.B. spends an extensive amount of time at his girlfriend’s home, both parties were clear that they are waiting for the outcome of their respective divorces before committing to each other and advancing their relationship. [ 39 ] I accept this. The evidence from K.B.’s girlfriend was very credible. She places the interests of her children first, and she must know where she stands in terms of her own divorce proceedings before making a commitment to K.B.

The fact that she and K.B. have a child together does not negate this finding. [ 40 ] Although I have found that K.B. is not presently living common-law and sharing expenses with his girlfriend, it is likely that they will soon make that commitment. This will impact K.B.’s ability to pay.

[ 41 ] Even now, without someone sharing expenses, K.B. would not be hard pressed to pay a retroactive award. Including rent of $950.00/month for which there’s no evidence that he’s paying, his budget still shows a surplus. He may have to tighten his belt like B.B. did while supporting J.J.B. alone, but that does not equate to hardship. [ 42 ] B.B. did not delay in seeking child support. She filed a Petition in February 2014. Part of the relief claimed is child support. That was only seven months after K.B. stopped paying $500.00 bi-weekly. [ 43 ] J.J.B. is still young and will be his mother’s primary care.

He will have expenses for which I’m confident an award of retroactive child support will be used. [ 44 ] In all of these circumstances, I find it’s appropriate to award retroactive child support. Even recognizing that B.B. unilaterally terminated the shared parenting arrangement in late November, 2013, the child still had needs that were met by her.

I have calculated a retroactive award as follows: YEAR AMOUNT Sept – Dec 2012 4 months $1,742.84 Jan – Aug; Dec 2013 9 months $3,082.14 Jan – Sept 2014 9 months $3,915.09 TOTAL $8,740.07 [ 45 ] From this total must be deducted the amounts paid by K.B. after separation. I accept that he paid $500.00 bi-weekly for 12 months for a total of $13,000.00, and I classify these monies as child support. This leaves a credit of $4,259.93 owing to K.B. which I’ll address below. [ 46 ] B.B. has paid J.J.B.’s childcare expenses without contribution from K.B. since separation.

I accept the evidence of amounts paid and the calculations presented by B.B.’s counsel, which reflect a reduction in the amount claimed for B.B.’s marginal tax rate. K.B. has suggested no alternative methodology for determining the after-tax cost of child care. B.B. calculates the amount owing at $5,498.33 (net). After deduction of the credit owing to K.B. above, the total K.B. owes to B.B. for retroactive

section 7 expenses is $1,238.40. This sum shall be paid within thirty days. Issue 4: What is the appropriate division of assets? [ 47 ] The parties owned a home at the time of their separation, as well as an adjacent lot. They had some investments, pensions and vehicles. B.B. claims an unequal division. K.B. argues there is no evidence to suggest that an equal division would be unfair or unconscionable. [ 48 ] Under s.13 of the Matrimonial Property Act , an unequal division may be granted in certain circumstances.

Otherwise, the presumption is that there will be an equal division of matrimonial assets under s. 12. The onus is on the party advancing the s.13 claim, which in this case is B.B. She argues that an equal division would be unjust because: 1. She paid the mortgage alone after 2013; 2. She maintained the home, making improvements to it as necessary; 3. She paid the insurance, as well as the real property taxes; and 4.

She assumed the lion’s share of the parties’ debts after separation. [ 49 ] The evidence is uncontradicted that after separation, B.B. paid interest on the Scotiabank joint line of credit, and she paid off a joint Visa through consolidation of some debts into one loan, which she then paid.

She also maintained the mortgage. [ 50 ] If K.B. takes responsibility for half of the Scotiabank L.O.C. and compensates B.B. for half of the interest she paid over the years to maintain that account in good standing, he would owe her an equalization payment of $6,019.76. [ 51 ] B.B. acknowledges that K.B. made payments to her for approximately a year after separation. K.B. does not dispute that since July, 2013 he has made no payments.

Both characterized those payments as a contribution towards bills and the mortgage, but I have credited K.B. with payment of those funds as child support, so I decline to give K.B. credit again under the asset division. [ 52 ] B.B. wishes to retain the home. K.B. does not oppose this. He concedes that the balance to be deducted from the value of the home is the mortgage debt as of the date of separation, as opposed to the amount outstanding now. This makes the argument that B.B. should get an unequal division because she paid the mortgage moot.

She will get the benefit of those payments in a reduced balance for purposes of division. Otherwise, she would owe K.B. an equalization payment. [ 53 ] However, K.B. argues that in the division, I should use the home’s assessed value for tax purposes, rather than the appraised value. The appraisal is dated May 31, 2013. The appraiser valued the home at $124,000.00, while the assessment stands at $139,700.00.

There’s no evidence that the market has changed since the appraisal was completed, nor to what extent assessed values reflect the current market value, and the appraiser was not called for cross-examination on his report.

Given these issues, I reject the argument that the assessed value is more appropriate, and I accept the appraised value for purposes of division. [ 54 ] However, I do accept K.B.’s argument that where B.B. plans to retain the home, a real estate commission of 4% is appropriate for notional disposition costs. [ 55 ] There was little evidence on the value of the household contents, though K.B. says they had purchased new furniture before the separation. B.B. acknowledges that she kept most of the household contents. Neither provided an appraisal. I have therefore accepted

the value of $3,000.00 presented by the parties in their written submissions. [ 56 ] Although their evidence differed, the parties have also used the same values for the vehicles in their calculations, which I accept. [ 57 ] Having included the interest paid by B.B. on the L.O.C. in the calculations in

Schedule ‘B’ attached, and using the appraised value for the matrimonial home, and recognizing the concession made by K.B. on the mortgage, I find B.B. has not met the onus on her of establishing that an equal division would be unfair or unconscionable. I direct that the assets be divided equally as shown in

Schedule ‘B’ attached. This leaves K.B. owing B.B. an equalization payment of $6,019.77 which is payable within sixty days. K.B. will sign a Quit Claim Deed forthwith and deliver it to B.B. [ 58 ] The parties agree that they should each retain their respective pensions. That is accounted for in

Schedule ‘B’. Conclusion [ 59 ] Success has been divided. Barring any offers, both parties will be responsible for their own costs. MacLeod-Archer, J.

Schedule “A” 1. J.J.B. will be in the joint custody of both parents, but in the primary care of B.B. 2. The regular parenting

schedule will be as follows: (

a) J.J.B. will be in his mother’s care Monday from the start of the school day until Friday at 7:00 p.m.; (

b) Every second weekend starting October 5, 2018 J.J.B. will be in his father’s care from Friday at 7:00 p.m. until Monday morning, when school starts. K.B. will have parenting time on long weekends until Tuesday morning; (

c) Starting the week of October 12, 2018 and continuing every second week, K.B. will have parenting time with J.J.B. from after school on Friday until Saturday at 7:00 p.m. (

d) So long as K.B. lives with his mother, B.B. shall retrieve the child from that location when it’s her parenting time, and K.B. shall retrieve the child from B.B.’s home when he’s scheduled to exercise parenting time. Should K.B. move to his girlfriend’s home, the parties shall meet at the Sydney River McDonald’s parking lot for exchanges. Any request to change the location for retrieval will be made in writing, in advance, and if it cannot be accommodated, the regular location will be used. (

e) K.B. may have nightly phone contact with J.J.B. on nights when he is not in his care, to be initiated by him and received by the child in private. These calls shall be initiated between 6 – 7 p.m. and may last for up to 15 minutes each evening. In lieu of phone contact, K.B. may opt to Facetime or Skype with J.J.B.; (

f) B.B. will

schedule and arrange for J.J.B.’s attendance at counselling and medical appointments during her parenting time; (

g) Each parent will make their own childcare arrangements while J.J.B. is in their care; 3. Irrespective of the regular schedule, the following holiday and special occasion arrangements shall apply: 4. The parent into whose care the child is transitioning for holidays and special occasions shall retrieve the child and deliver the child to the other parent after their scheduled parenting time . (

a) Effective December 20 th at 2:00 p.m. each year, the regular

schedule will be suspended for Christmas. In 2018 and each even-numbered year thereafter, K.B. will have Christmas parenting time with J.J.B. from December 20 at 2:00 p.m. until December 25 th at noon and again from December 28 th at 2:00 p.m. until December 31 st at 2:00 p.m.; (

b) For March break, which shall run after school on the Friday before break starts until the Monday morning after break, the regular

schedule will be suspended. Starting in 2019 and each odd year thereafter, K.B. will have J.J.B. in his care for the full March break, and B.B. will have J.J.B. in her care for the full March break in even numbered years. (

c) B.B. shall have parenting time with J.J.B. on Easter Sunday from 12 noon until 6:00 p.m.; (

d) J.J.B. will spend time with B.B. on Mother’s Day from noon until 6:00 p.m.; (

e) K.B. will have parenting time on Father’s day from noon until 6:00 p.m.; (

f) K.B. will have J.J.B. in his care for 14 uninterrupted days in each of July and August each summer break, such time to be scheduled no later than April 30 of each year in writing with K.B. In the event K.B. fails to advise of his choice of weeks, he shall be deemed to have chosen the last 14 days of July and the last 14 days of August. B.B. will not

schedule J.J.B. for activities during K.B.’s vacation time with J.J.B. unless otherwise agreed in writing in advance. K.B. will retrieve the child at noon on the first day of his chosen

days and B.B. will retrieve the child at 6:00 p.m. on the 14 th day. 5. Both parties will have full access to all information, all health, educational, therapeutic, extra-curricular, and religious information respecting J.J.B. They may access such information directly from the source, without the need to obtain the authorization of the other parent, irrespective of who arranged the activity / service. 6.

B.B. will be responsible for making all decisions and arrangements respecting the child’s health, education, religious and general welfare, with the exception of emergency decisions while the child is in the care of K.B. In the event of such emergency, K.B. shall immediately notify B.B. of the nature of the emergency and what steps are being taken to remedy it; 7. Both parents will keep the other apprised of their day to day phone contact and residential address, as well as a secondary emergency contact name and number. B.B. shall provide K.B. with a number to reach J.J.B. for nightly phone contact.

Changes to those details must be communicated within 48 hours; 8. Each party will notify the other of travel plans involving J.J.B. travelling outside the province, including dates of travel, destination, address and telephone number where J.J.B. can be reached while away, as well as any applicable flight itinerary. Both parties will accommodate any request for passport documentation to allow J.J.B. to vacation with the other parent outside of Canada, and will sign any necessary documents including letters to permit travel outside of Canada, well in advance of the proposed travel.

Failure to cooperate with such requests on a timely basis, leading to a court application, will require the non-responsive parent to pay costs of $1,000.00; 9. Both parties may attend the child’s school events, meetings, extracurricular activities, religious ceremonies and specialist (non-routine) medical appointments. B.B. shall be responsible to provide K.B. with dates and times for these events, but K.B. shall educate himself on the child’s school calendar and sports

schedule once advised that the child is registered; 10. Neither parent will register J.J.B. for activities that fall on the other’s parenting time without prior agreement in writing; 11. Both parties will immediately enroll in and complete a cooperative parenting program through Family Services of Eastern Nova Scotia (or like program) in an effort to improve their communications. Confirmation of completion shall be exchanged between the parties; 12.

The parties shall ensure that J.J.B. is not placed in the middle of parental conflict, and they will communicate with each other civilly (in writing) at all times through a software program like Family Wizard, the expense of which is to be shared equally. 13. Neither parent, nor their partners, or those within the household will discuss or share with J.J.B. inter-parental communications or disputes, and shall try to ensure that no one else does so; 14. Neither party will speak negatively about the other in the presence or hearing of the child and shall ensure others refrain from doing so as well. 15.

The parent with whom J.J.B. spends the night prior to a school day must ensure that J.J.B. is delivered to school prepared for the day with a lunch, homework assignments, the proper clothing, J.J.B.’s medications, and any other necessary items; 16. If J.J.B. does not attend school on any day when K.B. is responsible to deliver him, K.B. shall advise B.B. immediately and the reason why the child was kept home and he shall deliver the child to B.B. after school ends; 17.

Should J.J.B. require medication, B.B. will notify K.B. of the nature of the illness for which the prescription has been given, the name of the physician and the dose, and the name of the pharmacy that filled the script. All medication will be sent back and forth with the child. Should the medication not be returned after parenting time, the parent who forgot to return it shall be responsible to obtain a new refill or deliver the medication to the other parent, and they will be responsible for the cost of replacing it.

K.B. shall keep B.B. apprised of any changes to his health (medical/dental) plan for the child; 18. Each party will ensure that the child’s personal belongings travel with him between homes, including winter outer gear, sports equipment, portable electronic devices, orthodontic devices, and other items which are not normally purchased in duplicate. In the event either parent forgets to return such items, they will deliver them to the other parent forthwith upon being notified; 19. No firearms are to be stored in the home where the child spends time with either parent.