2022 FC, 2022 FC 1517

Date: 20221108 Docket: T-1732-22 Citation: 2022 FC 1517 Toronto, Ontario, November 8, 2022 PRESENT: Associate Judge Trent Horne BETWEEN: GLYCOBIOSCIENCES INC. (“GLYCO”) Plaintiff and L’OREAL CANADA (“L’OREAL”) Defendant ORDER AND REASONS I. Overview [ 1 ] The plaintiff, an Ontario corporation, brings a motion under Rule 120 to be represented by its president, Mr Kevin Drizen. [ 2 ] I am not satisfied that special circumstances exist such that the requested order should be granted. The motion will therefore be dismissed. II.

Background [ 3 ] Glycobiosciences Inc. ( " “Glyco” " ) is a company incorporated pursuant to the laws of Ontario. [ 4 ] Glyco claims to be the owner of Canadian patent 2,896,038 (the " “038 Patent” " ), entitled polymer matrix compositions comprising a high concentration of bio-fermented sodium hyaluronate and uses thereof. The 038 Patent names Kevin Drizen and Jai Velusamy as inventors. [ 5 ] In this proceeding, Glyco claims that L’Oreal Canada Inc ( " “L’Oreal” " ) has infringed the 038 Patent. [ 6 ] Mr Drizen is one of the four directors of Glyco, its only officer, and its only employee.

When asked in cross-examination about who operates Glyco, Mr Drizen responded that he does everything; that he is a " “one-man band” " . III. Glyco’s Reply Motion Record [ 7 ] The record for this motion is unwieldy. [ 8 ] Mr Drizen filed a motion record on September 7, 2022. Contrary to subrule 364(2) (

e) of the Federal Courts Rules SOR/98-106 ( " “ Rules ” " ), the record did not include written representations. Written representations were separately filed on September 13, 2022 (I understand another version of the written representations was served on September 12, 2022, but was not received for filing). These written representations comprise 20 pages.

While there is no express limit in the Rules on the length of written representations, the Court strongly discourages written representations that exceed 30 pages, the page limit for a memorandum of fact and law (Rule 70). [ 9 ] On October 6, 2022 Mr Drizen filed a supplementary motion record.

This supplementary record includes three further affidavits (sworn by Mr Drizen on September 30, October 3 and October 4, 2022) and further written representations comprising 13 pages. [ 10 ] The defendant filed a responding motion record on October 11, 2022. [ 11 ] Mr Drizen was cross-examined on his affidavits on October 12, 2022. The defendant’s affiant, a law clerk employed by counsel for the defendant, was not cross-examined. [ 12 ] On October 24, 2022, Mr Drizen presented a " “reply motion record” " for filing.

It included a further affidavit of Mr Drizen sworn on that date (his fifth on the motion), and further written representations comprising an additional 28 pages. [ 13 ] The defendant objects to the filing of the reply motion record. [ 14 ] On October 25, 2022, I directed that t he plaintiff's reply motion record may be received for filing, under reserve of any objection by the defendant, and a determination of its admissibility by the Court. [ 15 ] The parties agreed on a

schedule leading up to the hearing of this motion. In correspondence to the Court dated September 28, 2022, Mr Drizen advised that the parties had agreed to: October 5, 2022 – Glyco to serve and file supplementary motion record (including written representations) October 10, 2022 – L'Oreal to serve and file responding motion record (including written representations) October 12, 2022 – cross-examination of Kevin Drizen

October 27, 2022 – supplementary written submissions of both parties following cross-examination, as required (no new evidence) (serve and file) November 1, 2022 – Rule 120 motion hearing [ 16 ] This

schedule was not endorsed by the Court, and was not included in an order or direction. A direction issued on October 11, 2022 reminding the parties that an earlier direction set a deadline of October 25, 2022 for the filing of all motion materials. [ 17 ] In hindsight, it is apparent that intervention in this

schedule was required to ensure the orderly exchange of materials and reasonable limits on the length of written submissions. I should have intervened and qualified the parties’ agreement to limit the written submissions of Glyco to no more than 30 pages in the aggregate (the defendant’s submissions in the aggregate were fewer than 30 pages, and required no such direction). [ 18 ] Glyco’s service of further evidence was contrary to the parties’ agreement that no new evidence would accompany the supplementary written submissions.

More importantly, there is no Rule that permits a party to submit further evidence after cross- examinations have been competed; a party may not unilaterally supplement its record, particularly close to the hearing. As the party seeking to introduce further evidence, Glyco should have sought leave.

Rather, it looked to simply file the additional evidence, leading to further letters to the Registry from the parties, a direction from the Court, and another issue to be decided at the hearing. [ 19 ] In correspondence to the Court dated October 30, 2022, and at the hearing, Mr Drizen submitted that the admissibility of the reply record may be more fairly decided on a full motion and a separate hearing in which evidence can be provided. I disagree.

I am not at all inclined to have a motion within a motion, and delay the determination of the principal issue with a further round of motion records, affidavits, and argument. That would be contrary to the guiding principles of Rule 3.

The issue can, and should, be determined now. [ 20 ] Mr Drizen’s submissions on the reply record generally address two points: that the reply evidence and argument complete information presented by the defendants on certain issues; and that further financial information and other documents should be included in the record. [ 21 ] When considering a request to admit reply evidence, a court must have regard to whether: the evidence will assist the court (in particular, its relevance and sufficient probative value); admitting the evidence will cause substantial or serious prejudice to the other side; the evidence was available when the party filed its affidavits or it could have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence. ( Amgen Canada Inc v Apotex Inc , 2016 FCA 121 at para 13 .) [ 22 ] I generally agree with the defendant’s submissions that Glyco has had ample opportunity to make its case on this motion, and that permitting yet another affidavit creates prejudice to the responding party and creates a never-ending cycle of evidence.

This is particularly the case in respect of the financial information included in the fifth affidavit of Mr Drizen. [ 23 ] As I indicated during the hearing, in order to permit this motion to proceed and avoid further delay, I will receive Mr Drizen’s October 24, 2022 affidavit, exhibits and written argument for filing with reluctance, and for a limited purpose.

To the extent the reply materials present a complete picture of the outcome of other court proceedings (particularly a decision of Deputy Judge Winny), or the settlement of other litigation (particularly a confidential settlement with a law firm), I have considered them. I will not consider the letter attached as Exhibit I as it addresses issues that were live on cross-examination, and gives the appearance of case splitting. I give no weight to the documents that existed prior to the execution of Mr Drizen’s earlier affidavits, particularly the further financial information, and related argument.

Complete financial particulars, and any documents related to other court proceedings, could and should have been presented in Glyco’s initial motion, and before cross-examination. A party cannot expect to have the ability to keep supplementing its record up to the eve of the hearing without requesting leave. IV.

Rule 120 [ 24 ] Rule 120 states: " Corporations or unincorporated associations " " " " Personne morale, société de personnes ou association " " 120 A corporation, partnership or unincorporated association shall be represented by a solicitor in all proceedings, unless the Court in special circumstances grants leave to it to be represented by an officer, partner or member, as the case may be.

" " " " 120 Une personne morale, une société de personnes ou une association sans personnalité morale se fait représenter par un avocat dans toute instance, à moins que la Cour, à cause de circonstances particulières, ne l’autorise à se faire représenter par un de ses dirigeants, associés ou membres, selon le cas. " " " [ 25 ] A party seeking to show there are " “special circumstances” " for the purposes of Rule 120 must generally demonstrate that (

i) it

cannot afford a lawyer; (ii) the proposed representative will not be required to be both advocate and witness; (iii) the issues are not so complex as to be beyond the proposed representative’s capabilities; and (iv) the action can proceed in an expeditious manner. These requirements are not merely procedural hoops designed to make it difficult for companies to be represented before the Federal Court.

They reflect a balance between important principles underlying regulation of the legal profession, the public interest in effective access to the Court through efficient and timely Court proceedings, and the need for access to justice ( UBS Group AG v Yones , 2022 FC 487 at paras 7-10 (“ UBS ”)). [ 26 ] The benefits of incorporation include tax planning opportunities and immunity from liability in tort. The costs of incorporation include an obligation to be represented before the courts by counsel. This is particularly so in a case where the corporation is the plaintiff.

Where a corporation is sued, it has little to say about whether it will be involved in litigation and incur the associated costs. But where the corporation is the plaintiff, it has made a conscious choice to embark upon litigation, a decision which will force the defendants in its action to incur legal costs defending themselves ( TPG Technology Consulting Ltd v Canada , 2011 FCA 345 at para 8 ). [ 27 ] The onus on the moving party to establish special circumstances is a high one.

The moving party must provide clear and unambiguous evidence establishing special circumstances, and these circumstances must be unusual, uncommon and exceptional, and the result of external forces as distinct from the voluntary acts of the plaintiff ( Alpha Marathon Technologies Inc v Dual Spiral Systems Inc , 2005 FC 1582 at para 4 ( " “ Alpha ” " ) ). V. Analysis A. Mr Drizen will be a Witness [ 28 ] Mr Drizen will be a witness in this action. As a named inventor on the 038 Patent, the defendant may examine him as an assignor (subrule 237(4)) as of right.

Mr Drizen expects that he will be Glyco’s discovery representative. [ 29 ] In argument, Mr Drizen relied heavily on Artemis Holdings Ltd v Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency) , 2002 FCT 504 ( " “ Artemis ” " ).

In that proceeding, prothonotary Hargrave granted leave to the sole officer and shareholder of a one-person company to represent it in the litigation. [ 30 ] I agree with Mr Drizen’s submissions that a person seeking leave under Rule 120, who will also be a witness, does not face an absolute bar to relief for that reason alone. [ 31 ] The fact that a proposed representative may also be a witness does not automatically prevent them from representing the company, as such a hard-and-fast rule might unduly prejudice small or closely-held companies such as Glyco.

However, it remains an adverse factor in considering whether the Court ought to exercise its discretion under Rule 120 ( UBS at para 12 ). [ 32 ] This factor does not favour Glyco. B. Complexity of the Issues [ 33 ] The issues of patent infringement and validity in this action will be inherently nuanced and complex (a defence has not been filed, however it would be unusual for a defendant in a patent infringement action not to challenge the validity of the rights being asserted).

But complexity alone is not determinative; the question is whether the issues are so complex so as to be beyond Mr Drizen’s capabilities. [ 34 ] The manner in which this motion was brought and conducted does not favourably reflect on Mr Drizen’s willingness to become familiar with Federal Court practice and procedure. [ 35 ] A person moving for relief under Rule 120 seeks to stand in the place of, and effectively act as, a lawyer.

It is expected that any person (whether a lawyer or person granted leave to act as a representative) seeking interlocutory relief will identify the relevant Rule, consider the requirements of the Rule (either in the Rule itself or the jurisprudence interpreting it), prepare evidence in the first instance to satisfy the requirements of the Rule ( i.e. put their best foot forward), and submit written representations explaining how the evidence meets the requirements of the Rule and why the relief should be granted.

It is also expected that the moving party will comply with the procedural rules that apply to motions. [ 36 ] That does not mean that a person seeking leave under Rule 120 must serve and file materials that are of the same standard expected from senior or experienced counsel.

However, the moving party’s motion materials should at least demonstrate that an effort was made to understand what the Rules and jurisprudence require before materials are served and filed, and to work within the Court’s procedural rules. [ 37 ] Glyco’s initial motion record includes an affidavit of Mr Drizen that refers to several proceedings in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice where he was granted leave to represent Glyco. The affidavit states that Glyco is not in a position to afford to pay a retainer, but does not attach financial statements or similar documents.

On a Rule 120 motion, complete and clear financial information is required ( Wang v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA , 2019 FCA 199 at paras 5-7 ). [ 38 ] The first affidavit attaches a resolution of Glyco’s directors authorizing Mr Drizen to act on behalf of Glyco in Court file no. 21- 00000124-0000 in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. No such resolution was included for this action. [ 39 ] The later-filed, and first, written representations focus on instances where Mr Drizen was granted leave to represent Glyco in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. I find this to be of limited assistance.

None of the Ontario proceedings involved issues of patent infringement and validity. Further, there is a difference in the relevant rules. Rule 120 requires a moving party to demonstrate " “special circumstances” " , a requirement that is not present in subrule 15.02(2) of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure , RRO 1990, Reg 194 . The

fact that Mr Drizen was granted leave to represent Glyco in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice is a relevant, but not determinative, factor. [ 40 ] The first written representations do not engage the test set out in UBS or other Federal Court authorities.

If I was to summarize Glyco’s first written representations, it is that Courts in Ontario have granted leave to Mr Drizen to represent Glyco, so this Court should too. [ 41 ] The only Federal Court authority cited in the first written representations ( Immigration Consultants of Canada Regulatory Council v CICC College of Immigration and Citizenship , 2021 FC 726 ( " “ ICCRC ” " )) is in support of a request for alternative relief that Mr Drizen be authorized to act for Glyco on an interim basis.

I will address this decision when considering the alternative relief requested. [ 42 ] All of Glyco’s evidence and argument should have been included in its moving motion record. But Mr Drizen filed three further affidavits, and further written representations, on October 6, 2022. (Mr Drizen explained that he served material in three volumes because of electronic filing limitations. My concern with this evidence is not that it was divided into three volumes, rather that it all should have been included in the initial motion record). These affidavits attach a range of financial information.

The second written representations focus on Glyco’s lack of financial resources, but again do not engage the test in UBS or other Federal Court jurisprudence articulating and applying the test for relief under Rule 120. [ 43 ] While this was ongoing, Mr Drizen was in contact with the registry several times asking for guidance on how to file large affidavits, how to deal with confidential documents, and matters of scheduling. Letters were sent to me as the case management judge.

The defendant’s affidavit on the motion indicates that Mr Drizen sent 124 emails to L’Oreal’s counsel between August 29, 2022 and October 7, 2022. For what should be a relatively straightforward motion, it consumed considerable resources of the defendant and the Court. [ 44 ] As discussed above, Mr. Drizen submitted a further affidavit and further written argument for filing on October 24, 2022. This third round of evidence resulted in a further exchange of correspondence addressed to the Registry. [ 45 ] I do not question that Mr Drizen is an intelligent and accomplished person.

However, the strong impression I have from the way he has conducted himself on this motion is that he has not familiarized himself with the relevant Federal Courts Rules in order to apply them. In several instances, particularly in respect of filing electronic documents and filing materials under seal, Mr Drizen sought the guidance of the Registry on how to proceed. I have already mentioned the 124 emails sent to counsel for L’Oreal over a short period of time.

The contested reply record in particular gives the impression that Mr Drizen has approached this motion in an ad hoc fashion, relying on others for guidance and supplementing the record in a piecemeal fashion along the way. Getting this motion briefed has been a challenge. Having regard to the upcoming examinations for discovery and preparation of expert reports, I am not satisfied that things will improve when the parties are engaged in these significantly more complex steps. [ 46 ] A Rule 120 motion should not descend into minutia, and the result turn on inconsequential considerations.

But here, at least one small point cannot be overlooked: a dispute over the deadline for service of a statement of defence. Glyco served the statement of claim on August 26, 2022. It served an amended statement of claim on September 21, 2022, and filed it the next day. Rule 78 is clear. When a document is amended in accordance with the Rules (as was done here) the period for taking a step (the service and filing of a defence) is calculated from the service or filing of the amended document. In this matter, a defence to the amended statement of claim was due on October 21, 2022.

Glyco disagreed, and insisted that L’Oreal’s defence be filed sooner.

This issue was the subject of correspondence to the Court, particularly a letter from Mr Drizen to the Court dated October 18, 2022 where he stated that the deadline for filing a statement of defence was October 5, 2022. [ 47 ] While the deadline for a defence was part of a larger debate between the parties as to whether the proceedings should be effectively suspended until the issue of Glyco’s representation is resolved, the deadline for service and filing of a statement of defence should not require the intervention of a case management judge; the Rule and the applicable deadline should have been apparent.

On its own, this issue does not determine the result. It does, however, reinforce my view that Mr Drizen has not demonstrated an interest or willingness to become familiar with the Federal Courts Rules . Again, I am not satisfied that things will improve when the parties will need to address and apply the discovery Rules , and the more complex jurisprudence relating to patent infringement and validity. [ 48 ] This factor weighs heavily against Glyco. C.

Whether the Matter will Proceed Expeditiously [ 49 ] For the reasons outlined above, particularly including the large number of communications from Mr Drizen to the Court and to L’Oreal’s counsel, and the manner in which this motion has unfolded, I am not satisfied that this matter will proceed expeditiously if leave is granted to Mr Drizen to represent Glyco.

Both the Court and the defendant would benefit if Glyco had professional legal representation. [ 50 ] In support of his assertion that the matter can proceed efficiently, Mr Drizen submits that although a case management judge has been assigned to this matter, no case management conference was scheduled before the November 1, 2022 hearing of this motion, and that the Court has not determined that a case conference has been needed. [ 51 ] I view matters differently. The absence of a case management conference before the hearing does not mean that this matter is not in need of active case management.

The Court has already received numerous letters from Mr Drizen, and issues have been put to it for determination. This includes the timing for service and filing of a defence, a proposed consent order to file documents under seal that was not accepted, and Glyco’s late-filed reply motion materials.

The timing of the first case management conference should in no way be viewed as an endorsement of the manner in which the proceeding has been conducted to date, or my expectation that Mr Drizen’s representation of Glyco would result in much more frequent and hands on case management compared to matters where a plaintiff in a patent infringement action is represented by counsel. [ 52 ] I agree with the submissions of the defendant that the time between two steps is not the only consideration; efficiency should also be

considered, and the additional amount of work that the Court and the opposite party will need to do if leave is granted. For the reasons set out above, I am not persuaded that the matter will proceed efficiently if Mr Drizen represents Glyco. [ 53 ] Mr Drizen points to favourable comments he received from judges in Ontario on his familiarity with the litigation process, and that his written and oral argument were at the level of legal advisors.

I cannot say that I have been left with the same impression in this proceeding, particularly with respect to the litigation process. [ 54 ] This factor also significantly weighs against Glyco. D.

Ability to Afford a Lawyer [ 55 ] The ability for Glyco to pay for legal representation is the most important factor to consider ( Alpha at para 5), however inability of a corporation to pay for legal representation is not an overriding consideration that warrants success on a Rule 120 motion ( ICCRC at para 25). [ 56 ] Mr Drizen’s central submission is that Glyco cannot afford to pay a lawyer, and that dismissing the motion will have the effect of denying Glyco its day in court. [ 57 ] Mr Drizen’s affidavits assert that Glyco does not have funds on hand to pay for a lawyer.

He has produced copies of Glyco’s bank account statements, which show a small balance. Glyco’s " “T2 Bar Code Returns” " for 2019 and 2020 show modest income. I acknowledge that the financial information filed by Mr Drizen appears to be more substantive than what was before the Court in other matters, including UBS . [ 58 ] Mr. Drizen’s affidavits also speak to large sums of money received by Glyco as early as 2012, and also large sums of money spent since then on legal professionals.

Glyco’s cash reserves are small. [ 59 ] That is not to say that Glyco is insolvent, or is not a going concern. [ 60 ] Glyco does not have office or warehousing facilities, and the associated overhead. Mr Drizen runs the business out of his home; Glyco does not pay rent. [ 61 ] Glyco does not sell products directly to consumers or retailers, rather principally earns income from licensing revenue. It has also received money as a result of settlement agreements, and the sale of intellectual property rights.

In the second written representations, Mr Drizen submits that Glyco is a profitable business, with valuable products and intellectual property assets from which Glyco has received substantial payments for the license, sale and enforcement of its intellectual property rights.

In addition to its patent portfolio, Glyco is the owner of medical device clearances in the United States. [ 62 ] One of Glyco’s corporate business partners sells its Hyalocare product in Mexico, and has reported that the sales of this product has reached more than 1% of the wound care market for topical wound gels. [ 63 ] Glyco has also sued L’Oreal SA in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for patent infringement. It is represented by counsel in that action, who is working on a contingency basis.

Glyco has also used the services of patent agents or lawyers in Canada and abroad for the creation and maintenance of its patent portfolio. In some instances, business partners have paid for services associated with Glyco’s patent portfolio. [ 64 ] On cross-examination, Mr Drizen stated that he contacted " “two or three” " Canadian lawyers to act on a contingency basis for this action, but none of them would entertain it.

There is no indication that Glyco contacted other Canadian lawyers to act on this basis, and no indication that Glyco has considered or explored litigation funding. [ 65 ] Also in the second written representations, Mr Drizen submits that it would be a travesty if Glyco was forced to sell its assets to pay for a lawyer. [ 66 ] Glyco has apparently made creative arrangements with other lawyers in other circumstances. It is represented in the United States in patent litigation on a contingency basis. It has engaged lawyers or patent agents in other countries, at least in part financed by its business partners.

It has availed itself of the services of a Canadian patent professional. [ 67 ] The defendant notes that Glyco does not have a line of credit, something many businesses use. [ 68 ] It will be difficult for Glyco to pay for a lawyer to represent it in this action, and a retainer may result in hard choices when it comes to the best use of the company’s assets, and perhaps also hard choices for Glyco’s shareholders. [ 69 ] I note that in ICCRC , there was evidence that the corporate defendant is a pro bono corporation that does not hold a bank account, collect membership fees or receive compensation, and does not retain earnings.

The person moving for relief stated that she used up an available line of credit to pay for legal fees, and that if she was not granted leave to represent the company, she would have to take out a mortgage on her home (para 9). Each case turns on its own facts, however Glyco is not in such a dire situation. [ 70 ] This factor leans in Glyco’s favour. While this factor may be the most important, it cannot independently determine the outcome.

Otherwise, the four factors would not be treated as conjunctive ( ICCRC at para 30). [ 71 ] In considering the four factors together, any favourable consideration of the fourth factor is outweighed by the other three factors, two of which weigh heavily against Glyco. Having regard to the evidence and argument as a whole, I am not persuaded that special circumstances exist such that Mr Drizen should be granted leave to represent Glyco. The circumstances of this motion are not exceptional.

[ 72 ] Mr Drizen made a good argument in reply that Rule 120 was not put in the Rules with an expectation that no one would be able to demonstrate special circumstances and be granted relief. Other than Artemis (which was decided 20 years ago), the Court dismissed motions brought under Rule 120 in each decision referred to by the parties. I agree that relief under Rule 120 should not be illusory, or the test for relief interpreted in such a way that it could never be satisfied.

The jurisprudence certainly sets a high bar, however, a high bar and the result of previous decisions do not mean that relief is practically unavailable. Other cases turned on their own facts. On this motion, the factors that carried the day were entirely within Mr Drizen’s control. Had he reviewed and applied the Rules before bringing this motion, the result may have been different. VI. Alternative Relief [ 73 ] In the alternative, Mr Drizen asks that he be authorized to represent Glyco " “through the preliminary or early stages of this matter.” " He relies on ICCRC .

It is unclear how long this provisional representation is proposed to last. [ 74 ] ICCRC can be distinguished on its facts. There, the corporate defendant was faced with a motion for an interlocutory injunction. P rior to the cross-examination on the affidavits filed for the motion, the defendants dismissed their counsel. They then filed notices to be self-represented (para 8). The case management judge granted leave to an individual to represent the corporate party through the motion stage (para 10), but issued a subsequent order requiring the corporate defendant to appoint counsel (para 11).

The order was upheld on appeal. [ 75 ] Unlike the circumstances in ICCRC , Glyco is not responding to an imminent motion for an injunction or other relief. Other than this motion, no interlocutory motions have been scheduled. [ 76 ] I am not inclined to give Mr Drizen what is effectively an indefinite trial run at representing Glyco. It would be unreasonable for the parties to set a

schedule and move the matter forward with uncertainty as to how long Mr Drizen’s representation may last. [ 77 ] A party is expected to put its best foot forward on a Rule 120 motion. To the extent there was a trial run, it was the conduct of this motion. As set out above, Mr Drizen’s approach to this motion does not provide assurances that the immediate next steps in the litigation will proceed efficiently or expeditiously. The alternative relief will not be granted. VII.

Costs [ 78 ] The Court has full discretionary power over the amount and allocation of costs (subrule 400(1)). [ 79 ] At the conclusion of the hearing, I advised the parties that the motion would be dismissed so that submissions on costs could be made. The defendant requested an all-inclusive amount of $4,000.00 (comprised of $2,000.00 in fees based on Column III of the Tariff, and $2,000.00 in disbursements). The plaintiff did not object to this amount, and it will be awarded. [ 80 ] The defendant requested that costs be payable forthwith.

A costs award can be made payable forthwith where the Court is satisfied that the motion should not have been brought (subrule 401(1)). While the motion was dismissed, I am not satisfied that it should not have been brought at all. The additional work that resulted from the service and filing of Glyco’s multiple motion records is reflected in the fee award above. ORDER in T-1732-22 THIS COURT ORDERS that : 1 . The plaintiff’s motion is dismissed. 2 . The plaintiff shall appoint a solicitor of record within 60 days of the date of this order. 3 .

Costs of the motion are payable by the plaintiff to the defendant, fixed at $4,000.00, payable in any event of the cause. blank “Trent Horne” blank Associate Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: T-1732-22 STYLE OF CAUSE: GLYCOBIOSCIENCES INC. (“GLYCO”) v L’OREAL CANADA (“L’OREAL”)

PLACE OF HEARING: Held by Videoconference DATE OF HEARING: November 1, 2022 ORDER and REASONS: HORNE A.J. DATED: November 8, 2022 APPEARANCES: Kevin Drizen For The Plaintiff ON HIS OWN BEHALF Sana Halwani Kaitlin Soye For The Defendant SOLICITORS OF RECORD : LENCZNER SLAGHT LLP Barristers Toronto, Ontario For The Defendant