R v CRN, 2023 ABKB 229
Opinion
Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: R v CRN, 2023 ABKB 229 Date: 20230420 Docket: 211143979Q1 Registry: Red Deer Between: His Majesty the King - and - CRN Accused Restriction on Publication Identification Ban – See the Criminal Code ,
section 486.5 . By Court Order:
(1) Information that could identify the victim, witness or justice system participant shall not be published, broadcast, or transmitted in any way.
(2) No person shall publish, broadcast, or transmit in any way the contents of the publication ban application or the evidence, information or submissions at the hearing of the application. NOTE: Identifying information has been removed from this judgment to comply with the ban so that it may be published. _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Eleanor J. Funk
_______________________________________________________ Introduction [1] The Accused is charged with one count of sexual assault contrary to s 271 of the Criminal Code. The offence is alleged tohave taken place in the early morning hours of October 30, 2021. [2] There is no dispute that the Accused touched the Complainant in a sexual manner. The issues are whether the Crown hasproven beyond a reasonable doubt that the Complainant did not consent to the sexual touching and whether the Accused knew that shedid not consent or was reckless or wilfully blind to the absence of consent.
The Accused has raised the defence of honest but mistakenbelief in consent. [3] The Crown additionally argued that the Complainant lacked capacity to consent due to her level of intoxication. [4] Since there is conflicting Crown and Defence evidence, I must determine the credibility and reliability of that evidence anddecide, based on all of the evidence, whether the Crown has proven the alleged offence beyond a reasonable doubt. [5] I provided an oral
summary of these Reasons in open court. I provided these Reasons for Judgment to Counsel immediatelyafter delivering my reasons. Relevant Law Burden and Standard of Proof [6] The Crown has the burden of proving the Accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Accused does not need to provehis innocence. He is presumed to be innocent. That burden never shifts away from the Crown: R v Lifchus, (SCC),[1997] 3 SCR 320 (SCC) at para 27. [7] The principle of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has deep roots in our system of criminal justice.
It is inextricably linked tothe presumption of innocence and is one of our principal safeguards against convicting the innocent. While the Crown is not required toprove the Accused’s guilt to an absolute certainty, the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt lays closer to that standard than itdoes to the civil standard of balance of probabilities: Lifchus, at paras 36-38; R v Starr, 2000 SCC 40 at para 96. [8] A reasonable doubt is not one that is imaginary or frivolous. It is not based in sympathy or prejudice. Rather, it is one that isbased in reason and common sense.
It is derived from the evidence, or absence of evidence: Lifchus, at paras 13, 14, 27, 31, 32, 36. [9] Even if I believe that the Accused is probably guilty or likely guilty, that is not enough to convict. In that case, he would beentitled to the benefit of the doubt as the Crown would have failed to meet its burden of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.Only if, based on the evidence, I am sure of the Accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, can I conclude he is guilty: Lifchus, at para39.
Credibility and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt [10] The standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt also applies to my assessments of credibility. [11] Credibility relates to the veracity or truthfulness of a witness’ evidence. Reliability has to do with the accuracy of thatevidence. [12] When I consider the credibility of a witness’ evidence, I am to consider the evidence as a whole, and not weigh individualpieces of evidence in isolation.
When I assess the credibility of any witness, I may employ my common sense and life experiences,combined with logic, and in consideration of the general picture revealed on consideration of the whole of the case: R v Beland, (SCC), [1987] 2 SCR 398 at para 20, see also, R v Fuhr, 2018 ABCA 15, at para 39 and R v RR, 2018 ABCA 287, at para 8. [13] As stated, reliability has to do with the accuracy of a witness’ evidence.
It engages consideration of the witness’ ability toobserve, recall and recount events on which they are giving evidence: R v GF, 2021 SCC 20 at para. 82, citing R v HC, 2009 ONCA 56at para 41, see also, R v Hogan, 2022 ABCA 5, at para 6. [14] The Supreme Court of Canada, in R v W(D), (SCC), [1991] 1 SCR 742 (SCC), articulated a test to be appliedin assessing credibility against the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard. [15] First, if I believe the Accused’s evidence in denying his guilt, I must acquit.
Next, even if I do not believe the Accused’sexculpatory evidence but am left with a reasonable doubt that it may be true, then I must acquit. [16] Finally, even if I do not believe the Accused’s evidence or am not left with a reasonable doubt from his evidence, I must notsimply assume that the Complainant’s version must be true.
Instead, I must carefully assess the evidence that I do believe and decidewhether that evidence persuades me beyond a reasonable doubt of the Accused’s guilt. [17] In this assessment, I may believe some, none, or all of the testimony of any witness, including the Accused: R v S(JH), 2008SCC 30 at para 10, see also, R v Hardy, 2019 ABCA 160 at para 45.
Prohibited myths and stereotypes [18] When I apply these principles, along with my common sense, to the Complainant’s evidence, I must not allow any prohibitedmyths or reasoning enter my decision-making process. I am not to draw any negative inferences from the fact that the Complainant didnot apparently physically resist the Accused. I am not to draw any negative inferences from the fact that she did not disclose thesealleged acts right away.
I am not to draw any negative inferences from the way in which the Complainant was dressed; that she wasintoxicated; or that she may have flirted with and kissed the Accused earlier in the night. [19] The law recognizes that victims of sexual assault may respond in a number of different ways, and I am not to base my findingsof credibility and reliability of the Complainant’s evidence on those factors: R v Seaboyer, [1992] 2 SCR 577 at paras 147-152; R vCMG, 2016 ABQB 368 at para 63-81; R v ADG, 2015 ABCA 470 at para 33.
Sexual assault [20] A conviction for sexual assault requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the actus reus and the mens rea of the offence. Aperson commits the actus reus if he, (
i) touches another person, (ii) in a sexual way, and (iii) without that person’s consent: R. v.Kirkpatrick, 2022 SCC 33, at para 28; GF, at para 25; R v Barton, 2019 SCC 33, at para 87; R v JA, 2011 SCC 28, at para 23. [21] The first two of these elements are objective. The Crown need only prove the Accused’s actions were voluntary.
The Crownneed not prove the Accused had any mens rea in relation to the sexual nature of the touching: R v Ewanchuk, (SCC),[1999] 1 SCR 330 (SCC) at para 25. [22] The mens rea is established with proof of an intention to touch knowing of, or being reckless or wilfully blind to, the absenceof consent: Kirkpatrick, at para 28; GF, at para 25; Barton, at para 87; Ewanchuk, at para 41-42, Consent [23] Consent for these purposes means “the voluntary agreement of the Complainant to engage in the sexual activity in question”:Criminal Code, 273.1(1); JA, at para 31; Barton, at para 88. [24] Proving the absence of consent is subjective and is determined with reference only to the Complainant’s subjective internalstate of mind about the sexual touching, at the time that it occurred.
The focus of the inquiry, at the actus reus stage, is only to considerconsent from the Complainant’s perspective: Ewanchuk, at paras 26-27. [25] The Complainant’s testimony is the only direct source of evidence in relation to her subjective state of mind. I must assess thecredibility of her evidence in light of all of the evidence, including any ambiguous conduct. The question at this stage is whether thetotality of the Complainant’s conduct is consistent with her claim of non-consent.
If, at this stage, I accept the Complainant’s evidencethat she did not consent, then the absence of consent is established and the Crown will have proven the actus reus of the offence:Ewanchuk, at para 31; Barton, at para 89. Honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent [26] The Crown proves the mens rea of sexual assault by establishing the Accused intended to touch the Complainant and thateither the Accused
i) knew the Complainant did not consent or ii) was reckless or wilfully blind to the absence of consent: Ewanchuk, atpara 42; JA at para 24; Barton, at para 87; GF, at para 25; Kirkpatrick, at para 28. [27] The Accused may challenge the Crown’s evidence of mens rea by asserting that he had an honest but mistaken belief incommunicated consent. In other words, the Accused may deny he had the “guilty mind” necessary to prove the mens rea of sexualassault. While this is referred to as a defence, the burden of proof does not shift to the Accused. The Accused need not testify in order toraise or rely on the defence.
Instead, his belief in communicated consent may arise from any of the evidence before the Court, includingthe Crown’s case in chief and the testimony of the Complainant: Ewanchuk, at paras 43-44, 55. [28] When this defence is raised, the relevant question is whether the Accused honestly believed that the Complainant effectivelysaid “yes” through her words and/or actions. To succeed in raising a reasonable doubt, the evidence must show that the Complainantcommunicated consent to the sexual activity in question.
The Accused’s belief, in his own mind, that the Complainant wanted him totouch her but did not express that desire, is not sufficient. The Accused’s speculation as to what was going on in the Complainant’s mindprovides no defence: Ewanchuk, at paras 45-49; Barton, at para 90. [29] The Supreme Court made clear, in Barton, that in order to make out the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, theAccused must have an honest belief that the Complainant communicated consent, by her words and/or conduct.
The principalconsiderations relevant to this defence are, (1) the Complainant’s actual communicative behaviour; and (2) the totality of the admissibleand relevant evidence explaining how the Accused perceived that behaviour to communicate consent: Barton, at para 91. [30] The Court went on to explain that the “specious” defence of implied consent “rests on the assumption that unless a womanprotests or resists, she should be “deemed” to have consented. This concept has no place in our law.
A belief that “silence, passivity orambiguous conduct constitutes consent is a mistake of law, and provides no defence”: Ewanchuk, at para 103; Barton, para 98. It is alsoa mistake of law to infer that the Complainant’s consent was implied by the circumstances. In other words, it is an error of law to assumethat unless and until a woman says “no,” she has implicitly given her consent to any and all sexual activity. Recklessness and wilful blindness
[31] The Criminal Code places limits on the use of the defence of mistaken belief in consent.
Section 273.2(a)(ii) states thedefence is not available where the Accused’s belief in consent arises from his own recklessness or wilful blindness. [32] The Supreme Court, in R v Morrison, 2019 SCC 15, reviewed the meanings of “recklessness” and “wilful blindness,” at paras98 and 100: Wilful blindness exists where an Accused’s “suspicion is aroused to the point where he or she sees the need for further inquiries, butdeliberately chooses not to make those inquiries”: R v Briscoe, 2010 SCC 13, [2010] 1 SCR 411, at para 21 (emphasis in original).Wilful blindness has been characterized as “deliberate ignorancebecause it connotes “an actual process of suppressing a suspicion”: D.
Steward, Canadian Criminal Law: A Treatise (7the ed, 2014) at p.261. “A court can properly find wilful blindness only where it can almost be said that the defendant actually knew”: Briscoe, at para 23, citing G. Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part (2nd ed. 1961), at p. 159. This court has repeatedly held that if an Accused is foundto be wilfully blind, that state of mind may substitute for actual knowledge: Sansregret v The Queen, (SCC), [1985] 1SCR 570, at pp. 584-85; Briscoe, at para 21. Indeed, it is “equivalent to knowledge”: Briscoe, at para 23, citing Williams, at p. 159. . . . ...
Recklessness is distinct from wilful blindness: Sansregret, a pp 584-85; Briscoe, at para 23. Recklessness refers to the state of mind ofa person who, “aware that there is danger that his conduct could bring about the result prohibited by the criminal law, neverthelesspersists, despite the risk”: Sansregret, at p. 582. By contrast, wilful blindness “arises where a person has become aware of the need forsome inquiry, declines to make the inquiry because he does not wish to know the truth. He would prefer to remain ignorant”: p. 584. Reasonable steps [33]
Section 273.2(
b) of the Criminal Code operates to further limit the defence of honest belief in consent in situations where theAccused did not take reasonable steps, in the circumstances known to him at the time, to ascertain the Complainant’s consent. In otherwords, if reasonable steps were not taken, the defence is not available: Barton, at para 104. [34] The Court in Barton discussed what is meant by “reasonable steps,” saying it has both objective and subjective elements. TheAccused must take steps that are objectively reasonable.
The Court must assess the reasonableness of those steps in light of thecircumstances known to the Accused at the time: Barton, at para 104. [35] The determination of whether the steps taken by an Accused person were objectively reasonable will be highly fact specific.Steps taken based on rape myths or stereotypical assumptions about what constitutes consent will not be objectively reasonable. AnAccused’s attempt to ‘test the waters’ by recklessly or knowingly engaging in non-consensual sexual touching cannot be considered areasonable step.
If at any time, the Complainant expressed a lack of agreement to engage in sexual activity, it is incumbent on theAccused to point to some evidence from which he could honestly believe consent to have been re-established before he resumed hisadvances: Ewanchuk, at para 65; Barton, at paras 106-107; R v Stewart, 2022 ABCA 192 at para 23. [36] The Court in Barton went on to identify circumstances in which the threshold for satisfying the requirement of reasonablesteps will be elevated.
These include situations where the sexual activity is more invasive and/or where there is a greater risk posed to thehealth and safety of those involved. The threshold will also be higher where the Accused and Complainant are less familiar with eachother, and the risks of miscommunications, misunderstandings and mistakes are higher: Barton, at para 108. [37] In the end, I must be mindful that the reasonable steps requirement is in keeping with the principle that an Accused personcannot equate silence, passivity, or ambiguity with the communication of consent: Barton, at para 109. Incapacity to consent [38]
Section 273.1 of the Criminal Code defines “consent.” Subsection (2)(
b) provides that no consent is obtained if theComplainant is incapable of consenting to the activity. [39] The Supreme Court of Canada, in R v GF, confirmed that capacity is a precondition to consent and discussed the fourrequirements of capacity.
Having the capacity to consent to sexual touching requires that the Complainant have an operating mind,capable of understanding each element of the sexual activity in question: the physical act, its sexual nature, and the specific identity ofthe partner: GF, at para 55. [40] The Court went on to explain a fourth requirement: that the Complainant be capable of understanding that she has a choice ofwhether or not to engage in the sexual activity in question.
A Complainant is incapable of forming subjective consent if she is unable tosay “no,” or she believes she has no choice in the matter: GF, at para 57. [41] If the Crown proves any of these four factors, beyond a reasonable doubt, then the Complainant will be found to be incapableof subjective consent and the absence of consent is established at the actus reus stage: GF, at para 58. Background [42] There is no dispute in relation to much of the narrative of events over the evening of October 29 and early morning of October30, 2021.
To some extent, the witnesses gave different evidence in relation to the details of what took place at each of these events andlocations. [43] In October of 2021, the Complainant was a student at, and working in the gym of, Red Deer Polytechnic. The Accused was
also a student and played on the men’s volleyball team. The Complainant and Accused were acquainted with each other. On a couple of occasions, prior to the events in question, they spent time together and they communicated from time to time through Snap Chat. On the evidence before me, these interactions between them took place in the week or two before the events in question. It is clear that the Accused and Complainant did not know each other well. At the basketball game [ 44 ] On October 29 th , the Complainant and her stepsister attended two back-to-back basketball games at the college.
They both described sitting with friends during the games. At some point, the Accused arrived at the game and sat with them. [ 45 ] The Complainant believed that the Accused walked over to where she was sitting and asked if he could sit with her until his friends arrived, she said “sure.” She did not think that she had invited him over. The Complainant’s stepsister believed that the Complainant was communicating with the Accused on Snap Chat and invited him over to sit with them. The Accused said that he arrived near the end of the first game and could not find his friends.
He said the Complainant invited him to sit with her and her friends. [ 46 ] To get to their seats, attendees at the game had to walk up some stairs, to the 200-meter track. Then walk some distance around the track, depending on where their seats were. And then walk down some stairs to get to the bleacher seats. The Complainant could not recall where they were sitting that night, saying that she had been to a lot of games. Her stepsister said they were sitting in the lower third of the bleachers, about halfway around the track.
The Accused said they were sitting in the first or second rows, courtside, about 20 steps down from the track level. He also said they were sitting about halfway around the track. [ 47 ] Throughout the two games, the Complainant made a number of trips out to the car, where she mixed whiskey and root beer in her drink bottle to sneak into the game. She was not sure how many stairs she had to navigate or how far she had to walk each time she went to and from the car. She said that her stepsister probably came with her out to the car but was not sure.
The Complainant’s stepsister said they went out to the car together three or four times to refill their drinks, she also was not sure how often they went. She was not sure if they drank in the parking lot or snuck their drinks into the game. The Accused believed the Complainant was drinking alcohol at the game and that she went out to the car three or four times, between quarters, to get more to drink. He went with her one of those times. [ 48 ] The Complainant described this as a “big drinking night,” saying that she and her stepsister finished their entire bottle of whiskey, with herself drinking most of it.
She described herself as “pretty intoxicated.” Her stepsister also said the Complainant drank more than she did. She believed they had finished most of the bottle of whiskey. The stepsister described the Complainant’s behaviour during the game as “probably loud” and that they were laughing together. She did not notice anything extreme in the Complainant’s behaviour.
The Accused said he noticed no change in the Complainant’s behaviour during the game and described her as “taking a couple of sips.” He did not know how much she drank, but described her as “pretty drunk, but not over the top.” [ 49 ] By the end of the game, the Complainant described her level of intoxication as 8.5/10, with one being completely sober and 10 being the most drunk she had been. She said she was able to walk up the stairs, to the track level. She added that she might have fallen but was not sure.
Her stepsister did not believe the Complainant had fallen or had any trouble walking during or after the game. The Accused was not drinking alcohol throughout the game. He said neither the Complainant nor her stepsister had any trouble walking after the game. [ 50 ] After the games, the Complainant and her stepsister had plans to change into their Halloween costumes and join some friends at the Canadian Brewhouse. Since the Accused was sober, it was decided that he would drive them to the Brewhouse.
At the Brewhouse [ 51 ] The Complainant, her stepsister, and the Accused joined the group of the Complainant’s friends that were already assembled at the Brewhouse. The Complainant was immediately cut off from being served alcohol, because of her level of intoxication. She said that someone might have shared drinks with her, but she did not know. The Complainant’s stepsister continued to drink at the Brewhouse; she did not share any of her drinks with the Complainant. The Accused did not drink any alcohol. [ 52 ] The Complainant thought that someone had ordered nachos, but she was not sure.
Her stepsister said that she and the Accused decided it would be a good idea to order some food for the Complainant. The Accused said that he was going to order garlic bread, but the Complainant wanted nachos, so he ordered nachos. [ 53 ] The Complainant said she did not remember much of what happened while at the Brewhouse. She did not know if people were dancing and said that it was not normal to dance there. She did not know if she interacted, or did anything, with the Accused, saying she was “too drunk.” Her stepsister saw the Complainant and the Accused sitting beside each other.
She described them as being “light and carefree together;” they danced in the aisle; and shared a kiss. She said it was not uncommon for people to dance at the Brewhouse. The Accused said that he and the Complainant were joking and flirting with each other. He was interested in her and believed he was getting similar signals from her. He said they had some type of flirtatious handshake, during which he spun and dipped her. They kissed when he dipped her and kissed another time while sitting at the table. [ 54 ] JA was one of the Complainant’s friends that was at the Brewhouse that night.
He saw the Complainant and the Accused come in together and believed they were friends. He agreed that he saw them flirting with each other, and then said they were talking with each other. He saw them dance and said it was normal for people to dance at the Brewhouse. [ 55 ] The Complainant continued to describe her level of intoxication at 8.5/10. She did not recall if she had trouble walking in the high heeled boots that she was wearing. She did not think that she had fallen down or had any injuries. Her stepsister described the Complainant as being loud and maybe slurring her words.
She did not know how she was walking. The Accused said that he thought the Complainant had sobered up a bit and was “ready to drink again” by the time they left the Brewhouse. He did not see her fall down and said that she did not need help walking to his car when they left. To the police, the Accused had said the Complainant seemed “pretty
drunk” and “wobbly” at the Brewhouse and that he helped her to his car. [ 56 ] JA described the Complainant as “very intoxicated” by the way that she was greeting people. He said that she was very loud and obnoxious; that she was kind of slurred in her speech; and that she struggled to keep her balance. He said the Complainant twice fell to floor while at the Brewhouse and that the Accused was close to her when she fell. He did not know who, if anyone, helped her to her feet.
JA did not say anything in his police statement about the Complainant falling down or struggling to keep her balance. [ 57 ] The group stayed at the Brewhouse for one or two hours. From there, the Accused drove the Complainant and her stepsister to a house party, where he also joined the party. At the house party [ 58 ] While at the house party, the Complainant and her stepsister continued to drink alcohol. The Accused did not drink anything, save for a small amount of beer. [ 59 ] The Complainant believed she went to both levels of the house, but she was not sure.
Her stepsister said the two of them mostly stuck together at the party. They went into the basement, where they played beer pong and visited with people. The Accused said he played a game of beer pong with the Complainant. [ 60 ] Both the Complainant and her stepsister continued to drink at the party. Neither had a clear recollection of how much they drank. The Accused knew that the Complainant continued to drink but did not know how much she drank. The Complainant described her own level of intoxication as 10/10, and that she had not been that drunk before.
Her stepsister estimated the Complainant’s level of intoxication as 9 or 10/10 and her own level as also a 9/10. [ 61 ] The Complainant did not remember if she continued to wear her high heeled boots and did not remember if she fell down at the party. Her stepsister had no recollection of how the Complainant was walking at the party. The Accused said the Complainant was wearing her boots and that she did not fall down. [ 62 ] JA was also at the house party. He described the Complainant as “still very drunk” and that she drank more at the party but did not know how much.
He believed she was more drunk than she had been at the Brewhouse and described her as falling down more and struggling to keep her balance. He said that the Complainant was not walking well and that she needed help. He described her speech as more slurred than it had been at the Brewhouse. JA did not tell the police that the Complainant was falling down at the party when he gave his statement to them. [ 63 ] The Complainant’s stepsister stayed at the party until about 1 AM. The Complainant and the Accused remained at the party until about 3 AM.
When leaving the party, the Complainant continued to describe her level of intoxication as 10/10. The Accused told the police that at the end of the night, the Complainant seemed fine and wanted to go to bed. [ 64 ] After leaving the party, the Accused drove the Complainant to her friend A’s house, where she had planned to spend the night. At A’s house [ 65 ] As the Accused drove the Complainant to A’s house, the Complainant said that she had A’s address on her phone. She did not remember if she gave the Accused driving directions to get to A’s.
The Accused said that he received driving directions from both the Complainant and her phone. He had no trouble understanding her. [ 66 ] Once at A’s, the Complainant said she thanked the Accused for the ride and started to walk inside. The Accused asked if she needed help. She said she was okay, but the Accused followed her into the house.
She denied that she invited the Accused to come into the house with her. [ 67 ] The Accused said that he and the Complainant kissed in the car, and she invited him to come inside the house; he said “absolutely.” He had not planned to go into the house, but now thought there was some mutual interest between them. [ 68 ] Inside, the Complainant said that she grabbed a box of crackers from the kitchen and went to the basement. There were other people in the kitchen, but she did not have any conversation with them; she felt drunk and tired and just wanted to go to bed. The Accused followed her to the basement.
The Complainant did not know if anyone was cooking, or if the Accused helped anyone with any cooking. She did not think that she sat on the counter in the kitchen before going to the basement. [ 69 ] The Accused said there were people in the kitchen, struggling to cook eggs, and that he helped them. While he helped with the eggs, he said the Complainant sat on the counter beside the stove. After, the Accused said that Complainant looked tired, and he asked her if she wanted to go to bed together, she did.
He said the Complainant looked back towards him as she started to go to the basement, a gesture he understood to mean that she was inviting him to follow her. To the police, the Accused said he asked the Complainant if she wanted to go to bed. His statement to the police did not include asking if she wanted to go “together.” [ 70 ] JA was also at A’s house when the Complainant and the Accused walked into the house, he believed they came together. At first, he said the Complainant took some crackers and went to the basement. He did not recall what he said to her and said that it was hard to understand her.
He saw the Complainant and the Accused go to the basement together. JA said that he, and others, were cooking eggs in the kitchen. He did not know if the Accused helped them with the eggs. He did not remember if the Complainant sat on the counter or not. In the basement of A’s house
[ 71 ] In the basement, the Complainant said she was trying to plug in her phone but could not find her charger. She told the Accused that her bag was upstairs, and that he went upstairs, and then returned to the basement with her bag/charger. They both plugged in their phones. The Complainant said that she laid down, with her back to the Accused, and tried to go to sleep. She said she did not care if he was there or not; she just wanted to sleep.
She continued to describe her level of intoxication as 10/10. [ 72 ] The Accused said that when they got to the basement, he and the Complainant first laid down on the bed together. He realized he needed a phone charger as he would be spending the night and needed to set his alarm. He said the Complainant told him that her charger was in her car, and directed him to her car keys, on a dresser.
The Accused went to the Complainant’s car and retrieved a phone charger. [ 73 ] The Accused said that when he returned to the basement with the phone charger, the Complainant had taken off her Halloween costume and was wearing only her bra and underwear. He plugged in his phone and laid down on the bed. He said they kissed and talked. He asked the Complainant if she wanted to have sex; she said she did, but she was tired. The Accused took this as a “no.” They both laid on the bed, the Complainant had her back towards him.
The sexual touching [ 74 ] After they were both laying in the bed, the Complainant said that the Accused reached around and pulled down the zipper of the Halloween costume that she was still wearing. She said that he touched her chest, under her clothes. He undressed her and touched her vagina. He had oral and vaginal sex with her. He did not wear a condom. The Complainant said that she was “too drunk to struggle.” The Complainant did not believe that she had any scrapes or bruises from the Accused removing her clothing, but she did not look for any injuries. [ 75 ] The Complainant said “what are you doing?
Stop” to the Accused, but he did not respond. While he performed oral and vaginal sex on her, the Complainant said that she asked him to “please stop” and that she just wanted to sleep. The Accused said, “I know you want to.” She kept asking the Accused to stop. When he was done, the Accused laid down beside the Complainant and they both slept. [ 76 ] The Accused said that a few minutes after the Complainant said she was too tired to have sex, he felt the Complainant push against his groin with her buttocks. He thought the Complainant had changed her mind about having sex.
He did not ask her again if she wanted to have sex. Instead, he was “letting her body language decide.” [ 77 ] The Accused said the Complainant rolled onto her back and they kissed. After kissing for a few minutes, he kissed down her body towards her groin. He got between her legs and the Complainant lifted her hips and lowered her hands. The Accused believed she was helping him to remove her underwear. [ 78 ] The Accused performed oral sex on the Complainant. He said that she moaned, breathed heavily, and played with his hair. He believed she was enjoying herself.
After about 10 minutes, the Accused kissed up her body and they kissed some more. He had vaginal intercourse with her; he did not ejaculate. [ 79 ] The Accused said he asked the Complainant three times if she was OK or if she wanted to continue. The first two times, she gave no verbal response. The last time, she said “up to you.” This is when the Accused stopped, explaining that it felt weird and wrong to continue if it was only up to him. He laid down and went to sleep. To the police the Accused said that at some point, the Complainant did not “seem so into it” and he asked if she wanted to continue.
When she did not say “no,” he kept going. In the morning [ 80 ] In the morning, the Complainant said that she heard the Accused get up and leave but she did not open her eyes. She later said that she did not remember hearing if the Accused’s alarm went off. She did not remember talking to him and did not remember if he kissed her before he left. She believed he left his jacket but did not know why. At some later date she returned his jacket to him at the college campus. [ 81 ] Later that day, the Accused sent her a message with some type of apology. The Complainant did not know what he was apologizing for.
She did not save the message or take a screenshot of it. [ 82 ] The Accused said when his alarm went off in the morning, he was in a hurry to get to volleyball practice.
He said that he and the Complainant had a brief conversation; she told him that she was going to have breakfast with her friends; he left his jacket for her as she had no clothes other than her costume from the night before; he kissed her on the forehead and left. [ 83 ] After practice, he sent the Complainant a message that said “Sorry, not that guy.” He explained that he wanted the Complainant to know that he was not running away after having had sex with her. He was interested in her and asked her if he could take her to dinner. He said the Complainant gave him the cold shoulder.
At some later date, she returned his jacket to him. The position of the parties [ 84 ] The Defence says that because the Accused was the only witness who was not drinking or intoxicated during any of the events in question that his evidence is the most reliable, arguing the Complainant’s evidence is inconsistent, implausible, and contradictory.
The Defence says the Complainant’s lack of memory, or lack of certainty throughout much of her narrative, renders her evidence unreliable. [ 85 ] The Defence further argues that the Complainant’s purported level of intoxication is implausible, pointing to her ability to navigate stairs both at the basketball game and later at A’s house; her ability to walk to and from the Accused’s vehicle; her ability to
give driving directions; and her ability to keep checking in with the Accused’s ability to be a sober driver. The Defence says this all flies in the face of her being very intoxicated. [ 86 ] Overall, the Defence says the Complainant was careless with details; tended to downplay aspects of her behaviour; and used intoxication as an excuse. [ 87 ] The Defence argues the Accused took reasonable steps to ascertain the Complainant’s consent by asking her first if she wanted to have sex, and then asking her three more times if she was OK or wanted to continue.
From her body language, the Accused honestly believed the Complainant was consenting to the sexual activity. [ 88 ] The Crown says the Complainant was honest and forthright throughout her evidence; that she made it clear when she was not sure or did not know the answer to a question. In relation to her forgetfulness, the Crown points to the Complainant’s intoxication and the passage of time from October of 2021 to now.
The Crown further argues the Complainant’s memory of a traumatic event is going to be clearer than her memory of more routine ones. [ 89 ] The Crown further points to the aspects of the Complainant’s evidence that are corroborated by the other evidence. Her drinking at the game and going out to the car to get more to drink was corroborated by both her stepsister and the Accused. Her state of intoxication at the game, at the Brewhouse and at the house party was corroborated by her stepsister as well as by the fact that the Complainant was cut off from alcohol service at the Brewhouse.
The locations of where the Complainant went and how she got to those places was corroborated by the Accused and by the Complainant’s stepsister.
The Crown asserts that it was only the Accused who contradicted the Complainant’s evidence on material points. [ 90 ] The Crown points to the Complainant’s evidence of repeatedly asking the Accused to stop as proof that the Accused either knew the Complainant was not consenting, or that he was reckless or wilfully blind to her absence of consent. [ 91 ] On his own evidence, the Crown argues the Accused failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain the Complainant’s consent.
Considering the Complainant’s state of intoxication and fatigue, the Crown argues the Accused did not take reasonable steps when he continued with his sexual advances after receiving no verbal affirmation that the Complainant was consenting. [ 92 ] The Crown additionally argued the Complainant’s level of intoxication rendered her incapable of consenting to the sexual activity. Analysis JA’s evidence [ 93 ] I have concerns with both the reliability and credibility of the evidence given by JA.
His evidence is both internally and externally inconsistent with the other evidence presented during this trial. [ 94 ] In his evidence, JA attempted to paint a picture of the Complainant literally being falling down drunk, both at the Brewhouse and later at the house party. Both the Accused and the Complainant’s stepsister were closer to, and interacted with, the Complainant more throughout these events than JA did. Both had more opportunities to observe the Complainant.
Neither testified to the Complainant falling down, struggling with her balance, or needing help to walk in the way that JA described. [ 95 ] JA described the Complainant’s speech as being slurred to the point of being difficult to understand by the end of the night when she arrived at A’s house. His evidence is not supported by either the evidence of the Accused or the Complainant.
On their accounts, the Complainant and Accused were able to communicate with and understand each other throughout the evening. [ 96 ] In his statement to police, JA said nothing about the Complainant being intoxicated to the point of falling down or struggling to keep her balance. He did not tell the police that the Complainant’s speech was difficult to understand at the end of the night. [ 97 ] The overall tenor of JA’s evidence appeared to be designed to exaggerate the Complainant’s level of intoxication. For these reasons, I find JA’s evidence both unreliable and untrustworthy.
The Complainant’s evidence [ 98 ] To the police, the Complainant said nothing about falling down or having any scrapes or bruises from falling down. Here, in cross examination, she said she might have fallen and might have had some injuries from falling. She explained this discrepancy in her statements by saying she has now had more time to think about it. [ 99 ] The Complainant gave her statement to the police when the events in question were fresher in her mind than here at trial, nearly a year and a half later. I am confident that, had the Complainant fallen down, she likely would have remembered falling.
Or, more likely, she would have had some type of bruising or injuries the next day. The fact that the Complainant did not tell the police about falling or having any injuries from falling suggests strongly to me that she did not fall and did not have injuries from falling. In respect of this portion of the Complainant’s testimony, I find her evidence unreliable. [ 100 ] Otherwise, the Complainant was forthright in testifying to the amount of alcohol that she consumed and her subjective assessment of her level of intoxication.
Her evidence is corroborated by the Accused, who described her as “pretty drunk” and by the Complainant’s stepsister, who described her as quite intoxicated. The Complainant’s evidence is further corroborated by the fact she was immediately cut off from liquor service at the Brewhouse, and then continued to drink at the house party afterwards. On all of this evidence, I have no difficulty finding that the Complainant was intoxicated to a significant degree throughout the events in question.
[ 101 ] The fact that the Complainant was able to maintain her speech and physical coordination does not change this finding. I have no evidence of how frequently the Complainant wore high heeled shoes, nor her experience in walking in high heels while intoxicated. Human experience teaches us that some people are able to maintain greater degrees of physical coordination while intoxicated than others.
I am not persuaded that her ability to walk and talk throughout these events contradicts or undermines the other evidence in relation to her intoxication. [ 102 ] The Complainant was also forthright in acknowledging when she could not remember many of the events that took place throughout the evening of October 29 and into the early morning of October 30, 2021. Not only was she intoxicated but, on her evidence, she was largely testifying to routine or unremarkable events. She said that she had been to many basketball games and, for this reason, could not remember where she was sitting at the game on October 29.
On all of the evidence, there was nothing remarkable that happened at the Brewhouse nor at the house party afterwards. It stands to reason that the Complainant would not have a clear recollection of these events nearly a year and a half later. [ 103 ] The sexual touching that took place in the basement of A’s house at the end of the night was, by all accounts, unexpected. In relation to these events, the Complainant clearly testified that she did not remove her own clothes and there was not any cuddling or kissing with the Accused.
She denied that they spooned together on the bed and that she pushed herself against the Accused’s groin. She denied that she moaned, played with his hair, or lifted her hips to help him remove her underwear. She said that she told the Accused to stop. And, she said that the Accused did not ask her if she wanted to have sex and that he never asked if she wanted him to continue. [ 104 ] On balance, I find her evidence reliable and trustworthy.
The Accused’s evidence [ 105 ] To the police, the Accused said the Complainant was “pretty drunk” and a “little wobbly” when they were at the Brewhouse and that he helped her walk to his car. In his evidence before me, he thought the Complainant had sobered up at the Brewhouse and that she did not struggle to walk.
He explained that he assisted her to his car in the same way that he would “just help a girl cross the street.” [ 106 ] When I consider that the Complainant was intoxicated to the point of being cut off from alcohol service at the Brewhouse, and that they stayed at the Brewhouse for no more than two hours, I find that the Accused’s initial statement to the police is a more reliable description of his observations in relation to the Complainant’s intoxication. [ 107 ] To the police, the Accused said he asked the Complainant, at A’s house, if she wanted to go to bed as she looked tired.
Here, he said that he asked the Complainant if she wanted to go to bed “together.” [ 108 ] The Accused first explained this discrepancy by saying he thought it was implied that they would go together when he asked the Complainant if she wanted to go to bed. He then further explained that, upon having more time to think about the “fine details” of his evidence, he believed he asked the Complainant if she wanted to go to bed “together.” [ 109 ] The Accused gave his statement to police when the events were fresher in his mind than they were now, nearly a year and a half later.
I do not accept his evidence that the detail of asking the Complainant if she wanted to go to bed “together” became clearer with the passage of time. [ 110 ] Instead, when I consider the Accused’s evidence that there had been some kissing and flirting between himself and the Complainant, along with the fact that he knew she was tired, I find it more likely that he asked the Complainant if she wanted to go to bed. Going “together” was implied. [ 111 ] I otherwise find that the Accused testified in a balanced way.
Overall, I find his evidence reliable and trustworthy. 1) Did the Complainant lack the capacity to consent ? [ 112 ] The Crown argues the Complainant’s level of intoxication rendered her incapable of consenting to the sexual touching.
The Defence points to the Complainant’s ability to walk (including in high heeled boots), her ability to talk (including giving driving directions), and her ability to undress herself as indicators of her capacity. [ 113 ] I have previously reviewed the four requirements of capacity as explained by the Supreme Court in GF. [ 114 ] On her evidence, the Complainant knew what was being done to her when the Accused was touching her; she knew the touching was sexual in nature; and she knew that it was the Accused who was touching her.
In response to whether she knew she had a choice, the Complainant answered that she had a choice and that she said “no”. She felt her opinion was not being respected and, for that reason, felt she had no choice. [ 115 ] Consent to engage in sexual touching requires, at the very least, that the Complainant has an operating mind and knows she can exercise a choice to engage in the sexual activity in question.
The Complainant must understand that saying “no” is an option: GF , at para 56. [ 116 ] Here the Complainant’s evidence clearly demonstrates that she understood saying “no” was an option and that she exercised that option by telling the Accused to stop. The fact that her opinion was ignored or disrespected did not render the Complainant incapable of consenting. [ 117 ] On this evidence, the Crown has not satisfied me, on any of the four requirements, that the Complainant was incapable of consenting to the sexual activity.
2) Has the Crown proven the actus reus of sexual assault? [ 118 ] There is no question that the Accused touched the Complainant in a sexual way, with this, two of the three elements of the actus reus of sexual assault are established. As to the third element, that the Complainant did not consent, I am to consider only the Complainant’s subjective state of mind: Ewanchuk , at paras 26-27 . [ 119 ] The Complainant’s evidence was clear and unequivocal. She did not want the sexual touching and she repeatedly asked the Accused to stop. Her evidence in this regard was not shaken in cross examination.
I must assess the credibility of this evidence in light of all of the evidence, including any ambiguous conduct: Ewanchuk , at para 31 ; Barton , at para 89 . [ 120 ] When I consider all of the evidence, I am mindful that the Complainant had been consuming alcohol over the course of several hours and was quite intoxicated in the hours leading up to the alleged assault. She was tired, and she said that she was tired. On the Accused’s evidence, when he asked if she wanted to have sex, the Complainant said she did, but she was tired.
The Accused took this as a “no.” The Complainant denied that she later initiated any sexual touching with the Accused. She denied that they kissed; and that she moaned, breathed heavily, and played with his hair. [ 121 ] When I consider the totality of the Complainant’s conduct, I am satisfied that it is consistent with her claim of non consent. With this, I find the Crown has proven the actus reus beyond a reasonable doubt. 3) Has the Crown proven the mens rea of sexual assault? [ 122 ] There is no question that the Accused intended to touch the Complainant.
To prove the requisite mens rea , the Crown must establish either that the Accused knew the Complainant did not consent or he was reckless or wilfully blind to her lack of consent: Ewanchuk , at para 41-42 ; Barton , at para 87 . [ 123 ] On the Accused’s evidence, he knew the Complainant effectively said “no” when he first asked her if she wanted to have sex. With this, his knowledge of the absence of consent is established, at least at the beginning of the sexual touching.
Without evidence of whether the Accused heard the Complainant’s repeated requests that he stop, the question is whether he was reckless or wilfully blind to her continued absence of consent.
A) Was the Accused reckless or wilfully blind to the absence of consent? [ 124 ] The Supreme Court, in Sansregret , explained the difference between “negligence” and “recklessness” in the criminal law context. Negligence refers to the failure to take reasonable care and is a creature of civil law. It is frequently confused with “recklessness” in the criminal context, but they are separate concepts. Negligence is tested against the objective standard of the reasonable person. [ 125 ] For recklessness to form part of the mens rea of a criminal offence, there must be a subjective element to the analysis.
Recklessness is found in the conduct of one who sees the risk and takes the chance: Sansregret , at para 16 . [ 126 ] Wilful blindness exists where an Accused person’s suspicions are aroused to the point where he sees the risk for further inquiries, but deliberately chooses not to make those inquiries: Morrison , at para 98 . [ 127 ] Believing the Complainant did not at first consent to sexual activity, the Accused says that he believed the Complainant changed her mind by initiating sexual touching with him and that she communicated her consent, throughout the sexual touching, with her body language. [ 128 ] For the Accused’s continued sexual advances to be reckless in relation to the Complainant’s consent, I must consider his perception of the Complainant’s communication with a view to determining if the Accused was aware of the risk that the Complainant was not consenting but took the chance anyway. [ 129 ] According to the Accused, that communication involved the Complainant pushing against his groin area as they laid in bed; rolling onto her back and kissing him; moaning and playing with his hair as he kissed down her body and performed oral sex on her.
At no time did the Complainant verbally consent to the sexual touching. [ 130 ] When I consider the Accused’s subjective state of mind, along with the standards of negligence as opposed to recklessness, I find the Accused was negligent in not taking further steps to confirm his belief that the Complainant had changed her mind.
I do not find, on his evidence, that the Crown has proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he was reckless or wilfully blind in relation to the Complainant’s continued non consent at this point in the sexual touching. [ 131 ] The Accused told police that, at some point, the mood changed, and the Complainant did not “seem as into it.” He said that he asked her again if she was OK or wanted to continue. When she did not say “no,” he kept going. [ 132 ] Here, the Accused was clearly put on notice that consent was a problem.
Where he had been relying on the Complainant’s body language to inform his perception of her consent, something in that same body language now told him there was a need to make further inquiries. By choosing to continue with his sexual advances when the Complainant did not say “no,” the Accused saw the risk, and took the chance.
In so doing, he was reckless in relation to the Complainant’s lack of consent. [ 133 ] Having found that the Accused knew, at first, that the Complainant had not consented to the sexual activity and was later reckless as to her continued non-consent, I find the Crown has proven the mens rea of the alleged sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt.
[134] Because the Accused’s belief in the Complainant’s consent arose from his recklessness, the defence of mistaken belief inconsent is not available to him (CC 273.2(a)(ii)). In the event that I am wrong, I will go on to consider whether the Accused tookreasonable steps to ascertain the Complainant’s consent.
b) Did the Accused take reasonable steps to ascertain consent? [135] The defence of mistaken belief in consent is not available where an Accused has not taken reasonable steps, in thecircumstances known to him, to ascertain consent: Criminal Code, 273.2(b); Barton, at para 104. [136] The Accused says that he took reasonable steps by asking the Complainant first if she wanted to have sex, and then by askingthree more times, during the sexual activity, if she was OK or wanted to continue.
He believed, from her body language, that theComplainant was enjoying herself and consenting to the sexual activity. [137] In R v Malcolm, 2000 MBCA 77 (leave to SCC refused: [2000] SCCA 473), the Court of Appeal suggested a process wherebythe court first ascertains the circumstances known to the Accused. Then, the question is whether a reasonable person, aware of the samecircumstances, would take further steps before proceeding with the sexual activity. If the answer is yes, and the Accused has not takenfurther steps, then the Accused cannot rely on the defence of honest belief in consent.
If the answer is no, or even maybe, then theAccused would not be required to take further steps and the defence will apply: Malcolm, at para 25. [138] Following this approach, I will first review the circumstances that were known to the Accused at the time. [139] The Accused knew that he and the Complainant were not well acquainted. He knew they had never engaged in any sexualactivity before this night. He believed there was some mutual interest growing between the two of them and that they had kissed andflirted with each other earlier in the evening.
He believed the Complainant had invited him into A’s house at the end of the evening. TheAccused knew that the Complainant had been intoxicated at the basketball games the night before; that she had been cut off from liquorservice at the Brewhouse; and that she continued drinking at the house party afterwards. He knew that she was tired and wanted to go tosleep. He believed she initially said “no” to having sex because she was tired.
He knew that she, at no time, gave verbal affirmation ofher consent. [140] Next, I will consider whether a reasonable person, aware of these same circumstances, would have taken further steps toascertain consent. [141] In R v Esau, (SCC), [1997] 2 SCR 777, Justice McLachlin (as she was then) said that in a case where theComplainant was, on any view of the evidence, quite drunk it would seem reasonable to expect the Accused to take steps to ascertainwhether her apparent participation was actual consent, thereby removing the possibility of mistake: Esau, at para 49. [142] In R v Sanclemente, 2021 ONCA 906, the Court of Appeal held there is an elevated threshold for satisfying the reasonablesteps requirement where there is unprotected sexual intercourse between partners who are “not all that familiar with each other”:Sanclemente, at paras 93 and 100. [143] In R v Potvin, 2012 ONCA 113, the Court of Appeal held that further inquiry was necessary where the Complainant initiallysaid “no” and then appeared to say “yes”: Potvin, at paras 4 and 6. [144] When I consider that the Complainant was, by all accounts, quite drunk and that her only purported communication wasexpressed through her non-verbal body language, I find a reasonable person would have taken further steps to ensure her actual consent. [145] When I consider that the Accused engaged in oral and unprotected vaginal sex with a person he did not know well, I find thethreshold for satisfying the reasonable steps requirement was higher than simply asking if the Complainant wanted to continue and then,relying only on her body language, continuing with his sexual advances with no verbal confirmation of consent. [146] Where the Accused initially believed that the Complainant said “no,” and then appeared, through her body language, to changeher mind, I find a reasonable person would have made further inquiries to ensure the Complainant’s actual consent. [147] Finally, on his evidence, the Accused believed the Complainant expressed a lack of agreement to the continued sexual touchingwhen she “didn’t seem so into it.” At this point, it was incumbent on the Accused to point to some evidence from which he couldhonestly believe consent to have been re-established before he continued with his sexual advances: Barton, at para 107.
Instead, whenthe Complainant did not say “no,” the Accused kept going. On this evidence, the Accused cannot satisfy the reasonable stepsrequirement. [148] For these reasons, I find that the Accused did not take reasonable steps to ascertain the Complainant’s consent and the defenceof mistaken belief in consent is not available to him. Conclusion [149] I have found that the Accused initially knew that the Complainant did not consent to the sexual touching in question. His laterbelief in her consent arose from his own recklessness.
I have additionally found that the Accused did not take reasonable steps toascertain the Complainant’s consent. When I apply these findings to the first and second branches of the WD analysis, I find that I do notaccept the Accused’s evidence in relation to his belief in the Complainant’s consent. Nor does his evidence leave me with a reasonabledoubt in relation to his belief in consent. Instead, the Accused’s belief lays closer to the prohibited concept of “implied consent”. [150] I have found that the Complainant did not subjectively consent to any of the sexual touching in question.
I have additionallyfound that the Accused knew, at first, that she did not consent. He was later reckless in relation to her continued non-consent. When Iapply these findings to the third branch of the WD analysis, I am satisfied the Crown has met its burden of proving both the actus reusand the mens rea of the alleged sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt.
[ 151 ] For all of these reasons, I find the Accused guilty of sexual assault. Heard on the 13, 14 and 15 th day of March, 2023. Dated at the City of Red Deer, Alberta this 20 th day of April, 2023 . E.J. Funk J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: Davin Mitchell for the Crown Richard Muenz for the Accused
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