RAYMOND BRUNEAU Applicant v. UNIVERSAL COACH, 2017 FC 541

Date: 20170601 Docket: T-10-17 Citation: 2017 FC 541 Vancouver, British Columbia, June 1, 2017 PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Barnes BETWEEN:RAYMOND BRUNEAUApplicantandUNIVERSAL COACH LINE LTDRespondent JUDGMENT AND REASONS [1] The Applicant, Raymond Bruneau, challenges a decision of an Adjudicator appointed under subsection 242(1) of

Part III ofthe Canada Labour Code, RSC 1985 c L-2 [Code] by which his complaint of unjust dismissal was rejected on jurisdictional grounds. [2] The Adjudicator found on the evidence presented that Mr. Bruneau had not been employed for twelve consecutive months ofcontinuous employment by an employer, as required by

section 240 of the Code. In the result, Mr. Bruneau was not entitled to make acomplaint for relief. [3] The authority of this Court sitting in review of an Adjudicator’s decision is limited by the principle of judicial deference.That is the case even where the decision turns on a jurisdictional finding. This point was affirmed in the recent decision of the SupremeCourt of Canada in Wilson v Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd, 2016 SCC 29, [2016] 1 SCR 770, where the Court held: [15] The parties before this Court, as they had inall the prior judicial proceedings, accepted thatthe standard of review was reasonableness.

Iagree. The decisions of labour adjudicators orarbitrators interpreting statutes or agreementswithin their expertise attract a reasonablenessstandard: Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008SCC 9 , [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, at para.68; Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc. v.Manitoba Association of Health CareProfessionals, 2011 SCC 59 , [2011] 3S.C.R. 616, at para. 42. [16] The Federal Court of Appeal itself,including two of the judges who decided thecase before us, recently held in Yue v.

Bank ofMontreal, 2016 FCA 107, 483 N.R. 375, that thedecisions of adjudicators applying the UnjustDismissal provisions of the Code attract areasonableness standard: It is well-settled that the reasonableness standardapplies to review of adjudicators’ decisionsunder Division XIV of

Part III of the Code,generally, and to their

interpretations of whatsorts of employer conduct constitute an unjustdismissal: Payne v. Bank of Montreal, 2013 FCA33 at paragraphs 32-33, [443] N.R. 253;MacFarlane v. Day & Ross, 2014 FCA 199 atparagraph 3, 466 N.R. 53; Donaldson v. WesternGrain By-Products Storage Ltd., 2015 FCA 62 atparagraph 33, 469 N.R. 189. [para. 5] [15] Devant la Cour comme devant lesjuridictions inférieures, les parties ont acceptéque la norme de contrôle applicable était celle dela décision raisonnable. Je suis d’accord.

Lessentences des arbitres en droit du travail chargésd’interpréter des lois ou des ententes qui relèventde leur expertise appellent la norme de ladécision raisonnable (Dunsmuir c. Nouveau-Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 , [2008] 1R.C.S. 190, par. 68; Nor-Man Regional HealthAuthority Inc. c. Manitoba Association of HealthCare Professionals, 2011 SCC 59 ,[2011] 3 R.C.S. 616, par. 42). [16] La Cour d’appel fédérale elle-même — sousla plume de deux des juges ayant statué dansl’affaire dont nous sommes saisis — a conclurécemment dans l’arrêt Yue c.

Banque deMontréal, 2016 CAF 107, 483 N.R. 375, quec’est la norme de la décision raisonnable quis’applique aux sentences des arbitres chargésd’appliquer les dispositions sur le congédiementinjuste du Code : [traduction] Il est bien établi que la norme de ladécision raisonnable s’applique au contrôle dessentences arbitrales rendues à l’égard de lasection XIV de la

partie III du Code,généralement, et à l’interprétation par les arbitresde ce qui constitue un congédiement injuste parl’employeur (Payne c. Banque de Montréal,2013 CAF 33, par. 32-33, 443 N.R. 253;MacFarlane c. Day & Ross, 2014 CAF 199, par.3, 466 N.R. 53; Donaldson c. Western GrainBy-Products Storage Ltd., 2015 CAF 62, par. 33,469 N.R. 189). [par. 5] [4] In practical terms, what this means is that the Court must be respectful of an Adjudicator’s findings of fact and law.

I canonly intervene where the decision under review is unreasonable in the sense that is described in Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 SCR 708: [13] This, I think, is the context for [13] C’est dans cette optique, selon moi, qu’il

[13] This, I think, is the context forunderstanding what the Court meant inDunsmuir when it called for “justification,transparency and intelligibility”. To me, itrepresents a respectful appreciation that a widerange of specialized decision-makers routinelyrender decisions in their respective spheres ofexpertise, using concepts and language oftenunique to their areas and rendering decisions thatare often counter-intuitive to a generalist. Thatwas the basis for this Court’s new direction inCanadian Union of Public Employees, Local 963v.

New Brunswick Liquor Corp., (SCC), [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227, where Dickson J.urged restraint in assessing the decisions ofspecialized administrative tribunals.

Thisdecision oriented the Court towards grantinggreater deference to tribunals, shown inDunsmuir’s conclusion that tribunals should“have a margin of appreciation within the rangeof acceptable and rational solutions” (para. 47). [14] Read as a whole, I do not see Dunsmuir asstanding for the proposition that the “adequacy”of reasons is a stand-alone basis for quashing adecision, or as advocating that a reviewing courtundertake two discrete analyses — one for thereasons and a separate one for the result (DonaldJ. M. Brown and John M.

Evans, Judicial Reviewof Administrative Action in Canada (loose-leaf),at §§12:5330 and 12:5510). It is a more organicexercise — the reasons must be read togetherwith the outcome and serve the purpose ofshowing whether the result falls within a rangeof possible outcomes.

This, it seems to me, iswhat the Court was saying in Dunsmuir when ittold reviewing courts to look at “the qualitiesthat make a decision reasonable, referring both tothe process of articulating the reasons and tooutcomes” (para. 47). [15] In assessing whether the decision isreasonable in light of the outcome and thereasons, courts must show “respect for thedecision-making process of adjudicative bodieswith regard to both the facts and the law”(Dunsmuir, at para. 48).

This means that courtsshould not substitute their own reasons, but theymay, if they find it necessary, look to the recordfor the purpose of assessing the reasonablenessof the outcome. [16] Reasons may not include all the arguments,statutory provisions, jurisprudence or otherdetails the reviewing judge would havepreferred, but that does not impugn the validityof either the reasons or the result under areasonableness analysis.

A decision-maker is notrequired to make an explicit finding on eachconstituent element, however subordinate,leading to its final conclusion (ServiceEmployees’ International Union, Local No. 333v. Nipawin District Staff Nurses Assn., (SCC), [1975] 1 S.C.R. 382, at p.391).

In other words, if the reasons allow thereviewing court to understand why the tribunalmade its decision and permit it to determinewhether the conclusion is within the range ofacceptable outcomes, the Dunsmuir criteria aremet. [17] The fact that there may be an alternativeinterpretation of the agreement to that providedby the arbitrator does not inevitably lead to the [13] C’est dans cette optique, selon moi, qu’ilfaut interpréter ce que la Cour voulait dire dansDunsmuir lorsqu’elle a parlé de « la justificationde la décision [ainsi que de] la transparence et[de] l’intelligibilité du processus décisionnel ».

À mon avis, ces propos témoignent d’unereconnaissance respectueuse du vaste éventail dedécideurs spécialisés qui rendent courammentdes décisions — qui paraissent souventcontre-intuitives aux yeux d’un généraliste —dans leurs sphères d’expertise, et ce en ayantrecours à des concepts et des termes souventpropres à leurs champs d’activité. C’est sur cefondement que notre Cour a changé d’orientationdans Syndicat canadien de la Fonction publique,section locale 963 c.

Société des alcools duNouveau-Brunswick, (SCC),[1979] 2 R.C.S. 227, où le juge Dickson a insistésur le fait qu’il y avait lieu de faire preuve dedéférence en appréciant les décisions destribunaux administratifs spécialisés.

Cet arrêt aamené la Cour à faire preuve d’une déférenceaccrue envers les tribunaux, comme en témoignela conclusion, tirée dans Dunsmuir, qu’il doit être« loisible au tribunal administratif d’opter pourl’une ou l’autre des différentes solutionsrationnelles acceptables » (par. 47). [14] Je ne suis pas d’avis que, considéré dans sonensemble, l’arrêt Dunsmuir signifie que l’«insuffisance » des motifs permet à elle seule decasser une décision, ou que les cours de révisiondoivent effectuer deux analyses distinctes, l’uneportant sur les motifs et l’autre, sur le résultat(Donald J. M. Brown et John M.

Evans, JudicialReview of Administrative Action in Canada(feuilles mobiles), §§12:5330 et 12:5510). Ils’agit d’un exercice plus global : les motifsdoivent être examinés en corrélation avec lerésultat et ils doivent permettre de savoir si cedernier fait

partie des issues possibles. Il mesemble que c’est ce que la Cour voulait dire dansDunsmuir en invitant les cours de révision à sedemander si « la décision et sa justificationpossèdent les attributs de la raisonnabilité » (par.47). [15] La cour de justice qui se demande si ladécision qu’elle est en train d’examiner estraisonnable du point de vue du résultat et desmotifs doit faire preuve de « respect [à l’égard]du processus décisionnel [de l’organismejuridictionnel] au regard des faits et du droit »(Dunsmuir, par. 48).

Elle ne doit donc passubstituer ses propres motifs à ceux de ladécision sous examen mais peut toutefois, si ellele juge nécessaire, examiner le dossier pourapprécier le caractère raisonnable du résultat. [16] Il se peut que les motifs ne fassent pasréférence à tous les arguments, dispositionslégislatives, précédents ou autres détails que lejuge siégeant en révision aurait voulu y lire, maiscela ne met pas en doute leur validité ni celle durésultat au terme de l’analyse du caractèreraisonnable de la décision.

Le décideur n’est pastenu de tirer une conclusion explicite sur chaqueélément constitutif du raisonnement, sisubordonné soit-il, qui a mené à sa conclusionfinale (Union internationale des employés desservices, local no 333 c. Nipawin District StaffNurses Assn., (SCC), [1975] 1R.C.S. 382, p. 391). En d’autres termes, les

conclusion that the arbitrator’s decision should be set aside if the decision itself is in the realm of reasonable outcomes. Reviewing judges should pay “respectful attention” to the decision- maker’s reasons, and be cautious about substituting their own view of the proper outcome by designating certain omissions in the reasons to be fateful. motifs répondent aux critères établis dans Dunsmuir s’ils permettent à la cour de révision de comprendre le fondement de la décision du tribunal et de déterminer si la conclusion fait

partie des issues possibles acceptables. [17] Le fait que la convention collective puisse se prêter à une interprétation autre que celle que lui a donnée l’arbitre ne mène pas forcément à la conclusion qu’il faut annuler sa décision, si celle - ci fait

partie des issues possibles raisonnables. Les juges siégeant en révision doivent accorder une « attention respectueuse » aux motifs des décideurs et se garder de substituer leurs propres opinions à celles de ces derniers quant au résultat approprié en qualifiant de fatales certaines omissions qu’ils ont relevées dans les motifs. [ 5 ] In his argument to the Adjudicator, Mr. Bruneau maintained that he had been employed for more than twelve consecutive months based on two periods of connected employment. He began his relevant employment as an airport shuttle driver with Concord Security [Concord] in January 2015.

That employment ended when Concord lost the airport shuttle contract with Vancouver Airport Authority. Mr. Bruneau’s last day of paid work with Concord was April 29, 2016. Mr. Bruneau was then employed by Universal Coach Line Ltd [Universal] as the successful bidder on the airport shuttle service contract commencing May 1, 2016. According to Mr. Bruneau, the above periods of employment ought to have been treated by the Adjudicator as uninterrupted and sufficient to found the Adjudicator’s remedial authority under the Code . In advancing this point, Mr. Bruneau relies on

section 189 of the Code , which provides: 189

(1) Where any particular federal work, undertaking or business, or part thereof, in or in connection with the operation of which an employee is employed is, by sale, lease, merger or otherwise, transferred from one employer to another employer, the employment of the employee by the two employers before and after the transfer of the work, undertaking or business, or part thereof, shall, for the purposes of this Division, be deemed to be continuous with one employer, notwithstanding the transfer. 189

(1) En cas de cession d’un employeur à un autre — notamment par vente, bail ou fusion — de tout ou

partie de l’entreprise fédérale où elle travaille, la personne employée auprès de l’un et l’autre est, pour l’application de la présente section, réputée n’avoir pas cessé de travailler pour un seul employeur. [ 6 ] Before me, Mr. Bruneau acknowledged that he did not refer to the above provision in his argument to the Adjudicator. Nevertheless, he says now that the Adjudicator should have known about the provision and applied it to his situation. According to Mr. Bruneau, the Adjudicator’s failure to apply

section 189 represents an error of law and renders the decision unreasonable. [ 7 ] While it is clear from the decision that the Adjudicator did not refer to

section 189 and may not have considered it, this does not constitute an error of law. I say that because

section 189 clearly has no application to Mr. Bruneau’s employment history. [ 8 ] As the Adjudicator appropriately found, Mr. Bruneau was employed under two separate contracts of employment, each with an independent and unrelated employer. This was not a situation where a contract of service was transferred by a sale, lease or merger from one business to another. Instead, Mr. Bruneau's first employer, Concord, lost the airport shuttle service contract and a new contract was awarded to Universal. Mr.

Bruneau's employment contract with Concord accordingly came to its legal end and he was then hired by Universal under a new employment contract. These are legally distinct periods of employment with two distinct employers that are not caught by

section 189 . [ 9 ] Mr. Bruneau can perhaps be excused for not appreciating the limited scope of

section 189 . A person without legal training could interpret the provision more broadly by relying on the reference to a transfer of work “by sale, lease, merger or otherwise”. It is, however, a well-known legal principle of statutory

interpretation that when legislation sets out a list of items (i.e. “sale, lease, merger” ) followed by a general term (i.e. “or otherwise” ), the scope of the general term will be limited to the class to which the specific items all belong. The principle has been described by the Federal Court of Appeal in Montréal Port Authority v Montréal (City) , 2008 FCA 278 , 301 DLR (4 th ) 202 in the following way:

[97] Applying this reasoning to the present case would mean that a specific term that completes an enumeration would restrict the generic terms that precede it. To do so would completely distort the ejusdem generis rule. Professor Côté wrote the following on the operation of the rule and the conditions for its application in his excellent book The

Interpretation of Legislation in Canada , cited above, at page 315: In fact, the latter [the ejusdem generis rule ] is merely a particular application of nocitur a sociis to cases where a general term follows a list of specific ones. . . . “The ejusdem generis rule means that a generic or collective term that completes an enumeration of terms should be restricted to the same genus as those words, even though the generic or collective term may ordinarily have a much broader meaning”. [97] Appliquer ce raisonnement dans le cas présent ferait en sorte que le terme spécifique qui complète une énumération viendrait restreindre les termes génériques qui le précèdent.

Ce serait complètement dénaturer la règle d’interprétation ejusdem generis . Traitant du fonctionnement de la règle et de ses conditions d’application, le professeur Côté écrit dans son excellent volume Interprétation des lois , précité, à la page 315 : « Cette règle est en réalité une application particulière de la règle nocitur a sociis au cas d’un terme général venant à la suite de plusieurs termes spécifiques.

« La règle signifie que le terme générique ou collectif qui complète une énumération se restreint à des choses de même genre que celles qui sont énumérées même si de par sa nature ce terme générique ou collectif, cette expression générale est susceptible d’embrasser beaucoup plus ». » [ 10 ] It is worth noting that the French version of

section 189 uses « notamment » (notably in English) as opposed to “or otherwise” , which suggests the legislature intended the

section to apply narrowly. It follows from this that

section 189 of the Code has no application to Mr. Bruneau’s employment situation and the Adjudicator did not err by failing to apply it.

Section 189 is intended to apply to a very different set of circumstances. It would apply, for instance, if, as a consequence of a sale or merger between Concord and Universal, the shuttle contract with the airport passed from one to the other. The provision assuredly does not apply to a situation where one employer loses a contract with a third party and a new and unrelated employer acquires an entirely new contract with that third party. [ 11 ] Mr. Bruneau worked for two distinct and independent employers under separate contracts of employment. His employment was not continuous as required by

section 240 of the Code and the Adjudicator was correct to decline jurisdiction over Mr. Bruneau’s complaint. [ 12 ] In the result, this application is dismissed. I do not award costs to the Respondent because no claim to costs was set out in its written argument. While that is not an impediment where the unsuccessful party is represented by counsel, it is a problem when that party is unrepresented. To be fair to a self-represented litigant, notice of the potential for an award of costs should always be given to allow that party to consider the risk of going forward with the case.

JUDGMENT THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that the application is dismissed. "R.L. Barnes" Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: T-10-17 STYLE OF CAUSE: RAYMOND BRUNEAU v UNIVERSAL COACH LINE LTD PLACE OF HEARING: Vancouver, British Columbia DATE OF HEARING: MAY 29, 2017 JUDGMENT AND REASONS: bARNES J. DATED: june 1, 2017 APPEARANCES : Raymond Bruneau The Applicant on his own behalf Tom R. I. Dusevic For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : Dusevic & Co. For The Respondent Burnaby, BC