LL v DB, 2022 ABKB 766

Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: LL v DB, 2022 ABKB 766 Date: 20221118 Docket: FL03 48937 Registry: Edmonton Between: LL Plaintiff (Respondent) - and - DB Defendant (Applicant) Corrected judgment: A corrigendum was issued on November 21, 2022; the corrections have been made to the text and the corrigendum is appended to this judgment. _______________________________________________________ Endorsement of the Honourable Justice M. J. Lema _______________________________________________________ A. Introduction

[ 1 ] A self-represented father applies for various relief including changing primary parenting from the mother to himself as well as sole decision making for the child “until such time as the [mother] can prove … that she can care for the child and raise her in a stable environment.

After applying and proving that …, [parenting to be] amended to [shared parenting of] one week on, one week off.” [ 2 ] The self-represented mother resists, seeking continuation of her primary parenting and dismissal of the other relief sought by the father. [ 3 ] I find that the father is entitled to some of the relief he is seeking, principally enforcement of his existing parenting time. I also direct make-up parenting time for him.

And make other adjustments to the existing parenting order (see below). [ 4 ] However, on the central question – whether primary parenting should be switched – I find that the parties’ evidence conflicts in material ways on material points. [ 5 ] I also find that the circumstances are not so urgent that even an interim change in primary parenting is warranted. Any urgency arising from earlier instability in the mother’s residential circumstances and the child missing school at the start of the 2022-23 school year has largely abated, at least on the most current evidence.

The circumstances overall do not warrant a change in parenting i.e. unless and until, following a viva voce hearing and resolution there of the evidentiary conflicts, it emerges that the child’s best interests require such a change. B. Background [ 6 ] Some of the background is outlined in my decision in 2018 ABQB 886 , following a trial in which both parents were represented by counsel, largely dealing with property and support issues. [ 7 ] At that point, parenting was governed by an order granted by Manderscheid J. on February 13, 2017.

Its material provisions, which largely still apply today, are as follows: The [mother] shall be the primary guardian and shall have day-to-day care of [the child, now 10 years old].

The [father] shall have regular parenting time with [her] as follows: a. … the [father] shall have parenting time every second weekend from Friday at 5:00 pm to Sunday at 7:00 pm; provided however, that if the Monday is a statutory holiday, the [father’s] parenting time will be extended to Monday at 7:00 pm; [and] b. every week on Wednesdays from 5:00 pm to 7:30 pm. [para 2] [provisions addressing parenting over Christmas, summer, Easter, Thanksgiving, birthdays and other long weekends and special occasions – para 3] … The parties will notify each other if they intend to travel outside the City of Edmonton , or out of the country, with [the child]. … [para 6] The [father] shall have the right to directly communicate with [the child’s] healthcare givers, counsellors, teachers and extracurricular activity providers, including acquiring a copy of [the child’s] school schedules and events, trip itineraries, report cards, medical, dental [and] psychological records, and extracurricular schedules and all information in regard to religion. [para 7] Any decisions made by [the mother] in relation to [the child] and in regard specifically to the child’s education , medical requirements, extracurricular activities or religious requirements are to be communicated in advance to the [father].

The [father] must, within 24 hours, give his approval or rejection of the request and outline his reasons for the decision .

The exception to this will be in the event of a medical emergency wherein the party who has care and control of [the child] during that particular time will have sole decision-making authority. [para 8] [emphasis added] [ 8 ] In 2018 ABQB 886 , I dismissed the mother’s application for supervision of the father’s parenting time and granted his to expand his Wednesday parenting to overnight (with him driving the child to school on Thursday mornings), albeit not compelling the mother to share in the driving associated with his parenting. [ 9 ] The father’s current application stems from his concerns about the mother’s move, in summer 2022, from a residence in Edmonton to (as he understands it) somewhere in the vicinity of Spruce Grove, to associated turbulence in the child’s school life (with her (per him) uprooted from her longstanding and ideal Edmonton school and not registered or at least attending school in Spruce Grove until recently), as well as overall concerns about the mother’s suitability as primary parent, augmented by her apparent (per him) inability or unwillingness to facilitate his access parenting consistently, especially over the last few months. [ 10 ] Per the father, the mother has deviated in material ways from the Manderscheid-ordered parenting and overall shown core unfitness to continue to primary-parent the child. [ 11 ] Per the mother, the father’s application represents the continuation of long-running efforts by him to interfere in her parenting and overall life.

As she explains it, she was effectively forced to move from her Edmonton residence by unsuitable living conditions and an unresponsive and, in fact, antagonistic landlord, she was entitled to relocate to the Spruce Grove area and, by extension, to change the child’s school, and, above all, she continues to be a responsible and caring parent, with no cause existing for the fundamental shift sought by the father. [ 12 ] The evidentiary foundation for the current application is three affidavits sworn by the father (one each in September, October

and November 2022) and one by the mother (in October). [ 13 ] No cross-examinations on affidavit occurred or were apparently requested. C.

Analysis Denial of access [ 14 ] The father gave evidence of missing various weekend and Wednesday-Thursday access in spring, summer and early fall 2022 owing to the mother withholding the child: the weekends of September 30-October 2 and October 7-10 (father’s Thanksgiving weekend this year); missed Wed-Thur access on April 13-14, May 18-19, June 22-23, August 31-September 1, September 14-15, September 21-22, September 28-29, and October 5-6; and reduced (late drop-off) access on August 17-18 (Wed-Thur). [ 15 ] Counting the Wed-Thur access as effectively two-thirds of a day (5 pm Wednesday to start of school on Thursday morning (approx. 9 am) i.e. 16 hours), the collective missed time for the father adds up to approximately ten full days over that period.

Asserted unfitness of mother [ 16 ] Beyond the access denials, the father argues that the mother is overall unfit to continue as primary parent. [ 17 ] His evidence centers on considerable school absences for the child over the years (average of 27 days per year from kindergarten through Grade 4); delayed registration and very limited school attendance for the first few weeks of the 2022-23 school year in Spruce Grove; keeping him in the dark about her move and school intentions in the summer and early fall this year; not disclosing her current residence; being hard to reach (often unresponsive to messages) and inconsistent with pick-up and drop-off times; threats by her to cease complying with the 2017 parenting order altogether and to move to Newfoundland over his objections. [ 18 ] He doubts her overall capacity to care for the child: As I was aware that the [mother] was staying at a [hotel] in Edmonton for the month of August [2022] [after the mother had moved out of her long-time (six-years) apartment in Edmonton], I contacted her previous landlord to see why she had to move out so quickly. … [The landlord] told me that the only reason she gave [the mother] another two months [after declining to renew her lease] was that she did it for the child as the landlord has always cared for the well-being of the child.

The landlord went on to tell me that [the mother’s aunt] said she was taking care of the child while the [mother] “got her shit together” and agreed when the landlord said she should be living with her dad [i.e. the father]. On July 29th, 2020, I was emailed by this same landlord stating she was concerned about the well-being of my child. That the mother allows her to be out at all time and that tenants have told her that she has been locked out to play while the mother slept and took naps.

She said that the child was not being fed and that there were signs of drug use but could not be 100% sure . … [emphasis added] Mother’s attempt to justify withholding [ 19 ] The mother did not contest the father’s missed-parenting evidence. However, she tried to justify the withholding: … I do take accountability for the times and situations where I have felt it was in the child’s better interest to stay at home due to the physical and/or mental health of the child, and on rare occasions, upon request of the child not wanting to [have] visitation.

It is fair to note in the defence [of] these situations – over the course of ten years, the continuance of covert abuse, slander, and unlawful harassment has been carried out by the [father] in many forms and areas of our immediate family and private life, post and present stasis.

I have since addressed these concerns and issues to many public and private sectors within the course of ten years, as I have done my best to remain transparent as possible, in order to seek out the better interest for both [my] and the child’s emotional, mental and physical health. [ 20 ] I discuss later whether the mother successfully justified these withholdings.

Mother contests much of father’s evidence [ 21 ] More generally, the mother contests much of what the father says. [ 22 ] Her affidavit starts by saying that she “disagree[s] and dispute[s] the [father’s] [allegations] ….” [ 23 ] On school absences (which the father views as unjustified), she states: The child’s school attendance has been poor for many reasons in the past few years on account and for the record of both home and health-related issues. The issues we have been experiencing have been ongoing, concurrent, and brought much grief.

The health-related issues and illness is the direct result from undergoing a multitude of unfortunate circumstance(

s) and loss, causing undue hardship and heavy burden. Regardless of circumstance, it is both positive and imperative to note that the child has good grades and show this progress on the school report card. [her affidavit, para 4] [ 24 ] On the addition of Wednesday overnights for the father in 2018 (which the father viewed as beneficial for the child), she stated:

The [father] did not want to do the commute every day, as he felt it was too far and expensive for his daily travel, so I then co-negotiated a better plan suited to both the child and the [father] by allowing more overnight stays to assist and accommodate. This caused behaviour of our child to act out aggressively in anger, upon each time coming back into my car.

These are issues which have been documented and brought into discussion within the court system back in the year(s) 2013-2018. [para 6] [ 25 ] On the move from her apartment, she stated: … the contractual lease for our former home residence located at [Edmonton address] legally ended back in June 2022. The landlord … opted out of renewing the contractual lease for an additional year, because amongst many other unlawful reasoning, she was caught and exposed for illegally stalking, monitoring and harassing me at my home residence for over two years.

These circumstances, like many others, were out of my human control, yet caused much hardship for both the child and myself. [para 7] [ 26 ] On the Newfoundland aspect, she stated: … material circumstance has changed for our family household, as I lost both my [grandfather] in February 3, 2021 to natural causes, and also my father … on October 3, 2021 suddenly and tragically. I have since then become a beneficiary to that of both my father and grandfather’s property, land, will, and estate located in Newfoundland. I did not make any threat to move outside of [Alberta].

I simply stated that our circumstances are forever altered, and forewarned the [father] to be prepared for legal change(s). … [para 7] [ 27 ] As noted earlier, she referred (without details) to “covert abuse, slander and undue harassment” by the father. She elaborated (again without many details): This is a complex family matter that has been subject to change at a moment’s notice, solely dependent on circumstance risk factor(

s) which come from the cycle of toxicity and abuse. What I have been observing, documenting, and defending [against] since year 2014 to year 2022 is considered abuse. The risk factor(

s) continue to be harmful for both the child and myself with no solution nor remedy found Sitting with certain knowledges based on the [father], I detest from sharing my current residence and location coordinates with him for privacy and protection. … For immediate relief to said known risk factor(s), I have sought out emergency protection order(

s) on more than one occasion, most recently twice this year. Once on September 29, and two other times in October of this current year, 2022. … the [father] has shown many predatory qualities that trigger me into a fight or flight response. … … starting in year 2020, the [father] … made calls to my personal friends who were my neighbours and parents to our children’s community of friends at the time; however, [he] also kept in direct contact and communication with [my former landlord].

It is important to note that these types of behaviours and unlawful acts are in violation to both our natural human and civil rights.

In turn it is also volatile, abusive, malignant and malicious. … I feel that the [father] not only helped aid in stalking, harassing, and monitoring me within a group effort, but has also been covering up all kinds of monstrosities aside from this. [His] [application] and … supporting evidence shown in each exhibit display both cruel and vile intention. … [her affidavit, paras 9, 11 and 12] Material conflicts on material points [ 28 ] I find material conflicts on central points such as whether the historical school absences were justified (versus being a marker of parental unfitness), the living conditions at the mother’s former residence, and the adequacy of the mother’s day-to-day care of the child. [ 29 ] I also note that the bulk of the father’s evidence on the latter two dimensions is hearsay (statements reported from the landlord) or double hearsay (statements of the mother’s aunt, reported via the landlord). [ 30 ] I also find that some of the fall 2022 school absences were due to uncertainty arising from the father bringing an ex parte application for, and me granting, an order changing the child’s school back to her Edmonton school and a subsequent reversal of that order by me after hearing from the mother i.e. once she had notice of that order. [ 31 ] Much of the mother’s counter-evidence, going to her perceptions of the father and why he should not receive enhanced parenting rights, is vague and unfocused.

It is of a piece with similar allegations rejected by me in the 2018 trial. [ 32 ] However, even discounting (for sake of discussion) her concerns about the father’s character and conduct, the central thrust of the father’s application remains the mother’s overall fitness to continue as primary parent. [ 33 ] And that is where (as noted) I find material conflicts in the evidence. And in any case gaps in direct evidence e.g. about day- to-day life in the mother’s Edmonton residence.

Evidentiary conflicts and lack of urgency preclude material changes to parenting here [ 34 ] Is it appropriate to switch primary parenting (mother to father) on this conflicting evidence? [ 35 ] The answer is no. [ 36 ] Numerous Alberta Court of Appeal decisions bar such a fundamental change in parenting where evidence on material points is conflicting and where no urgency (justifying an interim order) is present. See, for instance, Shwaykosky v Pattison , 2015 ABCA 337 : The primary issue is whether it was reviewable error to change a parenting regime in these circumstances.

We make the following observations: Except in the case of urgency and only where it is clearly in the child’s best interests, substantially changing a parenting regime in chambers without the benefit of viva voce evidence is a practice that we do not endorse. This Court has said on several occasions that in the absence of seriously compelling circumstances, doing so is fraught with problems, is often

procedurally unfair, may lead to protracted litigation and moving children unnecessarily . See: DB v RB , 1996 ABCA 248 . Here there was conflicting evidence and no apparent urgency. The preferable practice was to direct a viva voce hearing leaving the status quo until better evidence accompanied by procedural safeguards was available. At the time the order was granted a viva voce hearing was expected to be scheduled .

The children were not in apparent jeopardy, although they had expressed views to the expert that they preferred a change in their care. [paras 6 and 7] [emphasis added] [ 37 ] And Mallard v Mallard , 2021 ABCA 47 : At the outset we note that substantial changes to a parenting regime – which is what happened here – should not be made in chambers without viva voce evidence, unless the situation is urgent and the new regime is clearly in the child’s best interests. [citing, in part, Shwaykosky ] [para 25] [ 38 ] And AF v DS , 2022 ABCA 20 : While we understand that the pandemic has led to the adjournment of in-person trials and compelled the use of electronic hearings wherever possible, a chambers judge should consider whether the process being undertaken is in the best interests of the child (or children), or whether a different process involving viva voce evidence would be preferable in order to find the necessary facts and provide some finality between the parties .

Repeated appearances to alter interim parenting orders are discouraged. Interim orders should focus on maintaining the status quo pending a proper hearing: LDM v WFT , 2017 ABCA 106 at para 7 . Unless there is urgency and only where it is clearly in the child’s best interests, a chambers judge should refrain from making substantial changes to a parenting regime without the benefit of viva voce evidence : Shwaykosky v Pattison , 2015 ABCA 337 at para 6 .

This is particularly so in high conflict matters where there is conflicting affidavit evidence , and where, as here, the expert evaluation intended to assist the court in resolving the conflict remained incomplete. [para 33] [emphasis added] [ 39 ] And JM v EM , 2022 ABCA 49 : … In cases involving parenting rights, unless there is imminent danger to the children or it is impractical, the court must give the parties notice and an opportunity to provide their positions: W(SL) v W(WN), 2007 ABCA 282 at para 6 .

This Court has repeatedly said that absent urgency and clarity on the children’s best interests, a chambers judge should not make substantial changes to a parenting regime without oral evidence, and when this is not possible, the orders made “should focus on maintaining the status quo pending a proper hearing” : AF v DS , 2022 ABCA 20 at para 33 ; LDM v WFT , 2017 ABCA 106 at para 7 ; Shwaykosky v Pattison , 2015 ABCA 337 at para 6 .

Particularly in high-conflict cases with conflicting evidence, “the court must ensure that the parties are afforded procedural fairness”: AF v DS, 2022 ABCA 20 at paras 30-31 . [para 48] [emphasis added] [ 40 ] And Chambers v Nyhus , 2022 ABCA 287 : In our view, the appeal can be determined on the basis that the chambers judge made a final parenting order stemming from an appearance in morning chambers, when there was no urgency, in the face of conflicting affidavit evidence about parenting and when allegations of sexual assault involving the child remained outstanding.

This is surprising given the chambers judge’s statement on November 25, 2021 that he was contemplating “interim adjustments”. An interim adjustment would have been appropriate.

Unless there is urgency and only where it is clearly in the child’s best interests, a chambers judge should refrain from making substantial changes to a parenting regime without the benefit of viva voce evidence: AF v DS , 2022 ABCA 20 at para 33 . “This Court has said on several occasions that in the absence of seriously compelling circumstances, doing so is fraught with problems, is often procedurally unfair, may lead to protracted litigation and moving children unnecessarily”: Shwaykosky v Pattison , 2015 ABCA 337 at para 6 .

Viva voce evidence was required not only because there were material conflicts in the evidence , but also because the PN5 report was not conclusive of the issue of sexual assault. “A Practice Note 5 report does not determine whether abuse did or did not occur.

It does not supplant the court’s role in determining the merits of the allegations through a trial.”: JM v EM at para 45 . [paras 21-23] [emphasis added] [ 41 ] Given the material conflicts in the evidence bearing on the mother’s fundamental fitness to parent, including whether the historical school absences were justified, and given the recent general calming of the waters (with the mother and child moved out of their apparently problematic Edmonton residence, the child now registered in the Spruce Grove school and no evidence of continuing chronic absences or any at all (albeit in these early days), no current evidence of any intention on the mother’s part to relocate to Newfoundland, and the father’s most recent access apparently tracking the 2017 order (as modified by the 2018 judgment)), I am not in a position to rule on the father’s bid to change primary parenting to him, and neither do I find it appropriate to make an interim order on that front. [ 42 ] If the father continues to seek this change, he must apply, through the family-docket process, for permission to

schedule an oral hearing or, as necessary, trial, at which viva voce evidence can be presented, cross-examinations pursued, and a foundation laid for sorting out these evidentiary conflicts and ultimately determining the parenting configuration that is in the best interests of the child.

No school-change order warranted now [ 43 ] In his application filed September 20, 2022, the father asked that (among other relief) the child be re-registered in her Edmonton school. [ 44 ] As noted, I granted such an order ex parte and then set it aside after hearing from the mother. [ 45 ] In his application filed on October 12, 2022, the father did not specifically request an order that the child return to the Edmonton school. I believe it was implicit in his request for primary parenting that, if he had received such parenting, he would have

been able to withdraw the child from the Spruce Grove school for re-registration at the Edmonton school. [ 46 ] With primary parenting not changing at present, I am not prepared to direct a school change: the child will continue at the Spruce Grove school. [ 47 ] I acknowledge the provision in the 2017 order requiring the mother to seek the father’s advance consent for matters such as a school change. [ 48 ] But that requirement does not give the father a veto over such a proposed change.

As I see it, if the parties are a logger-heads over such an issue, the answer is (or may be) a court application. [ 49 ] But I see the choice-of-school issue as downstream to, and largely dependent on, the parenting decision.

If the mother remains as primary parent, and if her move to the Spruce Grove area was permissible (and neither parties raised relocation or mobility principles in their arguments), those factors will presumably weigh significantly in favour of the child continuing at the Spruce Grove school. [ 50 ] Conversely, if the father becomes the primary parent, presumably that will weigh heavily in favour of the Edmonton school, which is in his neighbourhood and which he favours.

Enforcing the father’s access [ 51 ] The father also sought an order making his parenting police-enforceable. [ 52 ] I decline to make that order, with his rationale (per his October application) – the child then missing and needing to be located – no longer applying. [ 53 ] But I do find that he is entitled to make-up parenting of ten days, to be recovered by the father having five additional weekends of access, one per month in January to May, 2023, with the father to select the extra weekend for each month, advising the mother of his selection by no later than five days before the start of a given month e.g. by December 26, 2022 for January 2023, etc. [ 54 ] And I direct that any future missed access parenting by him will result in double make-up time for him, with the make-up dates to be selected by the father from the opening or closing segments of the Christmas, spring-break or summer-vacation time belonging to the mother per the 2017 order. [ 55 ] The reason for these orders is that, on the specific issue of whether the mother was justified in withholding access, we do not actually have conflicting evidence bearing on material reasons (or lack thereof) for the access denials, instead the mother’s vague and ambiguous evidence on that subject (reproduced above). [ 56 ] She had an onus to provide detailed, concrete evidence to justify withholding the child from access time with the father. [ 57 ] She did not do that. [ 58 ] She did not present any medical or psychological evidence about access affecting the child’s physical or mental health or of seeking medical or psychological assistance for the child relating to access time with the father. [ 59 ] Neither did she provide any details of the asserted presentation of medical or psychological difficulties for the child associated with the father’s access parenting. [ 60 ] Or any window, via any third-party counsellor or otherwise, into the views (if any) of the child here (now 10.5 years old). [ 61 ] Or of any reason(

s) provided by the child for not wanting access connection with the father. Or of inquiring as to any such reasons. Or of efforts to encourage the child to participate in access visits when balking. [ 62 ] Or any details of the asserted “covert abuse, slander and unlawful harassment.” [ 63 ] In any case, she did not give evidence that any such asserted behaviour by the father was directed at or to the child or, if directed at or to the mother, why denying access to the father was in the child’s best interest. [ 64 ] The mother made similar vague allegations against the father in the 2018 trial.

See paragraphs 64-73 of 2018 ABQB 886 for those allegations and my decision, discounting them, against imposing supervision of the father’s parenting. [ 65 ] The sporadic nature of the withholding is also telling here: if the mother had legitimate access concerns anchored in longstanding misconduct or otherwise detrimental behaviour by the father, she would presumably not acquiesce to full-weekend and overnight (Wed-Thur) access occurring most of the time i.e. instead take steps to eclipse the father’s access altogether, reduce it, have it supervised, or otherwise have her concerns recognized. [ 66 ] The mother did not apply for any such changes here. [ 67 ] I find that the mother did not justify withholding the child on any of the occasions outlined in the father’s affidavits (noted above), hence the make-up time and associated directions above. [ 68 ] If future access denials occur, they may bear on any change-in-primary-parenting application down the road i.e. as reflecting on the mother’s overall fitness serve as primary parent. [ 69 ] The present analysis approaches the access denials to date from an enforcement-of-access perspective i.e. not as a factor

bearing on the father’s change-parenting application. The reasons are that the noted evidentiary conflicts bar determination of that application and the access denials are insufficient on their own to justify that change, No-Newfoundland-move order [ 70 ] As for his request for an order barring the mother from moving to Newfoundland, the mother denies any present intention to relocate there. [ 71 ] The Manderscheid order (para 6) requires advance notice of any intention to travel outside Edmonton.

I believe it is implicit in that provision that any actual move outside Edmonton would also require advance notice, subject to a court order dispensing with that requirement. [ 72 ] I do not see any need for a “do not move” order here, in view of the implicit advance-notice obligation and the general legal obligations surrounding relocation or mobility scenarios.

Passports [ 73 ] The father also asked for permission to obtain a passport for the child (presumably without the mother’s consent) and dispensing with the need for her consent to out-of-Canada travel by him and the child. [ 74 ] The father may seek the mother’s approval and endorsement of any passport application for the child.

If she declines to participate, the father may apply for a passport for the child without requiring the mother’s consent or endorsement of the application. [ 75 ] Any passport obtained shall be kept by the primary parent (currently the mother) and provided to the other parent for any agreed-to or court-approved travel.

Sharing access-related driving [ 76 ] He also asked that “driving between parenting be split 50/50.” [ 77 ] I approve that variation to the 2017 order, with such sharing having occurred in at least the most recent access visits, the mother apparently having an adequate vehicle, her having made the decision to move outside the city, and the following direction in 2018 ABQB 886 : As for driving, I decline to vary the order as sought by the Father.

However, he can re-apply if the Mother fails to have the child ready for pick-up at the times directed in the earlier orders. [Here I am treating the 2022 access denials as instances of “ready for pick-up” failures.] Disclosure of address [ 78 ] Finally, the father seeks an order obliging the mother to disclose her new address to him. [ 79 ] A number of cases have reviewed this issue. [ 80 ] For example, see Lee J.’s decision in RD v SD , 2003 ABQB 612 : … I note with some concern the mother’s recent complaint in her letter dated July 7, 2003 that she does not know where the teenage son and the father are residing.

Short of serious harassment or manipulation by the mother, I do not see any reason why the father would not reveal an address and phone number where he and the son are living and can be reached . This would also be relevant for access purposes to the other child of the marriage, for whom the mother retains sole custody and primary residency. Accordingly, I am directing that the father provide a phone number and address where he is residing.

If the father has privacy concerns, or restraining order type concerns, then he must bring those forward in a separate application before the Court in regular Chambers . [paras 31-34] [emphasis added] [ 81 ] And Zisman J. in Wiafe v Afoakwa-Yeboah , 2021 ONCJ 68 : Is the mother required to reveal her address and telephone number? [heading 7.3] The mother seeks an order protecting her address from being released to the father . …

The mother goes so far as to depose that, “ I am under no obligation to reveal my address.” I requested that mother’s counsel provide me with any case law supporting her position that the mother’s address should not be revealed. The only case she provided was a civil estate case [32] with respect to granting a stay of an order that required information about beneficiaries to be released pending an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. The case is not relevant or helpful to a family law case where it is generally accepted that parents have the right to know the contact information of the other parent.

Counsel for the mother then submitted that it was not necessary for the father to know the mother’s address as the police were aware of the address and the exchange takes place at a police station. The mother … states that the father is … an “abusive mastermind” and these are “evil mind games” that he plays. These are serious allegations and is another credibility issue that will need to be resolved at trial.

There are many situations that can arise that require both parents to be able to contact each other and be aware of each other’s addresses and telephone numbers, not just a situation where a parent does not comply with court ordered parenting times. For example, there may be medical issues, school issues or simply a child forgetting items she needs at one parent’s home that need to be retrieved. Further, if one parent advises a third party such as a school or health professional that her address is not to be revealed it leads the third party to assume that the other parent may pose a risk to the child .

In this case, even if the mother’s allegations of domestic violence against the father were to be believed, they are not of a nature that would justify her position that she should not be required to reveal her address . The mother will be ordered to provide proof of this address and telephone number such as a utility bill and a telephone bill or if this is not her correct contact information then the mother is required to provide proof of her contact address and telephone number.

Until the mother provides proof of her address and telephone number, the expanded access shall not commence. [paras 311, 315-317, 320-322, 327-328] [emphasis added] [footnotes omitted] [ 82 ] And BK v JB , 2018 BCSC 2290 (Shergill J.): “It is in the best interests of [the child] that both parties know where D. is residing when he is exercising parenting time with the other parent.” (part of para 118). [ 83 ] Where domestic violence had been alleged and the evidence was conflicting, a father’s refusal to disclose his address was upheld, at least pending a motion to address the point and resolve the evidentiary conflict: PG v LVG , 2021 ONSC 2912 (Mitrow J.) (paras 33-35 ). [ 84 ] See also WDR v MES , 2019 ABQB 270 (my decision): To date, WDR has refused to inform MES of his address (or geographic coordinates in the absence of a precise address).

WDR can no longer shield his whereabouts from MES. Each parent is entitled to know where the other parent lives when parenting is involved. At minimum, she should able able to know where to find JDR if he were to reach out over the phone for assistance while at the trailer.

If MES somehow misuses knowledge of the address e.g. starts harassing WDR at the trailer, she will face the consequences. (WDR can apply for a restraining order or whatever he feel is necessary in that event.) [paras 41 and 42] [emphasis added] [ 85 ] In contrast, see AJK v JPB , 2022 MBQB 43 (Dunlop J.), where in a relocation context, the history of family violence relieved a parent from having to provide her address or other contact information to the other parent (paras 16, 36, 54-63). [ 86 ] In light of the above analyses of parent-address-disclosure, the vague nature of the mother’s concerns about disclosure, and the two (or possibly three) unsuccessful EPO applications by her in the last few months, I do not see any basis for keeping the father in the dark about where the child lives with the mother. [ 87 ] Accordingly, I direct that she provide her address or other geographical coordinates to him via text or email within two days of the release of this decision.

D. Costs [ 88 ] In view of the divided success here, the parties will bear their own costs of the application. Heard on the 9 th day of November, 2022. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 18 th day of November, 2022.

M. J. Lema J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: DB Self-Represented Litigant for the Defendant (Applicant) LL Self-Represented Litigant for the Plaintiff (Respondent _______________________________________________________ Corrigendum of the Endorsement of The Honourable Justice M. J. Lema _______________________________________________________ In paragraph 57 it was changed from “She did do that” to “She did not do that.” The last paragraph (under “Costs”) a paragraph number (88) was added.