Davis v Davis, 2023 ABKB 242
Opinion
Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Davis v Davis, 2023 ABKB 242 Date: 20230425 Docket: 4803 183851 Registry: Edmonton Between: Monica Marie Davis Plaintiff (Respondent) - and - Benjamin Davis Defendant (Applicant) _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Decision of the Honourable Justice W.N. Renke _______________________________________________________ [ 1 ] This matter came before me in Family Chambers by way of an application by Mr. Davis seeking, among other things, directions concerning an appeal from an arbitration award.
The issues went beyond what could be accommodated in that context, so resolution was set to be by written submissions and a written decision. [ 2 ] The overarching problem is the interaction of a Practice Note 7 Order and a subsequent arbitration agreement. I. Background
[ 3 ] The parties married in 2006, separated in 2017, and were divorced in 2020. There are four children of the marriage, ages 13, nearly 11, 9, and 8. [ 4 ] On April 12, 2019, the parties entered into a Consent Parenting Coordination Order under Practice Note 7 granted by Justice Lee (the Consent Order). [ 5 ] On April 30, 2019, the parties and Dr. Gregory Pickering entered into an Agreement for Parenting Coordination Services and Arbitration Agreement, as contemplated under the Arbitration Act (the PC & Arbitration Agreement).
The parties had counsel who provided independent legal advice. [ 6 ] The parties managed their parenting relationship without incident, on occasion with the assistance of Dr. Pickering, until September 2022. [ 7 ] In September 2022, the parties decided to engage the arbitration process to determine whether the parenting arrangement should be changed from a 4 days on/4 days off
schedule to a 7 days on/7 days off schedule. [ 8 ] On October 17, 2022, Dr. Pickering issued an Award under the PC & Arbitration Agreement changing the parenting arrangement to the 7/7 arrangement effective January 6, 2023 (the Award). [ 9 ] Applicant’s counsel provided Dr. Pickering with a letter of objection to the Award on November 16, 2022. [ 10 ] Applicant’s counsel took steps to appeal the Award on November 16, 2022. Applicant’s counsel was advised by the KB filing clerks on November 21, 2022 that the matter required an appearance in Family Docket Court before any application could be made.
Further detail respecting filing efforts will be provided below. [ 11 ] Applicant’s counsel therefore filed a Notice to Attend Docket Court on November 21, 2022. This was 35 days after the date of the Award. [ 12 ] On December 12, 2022, counsel for the parties appeared in Family Docket Court. They were directed to have the matter considered in an application process. [ 13 ] The application was set for Family Chambers on January 5, 2023.
However, a power outage occurred at the Law Courts on January 3, 2023 and Chambers matters on January 4 and 5 were adjourned sine die . [ 14 ] The application returned to Chambers on March 10, 2023. [ 15 ] The Award is in effect and has been respected. [ 16 ] In the following, I will refer to Mr. Davis as the Applicant and Ms. Davis as the Respondent. II. Issues [ 17 ] The ultimate issues are whether the appeal remains viable and, if it does, what process should be followed, and if it does not, whether the Award may be enforced.
Resolution of these issues requires working out the relationship of the Consent Order and the PC & Arbitration Agreement respecting appeals of parenting coordinator decisions, and the effect of the steps taken to appeal the Award in the circumstances. [ 18 ] I note that there was no concern with the procedural fairness of the arbitration or respecting any other matters referred to in s. 45(1) of the Arbitration Act . [ 19 ] I’ll begin by reviewing the relevant terms of the Consent Order and PC & Arbitration Agreement as well as supplemental provisions of the Arbitration Act , then address their interaction. III.
The Order and the Agreement A. Practice Note 7 [ 20 ] Practice Note 7 (in the form effective October 1, 2012) stated the following under para 37.C, Mediation/Arbitration (pp. 8-9): Parenting Coordination: The Court may delegate decision-making to a Parenting Expert (parenting coordinator/arbitrator), where both parties to the action have consented.
The Parenting Expert will assist the parents to decide parenting issues within the context and specific instructions of a Court Order which establishes the parameters for the parenting coordinator/arbitrator and for custody/access/parenting time and parenting responsibilities. The Parenting Expert is a qualified arbitrator .... Where the Parenting Expert cannot assist the parties to negotiate a settlement of the conflict, the Parenting Expert may decide the issue and the parties are bound by that decision because of their jurisdiction as arbitrators ( sic ).
No decision of the Parenting Expert may override the Court Order. [ 21 ] The Consent Order tracked the form of Parenting Coordination Order, Appendix B to Practice Note 7, save that no Justice was seized under the order (Justice Lee was transitioning to supernumerary status).
B. Consent Order [ 22 ] The
Preamble to the Consent Order provided as follows: C. The parties have consented to the appointment of a Parenting Coordinator to assist the parents to decide parenting issues and to act as a mediator when the parents encounter conflict. D. The parties have consented to being bound by the decisions of the Parenting Coordinator, subject to review as provided below. [ 23 ] Para 2 provided that: 2. Dr. Greg Pickering is hereby appointed as Parenting Coordinator to assist the parties in deciding the following parenting issues: (
a) Developing a parenting plan respecting, but not necessarily limited to, parenting responsibilities .... [ 24 ] Para 3 provided that: (e) [the authority of the Parenting Coordinator is to] Assist the parties in developing a Parenting Plan setting out how the parenting responsibilities will be shared between the parties .... (
g) If, at any time, the parties have a dispute over any detail of parenting within the Parenting Plan, the Parenting Coordinator shall decide the matter and the parties are bound by that decision. The procedure to be followed shall be in the Parenting Coordinator’s discretion .... (
h) The Parenting Plan for the division of sharing parenting responsibilities between the parties shall include ... • The time the children spend with each parent .... (i) [the authority of the Parenting Coordinator includes] Any other authority the parties may agree to with the Parenting Coordinator. [ 25 ] Para 5 provided that: 5. No decision of the Parenting Coordinator may override this Order. [ 26 ] Para 7 provided that: 7. If a Parenting Plan is developed by the parties or by the Parenting Coordinator, it shall be filed with the Court. [ 27 ] Para 18 concerned appeals. It provided that: 18.
If either party objects to a decision of the Parenting Coordinator, that party can appeal to the Court, provided that (
a) The objecting party must first raise his or her objections to the Parenting Coordinator in writing. (
b) Until the Court rules on the objection, the Parenting Coordinator’s decision is to be followed. (
c) The Court shall convene a case conference with the parties and their counsel (if any) present. The Parenting Coordinator shall attend the case conference if either party or the judge requests his or her attendance. (
d) The party objecting to the Court about a decision of the Parenting Coordinator shall have the onus to show that the decision of the Parenting Coordinator should be changed. C. PC & Arbitration Agreement [ 28 ] The PC & Arbitration Agreement was captioned as being “in accordance with the Arbitration Act , RSA 2000, C.
A-43 , and amendments thereto.” [ 29 ] Clause 4 concerned the three main roles of the Parenting Coordinator, including para (c), that applied if the parties c. [failed] to reach an agreement through mediation to ARBITRATE so that a decision is made .... [this] role falls under the Decision Making phase of the process. [ 30 ] Clause 5 confirmed that the Parenting Coordinator “is not entitled to override ... any ... Court order, except as otherwise agreed to by further ... Court Order.” [ 31 ] The title of clause 10 is “Waiver of Right to Litigate in Courts” and it provided that: 10.
By submitting to arbitration of the issues involved in the parenting of the children, the parents hereby waive any right to further litigate those issues in court until such time that this agreement is ended for any reason whatsoever. [ 32 ] Clause 11 confirmed the Consent Order: 11. The parties agree with the terms of the Parenting Coordination Order granted by Justice D. Lee on April 15, 2019.
[ 33 ] Further, clause 27 provided that: 27. The parties agree that the terms of the Order of Justice D. Lee pronounced on April 15, 2019 relating to the Parenting Coordinator and parenting coordination process are hereby incorporated into this Agreement. [ 34 ] Clause 28 appointed Dr. Pickering as arbitrator: 28. The parties appoint Dr. Gregory Pickering ... as the ... sole Arbitrator to hear and determine issues in dispute as determined by Justice D. Lee Order and by paragraphs 19 and 31 herein. [ 35 ] Clauses 30 and 31 provided as follows: 30.
The Arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the Arbitration Act .... 31. If the issues [remain] unresolved under the Non-Decision Making process after reasonable effort ... the [Parenting Coordinator] shall proceed to Arbitrate the issue. [ 36 ] Clause 46 dealt with the enforcement of awards and the appeal of awards: 46.
The [Parenting Coordinator’s] Award when made and executed is final and binding upon the parties and enforceable in any court of competent jurisdiction and in the same manner as any other judgment of the said court subject however to the rights of appeal of Section 44(1) of the Arbitration Act . D.
Section 44 of the Arbitration Act [ 37 ] The PC & Arbitration Agreement did not reproduce s. 44(1) or the remainder of that section. The
section is as follows (version in force from December 17, 2014 to November 15, 2022): Appeal of award 44(1) If the arbitration agreement so provides, a party may appeal an award to the court on a question of law, on a question of fact or on a question of mixed law and fact.
(2) If the arbitration agreement does not provide that the parties may appeal an award to the court on a question of law, a party may, with the permission of the court, appeal an award to the court on a question of law.
(2.1) The court shall grant the permission referred to in subsection (2) only if it is satisfied that (
a) the importance to the parties of the matters at stake in the arbitration justifies an appeal, and (
b) the determination of the question of law at issue will significantly affect the rights of the parties.
(3) Notwithstanding subsections (1) and (2), a party may not appeal an award to the court on a question of law that the parties expressly referred to the arbitral tribunal for decision.
(4) The court may require the arbitral tribunal to explain any matter.
(5) The court may confirm, vary or set aside the award or may remit the award to the arbitral tribunal and give directions about the conduct of the arbitration.
(6) Where the court remits the award to the arbitral tribunal in the case of an appeal on a question of law, it may also remit to the tribunal the court’s opinion on the question of law. E. Further Arbitration Act Provisions [ 38 ] The Arbitration Act further provided as follows in ss. 6 , 46 , and 49 : Court intervention limited 6 No court may intervene in matters governed by this Act, except for the following purposes as provided by this Act: (
a) to assist the arbitration process; (
b) to ensure that an arbitration is carried on in accordance with the arbitration agreement; (
c) to prevent manifestly unfair or unequal treatment of a party to an arbitration agreement; (
d) to enforce awards. Time limit 46(1) The following must be commenced within 30 days after the appellant or applicant receives the award, correction, explanation, change or statement of reasons on which the appeal or application is based:
(
a) an appeal under section 44(1); (
b) an application for permission to appeal under section 44(2); (
c) an application to set aside an award under
section 45. Enforcement of award 49(1) A person who is entitled to enforce an award made in Alberta or elsewhere in Canada may make an application to the court to that effect.
(2) The application shall be made on notice to the person against whom enforcement is sought, in accordance with the Alberta Rules of Court, and shall be supported by the original award or a certified copy of it.
(3) The court shall give a judgment enforcing an award made in Alberta unless (
a) the 30-day period for commencing an appeal or an application to set the award aside has not yet elapsed, (
b) an appeal, an application to set the award aside or an application for a declaration of invalidity is pending, or (
c) the award has been set aside or the arbitration is the subject of a declaration of invalidity .... IV.
The Relationship of the Order and the Agreement [ 39 ] The following questions arise respecting the relationship of the Consent Order and the PC & Arbitration Agreement: • are the appeal provisions of the PC & Arbitration Agreement independent of the appeal provisions of the Consent Order? • is an appeal under the PC & Arbitration Agreement limited to an appeal respecting a question of law? • must an appeal under the PC & Arbitration Agreement be commenced within 30 days? • in this case, was the appeal commenced within 30 days? 1.
Are the appeal provisions of the PC & Arbitration Agreement independent of the appeal provisions of the Consent Order? [ 40 ] An argument for the maximum independence of the PC & Arbitration Agreement from the Consent Order is attractive. Parties enter into arbitration agreements precisely to avoid court-based litigation. [ 41 ] If the parties had intended to maximize their autonomy and freedom from court-based litigation, the Consent Order might have been varied or terminated. The Consent Order, though, remained in force. (
a) The Parenting Plan Argument [ 42 ] One might seek to avoid the reach of the Consent Order through the argument that the Consent Order was spent. What was contemplated by the Consent Order had been accomplished years before and the parties’ 2022 arbitration process did not fall under the terms of the Consent Order. More specifically, the parties had developed a Parenting Plan, as contemplated by paras 2(a), 3(
e) and 7 of the Consent Order. It was filed with the Court some time before November 2020. The task of the Parenting Coordinator envisaged by the Consent Order was complete. Arbitrations years later concerned new matters, not matters already resolved under the Consent Order. [ 43 ] However, the Consent Order did not describe the Parenting Plan as a fixed-term, one-time document. [ 44 ] The Parenting Plan concerns “parenting responsibilities” (paras 2(a), 3(e), 3(h)). Parenting responsibilities were the subject of the Award in question.
Under para 3(g), the Consent Order contemplated disputes arising “at any time” respecting the Parenting Plan. The present circumstances of the parties were contemplated by the Consent Order. [ 45 ] The Consent Order itself (reflecting Practice Note 7) authorized arbitration (preamble D, paras 2, 3(g), 3(i)). The arbitration process leading to the Award fell within the scope of the Consent Order. [ 46 ] The appeal process set out in para 18, then, applies to arbitration decisions within the contemplation of the Consent Order.
Preamble D confirms as much: “The parties have consented to being bound by the decisions of the Parenting Coordinator, subject to review as provided below” – that is, as provided in para 18. (
b) The Clause 28 Argument [ 47 ] Clause 28 of the PC & Arbitration Agreement stated that: 28. The parties appoint Dr. Gregory Pickering ... as the ... sole Arbitrator to hear and determine issues in dispute as determined by Justice D. Lee Order and by paragraphs 19 and 31 herein. [ 48 ] Respondent’s counsel argued that this clause points to matters outside the scope of the Consent Order, those falling under
clauses 19 and 31. I disagree. Dr. Pickering derived his authority from the Consent Order and the agreement. His authority had two complementary sources not two independent sources. And his primary source of authority was the Consent Order. (
c) The Arbitrator’s Discretion Argument [ 49 ] Alternatively, one might seek to avoid the reach of the Consent Order through the arbitrator’s discretion recognized by the Consent Order. [ 50 ] Practice Note 7 confirms that the Court may “delegate decision-making to a Parenting Expert ... where both parties have consented.” Para 3(
g) provided that the parties “are bound” by the decisions of the arbitrator. Further, the arbitration procedure to be followed “shall be in the Parenting Coordinator’s discretion.” And under para 3(i), the authority of the Parenting Coordinator includes “any other authority the parties may agree to.” The parties, then, were free to craft appeal provisions that suited them and Dr. Pickering, without regard to the appeal provisions of the Consent Order. [ 51 ] But again,
Preamble D expressly referred to the arbitrator’s decisions being “subject to review as provided below.” Para 18 established an appeal process. If that process did not apply to the Award, a decision of the arbitrator would “override” the Consent Order. The Consent Order prohibited that. (
d) The Inconsistency Argument [ 52 ] Finally, one might argue that the appeal contemplated by the PC & Arbitration Agreement is independent of the Consent Order appeal procedure because the two are inconsistent. Through contract, the parties recognized a procedure not falling within the contemplation of the Consent Order. [ 53 ] In my opinion, though, the clause 46 appeal provision and the para 18 appeal provision are not inconsistent. Clause 46 recognizes a right to appeal (I’ll consider the nature of that right in the next section). Para 18 too recognizes a right to appeal.
The appeal in both cases is to the Court of King’s Bench (again, more on this in a moment). Para 18 imposes two procedural steps that do not interfere with the appeal. The objecting party must first raise objections to the Parenting Coordinator in writing and, at some point (by implication prior to the hearing of the appeal), “the Court shall convene a case conference.” The additional procedural aspects of para 18 do not affect the substance of the appeal contemplated by clause 46. (
e) Bivalent Consent Order Authority [ 54 ] The subordination of the arbitration agreement to the Consent Order is established not only by the reach of the Consent Order. The parties themselves incorporated and recognized the authority of the Consent Order in the arbitration agreement. Clause 5 states that the Parenting Coordinator was not entitled to “override” any Court order. Clause 11 confirms the parties’ agreement with the Consent Order.
Clause 27 provides that the parties agreed that the Consent Order terms relating to the Parenting Coordinator and the parenting coordination process were “hereby incorporated into this Agreement.” [ 55 ] With respect to clause 27, Respondent’s counsel argued that the parenting coordination process is different from requesting arbitration on specific and discrete issues. I disagree.
Part of the parenting coordination process is arbitrating specific and discrete issues. [ 56 ] Hence, in my opinion, the parties themselves imported para 18 of the Consent Order into the PC & Arbitration Agreement. [ 57 ] The parties remained subject to bi-level governance of dispute resolution. (
f) Conclusion [ 58 ] Matters determined by arbitration under the PC & Arbitration Agreement fall under the purview not only of that agreement but of the Consent Order. The agreement does not carve out a set of decisions falling outside the scope of the Consent Order. 2.
Is an appeal under the PC & Arbitration Agreement limited to an appeal respecting a question of law? [ 59 ] Clause 46 provides that an award is final and binding “subject however to the rights of appeal of Section 44(1) of the Arbitration Act .” [ 60 ] Subsection 44(1) provides that “[i]f the arbitration agreement so provides, a party may appeal an award to the court on a question of law, on a question of fact or on a question of mixed law and fact.” [ 61 ] Under s. 44(2), “[i]f the arbitration agreement does not provide that the parties may appeal an award to the court on a question of law, a party may, with the permission of the court, appeal an award to the court on a question of law.” (
a) No Specification of Appealable Issues [ 62 ] It is true that the PC & Arbitration Agreement does not have a provision stating expressly something along the following lines: “A party may appeal an Award to the Court on a question of law, a question of fact, or a question of mixed law and fact.” [ 63 ] The problem is this: If the PC & Arbitration Agreement did not specify the types of issues that could be appealed – questions of law, of fact, or of mixed law and fact – then under s. 44(2), first, a party is restricted to an appeal on a question of law, and second, an appeal on the question of law requires leave of the Court.
[64] There would be two implications if the PC & Arbitration agreement did not specify the issues that could be appealed. First,the Applicant would be restricted to an appeal on a question of law. However, the parenting determination in the Award was (arguably) adetermination of mixed law and fact only (unless an extricable legal error could be identified). See (e.g.) Nicol v Tremblay, 2021 ABCA298 at para 8: [8] There is no dispute about the deferential standard of review in family law cases, set out in MacPhail v Karasek, 2006 ABCA 238at paras 25-27, [2006] AJ No 982 (QL): 25 In Van de Perre v.
Edwards, 2001 SCC 60 , [2001] 2 S.C.R. 1014, Bastarache J. stated at para. 13: [A]n appellate court may only intervene in the decision of a trial judge if he or she erred in law or made a material error in theappreciation of the facts. Custody and access decisions are inherently exercises in discretion. 26 This parallels the decision in Housen v.
Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33 , [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235, in which the court held thatquestions of law are reviewable on a standard of correctness, while conclusions of fact, or mixed fact and law, cannot be disturbed unlessthere is palpable and overriding error. 27 When it is alleged the trial judge did not consider relevant factors or evidence, the reviewing court may reconsider the evidence ifthe omission “gives rise to the reasoned belief that the trial judge must have forgotten, ignored or misconceived the evidence in a waythat affected his conclusion”: Van de Perre at para. 15. [emphasis added] [65] Second, the Applicant failed to follow the appropriate appellate procedure.
He was required to obtain leave to appeal. He didnot seek such leave. The appeal procedure he attempted to initiate was fatally flawed. (
b) Specification of Appealable Issues [66] In my opinion, however, clause 46 of the PC & Arbitration Agreement does specify the types of issues that may be appealed,not through an express listing but through reference to s. 44(1) of the Arbitration Act.
On this point I agree with Applicant’s counsel. [67] Clause 46 provides that an award is final and binding “subject however to the rights of appeal of Section 44(1) of theArbitration Act.” [68] If clause 46 had referred to s. 44 without specifying subsection (1), I would be driven to the conclusion that clause 46 did notspecify types of issues that could be appealed. I note that in Seneviratne v Seneviratne, 1998 ABQB 289, the appeals clause (13.1)referred to s. 44, “subject however to the rights of appeal of
Section 44 of the Act” (i.e., not s. 44(1)). Justice Hutchinson found in para 9that the language “may not be a sufficient indication as to exactly what is being appealed ....” and stated the following at paras 34 and 35: [34] .... I find that s. 44(1) requires the parties to an arbitration agreement to specifically provide precisely what categories of revieware open for appeal under that section. That is whether the parties wish to provide for an appeal on a question of law, on a question offact or on a question of mixed law and fact.
Of course, if they do not wish to make such a provision then they need not do so. They arethen left with the discretionary appeal limited to a question of law under s. 44(2) and no appeal on a question of law expressly referred tothe arbitral tribunal under s. 44(3). [35] By referring to s. 44 only, the parties to this Arbitration Agreement did not automatically subject their Arbitration Agreement toall of the rights of appeal contained in s. 44(1). They did not choose the specific remedies provided for in that subsection andaccordingly, they did not comply with the direction given in s. 44(1).
They did not specifically provide that s. 44(1) applies and specifytheir choice of a right of appeal on law or a right of appeal on fact or a right of appeal on mixed law and fact depending upon what theydesired. See Schafer v Schafer, 2023 ABCA 117 at paras 60-63; Sheridan v Sheridan, 2022 ABQB 180, Jerke J at paras 15 and 18 (“The flaw inthis argument is that the agreement does not purport to engage s 44(1), nor does it purport to engage the rights of appeal in s 44(1).
Itengages all of the appeal rights in s 44” [emphasis in original]); Esfahani v Samimi, 2022 ABCA 178 at para 12. [69] But because clause 46 states that a party has “the rights of appeal of Section 44(1),” clause 46 incorporates s. 44(1).Subsection 44(1) begins “[i]f the arbitration agreement so provides:” but the PC & Arbitration Agreement does so provide. Itincorporates s. 44(1).
Subsection 44(1) continues: “a party may appeal an award to the court on a question of law, on a question of fact oron a question of mixed law and fact.” That is to say that clause 46 recognizes that appeals could be made of an arbitrator’s decision ongrounds falling within s. 44(1) – a question of law, of fact, or mixed law and fact. [70] As Applicant’s counsel observed, my reasoning and his submission match the approach of Justice Brooker in CRW v SJA,2018 ABQB 1041 respecting a similar arbitration agreement clause (“...
Subject to the rights of appeal of Section 44(1) of the Act ....”).Justice Brooker commented in para 10 that “this clause, given its specific reference to section 44(1), seems to suggest that the Agreementpermitted appeals on questions of law, fact, or mixed law and fact ....” [71] I should add that I view the specific reference to s. 44(1) as being for the purpose of distinguishing that appeals clause fromthe appeal clauses referring to s. 44 alone (without reference to a subsection). The reference to s. 44(1) pulls the current clause out of thejurisprudence respecting s. 44 simpliciter clauses.
Applicant’s counsel held the same view. [72] Hence, it would be of no moment that the Applicant’s appeal concerned issues of mixed law and fact. An appeal is availablerespecting that type of question. [73] That does not mean, of course, that the Applicant will necessarily be successful on appeal. As para 18 of the Consent Orderrecognized, the Applicant, like any other appellant, bears the burden in the appeal of demonstrating error. And further, that error must bedemonstrated according to the applicable standard of review.
[ 74 ] I note that there was no argument that s. 44(3) of the Arbitration Act was engaged in the circumstances (no appeal on a question of law “expressly referred” to the arbitrator for decision). 3. Must an appeal under the PC & Arbitration Agreement be commenced within 30 days? [ 75 ] The Consent Order does not impose a time limit for an appeal. That seems to create an absurdity. On the terms of the Consent Order alone, an appeal could be brought years after an award was made. [ 76 ] Practically, absurdities may not arise.
A party could appeal but the longer the party waited the less likely the party would succeed. Assuming that the award concerned parenting, children’s interests in stability (the status quo ), if nothing else, might eventually be an insurmountable obstacle to success. [ 77 ] But does the 30 day limit on commencing an appeal set out in s. 46(1) of the Arbitration Act apply through the PC & Arbitration Agreement? Applicant’s counsel argued that the sole governing appeal provision is para 18 (as it reflects the equivalent Practice Note 7 provision).
I disagree. [ 78 ] It is true that the PC & Arbitration Agreement did not expressly refer to the s. 46(1) time limit. [ 79 ] The agreement, though, is captioned as being “in accordance with the Arbitration Act .” Clause 30 provides that the arbitration “shall be conducted in accordance with the Arbitration Act .” Clause 46, again, provides that an award is final and binding “subject to the rights of appeal of Section 44(1) of the Arbitration Act .” [ 80 ] Under s. 46(1)(a), an appeal under s. 44(1) of the Arbitration Act must be commenced within 30 days after an appellant or applicant receives the award on which the appeal is based. [ 81 ] In my opinion, the 30-day time limit for commencing an appeal was set by the parties’ agreement and the Arbitration Act . [ 82 ] In my opinion as well, setting a time-limit for commencing an appeal is not inconsistent with the Consent Order since the Consent Order does not itself specify a time-limit for an appeal.
The agreement does not “override” the Consent Order. In effect, para 18 of the Consent Order embraces an appeal that a party is entitled to make. It does not interfere with the appeal process save by adding the requirements of the written objection and the pre-hearing case conference. The Consent Order recognizes in para 3(
g) that the Parenting Coordinator had discretion respecting “the procedure to be followed” in deciding matters at issue between the parties. 4. In this case, was the appeal commenced within 30 days? (
a) Background [ 83 ] When the Award was made the Applicant was self-represented. He subsequently retained counsel. I do not consider Applicant’s counsel as being responsible for the timing of the attempted court filings. The lateness of the retainer left no room for manoeuvre. [ 84 ] On November 16, 2022, the Applicant’s letter of objection was provided to Dr. Pickering. [ 85 ] November 16, 2022 was the 30 th day following the date of receipt of the Award. [ 86 ] That same day at 11:48 a.m. Applicant’s counsel submitted for filing two forms of Notices of Appeal.
There was some difficulty in determining the proper form for this particular (and relatively rare) form of appeal. The Notices of Appeal were electronically submitted to qbfiling edmonton. [ 87 ] The Notices of Appeal set out the grounds for appeal, generally that the Arbitrator erred in making a change to the children’s shared parenting schedule. [ 88 ] The clerk responded on November 21, 2022 as follows: “This matter must proceed by way of Family Docket Court before any other application can be made.” [ 89 ] The Notice to Attend Family Docket Court followed, as did the other history reviewed above. (
b) Observations [ 90 ] As regards an arbitration agreement not made under the auspices of Practice Note 7 and a parenting coordination order (at least if the agreement did not concern Family Law matters), the appeal process should have been straightforward. A Notice of Appeal would have been filed in the Court of King’s Bench and by that means the appeal would have been commenced. [ 91 ] The Applicant encountered two difficulties. First, the Practice Note 7 form of Order contemplated an appeal to the Case Management Judge. Had there been one, a Notice of Appeal would have had a definite judicial destination.
The Case Management Judge could also have organized the case conference. But there was no Case Management Judge. Para 18 of the Consent Order referred instead to an appeal to “the Court.” [ 92 ] Second, had the appeal occurred in 2019, there would have been no difficulty. A Notice of Appeal could have been filed in the Court of Queen’s Bench, the matter would likely have come up for first appearance in Family Chambers, and the matter would have been set down for a hearing. A case conference could have been scheduled pre-hearing. Filing of the Notice of Appeal would have commenced the appeal.
But the attempt to file the appeal was pre-empted and a requirement was imposed to file a Notice to Attend Family Docket Court.
(
c) Determination [ 93 ] Under clause 44(1) of the agreement, the appeal is to “the court.” The court is the Court of Kings Bench, as confirmed by s. 1(1) (
c) of the Arbitration Act . Para 18 also refers to appeal to “the Court.” Given the nature of the proceedings, the appeal would be a Family Law matter. [ 94 ] What has occurred since the Consent Order was granted is that King’s Bench Family Law procedures have changed. We now have Family Docket Court. This was not a circumstance in the contemplation of the parties at the time the PC & Arbitration Agreement was entered into.
Practice Note 7 (at the time) and the Consent Order did not contemplate Family Docket Court. [ 95 ] The Applicant received official advice that he could only proceed by beginning with a Notice to Attend Family Docket Court to obtain directions about next steps. [ 96 ] Neither para 18 nor clause 44(1) or 46(1) specified the precise documentation and procedure for commencing an appeal.
Under para 18, the parties are bound to comply with the procedures set by the Court for commencing an appeal. [ 97 ] I would have been prepared to accept the Notice to Attend Family Docket court as commencing the appeal had it been filed within the required time period, but it was not. It was filed after 30 days had elapsed. I would have considered Justice Feth’s decision in Coble v Atkin , 2023 ABKB 10 at paras 31-26 to provide a useful analogy although the present case concerns a statutory and contractual time limit. [ 98 ] In this case, the Applicant submitted Notices of Appeal for filing.
Since what was sought was an appeal, the natural document to file was a notice of appeal. Rule 3.2(1)(
c) contemplates starting an action by a notice of appeal. [ 99 ] The Notices of Appeal were received within the deadline, on the last day, but still within the deadline. Filing did not occur, not because of any defect in the documents but because a judicial and administrative process was superimposed on the appeal. [ 100 ] In my opinion, in the particular circumstances of this case, the inherent jurisdiction of the Court is engaged.
I draw on Sir Jack Jacob’s “The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court” (1970), Current Legal Problems 23 at 51: ... the inherent jurisdiction of the court may be defined as being the reserve or fund of powers, a residual source of powers, which the court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just or equitable to do so, and in particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to prevent improper vexation or oppression, to do justice between the parties and to secure a fair trial between them. At p. 24 we read: ...
The inherent jurisdiction of the court is exercisable as part of the process of the administration of justice. It is part of procedural law ... and not of substantive law; it is invoked in relation to the process of litigation.
And at pp. 27-28: ... the jurisdiction to exercise these powers was derived, not from any statute or rule of law, but from the very nature of the court as a superior court of law, and for this reason such jurisdiction has been called “inherent” ... the essential character of a superior court of law necessarily involves that it should be invested with a power to maintain its authority and to prevent its process being obstructed and abused ....
The juridical basis of this jurisdiction is therefore the authority of the judiciary to uphold, to protect and to fulfil the judicial function of administering justice according to law in a regular, orderly and effective manner. [ 101 ] Inherent jurisdiction extends, in one aspect, to the Court’s control over its process and proceedings. At p. 32: there is vested in superior courts of justice, as part of their inherent jurisdiction, power to control their own proceedings and process, and by this means to prevent any obstruction or interference with the administration of justice.
See Bass v Mcnally , 2003 NLCA 15 at paras 12-15 . [ 102 ] I must clarify that I am not seeking to make a general rule or supplement the rules of court. I am dealing with a particular consent order and a particular arbitration agreement, the language of the order and the agreement, the lack of procedural specificity of the consent order and the arbitration agreement, the development of new Court procedures after the Practice Note, consent order and agreement were established, and the interaction between counsel and Court administration. Moreover, I intend no disrespect to the clerks.
They are overworked and understaffed. They have the burdens of being not only a forward face of the Courts but of policing innovations. Finally, I am extending no deadline.
I was directed to no statutory provision, whether under the Arbitration Act or otherwise, that would permit me to extend the time limit for commencing an appeal. [ 103 ] But, in my opinion, as a matter of inherent jurisdiction, I am entitled to recognize the commencement of the appeal at the time when the appeal commencement documents were submitted, regardless of the administrative response to those documents. [ 104 ] I realize that the Applicant bears responsibility.
Had he got counsel in place earlier, difficulties could have been addressed before the time for appeal expired. [ 105 ] Nevertheless, my concern is that an administrative and procedural determination impaired substantive rights. The administrative response was provided after the deadline had passed. The process in this case was not regular, orderly, and effective.
In my opinion, to deny the appeal on the basis of this process would be contrary to my responsibilities to do what I can to prevent our litigation process itself from denying rights. [ 106 ] I therefore consider the appeal to have been commenced within 30 days from the date of the Award.
5. Conclusion [ 107 ] In my opinion, an appeal was commenced within 30 days in compliance with the Arbitration Act and the PC & Arbitration Agreement. The appeal concerns the change in parenting from the 4/4 arrangement to the 7/7 arrangement. The appeal may raise issues of law, fact, or mixed law and fact, as set out in the Notices of Appeal. [ 108 ] I hereby direct that the Applicant’s Notice of Appeal titled Notice of Appeal – Arbitration Award ( Arbitration Act ) be accepted for filing.
A filed copy shall be served on the Respondent’s counsel within 5 days of the date of filing. [ 109 ] If Applicant’s counsel would provide an electronic version of the Notice of Appeal to my Judicial Assistant, I will endorse a fiat on it respecting its acceptability for filing. V.
Next Steps [ 110 ] Since, in my opinion, the Award has been validly appealed, I will not enforce the Award under s. 49 of the Arbitration Act . [ 111 ] The Award must continue to be followed, however, unless otherwise determined on appeal. [ 112 ] The next steps might be for me to direct the parties to apply for a s. 4.10 case conference regarding the procedure and materials for the appeal and to adjourn the matter back to Family Chambers to set a date for the hearing of the appeal. [ 113 ] However, in view of the time it has taken to get this appeal on track (including the time required for this decision), if this would be acceptable to the parties, I would be willing to hold the case conference and to hear the appeal.
If you wish me to remain involved, please so advise my Judicial Assistant. If you do not, please also so advise, and I will attend to the formal direction and adjournment. [ 114 ] Applicant’s counsel addressed costs but Respondent’s counsel did not. I will defer comment on costs pending counsel’s response. Heard on the 10 th day of March, 2023; written submissions received the 17 th day of March, 2023. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 25 th day of April, 2023 . W.N. Renke J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: Stephen D. Harfield for the Plaintiff (Respondent) Mark Dupres for the Defendant (Applicant)
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