ANDRE BLAIR Applicant v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA, 2022 FC 957

Date: 20220627Docket: T-785-22 Citation: 2022 FC 957Ottawa, Ontario, June 27, 2022PRESENT: Prothonotary Benoit M. DuchesneBETWEEN: ANDRE BLAIR ApplicantandATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Respondent AMENDED REASONS AND ORDER [1] The Applicant, Mr. Blair, is incarcerated at the Beaver Creek Institution. On June 2, 2021, he made an application pursuant to section745.6(1) of the Criminal Code to the Superior Court of Justice in Ontario, for a reduction in the number of years of imprisonment duringwhich he is ineligible for parole. This type of application is known as "“Faint Hope”" application.

At the time of his "“Faint Hope”"application, Mr. Blair’s security threat group affiliation status was that of an inactive member of the M&E (Markham & Eglington) CrewBloods. [2] On March 10, 2022, 9 months later, and while his "“Faint Hope”" application remained pending, the Institutional Head at the BeaverCreek Institution made a decision to modify Mr. Blair’s security threat group affiliation status from an "“inactive”" member to an"“active”" member of the M&E Crew Bloods (the "“Decision”"). Mr.

Blair was informed of the Decision on March 18, 2022 andcommenced an application for judicial review of the Decision on April 12, 2022. [3] The Respondent Attorney General of Canada (the "“AG”") has brought a motion in writing pursuant to Rule 369 of the FederalCourts Rules, SOR/98-106 (the "“Rules”") for an order striking out Mr. Blair’s application for judicial review on the basis that it ispremature and has no reasonable prospect of success. The AG argues that Mr.

Blair has not exhausted the grievance process available tohim pursuant to sections 90 and 91 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, R.S.C. 1985, C-44.6 (the "“CCRA”") and theCorrections and Conditional Release Regulations, SOR/92-620 (the "“Regulations”") for reviewing the Decision and that he is requiredto do so before this Court can intervene to review the Decision. [4] Mr. Blair resists the motion on the basis that exceptional circumstances exist in this case that render the grievance system created bythe CCRA and the Regulations an inadequate alternative remedy to judicial review.

The exceptional circumstance identified by Mr. Blairis that the Decision, if left unreviewed, may detrimentally impact his likelihood of success on his "“Faint Hope”" application that wasfiled 9 months earlier and remains pending. He also argues, among others, that the grievance process under the CCRA and theRegulations is unlikely to be completed prior to the adjudication of his "“Faint Hope”" application with the result that the Decision willremain in place when his "“Faint Hope”" application is disposed of.

It follows, in his view, that the grievance process need not beexhausted prior to judicial review. [5] For the reasons that follow, I allow the AG’s motion. I. The Law Applicable on a Motion to Strike [6] The parties are in agreement that the test applicable on a motion to strike an application for judicial review is the test set out inCanada (National Revenue) v. JP Morgan Asset Management (Canada) 2013 FCA 250 ("“JP Morgan”").

The Court wrote in thatdecision at paragraph 47 that: “The Court will strike a notice of application for judicial review only where it is “so clearly improper as to be bereft of anypossibility of success” There must be a “show stopper” or a “knockout punch” – an obvious, fatal flaw striking at the root ofthis Court’s power to entertain the application.” [7] In determining whether the high threshold is met by the moving party, the Court should consider that any of the following qualify asan obvious, fatal flaw warranting the striking out of a notice of application (JP Morgan, at para. 66; Dakota Plains First Nation v.Smoke, 2022 FC 911 , at para. 6):

a) If the notice of application fails to state a cognizable administrative law claim which can be brought in the Federal Court;

b) If the Federal Court is not able to deal with the administrative law claim by virtue of the Federal Courts Act or some other legalprinciple; or

c) If the Federal Court cannot grant the relief sought in the notice of application. [8] In considering a motion to strike, the Court must read the notice of application with a view to understanding its real essence, tohaving a realistic appreciation of the application’s essential character by reading it holistically and practically (JP Morgan, at paras. 49and 50). [9] The facts pleaded in the notice of application are to be taken as true while reading the application broadly with a view toaccommodating any inadequacies in the allegations.

Accepting facts as pleaded in the notice of application as true for the purposes of themotion does not entail that characterisations of fact or speculations contained in the application should be considered as true.

[10] The principles of pleading contained in the Rules and in our jurisprudence require that the grounds alleged in the notice ofapplication must be concise but not bald, complete, exhaustive and stated with particularity. The relevant facts in support of the groundsmust also be included. The applicant should not, however, include all the evidence that will be submitted to the record, or list all theindividuals who will produce sworn statements in support of the application.

While clearly not all the evidence will be in the notice ofapplication for judicial review, the grounds must all be stated at this preliminary stage (JP Morgan, at paras. 38 to 46; Soprema Inc. v.Canada (Attorney General), 2021 FC 732 , at paragraphs 37 to 39, affirmed 2022 FCA 103 ). It is not enough for anapplicant to say that his right of procedural fairness was violated. The applicant must go further and identify the facet of proceduralfairness he says was violated and how it was violated.

Similarly, an applicant who alleges that a decision is incorrect in law must pleadthe law relied upon and how the decision is incorrect. If an applicant pleads that a decision sought to be reviewed is unreasonable, thenthe application should include particulars of how and why the decision is unreasonable.

A failure to adequately plead allegations that, ifproven, could lead a court to exercise its discretion on judicial review, is fatal to an application for judicial review (Soprema Inc., supra). [11] As a general rule, affidavits are not admissible in support of a motion to strike applications for judicial review.

The general ruleagainst admissibility is justified by several considerations as articulated by the Federal Court of Appeal in JP Morgan at paragraph 52 asfollows: [51] As a general rule, affidavits are not admissible in support of motions to strike applications for judicial review. [52] This general rule is justified by several considerations: • Affidavits have the potential to trigger cross-examinations and refused questions and, thus, can delayapplications for judicial review. This is contrary to Parliament’s requirement that applications for judicialreview proceed “without delay” and be heard “in a

summary way.” • A respondent bringing a motion to strike a notice of application does not need to file an affidavit. In its motion,it must identify an obvious and fatal flaw in the notice of application, i.e., one apparent on the face of it. A flawthat can be shown only with the assistance of an affidavit is not obvious. A respondent’s inability to fileevidence does not normally prejudice it. It can file evidence later on the merits of the review, subject to certainlimitations, and often the merits can be heard within a few months. If an application has no merit, it will bedismissed soon enough.

And if there is some need for faster determination of the merits, a respondent canalways move for an order expediting the application. • As for an applicant responding to a motion to strike an application, the starting point is that in such a motionthe facts alleged in the notice of application are taken to be true: Chrysler Canada Inc. v. Canada, 2008 FC 727at paragraph 20, aff’d on appeal, 2008 FC 1049. This obviates the need for an affidavit supplying facts. Further,an applicant must state “complete” grounds in its notice of application.

Both the Court and opposing parties areentitled to assume that the notice of application includes everything substantial that is required to grant the reliefsought. An affidavit cannot be admitted to supplement or buttress the notice of application. [12] Exceptions to the rule against admitting affidavits on motions to strike should be permitted only where the justifications for thegeneral rule of inadmissibility are not undercut, and the exception is in the interests of justice. One such exception is where a documentis referred to and incorporated by reference in a notice of application ((Paul v.

Canada (Attorney General), 2001 FCT 1280 , atpara. 23; see also McLarty v. Canada, 2002 FCA 206 , at para. 10; Harris v. Canada, (FCA), [2000] 4 F.C.37 (F.C.A.) approving the judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Web Offset Publications Limited et al. v. Vickery et al. (1999), (ON CA), 43 O.R. (3d) 802 (C.A.)). In these circumstances, a party may file an affidavit merely appending thedocument, without more, for the assistance of the Court. [13] In this case, both parties submitted motion records that contain affidavit and documentary evidence.

These affidavits and theirdocumentary exhibits must be considered in light of the principles set out above before considering whether Mr. Blair’s application forjudicial review should be struck as their content may, if admissible, assist in understanding the real essence of the application. [14] The AG has filed a brief affidavit that introduces a copy of the Institution Head’s Decision, along with a copy of a final levelgrievance commenced by Mr.

Blair in respect of the Decision, and copies of the Commissioner’s Directive 081: Offender Complaint andGrievance, and of Guideline 081-1: Offender Complaint and Grievance Process. Only the Decision was specifically referred to andpleaded in the notice of application. The Decision itself is but a portion of a larger and more comprehensive document titled"“Assessment of Affiliation with a Security Threat Group”" that sets out the events and steps taken that led to the Decision. Its content isspecifically pleaded in several paragraphs of the notice of application.

It is incorporated by reference into the notice of application, fallswithin an exception to the prohibition against affidavit and documentary evidence on motions to strike, and is properly admitted forconsideration. The remainder of the affidavit material and documentary exhibits, however, are not. The final level grievance commencedby Mr. Blair in connection with the Decision that is included as an exhibit in the AG’s motion record is inadmissible on this motion andis not considered. [15] Mr.

Blair has filed an equally brief affidavit that introduces past grievances he made on September 19, 2017, July 12, 2017 and May15, 2019. Mr. Blair’s evidence also produces a copy of an Audit of Offender Redress dated March 6, 2018, published by CorrectionalService Canada, and a copy of the 2016-2107 Annual Report of the Office of the Correctional Investigator. None of these documents arereferred to in the notice of application. They do not fall within the evidentiary exception referred to above and cannot be admitted orconsidered on this motion. II. The Notice of Application for Judicial Review

[16] The facts that follow are taken from Mr. Blair’s notice of application and from the Decision and Assessment of Affiliation with aSecurity Threat Group referred to within it. [17] Mr. Blair is serving a life sentence (25) years for first degree murder and is incarcerated at the Beaver Creek Institution. [18] On June 2, 2021, Mr. Blair commenced a "“Faint Hope”" Application through which, if successful, the number of years ofimprisonment during which Mr. Blair is ineligible to apply for parole will be reduced. Mr. Blair’s "“Faint Hope”" application is pendingbefore the Superior Court of Justice.

When it may be heard is unknown. [19] Mr. Blair had previously been evaluated as a member of the "“M&E (Markham & Eglington) Crew Bloods”", a security threatgroup operating in Toronto. On December 14, 2018, Mr. Blair had his security threat group affiliation membership status changed from"“active”" to "“inactive”". The change in Mr. Blair’s security threat group affiliation status is argued as a beneficial change for thepurposes of his "“Faint Hope”" application. [20] Mr.

Blair’s affiliation with a security threat group was reassessed by the Beaver Creek Institution in the late fall of 2021 and earlymonths of 2022 following the seizure of a smart phone and Micro SD card from Mr. Blair’s cell. Mr. Blair has acknowledged being theowner of the Micro SD card at issue.

The information contained on the Micro SD card includes photos and open source resourceinformation on other persons having ties to security threat groups in Toronto as well as maps associating various security threat groups toneighbourhoods depicted on the maps. [21] The security intelligence officer who completed the reassessment reported that the Toronto Police Service was consulted and that itconsiders Mr. Blair as an active member of the M&E Crew Bloods. The security intelligence officer recommended that Mr.

Blair’sactivity level or affiliation role with the M&E Crew Bloods security threat group be modified from "“inactive”" to "“active”". [22] Mr. Blair was provided with the opportunity to rebut the security intelligence officer’s assessment and recommendations bothverbally and in writing, which he did on February 12 and February 14, 2022. [23] The Beaver Creek Institution Head concurred with the recommendation of the security intelligence officer and, on March 10, 2022,decided to modify Mr. Blair’s security threat group affiliation from "“inactive”" to "“active”". Mr.

Blair’s security threat groupaffiliation level was modified accordingly. [24] By way of relief sought, Mr. Blair this Court to set aside the Decision on the grounds that:

a) the Institutional Head’s decision isincorrect in law and/or unreasonable,

b) includes reasons that fail to adequately consider Mr. Blair’s arguments and evidence, and, moregenerally,

c) violate procedural fairness. III. ANALYSIS A. Sufficiency of the Notice of Application for Judicial Review [25] Although the notice of application alleges that the Decision is incorrect in law, it neither alleges nor sets out any particulars abouthow the Decision is incorrect in law. The notice of application sets out that Mr. Blair relies on sections 3, 4, 23, 24, and 25 of the CCRA,and the Commissioner’s Directive 568-3: Identification and Management of Security Threat Groups, but does not allege how theseprovisions might apply to bring one to conclude that the Decision is incorrect in law or unreasonable. [26]

Section 3 of the CCRA sets out the purpose of the correctional system while

section 4 sets out the principles that guide theCorrectional Service of Canada (the "“Service”") in achieving the purposes set out in

section 3. [27]

Section 23 of the CCRA prescribes the information the Service is to take reasonable steps to obtain about a person when that personis sentenced, committed or transferred to a penitentiary and how the offender can access a to such information as would be disclosedunder the Privacy Act and the Access to Information Act.

Section 23 focusses on a specific period in time which is not relevant theDecision.

Section 23 is of no assistance to Mr. Blair. [28]

Section 25 of the CCRA sets out the Service’s duty to give, at the appropriate times, to the Parole Board of Canada, provincialgovernments, provincial parole boards, police, and any body authorized by the Service to supervise offenders, all information under itscontrol that is relevant to release decision-making or to the supervision or surveillance of offenders.

Section 25 is of no assistance to Mr.Blair as the Decision does not involve any of the described

section 25 recipients of information or whether information, complete or not,was provided to them. [29] Subsection 24(1) of the CCRA sets out the Service’s obligation to take reasonable steps to ensure that any information about anoffender that it uses is as accurate, updated and complete as possible. This

section is sufficiently broad in its scope to include informationthe Service may have with respect to Mr. Blair’s security threat group affiliation through time including in 2022 (Ewert v. Canada, 2018SCC 30 , [2018] 2 SCR 165, at paragraphs 37 to 45). Subsection 24(1) might be of assistance to Mr. Blair in his application, butthere are no allegations of any failure by the Service to take reasonable steps to update its information on Mr.

Blair in breach ofsubsection 24(1), or how those failures make the Decision incorrect in law or unreasonable. [30] Subsection 24(2), of narrower scope, provides an opportunity for an offender to request that the Service correct the information theService has compiled pursuant to subsection 23(1) if the offender believes the information is inaccurate. Like sections 23 and 25 of theCCRA, subsection 24(2) is of no assistance to Mr.

Blair in alleging how the Decision is incorrect in law or unreasonable because itapplies to the information collected pursuant to subsection 23(1) and a request for correction of the same. [31] The notice of application also does not allege how the Decision is unreasonable other than that Mr. Blair contests the facts acceptedby the decision-maker as the basis for his Decision.

[32] The notice of application does not plead how Mr. Blair’s right to procedural fairness was violated despite his written and verbalsubmissions to the Institutional Head prior to the Decision being made. [33] The most detailed portions of the notice of application reiterate the

summary rationale contained in the Assessment of Affiliationwith a Security Threat Group that contains the Decision, and summarize Mr. Blair’s rebuttal submissions against a change in his securitythreat group affiliation. These brief submissions are completed by a verbatim reiteration of the brief reasons provided for the Decision.No particulars of what is being objected to are pleaded. [34] Finally, Mr. Blair’s pleads that he filed his "“Faint Hope”" application on June 2, 2021, and that it remains pending before theSuperior Court of Justice in Ontario.

He pleads that the Decision, if left undisturbed, will be before the Court hearing his "“Faint Hope”"application and will have significant and adverse impacts on his likelihood of success at having his parole ineligibility reduced. Despitethis allegation, there is no allegation that the Decision’s speculative effect on the "“Faint Hope”" application constitutes an exceptionalcircumstance that renders the grievance process under the CCRA inadequate as a remedy. [35] On the basis of the foregoing, I am of the view that Mr.

Blair’s notice of application for judicial review fails to adequately plead theminimum concise, complete and exhaustive grounds that are required to be pleaded for this Court to potentially grant the relief sought onthe merits of the application. Although an amendment could perhaps save the application and complete its general outline, no leave toamend was sought by Mr. Blair. [36] For the reasons that follow, however, whether an amendment could remedy the application’s deficiencies is an academic questionthat need not be answered. B.

The Principle of Exhaustion and Exceptional Circumstances [37] As referred to above, the AG pleads that Mr. Blair’s application for judicial review should be struck on the basis that it is prematurebecause he has not exhausted the grievance process available to him pursuant to sections 90 and 91 CCRA and the Regulations. [38] In his written representations, Mr.

Blair admits that he has not exhausted the Service’s internal grievance process. [39] He similarly admits in his written representations that while the Service’s internal grievance process may be an adequate alternativeto judicial review in most cases, exceptional circumstances exist in this case that make the grievance system an inadequate alternativeremedy. [40] The exceptional circumstances he relies upon are that:

a) the Decision will have and will have significant and adverse impacts on hislikelihood of success on his "“Faint Hope”" Application; and,

b) the grievance process might not conclude prior to his "“Faint Hope”"Application being heard. Only the first of these is pleaded in the notice of application, and it is not pleaded as an exceptionalcircumstance. [41] Judicial review is a discretionary remedy that the court will consider when there is no adequate alternative remedy available to theaggrieved applicant (Harelkin v University of Regina, (SCC), [1979] 2 SCR 561, 26 NR 364; Nome v. Canada, 2016 FC187: at paras 19 and following). [42] In Canada (Border Services Agency) v. C.B. Powell Limited, 2010 FCA 61 (“C.B.

Powell”), at paragraphs 30 to 33, thisCourt wrote about the well-established principle of judicial non-interference with ongoing administrative proceedings. It has beenreiterated through many of this Court’s decisions since (Dugré v. Canada (Attorney General), 2020 FC 789 , at paragraphs 24 to57). The normal rule that follows this principle is that parties can proceed to the court system only after all adequate remedial recoursesin the administrative process have been exhausted.

The importance of this rule in Canadian administrative law is well-demonstrated bythe large number of decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada on point. The general point of the rule is that, absent exceptionalcircumstances, courts should not interfere with ongoing administrative processes until after they are completed, or until the available,effective remedies within that process are exhausted.

Stated differently, applicants for judicial review are required, in principle, toexhaust all possible remedies available to them in the administrative process prior to asking the court to judicially review the decisioncomplained of. [43] Considering the admission contained in his written representations, it appears that Mr. Blair is aware of the grievance processestablished by sections 90 and 91 of the CCRA and its Regulations that is available to him. The scope of the grievance process throughthe CCRA is very broadly defined at

section 90 of the CCRA as including offenders’ grievances on matters within the jurisdiction of theCommissioner of Corrections. The Commissioner’s jurisdiction extends to the control and management of the Service and all mattersconnected with the Service pursuant to subsection 6(1) of the CCRA. In my view, a grievance from the Decision that followed anassessment of an offender’s affiliation with a security threat group falls within the broad scope of the grievance process created byParliament to be followed by offenders, including by Mr. Blair. Mr.

Blair does not suggest that the Decision is beyond the scope of thegrievance process established by statute. [44] This Court’s jurisprudence has generally held that the grievance process available through sections 90 and 91 of the CCRA is anadequate alternative remedy that must be exhausted prior to seeking judicial review Giesbrecht v.

Canada, , atparagraph 14; MacInnes v Mountain Institution, 2014 FC 212, at paragraph 17; Nome v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FC 187, atparagraphs 21, 22, Nome v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FC 1054 at paragraph 7; Thompson v Canada (Correctional Service), 2018FC 40 at paragraphs 14 to 17). [45] The Court will intervene and will allow the grievance process to be bypassed where there are exceptional circumstances (Rose vCanada (Attorney General), 2011 FC 1495 at para 35; Nickerson v.

Canada (Correctional Service), 2019 FC 1136 , atparagraphs 15 and 16). [46] Exceptional circumstances have been generally described as being, "“cases of emergency, evident inadequacy in the procedure, or

where physical or mental harm is caused to an inmate”" (Rose v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FC 1495 at para 35; Marleau vCanada (Attorney General), 2011 FC 1149 at para 34; Gates v Canada (Attorney General), 2007 FC 1058, 316 FTR 82 at para 26). Thislist of exceptional circumstances is not exhaustive. Very few circumstances qualify as "“exceptional”" and the threshold forexceptionality is high.

Concerns about procedural fairness or bias, the presence of an important legal or constitutional issue, or the factthat all parties have consented to early recourse to the courts are not exceptional circumstances allowing parties to bypass anadministrative process, as long as that process allows the issues to be raised and an effective remedy to be granted (C.B. Powell, supra, atparagraph 33). [47] Mr.

Blair argues that the effect his modified security threat group affiliation assessment on his "“Faint Hope”" application is an"“exceptional circumstance”" that renders the grievance process inadequate as an alternative remedy. He argues that the decision willhave significant and adverse impacts on his likelihood of success on his "“Faint Hope”" application pending before the Superior Court ofJustice.

His written representations address the various steps involved in a "“Faint Hope”" application, that the application goes to ascreening judge at the Superior Court of Justice, that the judge appointed to preside over Mr. Blair’s "“Faint Hope”" application wasappointed on June 14, 2021, and that Mr. Blair’s "“Faint Hope”" Application has been pending for a year, and will likely be determinedprior to the grievance process being completed. None of these points were alleged in the notice of application. [48] Mr.

Blair also argues that the Decision is impacting his daily life at the Beaver Creek Institution because it has slowed his ability toprogress within the institution, to cascade to lower levels security, and poses a potential threat to his safety. No grounds were not allegedin the notice of application in support of this argument. [49] In Karas v.

Canada (Attorney General), 2020 FC 345 ("“Karas”"), this Court considered whether an offender’sapplication for judicial review from a decision regarding the offender’s security level of maximum, medium or minimum should bedismissed because the offender had not exhausted the internal complaints process set out in the CCRA. The offender argued, as Mr.

Blairdoes here, that the potential for his position to be weakened in another proceeding, specifically, on a 745.6 Criminal Code "“FaintHope”" application, as a result of the decision sought to be reviewed outside of the grievance process constituted an exceptionalcircumstance sufficient for the Court to bypass the requirement that the internal complaints process be exhausted.

This Court wasunpersuaded because the outcome of success on the "“Faint Hope”" application was speculative and unsupported by evidence (Karas atparas. 21 and 22). [50] Although Karas was decided on the merits of an application for judicial review and not on a motion to strike, it is instructive for thepurposes of this motion in that it clarifies that the potential impact of a decision on an applicant’s prospects of success in a separate"“Faint Hope”" application does not constitute an "“exceptional circumstance”" that should permit the applicant to by-pass theobligation to exhaust the alternative grievance process available to him. [51] Mr.

Blair argues that Karas is distinguishable from this case because the security threat group affiliation at issue here is moreprejudicial than a security classification change in Karas may be in a "“Faint Hope”" application. Although there may be differentimpacts to be appreciated on a proper evidentiary record in connection with different security classifications, there is no evidence beforeme to support the argument being made and there are no allegations in support of the argument in the notice of application. Mr.

Blair’sargument is otherwise not persuasive because it fails to address the speculative and unsupported nature of the alleged prejudicial impacton Mr. Blair’s likelihood of success in another proceeding. [52] The allegations made in Mr. Blair’s notice of application do not reflect a case of emergency, physical or mental harm of the typeaccepted by the Court in Gates v.

Canada (Attorney General), 2007 FC 1058 as constituting an exceptional circumstance.Gates was concerned with a situation of real and immediate health concerns due to temperature changes and the obligation imposed uponthe Service to provide a healthy environment for offenders in penitentiaries. The exceptional circumstance at issue there fell squarelywithin the exceptional circumstances related to physical or mental harm to an inmate. [53] Although there is an argument to be made that the grievance procedure to be followed may be too slow to deliver a result before aMr.

Blair’s "“Faint Hope”" application has been determined that suggestion remains only an argument without foundation. The timerequired for the grievance process to run its course was not alleged in the application, and no admissible evidence was tendered insupport of the argument. [54] It is my view that there is no exceptional circumstance in this case as pleaded that could potentially exempt Mr. Blair fromexhausting the grievance process prescribed by the CCRA. IV. CONCLUSION [55] For the reasons set out above, I grant the AG’s motion and strike Mr.

Blair’s application for judicial review without leave to amendbecause it is bereft of any possibility of success. The obvious and fatal flaw striking at the root of this Court’s power to hear Mr. Blair’sapplication for judicial review at this time is the existence of an adequate alternative remedy through the CCRA that must be exhaustedby Mr. Blair prior to this Court intervening. There are no exceptional circumstances in this case that permit the Court to by-pass thegrievance process created by Parliament. THIS COURT ORDERS that 1.

The Attorney General of Canada’s motion to strike the application for judicial review commenced by Mr. Blair in this proceeding isgranted. 2. Mr. Blair’s application for judicial review is struck without leave to amend.

3. The parties are encouraged to confer and come to an agreement as to costs. If the parties are unable to agree, the Attorney General may serve and file written representations on costs not exceeding 3 pages (excluding schedules or appendices) within 15 days of this Order, and Mr. Blair may serve and file written representations on costs not exceeding 3 pages (excluding schedules or appendices) within 15 days thereof. Blank “Benoit M.

Duchesne” blank Prothonotary FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: T-785-22 STYLE OF CAUSE: ANDRE BLAIR v ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA PLACE OF HEARING: OTTAWA, ONTARIO DATE OF HEARING: JUNE 27, 2022 (IN WRITING) REASONS FOR REASONS AND ORDER: PROTHONOTARY DUCHESNE DATED: june 30, 2021 SOLICITORS OF RECORD : Peter Ketcheson Michael A. Crystal Professional Corporation Inc. Ottawa, Ontario For The Applicant Brooklyne Eeuwes Attorney General of Canada Toronto, Ontario For The Respondent