Bruneau v Quinn, 2023 ABKB 177
Opinion
Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Bruneau v Quinn, 2023 ABKB 177 Date: 20230327 Docket: 2303 04169 Registry: Edmonton Between: Calvin Bruneau, Sheila Desjarlais, Murray MacKinnon, Ezra Bergsma, Daniel Deschamps, Papaschase Cree Nation Society and Papaschase Employment and Training Centre Applicants - and - George Frank Quinn, Darlene Misik, Bonnie Gravel, Mark Nixdorf, Clifford Gladue, Papaschase First Nation #136 Association, Papaschase First Nation Group of Companies Inc., Papaschase First Nation #136 Inc., and Beaver Hills House 136 Inc., Robert Stanley Ghostkeeper, Dellmar Lapratt, and Deborah (Debbie) Lynn Metz Respondents _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Decision of the Honourable Justice W.N.
Renke _______________________________________________________ This decision was delivered orally, with written reasons to follow. [ 1 ] The Applicants have applied for a without notice interim injunction. [ 2 ] For the reasons that follow, the injunction is granted. [ 3 ] I’ll begin with three observations and an identification of what, in my view, was at stake in this application. [ 4 ] First, as this was a without notice application, I have relied on a record contributed to by only one party. My factual
determinations should be understood to bear that limitation. [ 5 ] Second, the Applicants have provided undertakings respecting damages. [ 6 ] Third, the record provided by the Applicants was extensive. The application was prefaced with a lot of background information. While the depth of background information provided may have been unusual, it was entirely appropriate. It was necessary for the application to be set in its proper context. [ 7 ] That context showed that this application was not about criticisms or even alleged defamation of the individual Applicants.
Had the application concerned only alleged defamation, an injunction likely would not have been appropriate: Peyrow v Kaklin , 2022 ABKB 823 . Freedom of speech, particularly in a political context, might not be restrained prior to a trial determination. [ 8 ] Neither was the application about mere economic competition between the Applicants and Respondents. [ 9 ] The application was not so much about the individual Applicants’ interests, although their interests were intertwined with broader interests.
The application concerned the individual Applicants as office-holders, as representatives. [ 10 ] What was the application about? This is what the background material illuminated. The application concerned the protection of the protection of the constitutional order of a nascent First Nation and the protection of that First Nation’s relationships with other governmental and private bodies. The application also concerned the protection of the economic interests and the futures of the members of that First Nation. I. Background [ 11 ] Except as otherwise indicated, the following is drawn from Mr.
Bruneau’s affidavit of February 1, 2023 (the First Affidavit). (For a far more complete exposition of the background, see the decision of Slatter J, as he then was, in Papaschase Indian Band (Descendants of) v Canada (Attorney General) , 2004 ABQB 655, 2006 ABCA 392 (revd in part) , sub nom Canada (Attorney General) v Lameman , 2008 SCC 14 (restoring Slatter J’s order) at paras 11-47(QB).) A. Loss of Rights [ 12 ] The Papaschase First Nation (PFN) signed Treaty 6 in 1877 and held reserve lands in the vicinity of part of present-day Edmonton (IR 136). By about 1886, reserve members lost access to food.
The federal government did not provide rations or relief that would prevent starvation. Chief Papaschase and other members of the PFN took Métis scrip. They surrendered their treaty rights and land rights for money or land so they could survive. Eventually, by 1888, the federal government seized the reserve and the PFN members were forced from the reserve lands. [ 13 ] As a consequence, the PFN is not a “band” under the Indian Act and is not formally recognized by the federal government. B.
Consultation, Organization, and the First Election [ 14 ] The descendants of the PFN members that adhered to Treaty 6 and had rights respecting IR 136 (the PFN descendants) have sought recognition by the federal government as a First Nation with Aboriginal and Treaty rights and have sought to right the wrongs committed by the federal government. [ 15 ] The Papaschase descendants asked the Chiefs of the Assembly of the Confederacy of Treaty Six First Nations how to proceed.
The Chiefs gave their approval for the Papaschase descendants to seek the advice, wisdom, and guidance of the Elders Council of the Papaschase IR 136 Descendants (the Papaschase Elders). [ 16 ] In 1999, the Papaschase Elders passed a resolution supporting the Papaschase descendants’ efforts to advance their claim against the federal Crown.
The resolution contemplated the creation of a committee with authority to advance the claim. [ 17 ] This committee later became the Chief and Council for the PFN. [ 18 ] The mandate of the PFN Council is to provide good governance for the Papaschase descendants, represent the Papaschase descendants on all issues, obtain a just settlement for the alleged unlawful surrender of IR 136 and pursue recognition of the PFN and Aboriginal and Treaty rights. [ 19 ] Two groups competed for leadership of the Papaschase descendants. [ 20 ] In 1999, following the Elders’ advice, a first group of about 300 Papaschase descendants assembled and held the first election for PFN Council.
A second group was led by Frances Doreen Wabasca. This group was named the Pahpahstayo First Nation or the Passpasschase First Nation Association. This group did not participate in the 1999 election. Mr. Bruneau stated that, to the best of his knowledge, this group was not active from about 2000 until 2019. [ 21 ] To vote and run in the election, individuals had to provide proof that they were Papaschase descendants. The PFN has established a Membership Code. [ 22 ] Rose Lameman was elected Chief in the first election. Mr. Bruneau was elected to Council. [ 23 ] The Papaschase descendants adopted an Election Code.
The Election Code has been used in all subsequent elections for Chief
and Council and elections have been conducted in accordance with that code. C. The 2019 Election [ 24 ] Mr. Bruneau was elected Chief of the PFN in 2011. He was re-elected in 2015. [ 25 ] In the fall of 2019, the PFN held its regularly scheduled election for Chief and Council. The election of Chief and some council members was held on September 7, 2019 and the election for the remaining council seats was held on October 5, 2019. [ 26 ] Mr. Bruneau and the Respondent George Frank Quinn ran for Chief. Mr. Bruneau was elected.
The Respondent Darlene Misik initially stood for election to Council but withdrew as a candidate before the vote. [ 27 ] The other Applicants (Sheila Desjarlais, Murray MacKinnon, Ezra Bergsma, Daniel Deschamps) were elected as Councillors in the 2019 election. [ 28 ] The 2019 election results have not been challenged under the Election Code. D.
Recognition and Resources [ 29 ] In 2018, both the Assembly of Treaty Chiefs of Alberta and the Assembly of First Nations passed resolutions recognizing the PFN and Chief and Council as the representatives of the Papaschase descendants. [ 30 ] The Chief and Council are recognized by the Confederacy of Treaty 6 First Nations Chiefs as the representatives of the PFN and the Papaschase descendants. E. Activities [ 31 ] As Chief, Mr.
Bruneau has led the PFN in matters requiring Council’s involvement, including: • communicating with the public and government on behalf of the PFN • establishing and maintaining relationships with federal and provincial funding agencies • creating joint ventures with industry • representing PFN in business transactions, including obtaining loans and financing. [ 32 ] Since 1999, the PFN Council has worked to gain recognition from the federal government. [ 33 ] The PFN has acted as a sovereign “Indian band.” It has established governance structures, and secured resources for Papaschase descendants, including educational and employment opportunities. [ 34 ] Currently there are about 800 Papaschase descendants on the membership list for the PFN and about 250 individuals who provided a genealogy verified by the PFN demonstrating their lineage from Chief Papaschase.
F.
The Respondents [ 35 ] After the 2019 election, individual Respondents or their associates have • held themselves out as representatives of the Papaschase descendants and the PFN and as Chief and Council of the PFN in press releases, on websites, in social media posts, and at public events (First Affidavit paras 50(e), (f), (p), (q), (s), 55, 62, 63, 64-68) • contacted business partners of the PFN to discuss participation in projects (para 48(j)) and have interfered in relations with business partners seeking to be recognized as the representatives of the PFN (paras 50(g), (h), (r), 51) • expressed the intention to apply for federal funding on behalf of the PFN (para 50(i)) • written to federal Ministers for Crown-Indigenous Relations and Indigenous Services, expressing dissatisfaction with the 2019 election and attempted to insert themselves into the PFN recognition process (para 50(c)) • written to the Mayor and City Council of Edmonton claiming the 2019 election was illegal and asserted that they should be regarded as the representatives of the PFN (para 50 (d)), attended City project meetings claiming to represent the PFN (para 50(l)), and attempted to become involved as representatives of PFN in consultations relating to the renaming of the Oliver neighborhood (para 50(t)) • attended a ceremony held by the Confederacy of Treaty 6 First Nations and accepted a gift on behalf of the PFN (para 50(n), (q.iii)) • published an image on a PPCFN website substantially similar to the image found on the PFN website (paras 57-58) and used that image on PPCFN correspondence (para 59). [ 36 ] The Respondents have raised questions about whether Mr.
Bruneau is a descendant of Chief Papaschase and about his business dealings.
[ 37 ] In his supplemental affidavit dated March 3, 2023 (Supplemental Affidavit) at para 4, Mr. Bruneau stated that on January 31, 2023, he received a letter from Jamie Brown, Regional Director General, Regional Operations, Alberta Region, Indigenous Services Canada. Mr. Brown wrote that “at least three other individuals assert to represent the interests of the former Papaschase Band, namely Darlene Misik, Dellmar LaPratt, and Robert Stanley Ghostkeeper.” Mr. Bruneau had not been aware of Mr. Ghostkeeper and Mr. LaPratt’s claims to represent the PFN until receiving Mr. Brown’s correspondence: para 7. [ 38 ] Mr.
Ghostkeeper has made social media posts claiming to be the Acting Hereditary Chief of the Pahpahstayo/Papachase First Nation: para 9. [ 39 ] Mr. LaPratt was described as working with Debbie Lynn Metz to commence an action on behalf of the Papaschase descendants: paras 14-22. [ 40 ] The Supplemental Affidavit also referred to another instance of the Respondents (specifically Ms.
Misik) asserting representative status for PFN and becoming involved in a business relationship with a potential industry partner: paras 29-32. [ 41 ] None of the individual Respondents holds a position attained through the PFN Election Code process. II. The Application [ 42 ] Two main issues must be addressed. First, whether this application should have been heard without notice to the Respondents. Second, whether an interim injunction should be granted. [ 43 ] The background I have described is relevant to both issues. A.
Without Notice [ 44 ] Rule 6.4 provides as follows: 6.4 Despite any other rule to the contrary, notice of an application is not required to be served on a party if an enactment so provides or permits or the Court is satisfied that (
a) no notice is necessary, or (
b) serving notice of the application might cause undue prejudice to the applicant. In this instance, 6.4(
b) is engaged. I must be satisfied that serving notice of the application might have caused undue prejudice to the Applicants. [ 45 ] In Ruby v Canada (Solicitor General) , 2002 SCC 75 , Justice Arbour wrote as follows at para 25: [25] .... The circumstances in which a court will accept submissions ex parte are exceptional and limited to those situations in which the delay associated with notice would result in harm or where there is a fear that the other party will act improperly or irrevocably if notice were given.
For instance, temporary injunctions are often issued ex parte in order to preserve the status quo for a short period of time before both parties can be heard (to prevent the demolition of a building, for example).
The Court of Appeal wrote at para 41 of Secure 2013 Group Inc v Tiger Calcium Services Inc , 2017 ABCA 316 that “it is a fundamental principle that parties have a right to be heard before their rights are negatively affected.” [ 46 ] The Applicants’ position was that “there is a concern that giving notice may precipitate the damage which the application is intended to prevent,” citing Justice Veit in 1400467 Alberta Ltd v Adderley , 2012 ABQB 155 at para 35 . [ 47 ] The Applicants argued that: • the Respondents “have engaged in a concerted campaign to discredit the PFN Council, particularly the Applicant Bruneau, which has increased in frequency and severity over time:” Applicants’ Brief (AB) at para 45, relying on paras 50, 64, and 70 of the First Affidavit; and in submissions the Applicants argued that the Respondents’ activities have increased since last summer and have become “more aggressive” • “These actions have resulted in community strife and negatively impacted the business and other relationships PFN Council have spent years developing:” AB para 46 • “Given the history of the actions taken by the Respondents, ... it is reasonable for the Court to draw the inference that providing notice of the application would encourage an escalation of the exact behaviour the injunction seeks to prevent ...:” AB para 47. [ 48 ] In my opinion, proceeding with the without notice application was, in all the circumstances, appropriate. [ 49 ] As for “why now?”, it is true that some damage has already been done to the Papaschase descendants to this point.
Government and industry have already had to contend with between two to four claimed representatives of the Papaschase descendants. That at least raises the reasonably likelihood that government and industry will be reluctant to work with the Papaschase descendants, for fear of dealing with the wrong representatives, and indeed, with the wrong parties. Dealing with the Papaschase descendants will not be worth the risk. The fact that damage has already occurred, however, should not preclude an injunction to stop further damage from occurring.
The longer government and industry are faced with competing representatives the greater the likelihood that governmental
and industry cooperation will cease. Worse damage may be caused than has already occurred. [50] Moreover, if nothing is done, it is very likely that what has occurred in the past will continue, causing further damage to thePapaschase descendants. The record has demonstrated continuous activity by the individual Respondents involving express or implicitclaims of being the proper representatives of the Papaschase descendants. [51] In September 2022, counsel for the Applicants sent “cease and desist” correspondence to the individual Respondents: FirstAffidavit at para 73. Ms.
Misik sent an e-mail to Applicants’ counsel on September 14, 2022. Her correspondence did not indicate thatthe Respondents would cease and desist. [52] Ms. Misik is a lawyer, but she is pursued in her personal capacity. The Applicants had no evidence that she is acting for theother Respondents or as counsel for herself. [53] As an additional matter respecting the propriety of a without notice application, I confirm (again) that the Applicants haveprovided very comprehensive materials in support of their application. B.
Interim Injunction [54] What is sought is an interim injunction only, to be returned to Chambers, reviewed in a Special Application and (ifmaintained) then at trial. [55] The test for an interim injunction is the tripartite test established in RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney General), (SCC), [1994] 1 SCR 311, Sopinka and Cory JJ at 334: (
a) there is a serious issue to be tried (
b) the Applicants would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted (
c) the balance of convenience favours granting the injunction. Justice Feth observed in Musaskapeo v Alberta (Director of SafeRoads), 2021 ABQB 1018 at para 13 that [13] While each branch of the test is considered, the factors are not watertight compartments. They relate to each other and can blendtogether. Strength in one part of the analysis can compensate for weakness in another.
In particular, the second and third branches are“inexorably linked and should be considered together”: Irwin v Alberta Veterinary Medical Association, 2015 ABCA 176 at para 21 ...;Pocklington Financial Corp v Alberta Treasury Branches, 1998 ABCA 254 at para 8.
Justice Veit observed in Enviro Trace Ltd v Sheichuk, 2014 ABQB 381at para 28 that the tripartite test “is a useful particularization ofthe factors inherent in an assessment of whether it is fair and equitable to issue an interlocutory injunction in a particular set ofcircumstances.” [56] The overarching consideration is whether it is “fair and equitable” or “just and equitable” or “just and convenient” to grant theinjunction: see Judicature Act, s. 13(2) (“An order in the nature of ... injunction may be granted ... by an interlocutory order of the Courtin all cases in which it appears to the Court to be just or convenient that the order should be made, and the order may be made eitherunconditionally or on any terms and conditions the Court thinks just”). [57] Once again, the background I described is relevant to each of the three elements of the tripartite test. 1.
Serious Issue to be Tried [58] I bear in mind that the threshold for this test is low. I am not deciding the case on the merits: RJR-MacDonald at 337-338. [59] As I stated initially, I do not view this application as a means to protect the private interests of the Applicants. The Applicantshold official positions in the PFN governance structure. It is that structure and the individuals it serves that are to be protected by theinjunction. (
a) Interference with Governance [60] I consider the foundation of the Applicants’ argument to be that the Respondents have violated PFN Indigenous law protectedunder s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. [61] The Applicants referred to para 137 of Justice Williamson’s decision in Campbell v AG BC/AG Canada and Nisga’a Nation,2000 BCSC 1123: [137] Can it be, as the plaintiffs’ submission would hold, that a limited right to self-government cannot be protected constitutionally bySection 35(1)? I think not.
The above passages from Delgamuukw suggesting the right for the community to decide to what uses theland encompassed by their aboriginal title can be put are determinative of the question. The right to aboriginal title “in its full form”,including the right for the community to make decisions as to the use of the land and therefore the right to have a political structure formaking those decisions, is, I conclude, constitutionally guaranteed by
Section 35. [emphasis added] See also paras 140-143. [62] The Papaschase descendants had a right to decide how they would create a governmental structure for themselves.
[ 63 ] The Papaschase descendants consulted with Elders, and developed the Chief and Counsel structure, with the Election Code. The Papaschase descendants established what were in effect constitutional rules. Elections were held under those rules. Mr. Bruneau was elected in 2019.
His election was not contested under the Election Code. [ 64 ] The PFN Chief and Counsel have been recognized by the Assembly of Treaty Chiefs of Alberta, the Assembly of First Nations, and the Confederacy of Treaty 6 First Nations Chiefs. [ 65 ] In my opinion, on the record, there is significant merit to the Applicants’ contention that the governance structure established by the Papaschase descendants is the sole and valid legal governance structure for the PFN and the Applicants have properly acquired their representative status through that process. [ 66 ] Moreover, in my opinion, the individual Applicants, as the duly elected representatives of the Papaschase descendants, have standing to ensure that the governance rules of the Papaschase descendants are respected. [ 67 ] On the record, the individual Respondents have held themselves out as Chief and Council or as true or legal representatives of the Papaschase descendants.
They lack the authority they claim. They have not attained representative positions through the established process. They know that. They cannot accrue authority just by claiming it. [ 68 ] The Respondents are in effect denying, subverting, and undermining the legal authority of the individual Applicants as Chief and Counsel.
What the Applicants assert against the Respondents is the political equivalent of “passing off.” [ 69 ] On the record, the claims of the Respondents have resulted or are likely to have resulted in injury and are likely to result in further injury. [ 70 ] The reputation of the individual Applicants as Chief and Counsel and the reputation of the PFN in the eyes of government and business partners has likely been diminished. The individual Respondents have stepped into the relationships of Chief and Counsel with the municipal, provincial, and federal government, Aboriginal organizations, and business partners.
The individual Respondents have communicated with governmental authorities seeking to undermine the authority of the individual Applicants. I refer here to AB para 68. The reputation of the PFN has been damaged. The individual Respondents have engendered uncertainty as to who business and government should be talking to. As indicated earlier, business partners will be reluctant to deal with the PFN, for fear of dealing with the wrong parties and becoming subject to litigation or to claims of lack of proper consultation.
Government is likely to pause conversations and cooperation with the PFN, until it can work out who exactly represents it. The federal government is likely to delay formal steps until it knows that it is dealing with the true representatives of the Papaschase descendants.
The Respondents have put obstacles in the path of recognition and reparation. [ 71 ] Business opportunities have been diverted from the PFN to the Respondents and it appears that some governmental funding may have been diverted from the PFN to the Respondents. [ 72 ] The individual Applicants as Chief and Counsel are not the only persons suffering injury by the intervention of the Respondents. Ultimately, it is the Papaschase descendants who will suffer loss, through the loss of opportunities and funding or in the delays in receiving those benefits as a consequence of the interventions of the Respondents. (
b) Violation of the Election Code [ 73 ] The Applicants argued that the Respondents have violated the Elections Code by holding themselves out as representing the PFN and Papaschase descendants and as having leadership roles for the PFN and Papaschase descendants. [ 74 ] The Election Code was adopted by a sovereign nation. [ 75 ] The Election Code process is the only means of legally and properly acquiring a leadership role for the PFN. [ 76 ] The individual Respondents are claiming a status that only the Election Code can provide.
Since the individual Respondents did not receive that status through the Election Code process, the process they used to support their status violates the Code by failing to follow the terms of the Code. [ 77 ] This argument does at least raise a serious issue to be tried. (
c) Tortious Conduct [ 78 ] The Applicants argued that the Respondents have engaged in two types of tortious conduct. (
i) Injurious Falsehood [ 79 ] In my opinion, there is a reasonably meritorious argument that the individual Respondents’ interventions involved commission of the tort of injurious falsehood. In Luan v ADP Canada Co , 2020 ABQB 387 , Justice McCarthy described this tort as follows: [246] With this cause of action, Ms. Luan must prove that the published matter (the report) was false, was actuated by malice, and resulted in damage. The tort of injurious falsehood is similar to the tort of defamation but protects a different interest.
Defamation protects a person's personal reputation while injurious falsehood protects an interest in one’s property, products or business. In order to recover for injurious falsehood, there must be a false statement made with malice and malice must be proven. Injurious falsehood consists in the publication of
false and malicious statements concerning the plaintiff or his property calculated and intended to induce others not to deal with him; seeHusky Injection Molding Systems Ltd. v Schad, 2016 ONSC 2297, at para. 415, citing Fleming, The Law of Torts, 9th ed., at pp. 778-779. Sankreacha [v Cameron J and Beach Sales Ltd, 2018 ONSC 7216 at] para 191.
In The Law of Torts, 6th ed (Irwin: 2020), Philip Osborne wrote as follows at 338: [T]he tort of injurious falsehood emerged to protect against a broad range of false statements which are disparaging of the plaintiff’strade, business, or property in a way that leads other persons not to deal with him. The essential elements of injurious falsehood are: afalse statement made of or concerning the plaintiff’s business, trade, or property, publication of that statement to a third person, malice,and actual pecuniary loss.
Justification is a defence to the action. [80] This argument raises a serious issue to be tried. (ii) Unlawful Interference with Economic Relations [81] The Applicants also relied on the tort of unlawful interference with economic relations. [82] In AI Enterprises Ltd v Bram Enterprises Ltd, 2014 SCC 12 Justice Cromwell addressed the scope of this tort at para 5: [5] .... [T]he tort should be kept within narrow bounds. It will be available in three-party situations in which the defendant commitsan unlawful act against a third party and that act intentionally causes economic harm to the plaintiff ....
Conduct is unlawful if it would be actionable by the third party or would have been actionable if the third party had suffered loss as aresult of it .... Justice Cromwell confirmed that the tort is available even if other causes of action are available to the plaintiff against the defendant inrelation to the alleged misconduct. The “unlawfulness” requirement is not subject to principled exceptions. [83] Given the narrow scope of this tort, it is likely that it is not applicable to the circumstances in question. I did not consider theApplicants’ arguments on this point to raise a serious issue to be tried. 2.
Irreparable Harm [84] “Irreparable harm” is addressed in RJR-MacDonald at 341: “Irreparable” refers to the nature of the harm suffered rather than its magnitude. It is harm which either cannot be quantified in monetaryterms or which cannot be cured, usually because one party cannot collect damages from the other. Examples of the former includeinstances where one party will be put out of business by the court’s decision (R.L. Crain Inc. v. Hendry (1988), (SKKB), 48 D.L.R. (4th) 228 (Sask.
Q.B.)); where one party will suffer permanent market loss or irrevocable damage to its businessreputation (American Cyanamid, supra); or where a permanent loss of natural resources will be the result when a challenged activity isnot enjoined (MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v.
Mullin, (BC CA), [1985] 3 W.W.R. 577 (B.C.C.A.)). [emphasis added] [85] In my opinion, the likelihood of injury to the PFN’s reputation, set-backs to the PFN’s attempts at recognition by the federalgovernment, loss of funding and other opportunities for the Papaschase descendants, and loss of business opportunities cannot bequantified in monetary terms. Two decades of building relationships stands to be lost: AB at para 76.
I refer to paras 70-72 above. [86] Further, the Applicants provided some evidence that the individual Respondents are contributing to division amongPapaschase descendants: see para 70 of the First Affidavit. The individual Respondents, then, are damaging the goodwill and trust thatthe Papaschase descendants community requires to attain its objectives and to remain a functioning community. The Applicantsdescribed this injury as follows: “There will be further uncertainty, community strife and confrontation, and the potential for governancedeadlock within the PFN and its members:” AB at para 75(b).
That damage too cannot be quantified in monetary terms. [87] I add that legitimacy, like reputation, is hard to earn but easy to lose, and even harder to regain, particularly in a context ofcompetition and confusion. [88] The Applicants have established this element of the test on the balance of probabilities. [89] I note that Justice Sharpe wrote as follows respecting the degree of proof of irreparable harm in Injunctions and SpecificPerformance (Canada Law Book, 2022) § 2:10: the plaintiff should be required to establish a “meaningful risk of irreparable harm” or “a meaningful doubt as to the adequacy ofdamages if the injunction is not granted”.
This assessment requires consideration of both the likelihood of harm occurring and the gravityof the harm. Assessing the “true overall risk of irreparable harm will always be a function of both the likelihood of the harm occurringand its size or significance should it occur”. Irreparable harm and the assessment of the balance of convenience are very closely linked,in some cases where the balance of convenience strongly favours an injunction, conclusive proof of irreparable harm may not berequired. [footnotes omitted] 3.
Balance of Convenience [90] The balance of convenience test concerns the determination of which of the two parties will suffer the greater harm from thegranting or refusal of an interim or interlocutory injunction, pending a decision on the merits: RJR-MacDonald at 342. Justice Sharpewrote the following respecting this element of the test in Injunctions and Specific Performance at § 2:14:
.... [Lord Diplock] observed that the assessment of where the balance of convenience lies is significantly affected by the “extent to which the disadvantages to each party would be incapable of being compensated in damages in the event of his succeeding at the trial”. The questions of “irreparable harm” and balance of convenience are closely linked, but balance of convenience also relates to matters difficult to quantify in monetary terms. Apart from, and in addition to, the risks of monetary loss and gain, what will be the relative impact upon the parties of granting or withholding the injunction?
Does the benefit the plaintiff will gain from preliminary relief outweigh the convenience to the defendant of withholding relief? Is the inconvenience to the defendant, should the injunction be granted, more substantial than the inconvenience the plaintiff will suffer if relief is withheld? “[W]hich of the two parties will suffer the greater harm from the granting or refusal of an interlocutory injunction pending a decision on the merits”? Would the injunction prejudice the public interest or the rights of parties not before the court? Would withholding the injunction result in an injustice?
It seems clear that the other factors influence the weight to be given to balance of convenience. If the plaintiff's case looks very strong, he or she may well succeed, although the injunction would cause greater inconvenience to the defendant than withholding preliminary relief would cause the plaintiff. Where the plaintiff's case looks weak, the balance of convenience may tilt in favour of the defendant. On the other hand, where an assessment of the case is impracticable and the damages question balanced, an assessment of balance of convenience will be determinative.
It is impossible to develop a precise calculus or calibration of such a question beyond restating the nature of the risk-balancing exercise that is involved .... [footnotes omitted] [ 91 ] If the injunction were not granted, the Papaschase descendants would suffer serious harm, for the reasons discussed. In addition to lost benefits for the Papaschase descendants, the PFN’s reputation will be damaged, and relationships with government and business will be damaged. [ 92 ] What injury would the Respondents suffer if prevented from holding themselves out as representatives of the Papaschase descendants?
The answer will eventually turn on a more complete record. [ 93 ] The current Chief and Council are the products of a little over two decades of labour. The Papaschase descendants have, in effect, invested in their governance structure. That investment is threatened if the injunction is not granted. That investment is not threatened if the Respondents are enjoined from holding themselves out as representing the Papaschase descendants.
The Respondents are not the product of twenty years of experience in working for the Papaschase descendants. [ 94 ] Further, the governance structure protected by the Applicants rests on the guidance of Elders. The evidence does not support such a provenance for the Respondents’ claims. The governance structure protected by the Applicants has deeper and broader roots than, on the record, could be claimed by the Respondents. [ 95 ] Less would be lost by the Respondents stepping back from their claimed authority. [ 96 ] The Respondents’ injury would be limited in time.
The Respondents may be successful in pre-trial review of the injunction. If not, they may be successful at trial. If they are not successful at trial, then they have lost nothing by being prevented from doing what they should not have done.
Moreover, if the individual Respondents successfully run in the next regular election, that would end the need for the injunction. [ 97 ] And as the Applicants contended, allowing the Respondents to continue to hold themselves out as the Papaschase descendants’ leadership would permit yet others to make such claims, making an already difficult situation worse. [ 98 ] Finally, as noted above, the Applicants have provided their undertakings in damages.
See Injunctions and Specific Performance at §§ 2:13, 2:13.10. [ 99 ] In my opinion, the Applicants have established on the balance of probabilities that the balance of convenience favours granting the interim injunction. III. Conclusion [ 100 ] I therefore grant the without notice interim injunction sought by the Applicants on the terms of the draft order provided to me and described by Ms. Gray in submissions. The central component of the order is that the Respondents are enjoined from any of the following, pending further court order: (
a) representing that any of George Frank Quinn, Darlene Misik, Bonnie Gravel, Mark Nixdorf, Clifford Gladue, Len Steinhauer, Holly Teed, Robert Stanley Ghostkeeper, Dellmar LaPratt, Deborah (Debbie) Lynn Metz (collectively, the “Individual Respondents”) or their associates are the representatives of the Papaschase First Nation (“PFN”) and the Papaschase descendants, and can act on behalf of the PFN and the Papaschase descendants; (
b) representing that any of the Individual Respondents are Chief, whether hereditary or elected, and Council of the PFN and/or the Papaschase descendants; (
c) holding the Individual Respondents out to be the duly elected or hereditary PFN and Papaschase descendants’ Chief and Council; (
d) taking any actions in the name or on behalf of PFN, the Papaschase First Nation #136, or any derivative thereof, the Papaschase descendants, or the PFN Chief and Council, which would include through any related societies, corporations or other legal entities; and/or (
e) communicating with the public or any third parties, including but not limited to, media, government agencies, or current or potential business partners of the Applicants, of any purported election for or appointment of the positions of Chief and Council of the PFN or the Papaschase descendants and/or any outcome of any such unauthorized election or appointments.
Heard on the 23 rd day of March, 2023. Delivered Orally on the 23 rd day of March, 2023 Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 27 th day of March, 2023. W.N. Renke J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: Alison Gray Caitlin Milne Gowling WLG (Canada) LLP for the Applicants
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