Taschuk v Taschuk, 2022 ABKB 786
Opinion
Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Taschuk v Taschuk, 2022 ABKB 786 Date: 20230613 Docket: 4803 173013; ES03 148815 Registry: Edmonton Between: Walter Allen Taschuk Applicant (Plaintiff) - and - Candice Irene Taschuk Respondent (Defendant) and Estate of Walter Allen Taschuk Corrected judgment: A corrigendum was issued on June 13, 2023; the corrections have been made to the text and the corrigendum is appended to this judgment.
_______________________________________________________ Reasons for Decision of the Honourable Justice A. Loparco _______________________________________________________ [ 1 ] This is my decision in two applications to strike actions for long delay pursuant to Rule 4.33 of the Alberta Rules of Court , Alta Reg 124/2010 . I. Procedural Background [ 2 ] Walter (the Husband) and Candice (the Wife) Taschuk were married on March 11, 1988. They separated in May 2014. A Matrimonial Settlement Agreement was signed on January 27, 2015.
Certificates of Independent Advice given to both parties were attached to the Agreement. [ 3 ] The Husband filed for divorce on August 11, 2015. On March 7, 2016, the Wife filed a Counterclaim in the divorce action, seeking, among other relief, to set aside the Matrimonial Settlement Agreement (the Family Action). [ 4 ] On September 10, 2016, the Husband passed away; his will named his five children as co-executors.
After letters of probate were issued, the Wife filed an application for maintenance and support against the Husband’s Estate (the Surrogate Action). [ 5 ] The subsequent steps occurred in the Family Action: • August 15, 2016: The parties agreed to sever corollary relief from the divorce judgment and have the divorce judgment proceed by desk application. • September 9, 2016: Mah J reached out to the parties indicating he had questions about the application.
The Husband passed away the next day, September 10 th , before the Justice’s questions were answered. • February 21, 2019: The Wife filed an application in the Family Action to consolidate both the Family and Surrogate Actions (the Consolidation Application).
A chambers date for that application was set for March 7, 2019, and that hearing was adjourned sine die by consent. • February 21, 2019: The Wife filed and served a Notice to Produce Affidavit of Records. • March 5, 2019: The Wife filed and served her Affidavit of Records. [ 6 ] The following steps occurred in the Surrogate Action: • August 10, 2017: Letters of Probate were issued in the Husband’s Estate. • October 13, 2017: The Wife filed the application for maintenance and support. • November 29, 2017: The maintenance and support application was heard in morning chambers and was set for a half-day special chambers hearing on April 20, 2018. • March 28, 2018: The special chambers hearing was adjourned sine die by consent. [ 7 ] On March 25, 2021, Counsel for the Beneficiaries filed applications to strike pursuant to Rule 4.33 in both the Family and Surrogate Actions (the Strike Applications).
After a mutual misunderstanding about applicable deadlines, a special chambers hearing on the Strike Applications, scheduled for November 2021, was adjourned. [ 8 ] On August 22, 2022, the Wife filed a Notice of Change of Representation. The parties appeared before me on November 2, 2022, to argue the Strike Applications. [ 9 ] For the reasons that follow, Action 4803 173013 and Action SES03 148815 are struck for long delay. II.
Rule 4.33’s Guiding Principles [ 10 ] Rule 4.33(2) provides as follows: 4.33(2) If 3 or more years have passed without a significant advance in an action, the Court, on application, must dismiss the action as against the applicant, unless
(
a) the action has been stayed or adjourned by order, an order has been made under subrule (9) or the delay is provided for in a litigation plan under this Part, or (
b) an application has been filed or proceedings have been taken since the delay and the applicant has participated in them for a purpose and to the extent that, in the opinion of the Court, warrants the action continuing. [ 11 ] Many of the guiding principles for the application of Rule 4.33 are succinctly summarized in AE v Alberta (Director of Child Youth and Family Enhancement) , 2016 ABQB 591 at paras 11 – 18 .
The relevant principles are: • A functional approach to Rule 4.33 “inquires whether the advance in an action moves the lawsuit forward in an essential way considering its nature, value, importance and quality . The genuineness and the timing of the advance in the action are also relevant. This analysis is undertaken in the context of the particular lawsuit.
The focus is on substance and effect, not form” ( Ursa Ventures Ltd v Edmonton (City) , 2016 ABCA 135 at para 19 , emphasis added) ( Ursa CA ) • A step that “significantly advances” an action must move the parties closer to resolution ( Weaver v Cherniawsky , 2016 ABCA 152 at para 26 ) • The outcomes or consequences of the litigants’ actions are relevant to whether there has been a significant advance in the action ( Ro-Dar Contracting Ltd v Verbeek Sand & Gravel Inc , 2016 ABCA 123 at para 21 ) ( Ro-Dar) • A step required by the Rules is not necessarily a significant step ( Ro-Dar at para 14) • Prejudice is not considered under Rule 4.33 .
The court has no discretion to allow the action to continue if the requirements of the rule are met ( Ursa CA at para 10) • The plaintiff bears the ultimate responsibility for prosecuting its claim ( XS Technologies Inc v Veritas DGC Land Ltd , 2016 ABCA 165 at para 7 ). [ 12 ] In Jacobs v McElhanney Land Surveys Ltd , 2019 ABCA 220 ( Jacobs) , the Court restated the indicators of a “significant advance”: • At paragraph 86, the Court asked: “[h]as anything that happened.... increased by a measurable degree the likelihood either the parties or a court would have sufficient information – usually a better idea of the facts that can be proven – and be in a better position to rationally assess the merits of the parties’ positions and either settle or adjudicate the action?
Are the parties at the end of the applicable period much closer to resolution than they were at the start date?” • At paragraphs 88-96, the Court reviewed hypotheticals and asked if the facts, law, and positions of the parties relative to each other are the same as they were before the supposed advance. [ 13 ] In Rahmani v 959630 Alberta Ltd , 2021 ABCA 110 at paras 16-17 , the Court specified how to assess if there has been a three-year period with no significant advance in the action: you count forward from the date of the “last uncontroversial significant advance” to the date on which the Rule 4.33 application was filed, and then you look for a three-year period in that window with no significant advance in the action.
III. Issues [ 14 ] The issues in this application are: 1) Is a standstill agreement in place that applies to either action? 2) In either action, is there a three-year period between the last uncontroversial significant advance and the applications to strike for delay where no significant advance occurred? IV.
Analysis Issue 1: There is no standstill agreement. [ 15 ] The Wife argues that an email exchange between counsel that took place between February 26, 2019 and March 4, 2019 and dealt with the Consolidation Application created an indefinite standstill agreement because the lawyers agreed to adjourn the matter sine die after the Beneficiaries’ counsel accepted that “any time passing after March 7, 2019, but before your application can be heard shall not be considered by the court.” [ 16 ] Rule 4.33(8) governs standstill agreements and requires written notice including the suspension period, and when and by whom the agreement was made. [ 17 ] The Husband died on September 10, 2016, and a Personal Representative was appointed.
A core task of a Personal Representative is to administer the estate, which includes commencing or defending a claim on behalf of the estate ( Estate Administration Act , SA 2014, c E-12.5 , Schedule, Core Tasks, s 2(i) ( EAA) ). [ 18 ] By operation of the EAA and ss 3 and 7 of the Survival of Actions Act , RSA 2000, c S-27 , upon his death, the Husband’s Estate became a party to the Family Action, despite never being formally added to the pleadings. No notice regarding the supposed
standstill agreement was given to the Personal Representative. This failure to give notice defeats the claim that a standstill agreement ever existed. Issue 2: There is a three-year period between the last significant advance and the applications to strike. [ 19 ] On March 25, 2021, Counsel for the Beneficiaries filed the Strike Applications in both the Family and Surrogate Actions. [ 20 ] The last uncontroversial significant step in the Family Action is the desk application for the divorce judgment, filed August 15, 2016.
In the Family Action, any three-year period between August 15, 2016, and March 25, 2021, where no significant advance occurred will be grounds to strike under Rule 4.33 . [ 21 ] The last uncontroversial significant step in the Surrogate Action was the chambers appearance on November 29, 2017, wherein the Wife’s application for maintenance and support was adjourned by Court order to special chambers. Thus, in the Surrogate Action, any three-year period between November 29, 2017, and March 25, 2021, where no significant advance occurred will be grounds to strike under Rule 4.33 .
Consolidation Application [ 22 ] The Wife argues that her application to consolidate the Family and Surrogate Actions, filed in the Family Action on February 21, 2019, amounts to a significant step in both actions. [ 23 ] Counsel for the Wife cites Thiessen v Corbiell , 2018 ABQB 267 ( Thiessen ) where Justice Phillips found that the “application to consolidate is a substantive step taken to move the parties closer to trial”: para 24. [ 24 ] Thiessen is, however, distinguishable from the case at bar.
Thiessen involved two claims by the same Plaintiff regarding two separate motor vehicle accidents that occurred within a month and a half of each other. [ 25 ] In Thiessen , all parties reached a consent agreement to consolidate the actions. One Defendant then requested amendments to the agreement; the Plaintiff did not object, however, the other Defendant refused to sign the revised consent order.
Justice Phillips found that the fact that the formal consolidation did not proceed until later did not bar the Plaintiff’s application to consolidate from being a significant step that ‘stopped the clock’ because all parties had consented to the consolidation. The subsequent actions of the Defendants were outside the Plaintiff’s control after they undertook to execute the consent agreement.
Justice Phillips’ finding that the original application to consolidate was a significant step was further bolstered by the fact that in sorting out the issue around the consent agreement, the parties agreed to attend mediation together. [ 26 ] The attempt to consolidate proceedings in Thiessen is markedly different from the significance of the Wife’s Consolidation Application; aside from scheduling a chambers hearing for March 7, 2019, which for the reasons below I reject as a significant step, there were no other possible significant advances in the matters.
As I expand on below, the March 7, 2019 hearing was adjourned by consent, and never heard. [ 27 ] Counsel for the Wife further argued that because the Consolidation Application was filed first, it should have been resolved first since it could prevent the Strike Application. However, the Consolidation Application was adjourned sine die by consent but on the Wife’s initiative and not by Court order.
In order for the Consolidation Application to have made a difference in this case, the Wife ought to have secured a court date for the hearing (either by consent or by Court Order) before the Strike Applications were filed. By simply adjourning it sine die, the Wife permitted the additional delay.
Although the Wife filed a second Consolidation Application on March 31, 2021, since the Strike Applications were filed first, it was too late to argue that any Consolidation Application should be heard first. [ 28 ] Any time after filing the Strike Applications, the Husband would have been within his rights to refuse to participate in any further steps so as not to acquiesce to the delay until his Strike Applications were heard.
In other words, unless the Consolidation Application had already been adjourned to a future date certain, the Wife, who agreed to adjourn sine die, would not be able to insist on a priority hearing of her Consolidation Application for the purpose of retrospectively preserving a significant step. [ 29 ] When counting time in a delay application, parties should not be disadvantaged by decisions of the Court - such as an adjournment to a special chambers date - over which they have no control.
However, in this case, the decision to adjourn the special chambers hearing sine die by consent was within the Wife’s control with further options available to her to ensure the delay would not prejudice her claims, e.g., she could have rescheduled it to a date certain, sought an order of the court to set it down for a hearing, or, she could have addressed the proposed suspension of time in a proper standstill agreement or litigation plan. [ 30 ] In conclusion, the delay in seeing through the Consolidation Application was not outside of the Wife’s control – as was the case in Thiessen – and there is no evidence that the Consolidation Application was a catalyst for any other significant movement in the litigation.
Affidavit of Records [ 31 ] On March 5, 2019, the Wife filed and served her Affidavit of Records (AOR) in the Family Action. Counsel for the Wife argued that this was a relevant significant step in the Family Action. She did not argue, pursuant to the functional approach, how the provision of the Affidavit of Records significantly advanced the matters. [ 32 ] Before me, Counsel for the Beneficiaries argued briefly that the AOR could not be considered a significant step under the functional approach because no evidence nor argument had been adduced to show how the AOR significantly advanced the action.
[ 33 ] I also note that he represented that three years had passed since the filing of the AOR, which, upon my review of the chronology, is not the case – only two years had passed. Thus, it could be a significant step. [ 34 ] The case law offers direction on how to assess whether or not an Affidavit of Records is a significant advance in an action: see Ursa Ventures Ltd v Edmonton (City), 2015 ABQB 438 ( Ursa) , aff’d Ursa CA , and Covey v Devon Canada Corp , unpublished order of the Chambers Justice, aff’d in 2020 ABCA 445 [ Covey ].
In those cases, Justice Park and Justice Anderson were presented with arguments regarding the content, nature, extent, and timing of the AORs filed. The Justices also considered any subsequent steps taken by the parties in response to the AOR. Nothing similar was put before me by counsel at this hearing. [ 35 ] The Wife’s AOR was filed and served on Counsel for the Beneficiaries as well as the Personal Representative on March 5, 2019, two days before the date Counsel for the Wife incorrectly assumed was the drop-dead date. The documents listed in the Wife’s AOR are not before the Court, but the AOR is.
Documents were never produced for opposing counsel, nor were they requested. Approximately 16 months after the AOR was filed, counsel engaged in unproductive correspondence regarding the scheduling of questioning. [ 36 ] Counsel for the Beneficiaries took the position that the AOR did not significantly advance the action. [ 37 ] The onus is on the party making the application to strike to lead evidence that no significant advance has occurred within a relevant three-year period: Canadian Engineering Services Ltd v Doraty , 1999 ABQB 709 .
In both Ursa and Covey , the parties advancing the application to strike argued the insignificance of AORs filed in the actions. They raised arguments about content, timing, and context. [ 38 ] While Counsel for the Beneficiaries is responsible for establishing that the AOR was not a significant advance, there is no presumption that it was. In the absence of submissions from the parties, I am only able to assess the AOR by making certain inferences based on the timeline above and the record before me.
An assessment of the documents listed does nothing to assist me in the determination of whether “ the advance in an action moves the lawsuit forward in an essential way considering its nature, value, importance and quality.” I therefore infer from the fact that none of the documents were subsequently produced or requested, and that no questioning occurred, that the AOR did nothing to significantly advance the action or move the parties closer to resolution. [ 39 ] It was open to both parties to argue the significance of the AOR.
Furthermore, in resisting the Strike Applications, it was incumbent on the Wife to demonstrate how this step met the test of significantly advancing the action. Counsel for the Wife made efforts between July 2020 and March 2021 to
schedule questioning and mediation so that ADR requirements were met and a trial date could be scheduled. However, without more, these attempts are not considered a significant advance in the action. The Wife could have filed a notice to attend to ensure questioning took place. [ 40 ] Ultimately, it is the plaintiff that bears responsibility for prosecuting its claim and consequently, has the corresponding onus of ensuring that the steps are significant if they are to be relied upon to advance the action. V.
Conclusion [ 41 ] In considering these issues and the evidence before me, as well as the impact of my decision, I am mindful of the guidance our Court of Appeal offered in Jacobs , at para 70 : Modern courts, more so than has been the case in the past, are aware of the need to resolve actions in a timely fashion and the critical role they play in the achievement of this goal.
They understand that ‘objectives… general speaking, [are] not self-executing’ and that they must enforce anti-delay rules if they are to be effective. [ 42 ] On the evidence before me, I cannot identify any significant advance in the Family Action that occurred after the parties agreed to seek a divorce judgment by way of desk application on August 15, 2016 – four years, seven months and ten days before the application to strike was filed on March 25, 2021. [ 43 ] The only significant advance in the Surrogate Action was the chambers appearance on November 29, 2017, which adjourned the matter to a future special chambers date – three years, three months and 25 days before the application to strike was filed on March 25, 2021. [ 44 ] Both actions are therefore struck for long delay pursuant to Rule 4.33 .
VI. Costs [ 45 ] Should the parties be unable to agree on costs, they have leave to bring the issue back before me. Heard on the 2 nd day of November, 2022. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 28 th day of November, 2022.
A. Loparco J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: Douglas N. Skovberg for the Applicant Katie Noel for the Respondent Victoria Jones For the Personal Representative ______________________________________________________ Corrigendum of the Memorandum of Decision of The Honourable Justice A. Loparco _______________________________________________________ - All references to Counsel for the Husband have been changed to Counsel for the Beneficiaries - Para 13, the word “counts” has been replaced with “count”. - Para 26 has been changed. - The last sentence of para 27 has been changed.
- Para 31 has been changed.
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