R v Harris, 2022 ABKB 759

Restriction on Publication Identification Ban – See the Criminal Code ,

section 486.4 . By Court Order, information that could identify the complainant must not be published, broadcast, or transmitted in any way. NOTE: Identifying information has been removed from this judgment to comply with the ban so that it may be published. Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: R v Harris, 2022 ABKB 759 Date: 20221115 Docket: 160693321Q2 Registry: Calgary Between: His Majesty the King Crown - and - Shawn Powell Harris Accused _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Colin C.J. Feasby _______________________________________________________

Introduction [1] The Accused is charged with, among other things, obtaining a material benefit from human trafficking contrary to CriminalCode, s 279.02. He is alleged to have functioned as what is commonly known as a pimp. [2] The Crown called only one witness, the Complainant. The Accused did not testify.

The Charges [3] The Accused was charged with five offences: (1) obtaining a material benefit from human trafficking (s 279.02); (2)possession of proceeds of crime over $5,000 (s 354(1)(A)); (3) facilitating the procuring of sexual services for consideration (s.286.3(1)); (4) uttering threats of bodily harm (s 264.1(1)(A)); and (5) cruelty to an animal (s 445.1(1)(A)).

The charges pertain to theperiod between November 1, 2013, and June 4, 2016 (the “Charge Period”). [4] During closing argument, the Crown advised that it was withdrawing the third count on the Indictment as the relevantsection of the Criminal Code has been ruled unconstitutional (R c. Kloubakov, 2021 ABQB 960) and that counts 2 and 4 are subsumedwithin count 1 and, in the event of a conviction on count 1, counts 2 and 4 should be stayed pursuant to the principle in Kienapple v. R., (SCC), [1975] 1 SCR 729.

Accordingly, the analysis that follows deals only with the charges of obtaining a materialbenefit from human trafficking and animal cruelty. The Offence of Obtaining a Material Benefit From HumanTrafficking [5] The Accused is charged with obtaining a material benefit from human trafficking contrary to Criminal Code s 279.02 whichprovides that:

(1) Every person who receives a financial or other material benefit, knowing that it is obtained by or derived directly or indirectly fromthe commission of an offence under subsection 279.01(1), is guilty of (

a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years; or (

b) an offence punishable on

summary conviction. [6] Criminal Code s 279.01, which is incorporated into s 279.02 by reference, provides:

(1) Every person who recruits, transports, transfers, receives, holds, conceals or harbours a person, or exercises control, direction orinfluence over the movements of a person, for the purpose of exploiting them or facilitating their exploitation is guilty of an indictableoffence and liable (

a) to imprisonment for life and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of five years if they kidnap, commit an aggravatedassault or aggravated sexual assault against, or cause death to, the victim during the commission of the offence; or (

b) to imprisonment for a term of not more than 14 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of four years in anyother case. [7] Hoy ACJO, writing for the Court in R v Gallone, 2019 ONCA 663 at para 33, held that the actus reus of the s 279.01offence “is made out if the accused engaged in any one of the specific types of conduct set out in the first part of the provision – i.e.recruits, transports, transfers, receives, holds, conceals or harbours.

It is also made out if the accused’s conduct satisfies one of the actsin the second part – i.e. exercises control, direction or influence over the movements of the person.” [8] Hoy ACJO went on to explain the mens rea of the offence at para 54 as follows: The Crown need only prove that the accused intentionally engaged in any of the conduct described in s 279.01(1) with the purpose ofexploiting the complainant or facilitating her or his exploitation. No exploitation need actually occur or be facilitated by the accused’sconduct.

The focus is on the accused’s state of mind – i.e. his or her purpose in engaging in the prohibited conduct – and not on theactual consequences of his or her conduct for the complainant. [9] Exploitation is defined in Criminal Code s 279.04, the relevant parts of which are as follows:

(1) For the purposes of sections 279.01 to 279.03, a person exploits another person if they cause them to provide, or offer to provide,labour or a service by engaging in conduct that, in all the circumstances, could reasonably be expected to cause the other person tobelieve that their safety or the safety of a person known to them would be threatened if they failed to provide, or offer to provide, thelabour or service.

(2) In determining whether an accused exploits another person under subsection (1), the Court may consider, among other factors,whether the accused (

a) used or threatened to use force or another form of coercion;

(

b) used deception; or (

c) abused a position of trust, power or authority. [10] Pardu JA, writing for the Court in R v Sinclair, 2020 ONCA 61 at para 14 held that the question of exploitation as defined in s279.04 is to be “assessed on an objective basis.” She further observed that “safety” in the context of s. 279.04 “includes protection frompsychological harm.” Pardu JA explained at para 15: Circumstances that might be relevant when assessing whether conduct could reasonably be expected to cause a complainant to fear fortheir safety might include: • the presence or absence of violence or threats • coercion, including physical, emotional or psychological • deception • abuse of trust, power, or authority • vulnerability due to age or personal circumstances, such as social or economic disadvantage and victimization from other sources • isolation of the complainant • the nature of the relationship between the accused and the complainant • directive behaviour • influence exercised over the nature and location services provided • control over advertising of services • limitations on the complainant’s movement • control of finances • financial benefit to the accused, and • use of social media to assert control or monitor communications with others. [11] The presence of one or more of the circumstances articulated by Pardu JA is not determinative of whether a complainant has areasonable concern for their safety.

The identified circumstances must be assessed in context to determine whether grounds for areasonable concern for safety exists. The Offence of Cruelty to an Animal [12] Criminal Code s. 445.1(1)(

a) provides that “[e]veryone commits an offence who wilfully causes or, being the owner, wilfullypermits to be caused unnecessary pain, suffering or injury to an animal or a bird.” Justice Paperny, writing for the Court, explained R vChen, 2021 ABCA 382 at para 31: “[t]he gravamen of the offence is wilfully causing unnecessary pain, suffering or injury to an animal.The mens rea of the offence requires wilful causation or, if an owner, wilful permission.” Analysis of the Evidence Burden of Proof, Credibility, Reliability, and Vetrovec (

a) Burden of Proof [13] Proof beyond a reasonable doubt derives from the presumption of innocence and is a very high standard: R v Morrison, 2019SCC 15 at para 56. A reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon reason and common sense, logically flowing from the evidence or absenceof evidence. Neither the presence nor absence of doubt is based upon sympathy or prejudice: R v Layton, 2009 SCC 36 at para 57. [14] The Crown does not have to prove the elements of an offence to an absolute certainty to meet its burden. A reasonable doubtis not an imaginary or frivolous doubt: R v Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33 at para 28.

The Crown, however, must prove more than theaccused is probably guilty. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is much closer to absolute certainty than to a balance of probabilities: R vStarr, 2000 SCC 40 at para 242. [15] Each of the essential elements of the offences charged must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt (R v Morrison, 2019 SCC15 at para 51). The standard of beyond a reasonable doubt also applies to the entirety of the evidence required to prove an offence (R vRyon, 2019 ABCA 36 at para 46 quoting R v Carrière (2001), (ON CA), 151 OAC 115 (Ont CA) at para 48.

Seealso, R v Dinardo, 2008 SCC 24 at para 23), but not to individual pieces of evidence (R v JMH, 2011 SCC 45 at para 31).

(

b) Credibility and Reliability [16] The distinction between credibility and reliability was explained by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R v Morrissey (1995), (ON CA), 22 OR (3d) 514 (CA) at 526 and quoted with approval by Hughes and Feehan JJ in R v Delmas, 2020ABCA 152 at para 25: Testimonial evidence can raise veracity and accuracy concerns. The former relate to the witness’s sincerity, that is, his or her willingnessto speak the truth as the witness believes it to be. The latter concerns relate to the actual accuracy of the witness’s testimony.

Theaccuracy of a witness’s testimony involves considerations of the witness’s ability to accurately observe, recall and recount the events inissue. When one is concerned with a witness’s veracity, one speaks of the witness’s credibility. When one is concerned with the accuracyof a witness’s testimony, one speaks of the reliability of that testimony. Obviously a witness whose evidence on a point isnot credible cannot give reliable evidence on that point. The evidence of a credible, that is, honest witness, may, however, still beunreliable. [17] Both credibility and reliability are in issue in the present case.

To assess credibility, I may consider, among other things, thedemeanour of the witnesses: R v S(N), 2012 SCR 726 at para 25. Devlin J. in 557466 Alberta Ltd v McPherson, 2022 ABQB 23 at para112 provided a useful description of factors that may be said to fall under the rubric of demeanour.

He explained that “testimonialfactors observed first-hand, such as responsiveness, fairness, and objectivity, along with their converses – evasiveness, exaggeration, andpartisanship – are indispensable measures in the assessment of credibility.” The Complainant in the present case was evasive at timesand argumentative throughout her cross-examination.

For example, the Complainant was evasive when questioned about drug use, heremail addresses, and which phone she provided police to search. [18] However, I cannot place too much emphasis on demeanour in making a credibility assessment as the Alberta Court of Appealcautioned against over-reliance on demeanour in R v Giroux, 2017 ABCA 270 at para 7.

The Ontario Court of Appeal in R v Rhayel,2015 ONCA 377 observed at para 85 that “[i]t is now acknowledged that demeanour is of limited value because it can be affected bymany factors including the culture of the witness, stereotypical attitudes, and the artificiality of and pressures associated with acourtroom.” [19] The most important test of credibility lies in the evidence itself. Justice David M. Paciocco, “Doubt about Doubt: Copingwith R. v.

W(D.) and Credibility Assessment” (2017) 22 Can Crim L Rev 31 at 65 described “non-exclusive and sometimes overlappingfactors” other than demeanour that may be used to assess the quality of evidence given by a witness: (

a) the plausibility of the evidence; (

b) independent supporting or contradicting evidence; (

c) the external consistency of the evidence; (

d) the internal consistency of the evidence; and (

e) the “balance” of the evidence. [20] Hughes and Feehan JJ, citing R v ARD, 2017 ABCA 237 aff’d R v ARJD, 2018 SCC 6, explained in R v Delmas at para 31that: “[t]riers of fact may rely on ‘reason and common sense’, ‘life experience’ and ‘logic’ in making assessments of credibility;however, they fall into error if they rely on prejudicial or stereotypical reasoning in making such assessments” [citations omitted]. [21] Counsel for the Accused submits that the Complainant admitted to lying many times in different contexts in her evidence and,therefore, her evidence cannot be trusted.

The Complainant admitted to lying to the Accused about various things, lying to her motherabout being involved in sex work, lying to the police about her identity when they came to search a home where she was residing, andmisrepresenting herself in advertisements by using pictures of other women. Given the stigma associated with sex work and thevulnerable circumstances of sex workers, lies of this sort are a rational survival strategy for sex workers. To find that these lies make theComplainant untrustworthy would, in essence, be making a categorical finding that sex workers are untrustworthy.

I decline to makesuch a finding on the basis urged by counsel for the Accused. [22] Of more concern in the present case is the issue of reliability. Lamer CJ discussed how a court should approach the questionof reliability in the context of a prior inconsistent statement in R v U (FJ), (SCC), [1995] 3 SCR 764. His comments atpara 46 are a useful guide for approaching reliability in the present case: The first factor contributing to reliability is the cross-examination of the witness.

If the witness provides an explanation for changing hisor her story, the trier of fact will be able to assess both versions of the story, as well as the explanation. However, where a witness doesnot recall making an earlier statement, or refuses to answer questions, the trial judge should take into account that this may impede thejury’s ability to assess the ultimate reliability of the statement. [23] Counsel for the Accused was required to repeatedly take the Complainant to the transcript of her statement to police to refreshher memory or to confront her with statements that were inconsistent in some respects.

As set out below in paras 46-51, I find that theComplainant’s memory with respect to alleged violent incidents is not reliable. Specifically, it is not clear that an event where theComplainant alleges the Accused nearly hit her and knocked her glasses off occurred and other events appear to have been exaggerated. (

c) Vetrovec [24] Counsel for the Accused submitted that the Complainant is a Vetrovec v R, (SCC), [1982] 1 SCR 811witness. By this, I understand counsel for the Accused to be saying that the Complainant is a witness, “who, because of [her] amoralcharacter, criminal lifestyle, past dishonesty or interest in the outcome of the trial, cannot be trusted to tell the truth — even when [she

has] expressly undertaken by oath or affirmation to do so”: R v Khela , 2009 SCC 4 at para 3 .

The Alberta Court of Appeal in R v KRR , 2020 ABCA 475 at para 47 explained that: witnesses who fall within this category are key witnesses who have one or more of the following characteristics: 1) a jail house informant; 2) a lengthy criminal record; 3) a criminal lifestyle, for example membership in a criminal gang; 4) a motive to lie by reason of a connection with the crime; 5) providing different accounts on other occasions; 6) telling lies under oath; and 7) receiving a benefit for testifying. [ 25 ] Counsel for the Accused submitted that the Complainant had a motive to lie and that she received a benefit for testifying.

Counsel for the Accused contended that because the Complainant was often the signatory on short-term leases for premises where she and other sex workers associated with the Accused lived and worked, she could have just as easily have been charged with obtaining a material benefit from human trafficking or some other offence. Counsel for the Accused further submits the Complainant must have received some sort of assurance from police predicated on her turning on the Accused.

Counsel for the Accused points to the police providing the Complainant with food, accommodation, and transportation to Ontario as benefits. [ 26 ] The Complainant testified that she did not receive any assurances of immunity from prosecution from police. None of the evidence before the Court indicates that there was a plausible charge that could be brought against the Complainant for which she might have sought to make a deal with police to avoid prosecution.

The provision of basic necessities by the police to the Complainant, including replacing her cell phone, are not benefits sufficient to make the Complainant a Vetrovec witness. To conclude otherwise would create a disincentive to police to treat people in difficult circumstances, like the Complainant, with decency. [ 27 ] Though I do not consider the Complainant to be a Vetrovec witness, I am mindful of the importance of corroborating evidence given my earlier conclusions about the Complainant’s lack of reliability due to the frailty of her memory.

Evidence of Recruiting, Transporting, and Harbouring [ 28 ] The Complainant was the only witness called by the Crown. The broad outlines of the Complainant’s evidence are not contested. The Complainant was living in Toronto with her abusive boyfriend when she met the Accused in the latter part of 2013. The Complainant was engaged in sex work and testified that, in retrospect, her abusive boyfriend was really her pimp. Briefly in January 2014, the Complainant left her abusive boyfriend/pimp after her hand was broken in an altercation with him.

The Accused assisted the Complainant during her brief period away from her abusive boyfriend/pimp by, among other things, taking her to Sudbury, Ontario where he had already lined up opportunities for other sex workers so that she could earn some money. [ 29 ] The Complainant resumed her relationship with her abusive boyfriend/pimp after returning from Sudbury. The relationship continued until the abusive boyfriend/pimp broke the Complainant’s leg in March 2014. The Complainant required surgery to repair her broken leg.

The Complainant was out of the sex work business for several months while she recovered from her injury. During this time, she survived on money provided by one or more “Sugar Daddies”. [ 30 ] The Accused reached out to the Complainant during her recovery period to let her know that sex work was more profitable in Alberta. The Complainant decided to go to Alberta in August or September 2014.

According to the Complainant, the Accused paid for her plane ticket and accommodation when she arrived in Alberta. [ 31 ] The Complainant testified that the Accused directed her movements, sending her to various locations such as Edmonton, Fort McMurray, and Grande Prairie. She further testified that he would sometimes pay for her transportation and accommodation. Accommodations at hotels were sometimes in her name, but if a credit card was required the booking would be in the Accused’s name.

Similarly, short term rentals where the Complainant stayed and conducted her business were sometimes in her name and sometimes in the Accused’s name. [ 32 ] Text messages were obtained from the Complainant’s phone for the latter part of the Charge Period. Text messages from the earlier part of the period were not available because the Complainant got a new phone after her old phone was broken. The text messages corroborate the Complainant’s evidence showing the Accused’s influence over the Complainant’s movements.

There are texts from the Complainant requesting permission to travel and texts from the Accused directing the Complainant to travel to Edmonton, Calgary, and Grande Prairie. There are texts from the Complainant asking for time off, asking the price of a call, asking for money, and concerning advertisements. The texts demonstrate a managerial relationship between the Accused and the Complainant that is consistent with the evidence of the Complainant on the point. [ 33 ] The evidence shows that the Accused was the Complainant’s pimp for much of the Charge Period.

The Complainant’s evidence, corroborated by the text messages, shows that the Accused exercised control, direction, or influence over the movements of the Complainant as she conducted her business. I further accept the Complainant’s evidence and find that the Accused recruited the Complainant to work for him in Alberta and transported her to Alberta for that purpose.

Evidence of Material Benefit [ 34 ] The Complainant testified that her clients would typically pay for services by e-transfer or in cash. E-transfer payments would go to either her or the Accused. If the e-transfer was made to her, she would e-transfer the money on to the Accused. If the payment was in cash, she would give the money to the Accused or take the cash to the bank and deposit it in the Accused’s account. Sometimes she kept some of the cash if she needed it for food or other expenses. [ 35 ] The Complainant’s evidence about her financial dealings with the Accused is corroborated by banking documents.

There are e-transfers between the Complainant and the Accused of more than $10,000. There are also texts about transfers of money, deposits of cash, and transfers of bitcoin for the purposes of posting advertisements. [ 36 ] Counsel for the Accused submitted that the number of e-transfers and amount of money transferred between the Complainant and the Accused is not evidence of a material benefit. Counsel for the Accused submitted that the amount shown in the banking records pales in comparison to the $160,000 revenue figure estimated by the Complainant for the Charge Period.

In my view, however, there is nothing to be taken from the fact that the amount of money e-transferred between the Complainant and the Accused is significantly less than the estimated revenue for the Charge Period because of her explanation as to how money was e-transferred directly to the Accused by clients and because of the role of cash and cryptocurrency in the business. [ 37 ] Counsel for the Accused submits that the banking records do not show the Accused to have a business of the scale described by the Complainant.

The Complainant testified that the Accused employed at least three other sex workers and that each of them made more money than her. Counsel for the Accused points out that if the Complainant’s estimate of her own revenue is correct, the banking records are inconsistent with the Accused having business revenue in the range of four times that estimated by the Complainant. The Complainant’s evidence makes clear, and there is no reason to doubt her on this point, that the Accused’s business had a significant cash component.

Given this reality, nothing can be taken from the fact that the banking records do not disclose financial activity consistent with the scale of the business described by the Complainant. [ 38 ] A theory advanced on behalf of the Accused is that he assisted the Complainant by paying for her plane ticket and accommodation and that subsequent payments from the Complainant to the Accused were to repay her debt to him for these expenses.

Counsel for the Accused submitted that other e-transfers from the Complainant to the Accused over the Charge Period would have also been for repayment of favours or advances of various sorts. [ 39 ] Even if the Complainant repaid the Accused for purchasing a one-way plane ticket from Ontario to Alberta and a few nights in a hotel, that falls far short of the more than $10,000 reflected in the banking records.

Further, I accept the Complainant’s evidence that once she arrived in Alberta she was working for the Accused and, as such, any e-transfers after her arrival in Alberta other than in relation to her relocation costs took place in the context of that working relationship. I conclude that it is proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the Accused obtained a material benefit from his managerial role in relation to the Complainant’s sex work. Exploitation [ 40 ] The elements of the first part of the s 279.01 offence and the material benefit element of the s 279.02 offence are proved.

The analysis turns now to the question of exploitation. When considering the question of exploitation, it is important to emphasize that it is the specific concept of exploitation expressed in s 279.04 that is in issue, not what might be considered exploitation in a more general sense. [ 41 ] Employment and quasi-employment relationships, whether involving sex work or more conventional work, may be exploitive where there is inadequate compensation, poor working conditions, or other oppressive or unfair aspects to the relationship.

The Complainant’s relationship with the Accused in the present case may have been exploitive in this broader sense. Parliament, however, has only criminalized a narrower form of exploitation where an accused’s conduct, objectively assessed, may cause a person to believe that their physical or psychological safety is at risk.

Exploitation in the context of s 279.04 requires that it be proved that the Accused was “engaging in conduct that, in all the circumstances, could reasonably be expected to cause the other person to believe that their safety or the safety of a person known to them would be threatened if they failed to provide, or offer to provide, the labour or service.” [ 42 ] The case law is replete with examples of pimp-sex worker relationships that involve violence by the pimp against the sex worker and coercive sex between the pimp and sex worker, including sexual assaults.

The existence of such characteristics in a pimp-sex worker relationship makes it easy to conclude that a relationship is exploitive in the sense provided for in s 279.04. However, these characteristics are absent from the relationship between the Accused and the Complainant in the present case. [ 43 ] The Crown submits that the Accused’s conduct was a reasonable basis for the Complainant to believe that her safety was threatened. The Crown points to several alleged incidents in particular: (

a) a threat against the Complainant; (

b) a confrontation where the Accused nearly hit the Complainant and knocked her glasses off in the process; (

c) a time when the Accused threw a frying pan at another sex worker; and (

d) the alleged beating of a dog. There can be no doubt that violence, threats of violence, violence against others, and violence against animals separately or together can be sufficient to ground a reasonable belief that an individual’s safety is threatened. Accordingly, each alleged incident will be considered. [ 44 ] The alleged threat by the Accused to the Complainant was to the effect that he would “put his hands” on her if he wasn’t afraid that she would call the police. The Accused’s statement can be taken in two ways.

The statement could be threatening in that it may be understood to imply that he was capable of hitting the Complainant and perhaps would do so in the future. Alternatively, the statement can be understood to be a statement that the Complainant was safe despite the Accused’s displeasure with her.

[ 45 ] The Accused’s statement must also be viewed in the context of the fact that the abusive boyfriend/pimp that the Complainant was with when she met the Accused was charged and later convicted of assaulting the Complainant. The Accused was aware of the Complainant’s former abusive boyfriend/pimp and that there was a legal case against him even though he told the Complainant that he did not want to know about it.

Viewed in this context, the second meaning of the Accused’s statement – that she was safe despite him being angry with her – is more plausible than the words being intended as a threat. [ 46 ] The Complainant testified about an incident where the Accused nearly hit her in anger and knocked her glasses off. This kind of incident could give rise to a reasonable concern for safety. On cross-examination, however, it was shown that the Complainant omitted to mention the incident where the Accused nearly hit her and knocked her glasses off to police.

Instead, a different incident where another sex worker knocked the Complainant’s glasses off in a conflict was relayed to police. While the Complainant gave a detailed account of the alleged incident where the Accused nearly hit her and knocked her glasses off at trial, the failure to tell police about the incident when it was the kind of information that they were asking for and the recounting to police of a similar incident with a different assailant, gives rise to a reasonable doubt that the Accused was involved. [ 47 ] Violence toward others may give rise to a reasonable concern for safety.

The Complainant described an incident where the Accused was angry at another sex worker who was staying in the same accommodations with the Complainant. The Accused threw a frying pan at the sex worker’s head. The frying pan missed its intended target, hitting the wall. The frying pan was “bent in half.” On cross-examination, the Complainant testified that the sex worker involved in the incident was “big” and “crazy” and tried to fight the Complainant during the same incident where the frying pan was thrown by the Accused.

The details of the frying pan incident seem exaggerated – it is hard to believe that a frying pan could be bent in half after being thrown across a room and hitting an interior wall – and given that the target of the frying pan wanted to fight the Complainant, the Accused may have been trying to protect the Complainant.

The details and meaning of the frying pan incident are sufficiently unclear that it is too thin a basis on which to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the Complainant had an objectively reasonable concern for her safety. [ 48 ] Violence against animals may be intended to intimidate or may simply demonstrate a propensity for violence that may be reasonably concluded to extend to human beings.

Either way, violence against animals, just like violence against other people, will often give rise to a reasonable concern for safety for the purposes of s 279.04. [ 49 ] The question in the present case is whether the Crown has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that violence against an animal occurred. The Complainant testified about a single incident of animal cruelty where the Accused allegedly beat a 5-pound Chihuahua. The Complainant testified as follows in her direct examination: Q Was there ever an occasion where you were concerned about the accused’s behaviour towards the dog?

A Yes, there was an incident in Edmonton where I actually witnessed the accused using his belt to beat the dog. Q And what were the circumstances around that activity? A One of the accused’s friends had fed the dog Chinese food, and the dog defecated on the floor in one of the short-term rentals we had, we were in, and it was carpeted. So the accused almost stepped in it, and so he lashed out in anger at the dog, took his belt off and beat the dog with his belt. Q Now, can you describe the belt for us, please?

A It was a – I’m pretty sure it was a Luis Vuitton belt, but it had a metal clasp, and he beat the dog so bad that the clasp broke off and he ended up – the accused had to take the belt to get repaired. [ 50 ] The Complainant testified in cross-examination as follows: Q And I think your words today in relation to the dog incident, he beat him so bad that the clasp broke off his Luis Vuitton belt; right? A Correct. Q Okay. And had you seen anything wrong with the dog after this big beating, then you would have taken the dog to the vet; right? A I would have -- I would have asked to take the dog to the vet.

One, I don’t drive, so it wouldn’t be up to myself. Two, seeing as I had no money in my bank account, how am I going to afford a vet bill? But yes. Q All right. But there was certainly no indication that the dog needed to go to the vet? A From my knowledge, no. [ 51 ] As with the frying pan incident, the story about the beating of the dog appears to be exaggerated. The Accused, an average sized adult male, weighs at least 30 times more than the 5-pound dog that was beaten.

If the beating took place as the Complainant alleges, the idea that the dog would show no indication of injuries requiring that the dog be taken to the veterinarian is implausible. The inescapable conclusion is that if the dog was beaten by the Accused with a belt with a metal fastener, the beating was not anywhere near as severe as the Complainant told the Court.

The Complainant’s account of the beating of the dog is not reliable and cannot be the basis for a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the Complainant had an objectively reasonable concern for her safety. [ 52 ] The Complainant’s evidence shows that the relationship between the Accused and the sex workers that he employed was such that the sex workers could leave the Accused without retribution. She explained that other sex workers would leave the Accused and then return to work for him later and she did not recall any negative consequences.

Her lack of memory of negative consequences for those that left the Accused must be understood in the context of evidence that she gave that she tended to remember bad things. She then

testified as follows: Q So I am going to suggest to you that what you’re explaining here to the police is that the two girls that you know that stopped working for him, they were just able to leave without any difficulties with [the Accused]. A My perception, but that may not be actually the case. Q Fair enough. But that was your perception?

A Yes. [ 53 ] The Complainant further testified that after one sex worker quit, the Accused bought her a plane ticket home to Toronto. [ 54 ] The Complainant testified that on at least two occasions she had left the Accused to do work on her own and returned without consequences.

Much in the same vein, during a disagreement over text between the Accused and the Complainant, he told her that if she was going to lie to him then she should just leave. [ 55 ] The obvious ability of sex workers to end their association with the Accused without consequences together with my earlier analysis of the alleged incidents of threats of violence, violence against the Complainant, violence against others, and violence against an animal leads me to the inexorable conclusion that the Crown has not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the Complainant had a reasonable concern for her safety.

Animal Cruelty [ 56 ] For the reasons set out above at paras 48-51, I conclude that the charge of animal cruelty has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Conclusion [ 57 ] I find the Accused not guilty of all the charges. Heard on November 7-10, 2022. Dated at the City of Calgary, Alberta this 15 th day of November, 2022. Colin C.J. Feasby J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: Tony Bell for the Crown Rebecca Snukal, KC for the Accused