Ziolkoski v Unger, 2023 ABKB 131
Opinion
Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Ziolkoski v Unger, 2023 ABKB 131 Date: 20230306 Docket: 0403 14625, 0703 15607 Registry: Edmonton Between: 0403 14625 Helen Ziolkoski (The Estate of Helen Ziolkoski) Plaintiff - and – Linda Unger, Boris Nahornick, Terrence Nugent, Her Majesty the Queen In Right of Alberta and John Doe Defendants And Between: 0703 15607 Helen Ziolkoski (The Estate of Helen Ziolkoski) Plaintiff - and - Lionel Whittaker, Her Majesty the Queen In Right of Alberta, Linda Unger, Cal Wrathall and John Doe Defendants _______________________________________________________ Memorandum of Decision of the Honourable Justice N.J. Whitling
_______________________________________________________ I. Introduction [ 1 ] In this action, the Plaintiff, Helen Ziolkoski, sues the Defendants in several causes of action, including misfeasance in a public office. At the time of the events in question, the Plaintiff, who had been the victim of a serious crime, had applied to the Crimes Compensation Board (“CCB”) and the Criminal Injuries Review Board (“CIRB”) for certain benefits from the Victims of Crimes Financial Benefits Program of Alberta. The Defendants were public officials responsible for the administration of that Program.
The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants committed certain unlawful acts when dealing with her application, which acts caused her to experience certain compensable injuries. The acts relied upon by the Plaintiff include certain alleged breaches of procedural fairness, notably certain failures to disclose documents to her. [ 2 ] On April 1, 2011, the Defendant Boris Nahornick, now deceased, was examined by the Plaintiff de bene esse .
The trial of this matter has recently commenced, and t he Plaintiff now seeks to have the transcript of this examination entered into evidence. [ 3 ] These reasons address the Defendants’ application to sustain certain objections which were raised by the Defendants during that examination, and to strike the resulting passages from the examination transcript. II. Questions 1 to 5, and 12 [ 4 ] The following Questions 1-5 and 12 raise similar issues: 1. But from 1969 to 1997, did you believe that you had to follow the general legal principles of administrative boards? 2. And. Dr.
Nahornick, if the lawyers told you that – this is during the period of 1969 to 1997. If you were told that there were principles of administrative law that boards had to follow, did you believe that you had to follow these principles? 3. When you were on the Board from 1969 to 1997, did you believe that you had to follow the principles of administrative board [ sic ]? 4. Do you know if the rules that these lawyers suggested to you about the doctors’ reports and the police reports was legal? 5. When you were on the Board, did you believe you had to be fair to applicants? [...] 12.
So I just want you to confirm that as a medical doctor, you agree with the assertion that Dr. David made, that starting a program of counselling and then stopping it partway through could cause irreparable damage to a sexual abuse victim. Is that correct? [ 5 ] In brief terms, these questions seek to elicit the state of Dr. Nahornick’s belief or knowledge as to the legal principles that he was required to follow when dealing with the Plaintiff’s application for benefits.
The questions are phrased in general terms in that they refer to, for example, the principles of fairness, without setting out all the specific duties that fairness requires. [ 6 ] The Defendants object to these questions on the basis that they are vague since they do not particularize the legal principles referred to, and since they seek to elicit legal opinions, or opinions on questions of mixed fact and law. A. Legal Principles respecting Questions 1 to 5, and 12 [ 7 ] The Plaintiff’s causes of action include misfeasance in a public office.
The elements of that tort were summarized in the leading case of Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse , 2003 SCC 69 as follows: 32 To summarize, I am of the opinion that the tort of misfeasance in a public office is an intentional tort whose distinguishing elements are twofold: (
i) deliberate unlawful conduct in the exercise of public functions; and (ii) awareness that the conduct is unlawful and likely to injure the plaintiff. Alongside deliberate unlawful conduct and the requisite knowledge, a plaintiff must also prove the other requirements common to all torts.
More specifically, the plaintiff must prove that the tortious conduct was the legal cause of his or her injuries, and that the injuries suffered are compensable in tort law. [Emphasis added] [ 8 ] The second requirement underlined in the above passage was examined in greater detail in the following passage from Odhavji Estate : 28... The requirement that the defendant must have been aware that his or her conduct was unlawful reflects the well-established principle that misfeasance in a public office requires an element of "bad faith" or "dishonesty".
In a democracy, public officers must retain the authority to make decisions that, where appropriate, are adverse to the interests of certain citizens. Knowledge of harm is thus an insufficient basis on which to conclude that the defendant has acted in bad faith or dishonestly. A [page285] public officer may in good faith make a decision that she or he knows to be adverse to interests of certain members of the public.
In order for the conduct to fall within the scope of the tort, the officer must deliberately engage in conduct that he or she knows to be inconsistent with the obligations of the office. [Emphasis added] [ 9 ] The Plaintiff submits that Questions 1 to 5, and 12 are relevant and material to the second element of the tort as explained in the above passages from Odhavji Estate . [ 10 ] Generally, a lay person cannot be asked questions which seek to elicit an opinion as opposed to knowledge of facts:
MacGregor v C.P.R., (AB CA), [1938] 3 DLR. 687 (AltaCA); Borys v C.P.R. Co. v Imperial Oil Ltd., (AB CA), [1950] 1 WWR 1093 (Alta CA).
However, where a professional person is being sued for breach of duty, and that person’scompetence and expertise are at issue, questions within the scope of the witness’s expertise are permissible, provided that they are notoverly broad or vague: Nicholson v McCulloch (1971), (AB KB), 21 DLR (3d) 126 (ASCTD) at pp. 127-28, aff’d:(1972), (AB CA), 26 DLR (3d) 384 (ASCAD); Quality Investments Ltd. v Curtis Engineering and Testing Ltd. etal., 1985 ABCA 236 at paras. 5-15. [11] Questions about the state of a witness’s understanding, expectation, or opinion at a specific point in time are questions of fact,not questions of law or opinion: Opron Construction Co. v Alberta (1988), (AB KB), 85 AR 143 (QB) at p. 152,para. 39 var’d on other grounds: 1989 ABCA 279; PetroFrontier Corp. v.
Macquarie Capital Markets Canada Ltd., 2021 ABQB 54 atparas. 62-63, aff’d: 2022 ABCA 136. [12] Where pleadings raise issues of mixed fact and law, questioning on the underlying factual issues is permissible: MansonInsulation Products Ltd. V Crossroads C&I Distributors, 2014 ABQB 442 at para. 167; Barclay Log Transport Ltd v Anglo-ScottishInsurance Co Ltd. (1963), (BC CA), 43 WWR 190 (BCCA) at 191. [13] A question may be objected to on the basis that it is vague, confusing, or misleading: Forliti (Guardian ad litem of) v.Woolley, 2002 BCSC 858 at para. 9(e). B.
Application of Legal Principles to Questions 1 to 5, and 12 [14] Applying the aforementioned legal principles to Questions 1 to 5, and 12, I find that all of these questions are permissible. [15] Given that the Plaintiff has a burden to prove that the Defendants were aware that their conduct was unlawful, she is entitledto ask questions respecting the state of the Defendants’ knowledge of their legal obligations at the relevant times. [16] Dr. Nahornick was a medical doctor and a member of an administrative tribunal. His position with the Board required him toexercise some degree of medical judgment.
The state of his knowledge respecting his own legal obligations at the relevant times is aquestion of fact and not a question of law. To the extent that these questions seek to elicit his opinions, those opinions fall within thescope of his expertise, and his expertise is at issue in this action. [17] Although these questions seek to elicit evidence respecting Dr. Nahornick’s knowledge of the duty of fairness, and althoughthe specific features that general duty vary with context, I do not find these questions to be overly vague or confusing. The question ofwhether Dr.
Nahornick or the Board understood that they owed a general duty to be fair can be answered without having to define everyelement or aspect of that duty. [18] Questions 1 to 5, and 12 are all permissible. III. Question 6 [19] The Defendants object to the following question on the basis that it “includes a hypothetical”: 6. And so you’d agree with me if the applicant says, I don’t know which doctor’s report you obtained; can you tell me which doctor’sreport you, that the practice of the Board would be to say, Well it was Dr. X or Dr.
Y or Counsellor A or Counsellor B? [20] In Real Estate Council of Alberta v Moser, 2019 ABQB 106, Ho J. (as she then was) summarized the law on this subject asfollows: 10 One way to attempt to elicit information that is outside the knowledge of a witness is by posing hypothetical questions. Whilehypothetical questions are not improper in themselves, they cannot become speculative, unrealistic or lack an air of reality: Maple TradeFinance Inc v Euler Hermes Canada, 2015 NSSC 37 at para 47; Dow Chemical Canada ULC v Nova Chemical Corporation, 2014ABCA 244 at para 21.
In asking hypothetical questions, counsel must not (
i) go beyond the pleadings (here, Originating Application) tofind a claim or defence that has not been raised; (ii) ask the witness a patently overbroad or vague question; or (iii) ask the witness tocomment on the actions or failures of other persons: Maple Trade at para 47. See also: Kostic v Scott Venturo Rudakoff LLP, 2022 ABQB 188 at para. 25(e). [21] As the above authorities confirm, Question 6 is not objectionable on the basis that it includes a hypothetical fact scenario. Thequestion is not speculative, unrealistic, or lacking an air of reality. Question 6 is therefore permissible. IV.
Question 7 [22] The Defendants object to the following Question 7 on the basis that it refers to another witness’s testimony based upon theexaminer’s own
summary or paraphrase of that prior testimony, rather than an exact reading from a transcript: 7. Is that a correct description of the policy from 1991 to 1997, or is that an incorrect description of the policy from 1991 to 1997? [23] Of course, a question is objectionable if it is misleading, and an example of a misleading question is one which mis-states ormis-characterizes earlier testimony: Forliti (Guardian ad litem of) v. Woolley, 2002 BCSC 858 at para. 9(e). But the Defendants cite noauthority for the proposition that prior testimony can only be put to a witness if it is read word-for-word from a transcript.
[ 24 ] Questions may refer to prior testimony provided that the examiner’s characterization of that testimony is not inaccurate or otherwise misleading. There is no strict requirement that the prior testimony be read word-for-word. The Defendants have not argued that counsel’s characterization of the prior evidence in Question 7 is inaccurate or otherwise misleading. Question 7 is therefore permissible. V. Questions 8 and 9 [ 25 ] The Defendants object to these questions on the basis that Dr. Nahornick’s knowledge as to the contents of certain documents three days before his examination is not relevant: 8.
On March 29 th , 2011, were you familiar with either of these documents? 9. Were you familiar with the contents of these letters three days ago? [ 26 ] For the sake of expediency, I do not find it necessary to provide a detailed examination of the documents at issue in these questions. It suffices to say that Dr.
Nahornick’s knowledge of the contents of the documents referred to in Questions 8 and 9 at the point in time referred to is relevant, since the existence of any such knowledge is important to understanding certain responses that were provided by him or on his behalf. [ 27 ] Questions 8 and 9 are permissible. VI. Questions 10 and 11 [ 28 ] The Defendants object to the following questions on the basis that they ask Dr. Nahornick to speculate about the concerns or internal state of mind of another party: 10. Well this particular RCMP office didn’t have a concern with giving this particular information to Ms.
Ziolkoski. Would you agree with that? 11. Did the RCMP have any concern with giving this information to Ms. Ziolkoski? [ 29 ] This objection is sustained, since Dr. Nahornick cannot be expected to know or otherwise surmise what was in the minds of the responsible RCMP officers. The passages from the transcript which pertain to these exchanges are to be struck out from the transcript. VII. Conclusions [ 30 ] The Defendants’ objections to Questions 10 and 11 are sustained and the corresponding passages of the transcript are struck out.
The Defendants’ objections with respect to the remaining questions are overruled and the corresponding passages from the transcript shall be entered into evidence. Heard on the 22 nd day of February, 2023. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 6 th day of March, 2023. N.J. Whitling J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: Robert P. Lee Victims Rights Law for the Plaintiff Tara Argent and Colten Harrish
McLennan Ross LLP for the Defendants
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