R v Walker, 2023 ABKB 22
Opinion
Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: R v Walker, 2023 ABKB 22 Date: 20230112 Docket: 200305480Q1 Registry: Edmonton Between: His Majesty the King Crown - and - Richard Walker Accused - and - The Chief of the Edmonton Police Service Intervener
Restriction on Publication Trial information in Absence of Jury – See the Criminal Code, section 648(1). Judgments filed in this matter concerning pre-trial applications may not bepublished, broadcast, or transmitted in any manner before the jury, at this time notselected, retires to consider its verdict. This decision is available from the court file. It may be published only after thejury retires to consider its verdict. This Order is provisional until that time, beforewhich anyone who wishes to challenge the restriction on publication may apply tothis Court.
This Order ceases to have any effect if the matter is no longer beingtried by a judge and jury. _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Decision of the Honourable Justice Peter Michalyshyn _______________________________________________________ Introduction [1] This is an application on behalf of the Chief of the Edmonton Police Service to intervene in the matter of R v Walker, and todecide if an application for third party records pursuant to R v O’Connor, (SCC), [1995] 4 SCR 411 is necessary on thefacts of this case. For reasons which follow, the application to intervene is allowed.
Further, the O’Connor procedure will necessarily beengaged should any further effort be made in the trial to question EPS witnesses regarding the origins of what is marked in theseproceedings as Exhibit A. [2] This written version is of a decision delivered orally on January 9, 2023. At that time I reserved the right to make stylistic orgrammatical changes, to add or complete authorities and citations, to complete quotations, and to make minor revisions none of whichaffect the substance of the oral decision. Background [3] Mr.
Walker is on trial for an alleged February 13, 2020 assault causing bodily harm on a peace officer and an alleged resistarrest on the same date. [4] A multi-day voir dire commenced in late October, 2021. In the course particularly of the October 26, 2021 cross-examination of Sgt. Orazietti of the EPS, a document was put before Sgt. Orazietti that the accused’s counsel initially described as a“reasonable officer response procedure” document.
The witness was asked to review the document and to give evidence with regard towhether it was an accurate copy of an EPS policy in force at the time of the offence of February 13, 2020. [5] The document presented to the witness was nine pages long. On page eight the “revision date” is indicated as “2015 July24”. The document is otherwise identified as “No. PrR15-023”.
Elsewhere on the same document other such markings appear, forexample at the top of page eight, “Procedure Number: OP7-1PR”, and “Alberta Policing Standard OP 9.1 & 9.2” and at the bottom ofpage eight, “Related Information: OP16-2PR Serious Incident Response Procedure”. [6] The 9-page document was marked in the voir dire as “Exhibit A”. [7] Upon initially being presented with Exhibit A.
Sgt Orazietti was unable to give evidence authenticating it as an EPS policyin force at the time of the offence. [8] A brief adjournment followed, with an invitation to the witness to make inquiries regarding Exhibit A and, again, itsauthenticity as an EPS policy in force at the time of the offence. [9] Both before and after that particular adjournment (on October 26, 2021) a concern arose as to the origins of Exhibit A, andwith regard to the appropriateness of asking Sgt.
Orazietti to take steps outside of court to authenticate it, particularly in the absence ofnotice to the Edmonton Police Service, and in the absence of a potential third-party records application pursuant to the O’Connorprocedure. [10] Several further appearances and adjournments followed, with the Exhibit A authenticity question not resolved. Indeed, Sgt.Orazietti has still not completed his evidence on the voir dire, including with regard to Exhibit A – if there will be further evidence fromhim in that regard.
[ 11 ] The Court convened again October 28, 2021. Scheduling was to be spoken to, but at that time some further submissions from counsel were also heard with regard to the origins of Exhibit A. It was submitted that Exhibit A had been obtained through a FOIP (Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy) request. [ 12 ] In response to that submission, it was the Crown’s position that proof was required of the origins of Exhibit A. No determination was made in that regard on October 28, 2021. [ 13 ] The Court convened again on November 1, 2021.
At that time, counsel for the Chief of the Edmonton Police Service, was present and made submissions, without objection at that point by either the Crown or the defence. [ 14 ] I say “without objection at that point” because in due course defence counsel took the position that the Chief of the EPS, through counsel, should not be given formal intervener status to make submissions regarding Exhibit A, including whether further questions could be put to or requests made of Sgt.
Orazietti about Exhibit A. [ 15 ] To return briefly to the events of November 1, 2021 – EPS counsel did make submissions with regard to Exhibit A, and with regard to all matters touching on requests for and production of EPS policies. [ 16 ] EPS counsel noted for example that her submission issues arose in terms of relevance of such policies in cases such as Mr. Walker’s – counsel’s position being that the authorities are clear that such policies are not relevant in criminal proceedings. [ 17 ] That aside, EPS counsel also addressed the process of authenticating a document such as Exhibit A.
It was counsel’s position that efforts by counsel to authenticate Exhibit A through cross-examination of Sgt.
Orazietti, including requests that the witness make inquiries of EPS, were not in keeping with proper third-party records ( O’Connor ) procedure. [ 18 ] Still in her submissions on November 1, 2021, EPS counsel made the point that the O’Connor procedure would apply to any request or direction to compare Exhibit A with any other EPS policy or information that itself was not in the possession of the Crown as a so-called first-party record. [ 19 ] At the November 1, 2021 attendance, the accused’s counsel confirmed Exhibit A came from another member of the criminal defence bar who had obtained it through the FOIP procedure. (I pause to note that there was some suggestion in submissions before me – but not in evidence – that Exhibit A is the same policy that was referred to in the decision of R v O’Mara,
(2019) ABPC 257.) [ 20 ] Counsel for EPS took no issue in the abstract with the FOIP request. If it is shown that Exhibit A came about from a FOIP request, it’s what it is. [ 21 ] The issue for EPS, counsel argued, was the O’Connor issue that arises when “someone from EPS has to engage EPS records in some fashion to confirm something. Because then it's the use of our records for this trial”. [ 22 ] Still before the voir dire was adjourned on November 3, 2021, I was advised by then-Crown counsel that Sgt.
Orazietti had made certain inquiries and emailed the Crown and included an attachment, which the Crown said appeared to be an EPS policy document of some description. The Crown went on to say that the attachment was not reviewed in any detail. The email and its attachment were passed on to EPS counsel. That email and attachment are not otherwise before the court. [ 23 ] The voir dire dealt with other matters until it was adjourned, on November 3, 2021. It is meant to be continued and completed, in the 2-day period forthcoming on January 16 and 17, 2023.
During the adjournment, it was also intended that I would deal with the EPS intervener application. [ 24 ] On November 23, 2022 I heard argument with regard to the issues arising from Exhibit A. Ahead of November 23, EPS counsel filed an April 19, 2022 application for intervener status on two questions: whether an O’Connor application was necessary in the circumstances; and whether an EPS policy was relevant in any event. [ 25 ] The Form CC1 application filed April 19, 2022 summarizes the EPS position and refers to authorities in support of it. [ 26 ] Further written submissions were received on November 9, 2022.
Counsel for the accused filed written submissions as well, on November 10, 2022. Crown counsel maintained essentially a watching brief, but did not otherwise participate in the November 23, 2022 application. [ 27 ] In the submission of the accused’s counsel: • The accused has not and does not intend to bring an O’Connor application; • EPS should be denied intervener status; • Should the Crown challenge what the accused’s counsel called the “legitimacy” of any document, it is open to the defence to authenticate the document by examining witnesses and/or calling its own evidence.
The accused’s counsel went on to say that the defence can authenticate Exhibit A “if pushed to do so”. Counsel mentioned specifically that he is prepared to subpoena the Chief of Police, FOIPP personnel, the criminal defence lawyer from whom the Exhibit A document was obtained, or “other appropriate personnel” to authenticate Exhibit A “if it becomes necessary”. • Relevancy should not be addressed by the court until the authenticity of the document is determined. Law regarding intervention, O’Connor procedure
[ 28 ] In the recent case of R v Badger, 2022 ABKB 686 , Belzil J decided similar intervention and O’Connor issues. The only material difference is that the intervention in Badger arose in a
summary conviction appeal, rather than in a trial. [ 29 ] Counsel for the accused argues that the distinction between an appeal, and a trial, is a meaningful one for the purposes of this application. In my view the distinction between an appeal and a trial, in the circumstances of Mr. Walker’s case and the application before me, is a distinction without a difference. [ 30 ] In Badger , the EPS document in question was obtained as a result of a FOIP request. That may be the situation in Mr.
Walker’s case, although again the proof of that remains to be heard. [ 31 ] In Badger , an EPS witness was asked if he was familiar with the document and answered that “it appears to be associated with our policy and procedure”. As noted by Belzil J, no attempt was made to authenticate the document. [ 32 ] In Badger , no O’Connor application was made.
Nor is it apparent, before the trial judge stayed the proceedings in that case, that the EPS was given an opportunity to weigh in on the use of the EPS document in the absence of an O’Connor application. [ 33 ] Belzil J held in Badger that the Chief of the EPS should be granted intervener status to argue essentially the same questions that are before the court in Mr. Walker’s case. [ 34 ] In so deciding, Belzil J disagreed with defence submissions that an O’Connor application was unnecessary where there was evidence of a document obtained through FOIP procedure.
Belzil J noted that at most, the trial judge in Badger had nothing more before him than a “purported policy document”. [ 35 ] With that observation in mind, Belzil J went on to deal with the issue of intervener status which, as he noted, was bifurcated from other issues in the appeal before him. [ 36 ] In deciding the intervener application in Badger , Belzil J relied on R v Vallentgoed , 2016 ABCA 19 . [ 37 ] The court in Vallentgoed at paragraph five sets out that intervener status will be granted where the applicant 1) is directly and significantly affected by the outcome of the appeal, and 2) has expertise and a fresh perspective on the subject matter of the appeal that is useful for the appeal’s resolution. (To a similar effect: Papaschase Indian Band v Canada (Attorney General) , 2005 ABCA 320 ; R v Ndhlovu , 2019 ABCA 132 .) [ 38 ] The court in Vallentgoed goes on to set out eight considerations that should be taken into account on an application to intervene.
The court in Vallentgoed also comments, at paragraph six, that the discretion to grant intervener status should be exercised sparingly, particularly in criminal proceedings where the dispute must remain between the accused and the Crown; the court noted that interventions in criminal appeals are “generally shunned by the courts for a variety of policy and prudential reasons”, especially the risk “the hearing of other voices can distort an appeal”. (To a similar effect: R v JLA , 2009 ABCA 324 ; R v Neve , 1996 ABCA 242 .) [ 39 ] In Badger , Belzil J went on to find as follows with regard to each of the eight Vallentgoed factors: 1.
Will the intervener be directly affected by the appeal? Yes, in Badger , in that the intervener controls the issuance of EPS Policy, the Chief is affected by the fact that a purported EPS policy document was not authenticated at trial, and an O’Connor application was not advanced. In Mr. Walker’s case, I find likewise that the proposed intervener controls the issuance of EPS policies, the Chief is directly affected by the fact that the accused on cross examination of an EPS witness is seeking to authenticate a policy document at trial, and in the absence of an O’Connor application.
In saying this, I am mindful again of the additional authorities which caution that interveners should have a direct interest in the question before the court, that the intervener’s interest should be broader than as to the precedential impact on it of the court’s decision, and that an intervention is more likely to be granted if the question to be addressed will not likely impact directly the guilt or innocence of the accused: R v MacKay , 2020 BCCA 258 , at para 22 (and 34-35), citing R v McKay , 2016 BCCA 126 , at para 11 . In my view, in the circumstances of Mr.
Walker’s case, all of these considerations speak in favour of the applicant’s intervention being granted. 2. Is the presence of the intervener necessary for the Court to properly decide the matter? Yes, in Badger , in that the intervener will be able to authenticate the purported policy document – presumably in the context of an O’Connor application – and will be able to provide supporting information dealing with EPS Policy documents. In Mr. Walker’s case, this factor is of limited if any relevance in that no O’Connor application exists or is forthcoming.
Put another way, in the absence of an O’Connor application to address authenticity and relevance, there is no other obvious path for questions of police witnesses on Exhibit A in Mr. Walker’s case. 3. Might the intervener’s interest in the proceedings not be fully protected by the parties? Yes, in Badger , in that as outlined at trial, neither Crown counsel or Defence counsel raised the necessity of an O’Connor application. And Crown counsel did not have control of the purported policy document. In Mr.
Walker’s case, likewise the Crown is not the Chief of Police and has no control of the purported policy document. What’s more, the roles of the Crown and of the applicant in the criminal justice system are not to be regarded as unitary, or the work of a single entity. They are, rather, divisible: R v McNeil , 2009 SCC 3 , cited in R v MacKay , 2020 BCCA 258 , at para 41 , and in many other authorities. 4. Will the intervener’s submission be useful and different or bring particular expertise to the subject matter of the appeal?
Yes, in Badger , in that the Intervener was uniquely qualified to make submissions on the subject of EPS Policy.
In Mr. Walker’s case, likewise I find the proposed intervener is similarly uniquely qualified. I find as well that in the materials and submissions heard to date, the proposed intervener has not duplicated points otherwise made in the proceeding. There has been no ‘piling on’ which would be unfair, or could cause the appearance of unfairness, to the accused: R v Mayers , 2011 BCCA 268 at para 8 . 5. Will the intervention unduly delay the proceedings? No, in Badger , in that Belzil J found that the intervention would not unduly delay the SCA. In Mr.
Walker’s case, there will be no undue delay either in that through counsel he has made it abundantly clear no O’Connor application will be forthcoming. Given other issues arising in the voir dire commenced in late October, 2021 and continuing only in a week’s time – there is little reason to accept that the applicant’s proposed intervention has caused or contributed to unreasonable delay in the proceedings. No particular delay was identified in the materials or in argument before me. 6. Will there possibly be prejudice to the parties if intervention is granted?
No, in Badger , as Belzil J found there was no possibility of prejudice to the parties if intervention is granted. In Mr. Walker’s case, I likewise find no prejudice to the parties by granting intervention status. 7. Will intervention widen the lis between the parties? No, in Badger , and in Mr. Walker’s case likewise I find that the lis between the parties will not particularly be widened. 8. Will the intervention transform the Court into a political arena? No, in Badger , and likewise in Mr.
Walker’s case I find there is no reason to believe a political issue will arise. [ 40 ] The decision in Badger aside, the following authorities were argued before me and in my view support the intervener’s application: [ 41 ] R v McKay 2016 BCCA 126 – a case concerning the scope of disclosure of confidential informant information in the possession of the police service in question. Arising from McKay is the consideration whether allowing the intervention will impact the accused’s guilt or innocence.
As did the court in McKay , I agree with the applicant that neither in its intent nor effect is the proposed intervention directed at the guilt or innocence of Mr.
Walker. [ 42 ] R v Barton , 2016 ABCA 68 (per Berger JA) and 2019 SCC 33 , at para 208 – cases which comment on the “vital role” interveners may play when assisting the court in deciding complex issues that have effects transcending the interests of the particular parties before it. [ 43 ] I pause to note that in Berger JA’s Barton intervention decision, the court at para 4 articulated a 12-factor test for determining applications for intervener status in criminal cases, as follows: 1. The nature of the case; 2. The issues which arise; 3.
The likelihood of the applicant being able to make a useful contribution to the resolution of the appeal without causing injustice to the immediate parties; 4. Whether the applicant will provide a fresh, distinctive and useful perspective; 5. Whether the applicant’s proposed submission links to an issue raised by the parties; new issues not argued in the court below will generally not be entertained at the instance of an intervener; 6. The prejudice to either party if the intervention is granted; 7. Whether the intervention will transform the court into a political arena; 8.
The applicant’s particular expertise on the subject matter of the appeal; 9. Whether the presence of the intervener is necessary for the court to properly decide the matter; 10. Whether the arguments advanced by the intervener are repetitive of those of the appellant or the respondent; 11. The extent that the proposed intervener is a well-recognized group with a special expertise and a broadly identifiable membership base; and 12.
Whether the proposed intervener has a real, substantial and identifiable interest in the subject matter of the proceedings. [ 44 ] In Barton , Berger JA went on to emphasize the importance of appropriate interventions, at para 10, I say, with great respect, that judges are too quick to shun intervention by a third party in a criminal case. Watson J.A. has observed [in R v.
JLA , 2009 ABCA 324 at para 2] “all necessary voices with proper standing will necessarily be heard through the traditional binary process” – but not always. [ 45 ] While there has been little judicial consideration of the Barton intervention decision of Berger JA, still, the court in R v McInnis, 2018 PECA 27 commented about it in the following terms: [Berger JA] observed that at the end of the day the relevant inquiry is whether the proposed intervenor will advance different and
valuable insights and perspectives that will actually further the court’s determination of the matter. Put another way, he posed, can theapplicant add to the effective adjudication by ensuring that all the issues are presented in a full adversarial context? [46] Counsel for Mr. Walker argued before me that I should reject the proposed intervention on the basis of little or no authority orprecedent for non-statutory or rules-based interventions at the trial level of criminal proceedings.
Counsel relied on R v Bremner, 2000BCCA 345; LLA v Beharriell, (ONCA); R v Bernardo, 1995 7434 ON SC; and R v Mack 2006 ABQB 324. [47] With regard to Mack in particular, the decision of Hillier J is worth noting. In that case, in the course of a trial a certainwitness or witnesses sought intervener status to argue their privacy interests arising from certain disclosure. That status was denied.
Itwas denied on the basis it would lead to inordinate delay; it was denied also on the basis (at para 15) of a lack of necessity in that thecourt found it could consider and determine the disclosure or publication ban issues without the contributions of an intervener. [48] It goes without saying that but for these considerations, Hillier J may have reached a different conclusion regarding thewitness intervention. He certainly did not say interventions are trial were prohibited.
He did say – and I don’t disagree with him in thisregard – that the primary duty of the court in a criminal matter is to facilitate a timely disposition of the Crown charges against theaccused (at para 11), and that the circumstances in which intervener status might be granted must be rare (at para 13). [49] These decisions aside, counsel for applicant, in her November 9, 2022 materials and subsequent oral submissions pointed towhat I conclude is ample authority in favour of a limited opportunity for non-statutory or rule-based interventions at trial. [50] The foundational case is the decision of Rooke J (as he then was) in R v Szczerba, 2002 ABQB 660 at paras 3-4.
Szczerbawas a case involving a proposed intervention by the Calgary Police Service on a disclosure issue, and in what the trial judge described as“unique circumstances”. Those unique circumstances included that the CPS – as a justice system participation clearly divisible from theprosecution service – had a right to intervene when a party to the criminal proceeding sought access to CPS’s arguably privilegedinformation. Part of that right was to allow CPS to argue that the O’Connor procedure prima facie applied to the sought-afterinformation (at paras 12-13). [51] Rooke J relied on an
interpretation of the Canada Evidence Act s 37(1) that CPS was “another official” and thus entitled tointervene to object to the disclosure of information before a court. Rooke J also went on to say that if he was wrong in relying on thatprovision – and I pause to note that I do not rely on it in Mr. Walker’s case, if only because s 37 was not argued before me – then hewould have relied on the common law.
In that regard, he reviewed a series of cases in which intervener status was allowed in differentcircumstances, many of them however involving police services: R v Leslie, [1995] OJ No. 658 (Ont Prov Div); R v Shepherd, [1998]OJ No. 6427 (Ont Gen Div); R v Thibeault, [1997] BCJ No. 3080 (BC Prov Ct); R v Scaduto (ON SC), [1999] OJ No. 1906 (Ont SCJ); R v Altunamaz, [1999] OJ No. 2262 (Ont SCJ); R v Tomlinson, (1998) 16 Crown (5th) 333 (Ont Prov Div); R vFudge, [1999] OJ No. 3121 (Ont SCJ); R v O’Carroll, [2000] OJ No. 3173 (Ont SCJ); R v Hankey, [2000] OJ No 5490 (Ont SCJ); andR v Small, [2001] OJ No. 2231 (Ont SCJ). [52] Coming after Szcerba, EPS counsel referred me to further trial decisions in which interventions were entertained: Duff vAlberta (Attorney General), 2010 ABPC 250 at para 76; and R v Paskimin (an unreported decision of Bilodeau PCJ from January 22,2021, pp 7-10;) I was also referred to two additional
summary conviction appeal decisions that allowed interventions by third parties: Rv Coopsammy, 2008 ABQB 266 at para 26; and R v Keirsted, 2004 ABQB 491 at para 14. [53] Not argued before me but coming to my recollection on reserve, the decision in R v Way, 2019 ABQB 271 at para 34, inwhich an intervention on behalf of the Resolution and Court Administration Services branch of Alberta Justice. [54] Having reviewed these authorities alongside all of the many cases argued before me on the intervention application, I agreewith the submission of the applicant Chief of Police, at para 14 of his counsel’s excellent brief: The Chief’s position in this case is that the O’Connor process is necessarily engaged if any officer is asked to authenticate a documentpurporting to be EPS policy.
Sgt Orazietti properly recognized that he could not answer, under oath, whether a document was an accuratecopy of EPS policy in place on a specific date without comparing the document put to him with EPS policy, or bringing the actual EPSpolicy to court. Whether the comparison is done at an EPS facility or by bringing EPS document to court, the result is the same – EPSrecords, which are not the fruits of the investigation, are being sought for the purposes of a criminal trial.
This is taking a backdoor routethrough an O’Connor application. [55] The proposed intervener makes the point again, at paragraph 60 of his counsel’s brief, and with which I agree: ...an accused cannot require a police officer to authenticate or confirm whether a document is an accurate copy of EPS policy without asuccessful O’Connor application” Conclusion [56] For the reasons stated, I agree that the applicant should be granted intervener status. [57] I find no principled basis for distinguishing the appeal decisions allowing interventions, mentioned earlier in these reasons,from the trial context of the application in Mr.
Walker’s case. There is no prohibition against non-statutory or rules-based interventions attrial. And in principle, the interests that are both enhanced and protected by the multi-faceted intervention tests in such cases asVallentgoed and Barton, apply equally to trials as they do to appeals. [58] I agree as well that in Mr. Walker’s case, the O’Connor procedure applies to any further effort by the defence to authenticateExhibit A through EPS witnesses. I make no comment with regard to other means, if any, by which the accused through counsel mayattempt to authenticate Exhibit A.
[ 59 ] As to the intervener’s submissions regarding relevance of Exhibit A – if it is authenticated – I have held off deciding anything in that regard in these reasons as it is premature to do so. Heard on the 23 rd day of November, 2022. Decision given orally on the 9 th day of January, 2023. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 12 th day of January, 2023. Peter Michalyshyn J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: Terry Hofmann for the Crown Rory Ziv for the Accused Megan Hankewich for the Intervener
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