Ziolkoski v Unger, 2023 ABKB 110
Opinion
Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Ziolkoski v Unger, 2023 ABKB 110 Date: 20230227 Docket: 0403 14625, 0703 15607 Registry: Edmonton Between: 0403 14625 Helen Ziolkoski (The Estate of Helen Ziolkoski) Plaintiff - and – Linda Unger, Boris Nahornick, Terrence Nugent, Her Majesty the Queen In Right of Alberta and John Doe Defendants And Between: 0703 15607 Helen Ziolkoski (The Estate of Helen Ziolkoski) Plaintiff - and - Lionel Whittaker, Her Majesty the Queen In Right of Alberta, Linda Unger, Cal Wrathall and John Doe Defendants _______________________________________________________ Memorandum of Decision of the
Honourable Justice N. Whitling _______________________________________________________ [1] In this action, the Plaintiff, Helen Ziolkoski, sues the Defendants for abuse of public office, misfeasance in public office,breach of fiduciary duty, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy. The facts relevant to these causes of action dateback at least as far as 1980 when the Plaintiff was the victim of a serious crime, and include Ms. Ziolkoski’s numerous dealings with theDefendants over the years as she attempted to obtain compensation for her injuries. Ms.
Ziolkoski has now passed away and the Plaintiffin this action is her estate. [2] In response to the Plaintiff’s claims, the Defendants have pleaded a limitations defence. This defence gives rise to the issueof discoverability for the purposes of s. 3(1) of the Limitations Act, RSA 2000 c. L-12. This issue will require me to consider what thePlaintiff knew or ought to have known at certain points in time throughout the complex history of this matter.
This will require me to siftthrough a large body of evidence pertaining to the Plaintiff’s dealings with the Defendants over many years. [3] The trial of this matter is about to commence with the Plaintiff’s opening statement. [4] The present decision addresses a pre-trial application by the Defendants for an order excluding certain expert evidence thatthe Plaintiff proposes to call in response to the Defendants’ limitations defence. The Plaintiff’s proposed expert witness on this subject isMr. Mark Feehan B.A. LL.B., a senior Edmonton lawyer with extensive experience in the field of civil litigation. Mr.
Feehan hasprepared a report which contains a
summary of his proposed evidence. In his report, Mr. Feehan states the questions he has been asked toaddress in the following terms: 1. Whether I would have advised Ms. Ziolkoski, prior to March 7, 2002, that her proper course of action was to sue Linda Ungerand/or the CCB [Crimes Compensation Board] (or members of the CCB), or whether instead to obtain a decision from the CCB and, ifnecessary, appeal that decision to the CIRB [Criminal Injuries Review Board]? 2. You ask whether, if Ms.
Ziolkoski had contacted me prior to February 2003 (the approximate date of receiving the full CCB filefrom the CIRB), whether I would have commenced an action on her behalf on a contingency basis against Linda Unger and the CCB forthe tort of abuse of a public office, or even mere negligence? 3. You also ask whether [sic], in my experience, what the chances were that Ms. Ziolkoski would have been able to find a lawyer inAlberta to represent her prior to February 2003 on a contingency basis to commence such an action? [5] In support of their application to exclude Mr.
Feehan’s evidence, the Defendants argue that Mr. Feehan’s opinion isirrelevant and unnecessary. They also argue that Mr. Feehan is biased in that the opinions expressed in his written report constituteargument in support of the Plaintiff’s position rather than objective expert evidence. [6] In response, the Plaintiff argues that she has proposed to call Mr.
Feehan out of an abundance of caution, given that in manycases, the courts have been critical of various parties for failing to call such evidence. [7] I turn now to the legal principles which govern this application. [8] The foundational Canadian decision on the admissibility of expert evidence is, of course, R v Mohan, (SCC), [1994] 2 SCR 9. The test in Mohan and the law on the subject of expert evidence were revisited in White Burgess LangilleInman v Abbott and Haliburton Co., 2015 SCC 23.
The net effect of these two leading decisions was summarized in R v Abdullahi,2021 ONCA 82 as follows: 34 A trial judge must use a two-step framework to consider the admissibility of expert opinion evidence. First, the proponent of theevidence must establish the threshold requirements of admissibility summarized in Mohan, at p. 20: logical relevance; necessity inassisting the trier of fact; absence of an exclusionary rule; and a duly qualified expert.
The second step requires the trial judge to exercisehis discretionary gatekeeping function by assessing whether the potential benefits of admitting the evidence justify the risks: WhiteBurgess Langille Inman v. Abbott and Haliburton Co., 2015 SCC 23, [2015] 2 S.C.R.182, at para. 24; R. v. Abbey, 2009 ONCA 624, 97O.R. (3d) 330 (Abbey (No. 1)), at para. 76. 35 The application of the Mohan requirements in any proceeding is case-specific. In each case, the trial judge determines issues ofrelevance and necessity within the factual matrix of the trial in which he or she is presiding.
The inquiry is very much a function of theother evidence and issues in the case being tried: R. v. Shafia, 2016 ONCA 812, [2016] O.J.
No. 5627, at para. 229. [9] Regarding Mohan’s necessity requirement, the learned authors of Sopinka, Lederman & Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada, (5th ed, 2018) at p. 845 summarize the leading cases of R v DD, 2000 SCC 43 and R v J(J-L), 2000 SCC 51 on this requirementas follows: §12.68 Justice Major, writing for the majority of the seven-judge panel [in DD], held that opinion evidence that is merely helpful ormight reasonably assist the jury did not satisfy the necessity threshold.
His Honour held that expert evidence is necessary when the fact-finder is apt to come to a wrong conclusion without expert assistance or where important information is unavailable without theassistance of experts. In R. v.
J. (J.-L.) the full Court affirmed that the necessity criterion and the proffered expert evidence must be morethan merely helpful – it must be necessary in the sense that the subject matter or information is likely beyond the experience orknowledge of the fact-finder and that the opinion evidence is necessary to enable the fact-finder to appreciate a matter in issue due to itstechnical nature. [10] Sopinka, Lederman & Bryant also explain at p. 848, §12.75 that “[t]here is no bright line to determine when a subject matter
falls within the normal experience of a particular trier of fact or becomes common knowledge”. In support of this statement, the authorscite the following words of O’Connor J.A. in R v F (DS) (1999), (ON CA), 43 OR (3d) 609 (CA) at para 65: There is no exact way to draw the line between what is within the normal experience of a judge or a jury and what is not. The normalexperiences of different triers of fact may differ. Over time the subject matters that come within the normal experiences of judges andjuries may change. The normal experiences of those in one community may differ from those in other communities.
In the end, the courtin each case will be required to exercise its best judgment in deciding whether a particular subject matter is or is not within the normalexperience of the trier of fact. [11] As the Defendants point out, expert opinions on questions of domestic law do not meet the necessity requirement and are,therefore, inadmissible: CNOOC Petroleum North America ULC v 801 Seventh Inc., 2022 ABQB 284 at para. 23. [12] In determining whether Mr.
Feehan’s evidence meets the necessity requirement, I have considered the case law surroundingthe discoverability principle embodied in s. 3(1) of the Limitations Act, and in particular the “warrants bringing a proceeding”requirement in s. 3(1)(a)(iii). In Condominium Plan 9421549 v Main Street Developments Ltd., (AB KB), 2004ABQB 962, rev’d on other grounds 2006 ABCA 194, Clackson J. provided the following
summary of factors that he considered to beimportant to his assessment of this requirement: 71 Having suffered an actionable wrong, what cost benefit analysis would have been reasonable for this prospective plaintiff to make?What were the advantages and disadvantages to bringing suit which it would have been reasonable for this prospective plaintiff toconsider? 72 In my view, it would have been reasonable to consider the following matters: the extent of the damage, the cost of remedying thedamage, the likelihood of success, the cost of proceedings, the likely time necessary to achieve success, the time to be personallyexpended by the Board's members in pursing action, the willingness of the individual owners to finance the litigation, the complexity ofthe potential litigation, whether the entire costs of the proceedings would have to be paid up front, and whether all or a portion of thelitigation could be undertaken by contingency arrangement.
No doubt, there are other matters which it might have been reasonable toconsider in this case. However, the foregoing is representative of the kind of issues that a cost benefit analysis might reasonablyencompass in this Plaintiff's circumstances. [13] Finally, I have reviewed the authorities considering the question of when the courts have found expert evidence from legalpractitioners to be necessary, and when such evidence has been excluded as unhelpful.
These cases hold that such evidence is generallyadmissible to determine the nature of the standard of care applicable to lawyers, but is generally inadmissible to determine the existenceof a duty of care: Adeshina v Litwiniuk & Co., 2010 ABQB 80 at paras. 169-175; Malton v Attia, 2013 ABQB 642. Determiningwhether bad faith has been demonstrated is well within the purview of the court: Agrium Inc. v Chubb Insurance Co. of Canada, 2007ABQB 140 at paras. 237-238. I am not aware of a previous case addressing the sort of expert evidence at issue on the presentapplication. [14] Having reviewed Mr.
Feehan’s report in light of the aforementioned legal principles and in all the circumstances of this case, Ifind that the Plaintiff has established the four admissibility requirements in Mohan. In particular, the proposed evidence will address thecost-benefit analysis that a decision by the Plaintiff to commence costly litigation would have entailed at various points in time basedupon the information that was then available to her.
As stated in Condominium Plan 9421549, these considerations include thelikelihood of success, the complexity of the potential litigation, and the economics involved in such a decision in light of the informationknown at the time. [15] In making this decision, I have taken into account the specific circumstances of this case, including the following: (1) there isno jury; (2) the proposed evidence does not appear to be overly lengthy (the report is only four pages long); (3) ample time has been setaside for the hearing of this trial, and (4) the documents in this matter are voluminous and the proposed evidence will be of assistance insorting through the documents of key importance to the limitations issues. [16] Regarding the Defendants’ submission that Mr.
Feehan’s proposed evidence includes legal opinions, it is true that Mr. Feehanmentions points of law in his expert report, and that his opinions are necessarily informed by his knowledge of legal principles. But I donot conclude that his proposed evidence is, in substance, an opinion on questions of domestic law. [17] Regarding the Defendants’ submission that Mr. Feehan’s proposed opinions lack objectivity and amount to impermissibleadvocacy, I do not find that any of Mr. Feehan’s written remarks raise this concern. The fact that many of Mr.
Feehan’s views aresupportive of the Plaintiff’s own position on the limitations issues does not render him biased in the sense discussed in White Burgess. [18] In those instances where Mr. Feehan’s opinions begin to approach some of the ultimate issues to be determined by me, I willof course be cautious when relying upon those opinions at the end of the day. [19] For these reasons, the Defendants’ application to exclude Mr. Feehan’s evidence is dismissed, and the Plaintiff will bepermitted to adduce expert evidence from this witness. Heard on the 22nd day of February, 2023.
Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 27th day of February, 2023.
N.J. Whitling J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: Robert P. Lee Victims Rights Law for the Plaintiff Tara Argent and Colten Harrish McLennan Ross LLP for the Defendants
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