All Good Collective Corp v 314 Pure Cannabis Ltd, 2023 ABKB 21
Opinion
Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: All Good Collective Corp v 314 Pure Cannabis Ltd, 2023 ABKB 21 Date: 20230112 Docket: 2203 13444 Registry: Edmonton Between: All Good Collective Corp. Plaintiff - and - 314 Pure Cannabis Ltd. Defendant _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Decision of the Honourable Justice Douglas R. Mah _______________________________________________________ A. Background [ 1 ] The plaintiff All Good Collective Corp seeks from the defendant 314 Pure Cannabis Ltd, by way of mandatory injunction, the restoration of $300,000 to a trust account.
These funds were removed from trust after a failed transaction concerning the sale of equipment. Both entities are participants in Alberta’s cannabis industry. [ 2 ] Under a March 30, 2022 agreement between the parties, All Good agreed to acquire and then sell to 314 certain equipment for pre-rolling and packaging cannabis products.
Initial deposits on the equipment, as required under the agreement ($200,000 for the pre-rolling equipment and $100,000 for the packaging equipment) for a total of $300,000, were paid by 314 to its counsel on April 13, 2022 “to be held in trust pending 314’s instructions to release such funds”. [ 3 ] The agreement further stated that:
• once All Good provided 314 with evidence, satisfactory to 314 acting reasonably, that shipping dates were confirmed, 314 wasobligated on a certain date to lodge further deposits with its counsel of $500,000 for the pre-rolling equipment and $700,000 for thepackaging equipment; and • on certain dates prior to actual shipping, 314 would instruct its counsel to release the totality of the deposit funds to All Good. [4] In June 2022, All Good’s deponent in this application and representative in the transaction, Mohamed Chaaban, was advisedby 314’s representatives (both its COO Mr. Carleton and its then CEO Mr.
Duguid) that 314 had encountered “cash flow” problems andwould not be able to meet the payment schedule. Mr. Chaaban also heard that 314 had not purchased production material from a supplierand had not set up its facility for installation of the equipment. Despite feeling nervous about whether 314 would make payment andforming the impression that 314 was giving All Good the runaround, Mr.
Chaaban says everything was done on All Good’s end to fulfillits obligations, including providing written confirmation of shipping dates as required under the agreement. [5] On August 15, 2022, when no further payments had been received, All Good’s counsel wrote to 314’s counsel indicatingdefault under the agreement had occurred, demanding payment of the full deposits and giving notice that the equipment was beingdiverted to another purchaser.
In that letter, All Good’s counsel advised 314’s counsel that the purpose of the deposits was to secure AllGood for its obligations to the manufacturer. [6] The next day, 314 responded by email purporting to terminate the agreement for reason of All Good’s failure to providesatisfactory evidence of confirmed shipping dates in accordance with the agreement. In response on August 18, 2022, All Good by itscounsel advised that the shipping confirmations were proper, and that while 314 did not have grounds to terminate the agreement, AllGood was accepting 314’s repudiation and treating the agreement as at an end.
However, All Good’s counsel cautioned that the depositson hand should remain in trust pending agreement or Court order and advised of All Good’s intention to make this injunction application.By August 22, 2022, 314’s counsel had released the deposit funds back to 314 as instructed by it. [7] Mr. Chaaban, responding to an undertaking from his questioning on affidavit, advised that both pieces of equipment hadbeen “assigned” by All Good to a non-arm’s length third party, YMC Development Corporation, the new end user.
YMC assumed all ofAll Good’s payment obligations for the equipment to the manufacturer. [8] The application before me, on All Good’s behalf, is for a mandatory injunction on an interlocutory basis requiring 314 torestore the deposit funds to its counsel or to counsel for All Good, pending final resolution or adjudication by the Court on the questionof whether All Good is entitled to damages from 314 on account of breach. B. All Good’s Position [9] Here is a
summary of the arguments made by Mr.
Greschner on behalf of All Good: • The three-part injunction test set out in R v Canadian Broadcasting Corp, 2018 SCC 5 at para 12 requires an applicant to show: o A strong prima facie case; o that the applicant will suffer irreparable harm if there is no injunction; and o that the balance of convenience favours the granting of the injunction. • All Good says that the Court may grant a mandatory injunction obligating a respondent to perform part of a contract, citing thesethree authorities: o ACCEL Canada Holdings Limited v Pembina Pipeline Corporation, 2018 ABQB 1039; o Minera Aquiline Argentina SA v IMA Exploration Inc, 2006 BCSC 1102; and o West Side Stevedoring Ltd v Nova Scotia Business Development Corp, (NS SC), [1992] 116 NSR (2d) 165. • All Good says that it has a strong prima facie case because the agreement is clear that 314 must instruct its counsel to pay over thedeposits to All Good on certain dates once All Good has provided satisfactory evidence of confirmed shipping dates, which it did.Moreover, All Good has other contractual entitlement to the deposits in question based on paras 9.4(b) [Effect of Termination] and 9.5[Survival] that should be enforced by the injunction. • All Good further says that it will suffer irreparable harm because the deposits were intended as security against 314’s default andif the funds are not returned to trust, All Good may end up with nothing more than a “hollow judgment” against 314.
All Good hasprovided evidence, from the mouths of 314’s own officers, that 314 is in financial distress. 314 has provided no refuting evidence fromany of its officers, only affidavit evidence from a legal assistant in its counsel’s office attaching land titles searches. • Finally, All Good says the balance of convenience tilts in its favour because it has been required to make alternate andunfavourable financing arrangements, has incurred other losses, and has little chance to recover its losses from the failed transactionbecause of 314’s financial condition. • In this regard, 314 has not demonstrated any harm that it will suffer if the mandatory injunction is granted. 314 has shown a lackof good faith in contractual performance.
Justice and equity demand that All Good be restored to its former position. All Good is notasking for the agreement to be fully enforced or specifically performed, only that its security be restored.
C. 314’s Position [10] Mr. McDonald’s arguments for 314 are summarized: • 314 says that what All Good actually seeks is a Mareva injunction or freezing or preservation order, not a mandatory injunction. • 314 says that All Good has no proprietary or trust claim in the deposit money. The funds were to be held in trust pending 314’sinstructions to release such funds. No trust was ever imposed in favour of All Good.
Rather at all times, 314 retained the right to controlthe funds and to direct its counsel to release them according to 314’s instructions. • 314 says that a Mareva injunction, which secures a plaintiff for an eventual judgment for damages, is an exceptional pre-trialremedy that is only granted in the clearest of cases: Aetna Financial Services Ltd v Feigelman, (SCC), [1985] SCJ No1, [1985] 1 SCR.2 (SC.) at para 1; Ma v.
Nutriview Systems Inc, 2011 BCSC 1033, 2011 CarswellBC 2037, at para 10. • 314 says the essence of a Mareva injunction is the respondent’s dissipation or removal of assets to render it judgment-proof:Simonelli v. Ayron Developments Inc, 2010 ABQB 565, 2010 CarswellAlta 1753 at para 97, citing Aetna Financial at paras 25 & 26.Here, All Good has led no evidence whatsoever that 314 has taken actions to place its assets beyond the reach of All Good. • It says that All Good does not have a strong prima facie case.
Even if breach is established, 314 has failed to show that it hasincurred any loss, as the equipment has been resold to or taken over by YMC with, 314 asserts, no provable loss to All Good. • 314 says that All Good cannot rely on paras 9.4(
b) and 9.5 as a basis for the injunction. Those sections are inapplicable. Ifanything, it is 314 that has properly terminated the contract under para 2.1(a)(v), relating to termination by 314 where All Good hasprovided inadequate confirmation of shipping dates. • Further, All Good accepted 314’s repudiation of the agreement and cannot now purport to revive or reinstate portions of theagreement or compel 314 to comply with select provisions.
This argument relies on the proposition that a non-defaulting party to acontract who elects to accept the defaulting party’s repudiation cannot subsequently purport to resuscitate the agreement by seekingspecific performance: Osmack v Stan Reynolds Auto Sales Ltd, 1973 AltaSCAD 55, 1973 CarswellAlta 122 (ABCA) at paras 29-31 &33, aff’d 1975 CarswellAlta 126 (SCC); Chevron Canada Resources v.
Canada (Executive Director of Indian Oil & Gas), 2006 ABQB945, 2006 CarswellAlta 1799, at para 13, aff’d 2009 ABCA 180, 2009 CarswellAlta 674 (ABCA); Arbutus Garden Homes Ltd vArbutus Gardens Apartments Corp, (BC SC), 1996 CarswellBC 445, [1996] 7 WWR 338, at para 126 (BCSC)Saunders v Multi Builders Ltd, 1981 CarswellBC 207, [1981] BCJ No 1942, at paras 36-37. • Further, there is no evidence of irreparable harm, only conjecture or speculation that 314 may be insolvent.
A Mareva injunctioncannot be issued on this basis even if there was a strong prima facie case: Simonelli at para 130. • Moreover, since All Good has no legitimate legal reason for sequestering 314’s assets, the balance of convenience favours 314who has a right to use its assets to carry on ordinary business, meet its obligations and pay its expenses: Simonelli at para 131. • Finally, All Good’s late furnishing (on the day of the application) of an undertaking as to damages is ineffective and should bedisregarded. D.
On what basis is All Good entitled to a MandatoryInjunction? [11] In asking this question, I am trying to determine the exact legal basis on which All Good is entitled to have the $300,000restored to trust pending the outcome of the litigation. A number of issues were discussed during the application in this regard. Trust [12] Mr. Greschner did not specifically argue that the deposits were held in trust for All Good. It was Mr. McDonald who raisedthe notion of trust in his brief (para 4) in relation to the “in trust” language used in the agreement.
I do not see anywhere in the evidencewhere that the $300,000 was impressed with a trust in favour of All Good. The words “in trust” throughout para 2.1 of the agreement areused in the sense of 314 placing its funds in trust with its lawyer for 314’s benefit, only to be released at 314’s instructions. The depositsto trust were intended only as a signal that 314 had money and was serious about the transaction. Placing the funds in trust did notamount to irrevocable payment in favour of All Good.
Indeed, the agreement specifically contemplates circumstances in which thetransaction would not be completed and the funds returned to 314: paras 2.1(a)(
v) and 2.1(b)(v). 314 says that is exactly what happened. [13] Mr. Greschner conceded that there is no express provision in the agreement that the deposits on hand in the trust accountwould be forfeited in the event the transaction failed to close. [14] All Good’s application here is not for a proprietary injunction. The requirements for a proprietary injunction are discussed atpara 108 of Simonelli and would not be met here. All Good does not say the deposit funds should be preserved because they belong toAll Good but rather because All Good wants to be secured for damages with 314’s money. The Effect of Repudiation
[ 15 ] Next, there is the language of repudiation used on behalf of All Good. In the August 18, 2022 letter from All Good’s counsel to 314’s counsel, All Good expressly accepts the repudiation: Our understanding at this point is that 314 does not intend to fulfill its obligations under the contract. As such, my client accepts the repudiation of the agreement by your client and will treat the contract as at an end.
Again, just to be clear, we do not think that your client has a legitimate basis for terminating the contract, but clearly has no intent to fulfill its obligations, and my client will need to take steps to minimize its losses. [ 16 ] While it is true that this letter was written four days before All Good’s counsel learned that the $300,000 had been returned to 314, nonetheless it is unequivocal in its message: the contract is at an end. [ 17 ] Mr.
Greschner argued at the hearing that repudiation operates prospectively only, not retrospectively, and thus actions taken by the parties prior to repudiation are essentially frozen or perpetuated notwithstanding repudiation of the contract by one party that is accepted by the other. He relies on this passage from Cheshire & Fifoot’s Law of Contracts , 2nd ed. (1949) at p 535, cited in para 18 of the Saunders case found in 314’s authorities: Where a party elects to treat a breach as discharging him from his obligations, the effect is to terminate the contract from the moment of election and no earlier.
Its termination is not retrospective. It still exists so far as the past acts and defaults of the parties are concerned, and it forms the basis upon which the innocent party may recover damages for the breach.
Not only is the innocent party entitled to recover damages for past breaches, but if the contract is specifically enforceable, he may apply for a decree of specific performance without waiting for the date of complete performance. [ 18 ] There are a several responses to this argument: • First, the deposits were to secure the purchase price and protect All Good with respect to its obligations to the manufacturer. But All Good, in accepting the repudiation and selling the equipment to YMC instead of 314, had no intention of completing the transaction with 314 and, as Mr.
McDonald pointed out, had protected itself by having YMC take over its obligations to the manufacturer. There was no reason to keep the funds in trust. • Second, the Cheshire & Fifoot quote might, I think, apply to funds already paid by a purchaser into the hands of a vendor such that the purchaser could not turn around and claim a refund upon repudiation, but would not apply to funds not yet paid over.
The $300,000, while in the purchaser’s lawyers’ trust account, had not yet been paid. • Third, having accepted repudiation in no uncertain terms, treating the transaction as a nullity and selling the equipment elsewhere, All Good as the electing party cannot now call upon 314 to perform the contract: Osmack at para 33; Arbutus Garden Homes at para 126; Saunders at paras 36-37.
This principle also applies, in my view, in the present situation where the electing party seeks only to compel the other party to perform a part of the contract, even where previously done but then undone. [ 19 ] In light of the circumstances, it is understandable that 314 instructed its counsel to return the deposit money and that 314’s counsel wrote to All Good’s counsel on August 22, 2022 as follows: We received a direction from our client 314 Pure Cannabis Ltd to release the funds held in our trust account on 314’s behalf back to 314.
As such, in accordance with our obligations under the Law Society of Alberta rules, we have released the trust funds to 314 as directed. [ 20 ] What purpose was there for 314’s counsel to keep its client’s money against its wishes? The purpose for which the funds had been lodged in the first place had evaporated. To wit, as of August 18, 2022 All Good had relinquished its claim to security for performance in the form of the deposits when it accepted that the agreement was repudiated and that the transaction was at an end. Contractual provisions [ 21 ] All Good relies on para 9(4)(
b) as giving it rights in the deposits. This provision states that if the agreement is terminated under para 9.2(
a) for reason of 314’s material default, then all “Balances”, Royalty Fees and Financing Fees then owing are immediately payable. I am unable to accept this position for the following reasons: • I agree with Mr. McDonald that 9(4)(
b) does not apply because termination under para 9.2(
a) is only permitted after the defaulting party is given 30 days following Notice of Default to remedy the default. This did not happen. While 314 was provided with a Notice of Default on August 15, 2022, it was not given 30 days to make good. Rather, 314 purported to terminate under para 2.1(a)(
v) on August 16, 2022 and then All Good treated 314’s actions as a repudiation, which it accepted on August 18, 2022. I understand Mr. Greschner’s point that it would not have been commercially feasible for All Good to extend the 30 days to 314 because of All Good’s obligations to the manufacturer, but it was still All Good’s choice to make. • Moreover, as Mr. McDonald pointed out, para 9(4)(
a) does not mention the deposits at all. In context, the word “Balances” appears to refer back to para 2.3(
b) which deals with payment of what remains outstanding after financing has run its course. This financing only arises after the full deposits are paid. Of course, the transaction never reached the financing stage. • Even if para 9(4)(
b) did apply, at best all it does is quantify some of All Good’s damages if it is ultimately successful in its breach action against 314. It does not otherwise confer rights upon All Good in respect of that exact $3000,000 placed into trust. [ 22 ] The survival clause at para 9.5 does not assist All Good. It states that the surviving provisions are those that expressly or by their nature survive termination.
The express provisions are sections 2.2 (vesting of title in 314 after delivery and filing of a security interest by All Good), 2.3 (payment of financed portion or remaining portion after financing), 6.1 (warranties and representations by All Good), 6.2 (warranties and representations by 314) and Articles 8 (confidentiality), 10 (non-solicitation), 11 (addresses for notices) and 12 (various miscellaneous clauses), none of the foregoing being relevant to this discussion. As stated, the provisions of 2.1(
a) and (
b) sought to be enforced in this application do not survive because their nature is to secure completion the purchase and both parties agreethe purchase is no longer proceeding. [23] In terms of other relevant contractual provisions, 314 also raises a triable issue in taking the position that it properlyterminated the agreement, relying on para 2.1(a)(v), which I will discuss further below.
All Good’s Authorities [24] I would now like to consider the authorities cited to me by All Good’s counsel: • In ACCEL, at issue was the validity of the assignment of a transportation agreement between ACCEL (as assignee) and Pembinafor the conveyance of crude oil. ARC had assigned the agreement to ACCEL. The Court granted a mandatory injunction to compelPembina to continue transporting ACCEL’s oil, primarily on the basis that there was a strong prima facie case that ACCEL had a validassignment of a subsisting contract.
That is different than this case where both parties agree that there is no subsisting contract. • In Minera, the Court enforced a confidentiality agreement signed by IMA. Both IMA and Minera as potential purchasers of amining property had accessed certain confidential information from the vendor. IMA did not purchase that property, but Minera did. IMAthen used the confidential information to stake a claim in an adjoining property. The Court awarded IMA’s interest in the adjoiningproperty to Minera as the purchaser of the original property. The Court merely enforced a subsisting confidentiality agreement.
Further,the Court equally relied on the duty of confidentiality arising at common law per Lac Minerals v International Corona, (SCC), [1989] 2 SCR 574. Neither of those features are present in the case before me. • At issue in West Side Stevedoring was whether the plaintiff had the exclusive right to provide stevedoring services at thedefendant’s terminal for a 5-year period. The defendant had purported to cancel the agreement because of certain conduct on theplaintiff’s part.
The Court ultimately decided to grant an interlocutory injunction to permit, with certain stipulations, the plaintiff tocontinue carrying out the contract.
The Court found that the plaintiff had made out a strong prima facie case that the contract had beenimproperly terminated and, moreover, said that it would be impossible to determine the plaintiff’s damages unless the plaintiff waspermitted to carry out the contract pending trial. • In the case before me, there is no connection, at least not drawn to my attention, between that specific $300,000 and thecalculation of what All Good’s damages would be if this matter were to proceed to trial on the issue of 314’s purported breach.
Therewas no argument that the damages would be unascertainable if the $300,000 was not restored to trust. [25] What I am left with is All Good’s assertion that if the $300,000 is not restored, it will lose its security. I ask: security forwhat? It is not security for completion of the transaction, for the parties agree the transaction has ended. It can only be security for theeventual judgment that All Good hopes to obtain against 314.
Thus, the Order that All Good is seeking is, in effect, for pre-trialattachment or a Mareva injunction in respect of some of 314’s assets (the $300,000 previously in trust), not a mandatory injunction. Thiswas confirmed as much by Mr. Greschner with his “hollow judgment” argument and by Mr.
Chaaban at para 39 of his September 6,2022 affidavit: If 314 is not ordered to return those deposit funds to its counsel, All Good will suffer irreparable harm if 314 is not able to satisfy ajudgment. [26] Based on all of the foregoing thus far, I cannot think of a reason why the Court should order a mandatory injunction to putthat $300,000 back in place. As the Supreme Court of Canada said in the 2018 case of R v Canadian Broadcasting Corp, a mandatoryinjunction requires that the defendant do something, take positive action, which can be burdensome and costly.
In this case, I am asked torestore the parties to a former state, to resume the previously existing status quo, but I can find no legal basis for doing so. So, this leavesme with the question of whether I should grant a Mareva injunction. E.
Mareva Injunction RJR McDonald test [27] Whether the injunction is characterized as a mandatory injunction or Mareva injunction, the tripartite test from RJR -McDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney General), (SCC), [1994] 1 SCR 311 (restated in R v Canadian BroadcastingCorp) must be met. [28] In terms of the strong prima facie case, I take the view that as well as establishing a cause of action, the applicant needs alsoto show that it has suffered damages. Mr. Greschner says I should infer damages from the facts or the contract itself.
I cannot do that.Given the fact of the resale or assignment of the equipment to YMC, it is unknown at this point whether any damages have beenincurred. All Good placed no particulars of loss in its evidence. [29] Further on the point of strong prima facie case, there is an argument that All Good did not provide sufficient evidence ofconfirmation of shipping dates in the relevant emails and attachments. 314 may well be right that no specific shipping dates werearticulated as required and therefore 314 was justified in terminating the contract. That will depend on an
interpretation of the emails sentto All Good by the third-party manufacturer and, in particular, whether “dispatch date” means the same thing as “shipping date”. I do notknow whether it does. It might, but then again it might not. No evidence was called on the point. The determination of that issue mightturn on expert evidence from the logistics industry as to the meaning of those terms. I think All Good certainly has a case that meritsdetermination, but I cannot say that it is a strong prima facie case in the sense that viable defences are precluded and All Good will likelysucceed.
As stated, 314 has raised a triable issue with regard to whether it properly terminated the agreement. Whether 314 dishonestlyperformed the contract by advancing a bogus or weak reason for termination, as was argued by All Good’s counsel, is part of this same
question. [ 30 ] When it comes to irreparable harm, what All Good is really saying is that it is better to have a bird in the hand. I think the same would apply to every plaintiff in every lawsuit. To me, All Good has not shown on a balance of probabilities that it would suffer irreparable harm because of 314’s financial status. Mr. McDonald urged me to note that 314 continues to operate a going-concern business in Alberta, with its own facility. The land titles searches indicate that 314 owns land in Alberta worth $10 million on which there is $7 million worth of mortgages.
All Good has not disproved this. [ 31 ] As Simonelli states, something more than guesswork or speculation is required. In this case, Mr. Chaaban’s unease with 314’s solvency, as expressed in his affidavit, is merely a premonition. That is insufficient whether 314’s financial state was being relied on for either a mandatory injunction or a Mareva injunction. [ 32 ] 314 may have assets but no cash flow, in which event it would need the $300,000 to continue operations.
At this point, I do not have sufficient evidence to determine whether the balance of convenience favours one party or the other, but the onus is on All Good and it has not been met. Dissipation [ 33 ] Finally, and more fundamentally on the availability of a Mareva injunction here, I agree with 314’s position that All Good has not shown, nor even suggested, that 314 has dissipated its assets or is removing assets from the jurisdiction in order to avoid All Good as a judgment creditor or that there is, as the Supreme Court of Canada noted in Aetna Financial at pg 25, “a genuine risk of disappearance of assets”.
See also Cho v Twin Cities Power-Canada , 2012 ABCA 47 at para 5 . F. Late Undertaking as to Damages [ 34 ] Rather than produce the undertaking as to damages on the day of the hearing, it would have been preferable for All Good to have either attached the undertaking as an exhibit to its supporting affidavit or file it as a separate document at the time the application was filed. [ 35 ] I take Mr. McDonald’s point that tendering the undertaking at this late stage deprived 314 of the opportunity to examine on it prior to the hearing. Here, Mr.
McDonald said he might have wanted to question All Good’s own solvency or Mr. Chaaban’s authority to bind All Good (given that he is not a director, officer or shareholder) in order to determine whether the undertaking had any value. The viability of any such undertaking might well be a consideration in whether to grant an injunction. [ 36 ] It is a small point now but worth mentioning in terms of practice when applying for injunctions. G.
Ruling [ 37 ] In the result, for all the foregoing reasons, I dismiss the application. [ 38 ] Counsel may address costs, if they wish, within 30 days of release of this decision, by way of written submissions in letter form not to exceed two pages in length, excluding exhibits and authorities. Heard on the 10 th day of January, 2023. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 12 th day of January, 2023. Douglas R. Mah J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: Carter D. Greschner, Bryan & Company LLP for All Good Collective Corp
Trevor McDonald, Burnet Duckworth & Palmer LLP for 314 Pure Cannabis Ltd
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