R v Monroe, 2023 ABCJ 196

In the Alberta Court of Justice Citation: R v Monroe, 2023 ABCJ 196 Date: 20230906 Docket: 221013733P1 Registry: Calgary Between: His Majesty the King - and - Michael Robert Monroe Ruling on

Section 752.1 Crown Application by the Honourable Justice B.C. Stevenson [ 1 ] On May 9, 2023, I convicted Michael Robert Munroe of the following four Criminal Code offences: 1. Criminal Harassment – s 264(2)(c) 2. Threats – s 264.1(1)(a) 3. Disobeying a Court Order – s 127(1) 4. Mischief – s 430(1)(c) [ 2 ] The accused’s criminal conduct giving rise to the above charges are set out in my decision, reported at R v Monroe , 2023 ABCJ 142 . [ 3 ] Following my decision, Ms.

Karuna Ramakrishnan, Crown Counsel, advised that she would be making an application pursuant to s 752.1 for an Order that the accused be remanded for assessment. [ 4 ] The application was argued before me on July 25, 2023. [ 5 ] To make such an Order, I must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused might be found to be a dangerous offender or a long-term offender.

If those reasonable grounds are shown to exist, then it is mandatory that I make the Order. [ 6 ] Procedurally, it must be shown that one or more of the offences of which the accused has been convicted meets the definition

of a serious personal injury offence set out in s 752. [ 7 ] The relevant portion of the definition relied upon by the Crown in its submissions is (a)(ii): “conduct endangering or likely to endanger the life or safety of another person or inflicting or likely to inflict severe psychological damage on another person, and for which the offender may be sentenced to imprisonment for ten years or more”. [ 8 ] The only offence of which the accused stands convicted that comes within that definition is the criminal harassment count. [ 9 ] Both Ms. Ramakrishnan and Defence Counsel Mr.

Bjoern Wolkmann filed written submissions, as well as making substantial oral submissions on the application hearing, and I am grateful for their careful review of the facts and law relating to these applications.

CROWN POSITION [ 10 ] First, Crown Counsel submits that the threshold for ordering an assessment is “not a high one”. [ 11 ] She submits that in considering whether the conduct leading up to the criminal harassment conviction constitutes “inflicting or likely to inflict severe psychological damage” on the victim, the Court must look at all available and relevant information, including the accused’s history in relation to the victim, and not just to the predicate offence. [ 12 ] She further submits that from the accused’s history, his actions constitute a pattern of repeated harassment of the victim, not just on this occasion, but for a period of seven years, and that the consequences of that is an appropriate consideration. [ 13 ] Here, Ms.

Ramakrishnan submits that the evidence adduced at trial clearly establishes the victim’s fear and psychological trauma from the accused’s repeated criminal actions. [ 14 ] Fear of meeting the accused, panic reaction, changing her name on her address at her residence, not using her car because of the accused’s knowledge of the vehicle she drove, changing how she lived day-to-day, the fear shared by her colleagues when the accused came to their workplace, the safety measures put in place only due to his repeated apparent obsession with either the victim, or workplace ownership, or authority over the victim and her colleagues, or how they should conduct their business, fear that was only lessened when the accused was in custody.

DEFENCE POSITION [ 15 ] Mr. Wolkmann submits that is client’s conduct was not such that it meets the definition of “inflicting or likely to inflict severe psychological damage to the victim. [ 16 ] He submits that the evidence does not show, beyond a reasonable doubt, the underlying elements of the definition. [ 17 ] He submits that there is no evidence of use or attempted use of violence against the victim, no conduct endangering or likely to endanger the life or safety of the victim, and that fear by itself does not amount to severe psychological damage. [ 18 ] Mr.

Wolkmann further submits that any psychological damage is not sufficient to satisfy what is set out in the definition, that the Crown needs to show actual or likely severe psychological damage. [ 19 ] He further submits that while he agrees that in considering whether or not to order an assessment psychiatric reports and expert evidence is not required, there is no evidence that the victim suffered or is likely to suffer psychological damage. [ 20 ] He also submits the fact that she is clearly scared of his client, that he’s a scary guy, that he’s very tall, that she doesn’t want to see him in dark shadows, etc., does not satisfy the requirement of actual or likely severe psychological damage. [ 21 ] He refers to her testimony that his client’s conduct was “a nuisance, annoying, upsetting, and complicated”, but that doesn’t amount to “severe psychological damage”.

ANALYSIS [ 22 ] While the term “severe psychological damage” continues to be the subject of judicial debate, I am satisfied that it means “the result of extraordinarily stressful events that shatter one’s sense of security”. [ 23 ] I also agree that my consideration of the application should include the history of the accused’s conduct with respect to her place of employment, and the results of that conduct.

In other words, I do not, and should not restrict my consideration to the predicate act that occurred on October 17, 2022. [ 24 ] I agree with the Crown’s position that the conduct of the accused over the seven-year period relating to the victim was likely to inflict severe psychological damage to her, and that it meets the definition of a “serious personal injury offence”. [ 25 ] In R v Tremblay , 2010 ONSC 486 , Justice Karakatsanis of the Ontario Court of Appeal (as she then was) states at paragraphs 75 -76:

75. “The meaning of severe psychological damage” was considered in R v Cherry, [1996] O.J. No. 267 paras 22-24 (Gen.

Div.) byanalogy to the Supreme Court of Canada definition of “serious bodily harm” in R v McCraw, (SCC), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 72,per Cory J at para 23 as “any hurt or injury whether physical or psychological that interferes in a substantial was with the physical orpsychological integrity, health or well-being of the complainant.” The Court in R v Cherry also referred to a corresponding definition of“damage” in the Concise Oxford Dictionary [1991], at para. 19, as “harm or injury impairing the health or normal function of a person”.The decision in R v Cherry was affirmed [1999] O.J.

No. 144, (C.A.) although the issue of severe psychological harm was not addressedin the reasons of the Court of Appeal”. 76. “The concept of severe psychological damage acts as a threshold: not just any level of psychological harm will suffice.

While I tendto think that “severe psychological damage” must be something more than “serious psychological harm”, I accept that severepsychological damage requires, at a minimum, a substantial interference with the victim’s physical or psychological integrity, health orwell-being”. [26] The pattern of criminal harassing behavior by the accused as outlined in my May 29th decision (paras. 6-24) and the stepstaken by the victim as a result of that behavior, including the plan put in place by her superiors due to their knowledge of the behavior ofthe accused in the past, for the safety of all, leads me to no other possible conclusion than the actions of the accused created an actualsubstantial interference with the victim’s psychological integrity, health or well-being. [27] In addition to the decisions mentioned earlier in these reasons, I have been referred to by Counsel and have reviewed thefollowing: [28] Some were helpful.

Others were not. All were, by and large, fact-specific. • R v Crane, 2006 ABPC 159 • R v Lebar, 2010 ONCA 220 • R v Morgan, (ON CA), 2005 CarswellOnt 1048; [2005] O J No 1041 • R v Steele, 2014 SCC 61 • R v Millie, 2021 SKQB 281 • R v Armstrong, 2014 BCCA 174 • R v Cook, 2020 ONCA 809 • R v Hopley, 2012 BCSC 1329 • R v D (FE), [2009] O. J. No. 819 • R v Brouiillard, 2020 QCCS 604 • R v Warren, [2018] O. J. No. 2040 • R v Currie, (SCC), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 260 • R v Albert, 2001 SKCA 57 • R v Fulton, 2006 SKCA 115 • R v Smyth, [2007] O. J. No. 1946 • R v Desjarlais, 2007 ABQB 94 • R v McArthur, [1997] O. J.

No. 5146 • R v T (JG), 2000 ABQB 161 • R v Pike, 2010 BCCA 401 • R v Boutilier, 2017 SCC 64 • R v Dow, 1999 BCCA 177 • R v Laporte, 2016 MBCA 36 • R v McCallum, 2016 SKCA 96 • R v Ominayak, 2007 ABQB 442 • R v Malakpour, 2018 BCCA 254 • R v Burton, 2016 ONCJ 103

• R v Singh , 2018 ONSC 957 • R v Lyons , [1987] S.C.R. 309 • R v Kapoor , 2012 ABPC 299 • R v Walters , 2018 ONCA 391 [ 29 ] I was also provided with transcripts of previous proceedings involving the accused in 2017, 2020, as well as his record of prior convictions, information from the Parole Board of Canada dated August of 2021, and June of 2022, a report from Correctional Service Canada, and a Report from the Calgary Police Service High Risk Offender Program relating to the accused dated June 30, 2022.

RULING [ 30 ] I am satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused, having been convicted by me of a serious personal injury offence, might be found to be a dangerous offender under s 753 or a long-term offender under s 753.1. [ 31 ] Accordingly, I order that the accused be remanded for an assessment pursuant to s 752.1 of the Criminal Code . Heard on the 6 th day of September, 2023. Dated at the City of Calgary, Alberta this 6 th day of September, 2023. B.C. Stevenson A Justice of the Alberta Court of Justice Appearances: Karuna Ramakrishnan for the Crown Bjoern Wolkmann for the Accused