Legare v Acme (Village), 2023 ABKB 145
Opinion
Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Legare v Acme (Village), 2023 ABKB 145 Date: 20230313 Docket: 2201 04392 Registry: Calgary Between: The Village of Acme Appellant - and - Trevor Legare and Katelyn Legare Respondents _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Decision of the Honourable Justice Colin C.J.
Feasby _______________________________________________________ Introduction [ 1 ] The Village of Acme (the “Village”) appeals a decision finding it liable for damages for the diminished value of a residential property owned by Trevor and Katelyn Legare (the “Legares”) arising from a violent sewer back up caused in part by a sewer line running beneath the street that the Village knew to be narrower in diameter than required by provincial standards. The Village asserts that the Trial Judge erred in: (
a) accepting expert evidence of diminished value, (
b) finding that a stigma attached to the property because of the sewer event, and (
c) finding liability despite s 530 of the Municipal Government Act, RSA 2000, c M-26 (“ MGA ”) which exempts
municipalities from liability associated with inspections and maintenance of public works, including lack of inspections and maintenance. Provincial Court Decision [ 2 ] The Trial Judge heard this matter over three days in July 2021. The parties delivered written submissions late in 2021 and the Trial Judge rendered a 22-page written decision in March 2022: Legare v Acme (Village) , 2022 ABPC 54 . [ 3 ] The Legares’ claim stems from an incident that occurred in April 2017. The Legares experienced a sewer back-up in their home.
They called a plumber who snaked the sewer line for 75 feet to the property line and found no obstructions, indicating that the problem was with the Village’s sewer line. The Legares then called the Village of Acme to investigate and remedy the problem. A contractor working for the Village attended on site with a Hydro-Jet truck to flush out the sewer lines from a manhole on the front street. The high-pressure flushing resulted in “black sludge sewage infiltrating throughout their home”: Legare at para 11 . The Trial Judge described the property damage as being “extreme and catastrophic”: Legare at para 11 .
The Legares were out of their home for several months while remediation work was performed. [ 4 ] The cost to repair to the property damage experienced by the Legares’ and remediate the property to a livable condition was mostly paid for by the Legares’ insurer. The Legares’ claim against the Village is for stigma damages. Stigma damages compensate a property owner for the diminution in value of property caused by negative perceptions.
In this case, the Legares take the position that their home has diminished value because buyers would view the property negatively because of the sewage eruption even though it has been repaired and remediated to a high standard. [ 5 ] There were four fact witnesses: Ms. Legare, Dale Babcock who operated the Hydro Jet truck, Dennis Boulet a foreman with the Village, and Gary Sawatzky the Chief Administrative Officer for the Village. The Trial Judge found that where there was a conflict between the evidence of the various witnesses, he “prefer[red] the well articulated evidence of Ms.
Legare over the confused evidence of the latter two gentlemen [Mr. Babcock and Mr. Boulet]”: Legare , para 23 . Mr. Sawatzky’s evidence did not overlap with that of the other witnesses as he was not present when the incident occurred and testified primarily about municipal budgeting and decision-making. [ 6 ] The Trial Judge found that the Village owed the Legares a statutory duty of care pursuant to MGA s 532: Legare at para 45 .
He found that the sanitary sewer lines under Prospect Avenue where the Legares lived were four-inches in diameter while provincial standards demand pipe of six-inches or greater in diameter: Legare at para 42 . He further found that the narrow diameter of the sewer lines caused or contributed to the incident. He concluded that the Village knew “that the undersized sewer lines were susceptible to blockage...”: Legare at para 46 . [ 7 ] The Trial Judge then considered the Village’s position that MGA s 530 exempted the Village from any liability.
He dismissed this position holding that “the statutory duty of care imposed on a municipality under
section 532 of the MGA is an exception to the shield or immunity provided to a municipality pursuant to sections 529 and 530 of the MGA ”: Legare at para 58 . [ 8 ] The Trial Judge went on at paras 62-65 to apply the analytical framework in Nelson (City) v Marchi , 2021 SCC 41 and conclude that the Village’s duty of care was not negated because the impugned decisions were operational in nature and not matters of policy. Though it makes no difference to the outcome of this appeal, this analysis was unnecessary.
The distinction between operational and policy decisions that is found in the Anns v Merton London Borough Council , [1978] AC 728 (HL) test affirmed in Nelson has no application in the context of a statutory cause of action with duty of care stated in mandatory terms: Pyke v Calgary (City) , 2022 ABQB 198 at para 24 . [ 9 ] The decision concludes with an analysis of damages. The Legares sought damages based on diminution of the value of their home despite having repaired and remediated the property with the support of their insurer following the incident.
Despite some reservations, the Trial Judge accepted the evidence of the Legares’ expert property valuation witness, Nathan Brewster. Though Mr. Brewster estimated stigma damages at $48,000, representing 15% of the value of the property, the Trial Judge assessed stigma damages at $33,600. Issues on Appeal [ 10 ] The Village identifies three issues on appeal: (
a) Did the Trial Judge err in holding that
section 530 of the MGA does not operate as a shield to the breach of
section 532 of the MGA ? (
b) Did the Trial Judge err in considering the evidence of Nathan Brewster? (
c) Did the Trial Judge err in finding stigma and quantifying stigma damages? [ 11 ] The Village criticizes the Trial Judge’s causation analysis saying that it “dooms the rest of the analysis on damages and analyzing the use of the MGA ,” but did not identify the Trial Judge’s conclusion on causation as a matter for appeal. In oral argument, counsel for the Village confirmed that the Trial Judge’s finding that the small diameter sewer line under the street was a cause of the incident was not a subject of the appeal. Municipal Government Act ss 530 & 532 [ 12 ] The Village’s position is that the Trial Judge erred in his
interpretation of MGA ss 530 and 532. The
interpretation of a
statute is a question of law: O’Chiese First Nation v DLA Piper (Canada) LLP , 2022 ABCA 197 at para 8 . The standard of review for a question of law is correctness: Housen v Nikolaisen , 2002 SCC 33 at para 8 . [ 13 ] MGA s 530 exempts municipalities from liability for damage attributable to inspection and maintenance: 530(1) A municipality is not liable for damage caused by (
a) a system of inspection, or the manner in which inspections are to be performed, or the frequency, infrequency or absence of inspections, and (
b) a system of maintenance, or the manner in which maintenance is to be performed, or the frequency, infrequency or absence of maintenance. [ 14 ] MGA s 532 imposes liability on municipalities for failing to keep “public works in, on or above the roads” – which includes the sewer in the present case – in a reasonable state of repair: 532(1) Every road or other public place that is subject to the direction, control and management of the municipality, including all public works in, on or above the roads or public place put there by the municipality or by any other person with the permission of the municipality, must be kept in a reasonable state of repair by the municipality, having regard to (
a) the character of the road, public place or public work, and (
b) the area of the municipality in which it is located.
(2) The municipality is liable for damage caused by the municipality failing to perform its duty under subsection (1).
(3) This
section does not apply to any road made or laid out by a private person or any work made or done on a road or place by a private person until the road or work is subject to the direction, control and management of the municipality.
(4) A municipality is not liable under this
section unless the claimant has suffered by reason of the default of the municipality a particular loss or damage beyond what is suffered by the claimant in common with all other persons affected by the state of repair.
(5) A municipality is not liable under this
section in respect of acts done or omitted to be done by persons exercising powers or authorities conferred on them by law, and over which the municipality has no control, if the municipality is not a party to those acts or omissions.
(6) A municipality is liable under this
section only if the municipality knew or should have known of the state of repair.
(7) A municipality is not liable under this
section if the municipality proves that it took reasonable steps to prevent the disrepair from arising.
(8) When a traffic control device has been defaced, removed or destroyed by someone other than a designated officer or employee or agent of the municipality, the municipality is liable under this
section only if the municipality (
a) had actual notice of the defacement, removal or destruction, and (
b) failed to restore, repair or replace the traffic control device in a reasonable period of time.
(9) A person who brings an action under this
section must notify the municipality of the event that gives rise to the action within 30 days after the occurrence of the event.
(10) Failure to notify the municipality bars the action unless (
a) there is a reasonable excuse for the lack of notice, and the municipality is not prejudiced by the lack of notice, (
b) death is the result of the event complained of, or (
c) the municipality waives in writing the requirement for notice. [ 15 ] I interpreted the interaction between MGA s 530 and MGA s 532 in Pyke . I concluded in Pyke at paras 95-99 that a broad
interpretation of the exemption from liability in MGA s 530 would render the imposition of liability in MGA s 532 meaningless. This could not have been the intention of the Legislature. Accordingly, I interpreted MGA s 530 as relieving municipalities from liability arising from inspections or maintenance, but not from liability for failing to keep public roads in a reasonable state of repair.
I would add to my comments in Pyke that MGA s 532(7), which exempts municipalities for liability for disrepair if they have taken “reasonable steps to prevent the disrepair from arising,” has no function if MGA s 530 is interpreted broadly to exempt municipalities from liability irrespective of whether a failure to inspect or maintain is reasonable. [ 16 ] Legare was released a few days after Pyke . The Trial Judge independently arrived at a similar
interpretation of MGA ss 530 and 532. He concluded that giving a broad reading to MGA s 530 would render MGA s 532 meaningless. The Legislature, having imposed a duty in mandatory terms in MGA s 532 with liability attaching, could not have intended to negate that duty through MGA s 530. He explained that MGA s 530 was a general exemption from liability that did not immunize municipalities from the specific provision for liability for failing to keep roads and associated public works in a reasonable state of repair. The Trial Judge wrote at para 57: At first glance, it would appear that the sections of the MGA cited by the Plaintiffs and the Defendant can not coexist. Specifically, by
application of sections 529 and 530 of the MGA there would appear to be no instances in which
section 532 could impose a duty of careon any municipality. The provisions of sections 529 and 530 of the MGA are general in their application and intended to shield themunicipality against any, and all, liability. The provisions of
section 532 of the MGA on the other hand are quite specific in naturesetting out the liability of the municipality for failing to maintain roads, public places, public works in a reasonable state of repairprovided other preconditions set out in
section 532 of the MGA have been met. Pursuing the Defendant’s argument to its logicalconclusion, a municipality can never be found liable for any acts of wrongdoing and
section 532 of the MGA would never apply. [17] Though the Trial Judge’s
interpretation of MGA ss 530 and 532 is correct, some additional comment is warranted. The TrialJudge chose not to consider whether the Village’s duty of care required it to replace the substandard sewer lines: Legare at para 42. Instead, he concluded that the duty of care imposed on the Village an obligation to institute a system of inspection, maintenance, andrepair: Legare at para 44.
What is lacking in the Trial Judge’s reasons is an explanation of how there can be an obligation to inspect andmaintain in the face of the MGA s 530 exemption from liability for inadequate inspection and maintenance. [18] The narrow diameter sewer line in this case is a defect in the original design. Public roads and works with design defects maybe in a state of disrepair giving rise to a claim under the MGA s 532 cause of action: Pyke at para 12. The substandard sewer line in thepresent case is analogous to the road built with a tight curve considered in Housen.
I discussed this point in Pyke at para 13: Housen, which is best known for its statement of the principles of standard of review, concerned a claim pursuant to the RuralMunicipality Act, 1989, SS 1989-90, c R-26.1 s 192 which, similar to MGA s 532, provided that rural municipalities could be held liablefor damages for not keeping roads in a reasonable state of repair. The Court in Housen found that a tight curve in a road represented asafety hazard and that the rural municipality had a duty of care to mitigate the hazard by posting signs.
What is significantabout Housen is that the tight curve was identified as a permanent feature of the road and that its existence so long as there was nosignage to warn road users constituted a state of disrepair. Housen is consistent with Lusk and the
interpretation of Lusk by Boghosianand Davison. The duty to keep roads in a reasonable state of repair stated in Housen does not necessarily require the original design orconstruction defect to be corrected if it can be mitigated in other ways (eg. signage or change in speed limit). [19] Like in Housen, the present case is one where the original infrastructure had a design defect and thus was in a state ofdisrepair.
The Trial Judge concluded that the Village’s knowledge of the inadequacy of the sewer line and the heightened risk ofblockage impressed upon the Village a duty to inspect and maintain the sewer line “above what was the norm”: Legare, para 42. Adifferent way of putting this would be to say that once the Village was aware of the state of disrepair, it had a choice; it could eitherupgrade the sewer line to the required standard or it could implement a heightened regimen of inspection and maintenance.
Theheightened level of inspection and maintenance referred to by the Trial Judge was a hypothetical remedy to address a known state ofdisrepair, not the routine inspection and maintenance of infrastructure in a good state of repair to which MGA s 532 applies. Regardless,on the evidence before the Trial Judge, the Village did nothing to address the sewer’s state of disrepair until after the incident when thesewer line was replaced with larger diameter pipe that met the required standard. [20] The Trial Judge’s analysis of MGA ss 530 and 532 is correct. The appeal on this ground fails.
Expert Evidence [21] The Village asserts that the Legares’ expert property valuation witness, Mr. Brewster, was not qualified to give expertevidence.
The Village relies on R v Mohan, (SCC), [1994] 2 SCR 9 for the proposition that expert evidence must begiven by a properly qualified expert. [22] The Court of Appeal explained in R v Dominic, 2016 ABCA 114 at para 17 that “[t]he admissibility of expert evidence is aquestion of law reviewable for correctness insofar as the proper articulation and application of the legal test is concerned.” The Court,however, went on to observe that “appellate courts generally owe deference to decisions of trial judges to admit or reject evidence”[citation omitted].
Some of the Village’s concerns go not to admissibility, but to what aspects of the expert evidence were accepted bythe Trial Judge or how the evidence was weighed by the Trial Judge. These latter issues are questions of fact reviewable on the standardof palpable and overriding error. [23] Mr. Brewster was accepted as an expert on real estate valuation, including the issue of impairment of property value due tostigma. The Village submitted that he was qualified to testify concerning real estate values, but not impairment of value due to stigma. [24] The Village’s complaints about Mr. Brewster are: (
a) Mr. Brewster’s CV was not attached to his report; (
b) He is not published anywhere on the topic of stigma analysis; (
c) He lacked a full CRA designation at the time he prepared the report, and the co-signer was never tendered as a witness; (
d) He has never testified before a court on the issue of stigma; and (
e) He was unsure about the exact courses he took in pursuit of his CRA accreditation. [25] None of these concerns precluded the Trial Judge from accepting Mr. Brewster as an expert. McLachlin J, as she then was,writing for the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Marquard, (SCC), [1993] 4 SCR 223 held at 243: The only requirement for the admission of expert opinion is that the “expert witness possesses special knowledge and experience goingbeyond that of the trier of fact”: R. v. Béland, (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 398, at p. 415. Deficiencies in the expertise go toweight, not admissibility. As stated by Sopinka, Lederman and Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada (1992), at pp. 536-37:
The admissibility of such [expert] evidence does not depend upon the means by which that skill was acquired. As long as the court issatisfied that the witness is sufficiently experienced in the subject-matter at issue, the court will not be concerned with whether his or herskill was derived from specific studies or by practical training, although that may affect the weight to be given to the evidence. [26] The Court of Appeal in R v N.O., 2009 ABCA 75 addressed some of the concerns raised by the Village about Mr. Brewster.
The Court concluded at para 22 that it “is immaterial how ‘special or peculiar knowledge’ or ‘special knowledge and experience’ wasacquired.” The Court went on to hold that knowledge may come “from study or instruction, practical experience or observation; formalstudy is not a requirement. There is no bar simply because a witness has not been previously qualified” [citations omitted]. [27] The Trial Judge presided over what he described as “a lengthy voir dire into Mr. Brewster’s credentials...”: Legare at para 66. Following the voir dire, the Trial Judge concluded that Mr.
Brewster was qualified to give expert evidence. The Trial Judge’s reasonsshow that he was aware of Mr, Brewster’s limitations as an expert and that he was appropriately skeptical of the evidence given by Mr.Brewster. The Trial Judge did not err in qualifying Mr. Brewster as an expert or in admitting his evidence. [28] The Village also submits that there were substantive problems with the evidence given by Mr, Brewster that should have ledthe Trial Judge to not accept the evidence or give it little weight. The Village attacked Mr.
Brewster’s evidence on the grounds that hedid not attach a primary source defining “stigma”, his source materials included real estate appraisal course resources, he used stigmaassociated with homes used for grow-ops and homes with fire damage as comparables, and he failed to account for the fact that stigmadiminishes over time. These issues, alone or together, do not cause me to conclude that the Trial Judge made any error in accepting Mr.Brewster’s evidence. [29] With respect to the two most significant items in the Village’s litany of complaints about Mr. Brewster’s evidence, there arestraightforward answers.
Mr. Brewster’s use of homes previously used for grow-ops and with fire damage is understandable given thathomes that have experienced sewage eruptions of similar scale to the one in the present case are unusual and perhaps not as easilyidentifiable as homes that were former grow-ops or suffered fire damage. The criticism that Mr.
Brewster failed to account for the factthat stigma diminishes over time is understandable given that counsel for the Village was unable to tell the Court when the appropriatetime in law is to assess stigma damages – as of the date of the injury, the date of trial, or when the loss is crystallized through a sale ofthe property. Mr. Brewster assessed stigma damages as of a point in time and it was open to the Trial Judge to adjust that assessment ashe saw fit to account for the fact that stigma diminishes over time and the time when loss will be crystallized is unknown.
The TrialJudge committed no error in his treatment of the expert evidence. Stigma Damages [30] The Legares’ property was remediated and repaired following the incident. Often the cost of returning a property to goodcondition will be the appropriate measure of loss, but in some cases the cost of repairs is not an accurate or complete measure of loss. Roskill LJ in Payton v Brooks, [1974] RTR 169 (CA) at 176 explained: There are many cases which arise, whether in the field of contract law or of tort, where the cost of repairs is a prima facie method ofascertaining the diminution in value.
It is not, however, the only method of measuring the loss. In a case where the evidence justifies afinding that there has been, on top of the cost of repairs, some diminution in market value – or, to put the point another way, justifies theconclusion that the loss to the plaintiff has not been fully compensated by the receipt of the cost of complete and adequate repairs,because of a resultant diminution in market value – I can see no reason why the plaintiff should be deprived of recover under that head ofdamage also. [31] Robotham J, as she then was, in 618369 Alberta Ltd v Canadian Turbo
(1993) Inc, 2004 ABQB 283 at para 39 confirmedthat the principle stated in Payton v Brooks “is also good law in Canada.” See also, Bustos v Tardif, 2015 ABQB 202 at para 17 quotingdiscussion of this principle in SM Waddams, The Law of Damages, loose-leaf (Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada Ltd, 2013) at paras1.231-1.232. [32] Damages to compensate for the loss of market value discussed by Roskill LJ has come to be known in Canada as stigmadamages. Stigma damages are awarded to compensate for loss resulting from diminished value of property that remains even after theproperty has been remediated or repaired.
Stigma damages are, as the name suggests, the result of negative perceptions that continue toattach to a property despite repair and cause a reduction in market value. Labrenz J explained in Khalil v Durant, 2021 ABQB 241 atpara 40 that, for a claim for stigma damages to be successful, there must be “evidence that the value of the property was reducednotwithstanding repair.” [33] The parties agree that a finding whether stigma exists is a finding of fact and that the assessment of the quantum of damagesis question of fact.
Accordingly, the appropriate standard of review is palpable and overriding error. [34] The Village complains that while stigma is discussed extensively by the Trial Judge in the present case, there is no explicitfinding of stigma. It is true that the Trial Judge did not say “I find stigma”, but a fair reading of his reasons is that there was a finding ofstigma.
There is a significant discussion of stigma in the context of the Trial Judge’s evaluation of the expert evidence, which hegenerally accepted, and he concluded by awarding stigma damages. [35] The more trenchant criticism made by the Village is that the Trial Judge erred in finding stigma because the Village hadreplaced the sewer lines after the incident with larger diameter pipe that met provincial standards. Accordingly, there is no risk ofreoccurrence of a sewer back-up and no ongoing stigma.
The Village relies on Tridan Developments Ltd v Shell Canada Products Ltd, (ON CA), 57 OR (3d) 503 (CA) where Justice Carthy, writing for himself and Justices Abella and Moldaver,concluded at para 13 that the remediation of a site with gasoline contamination to a “pristine” state meant that there was “no support forthe trial judge’s conclusion that there is a residual reduction of value in a pristine site caused by the knowledge that it was oncepolluted.” The Village submits that Tridan lays down a rule that there can be no stigma damages when a property is remediated topristine condition.
[36] The conclusion that there was no residual reduction in value because there had been remediation to pristine condition inTridan is a factual conclusion specific to that case and does not set down a legal rule. Stigma damages are not about whether a propertyhas, in fact, been remediated; instead, they concern the market’s perception of that property which is reflected in its value. Remediationto pristine condition does not negate a claim for loss where the market assigns a diminished value regardless of the high standard ofremediation. [37] The stigma in the present case stemmed from two sources.
First, there was stigma attached to the property because of theinadequate sewer lines and the possibility of a re-occurrence of blockages and a risk that something like the incident would happenagain. This stigma was addressed by the Village’s replacement of the sewer lines with appropriate diameter pipe. A prudent buyerinformed that the Village had replaced the sewer line under the street would not consider the property to have any ongoing stigma tied torisk of sewer blocakges recurring. [38] Second there is stigma attached to the property because a significant amount of sewage infiltrated the property.
The Villageargues that because the house was repaired by the Legares and their insurer, there can be no remaining stigma. The Trial Judge,however, accepted Mr. Brewster’s evidence that a home that had experienced a serious sewage event would have stigma attached to itdespite full remediation. Mr.
Brewster’s evidence accords with the common-sense inference that buyers faced with a choice betweentwo similar properties, one that has had a significant sewage event that has been fully remediated and one that has never had a significantsewage event, will choose to buy the one that has not had a significant sewage event. The Trial Judge did not make a palpable andoverriding error in finding stigma. [39] The Village further submits that there was insufficient evidence to assess the quantum of damages. The expert evidence,which is discussed in the preceding
section of these Reasons, pegged the stigma at 15% of the value of the property. The Trial Judgereduced this amount to just over 10% of the value of the property to account for the fact that stigma diminishes over time. [40] The Trial Judge acknowledged the impossibility of assessing stigma damages in this case with any precision.
He citedPenvidic v International Nickel, (SCC), [1976] 1 SCR 267 which, in turn, cited Wood v Grand Valley Railway Company, (SCC), [1915] 51 SCR 283 at 289 for the proposition that where a court has found that there has been a loss, the Courtmust do the “best it can” even if “the amount of the verdict is a matter of guess work.” [41] The Trial Judge’s assessment of quantum was not guesswork; it relied on expert evidence. Expert assessments of propertyvalue are always imperfect and couched in qualifications, but Courts work with this kind of imprecision every day.
The Trial Judge’sassessment of the quantum of damages was reasonable and discloses no palpable and overriding error. Conclusion [42] The appeal is dismissed. The Legares are entitled to the costs of the trial and appeal. If the parties are unable to agree on thequantum of costs, they may make written submissions of less than 5 pages supported by a bill of costs. Heard on the 10th day of March, 2023. Dated at the City of Calgary, Alberta this 13th day of March, 2023. Colin C.J. Feasby J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: Michael J. Geib & Gregory W.
Jaycock, Parlee McLaws LLP for the Appellant Nicholas Lo, McLeod Law LLP for the Respondents
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