Goldenkey Oil Inc (Re), 2023 ABKB 263
Opinion
Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Goldenkey Oil Inc (Re), 2023 ABKB 263 Date: 20230428 Docket: B201 906009 Registry: Calgary In the Matter of the Notice of Intention to Make a Proposal of Goldenkey Oil Inc. _______________________________________________________ Memorandum of Decision of the Honourable Justice M. J. Lema _______________________________________________________ I.
Introduction [ 1 ] An insolvent oil and gas company, with the support of its proposal trustee, seeks an order approving the transfer to a litigation trustee of the company’s fraud-alleging lawsuit against a former insider of the company and his corporation, plus a financing arrangement for the pursuit of that litigation, [ 2 ] The proposed litigation trustee is a current insider of the insolvent company. [ 3 ] The proposed litigation financier is a company closely associated with the litigation trustee and other insiders of the insolvent company. [ 4 ] Under the proposed arrangement, the litigation trustee will be authorized to borrow up to $3.2 million to fund the litigation, with the advances and associated interest (at minimum, currently approximately 14 per cent) being a first charge on any litigation recoveries. [ 5 ] As well, the litigation trustee would have exclusive carriage of and decision-making authority over the litigation. [ 6 ] Any amounts recovered over the advances, associated interest and the fees and expenses of the litigation trustee himself would be distributed to the proposal trustee or bankruptcy trustee (as the case may be) for distribution according to law.
[ 7 ] The applicants also seek to undo a consent order consolidating the litigation in question with a crossclaim of the defendants against the insolvent company, with the latter claim to be addressed via the claims-review-and-approval process in the proposal proceedings. [ 8 ] The defendants (cross-claimants) resist the proposal litigation-pursuit-and-financing arrangement and the undoing of the consolidation order., [ 9 ] I find the current evidence insufficient to show that the proposed litigation trust and associated financing are reasonable, appropriate and advance the objectives of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act . [ 10 ] Accordingly, I decline to approve them and, as a result, decline to undo the consolidation order.
II. Background [ 11 ] The sought-to-be-transferred lawsuit alleges a scheme by the former insider and others to overcharge the insolvent company for certain drilling activities and otherwise improperly move resources out of the company. It asserts total deprivations of approximately $9.2 million. [ 12 ] The crossclaim seeks repayment of shareholder loans of approximately $9.2 million.
Very recently, the cross-claimants have asserted that $3.5 million of its claim is proprietary i.e. it is entitled to the return of that amount beneficially owned by it. (In the alternative, it asserts the initial (shareholder-loan) claim for that amount.) [ 13 ] In January 2023, the insolvent company filed a notice of intention under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act . [ 14 ] At the recent application, the initial stay-and-assemble-proposal period was extended, now to the end of May 2023. [ 15 ] Various other (largely agreed-to) orders were also made at the recent application, including the approval of a sales process for the insolvent company’s assets other than the lawsuit against the former insider and others. [ 16 ] As noted, the current issues are whether the lawsuit in question should be separated from its consolidation-ordered cross- action and, in any case, whether it should be moved to a litigation trustee for pursuit with top-charge-status litigation financing.
III. Evidence re fraud claim, litigation trust, and litigation financing A. (Limited) evidence about the Fraud Claim [ 17 ] In the first of his two affidavits filed in support of the applications of Goldenkey Oil Inc.(GK), the proposed litigation trustee (James Dai) gave this core evidence about the Fraud Claim: … the Fraud Claim alleges that from 2012 to 2014, Mr. Song [i.e. the former insider] and two other members of [GK’s] management team … devised and implemented an overcharging scheme [described].
The Fraud Claim alleges that [certain companies] received substantial funds from [GK] … , which were ostensibly to be used for drilling exploratory wells. [Those] companies instead hired third- party service companies … to perform the drilling services at substantially lower amounts than the prices charged to [GK] …, with the difference … being diverted or transferred to [certain defendants or related persons] . … The Fraud Claim has been defended and the defendants have denied the allegations made by [GK]. … … the Fraud Claim seeks damages in the amount of $9,174,383.90 . … [ 18 ] In his second affidavit, Mr.
Dai added no information about the Fraud Action. [ 19 ] In other words, Mr. Dai provided no opinion on the merits or likelihood of success of the Fraud Action or, in any case, any evidence of any factors or considerations from which the merits or likely success could or might be gauged. B.
Details of the proposed litigation financing The key features of the ALFTS (financing term sheet) are: 1. the “ maximum principal amount available” is $3,289,170; 2. the maximum amount “may be further amended or increased , as may be agreed to, in writing, by the Proposal Trustee, the Litigation Lender, and the Litigation Trustee, for and on behalf of the GK Litigation Trust”; 3. the Litigation Financing Facility “shall be used to fund the current litigation fees, costs and disbursements , including, but not limited to, any security for costs amounts required to be paid into Court [note – in December 2022, two other defendants in the fraud action obtained an order requiring GK to pay security for costs of $289,170], under the Fraud Action, on a go-forward basis , for the
pendency of the Fraud Action”; 4. the litigation funding “will be made available, by the Litigation Lender, in multiple draws …, as may be requested by the Litigation Trustee , for and on behalf of the Borrower, as such requests may be made by the Litigation Trustee, in its sole and unfettered discretion …”; 5. the Litigation Lender’s obligation to make any funding advances is conditional on the continued accuracy of certain representations and warranties by GK and the Litigation Trust, no defined “ Events of Default ” (per s. 23) having occurred, and certain defined conditions precedents (per s. 27) being satisfied; 6. all advances earn interest at “prime plus 8% per annum”; 7. if an “Event of Default” occurs, the interest rate increases by 5 per cent ; 8. no commitment or standby fees are payable, and the Litigation Lender is not entitled to any share of any eventual litigation recoveries (by judgment or settlement) i.e. beyond repayment of its advances and interest; 9. the Litigation Lender’s claim for repayment of its advances and interest, plus its own expenses, have first call on any eventual settlement or judgment proceeds; 10. the “Event[s] of Default” include any uncured failure by GK, the Litigation Trustee or the Litigation Trust to “[observe] or [perform] … any term, covenant or condition , in this [ALFTS]”; 11. one of the covenants in question is that the Litigation Trust “will comply with and meet all litigation milestones, as set out in
Schedule “A” hereto …”; and 12. one of the conditions precedent is “approval, by the Litigation Lender, in [its] sole discretion, acting reasonably, of the progress of the Fraud action and the meeting of all Litigation Milestones , in connection with any Subsequent Advance [i.e. beyond the initial advance of $789,170] requested by the Litigation Trustee ….” IV.
Goldenkey’s position [ 20 ] Goldenkey (GK), the insolvent company, made the following principal arguments in support of the Litigation Trust and related arrangements: The relief sought pursuant to the Litigation Trust Order is the best available option to preserve and realize upon the Fraud Claim [i.e. the in-progress action commenced by GK against the former insider and others], for the benefit of [GK’s] creditors and stakeholders. The proposed Litigation Trust Order: (
i) will ensure that the Fraud Claim is advanced using third-party funds , thereby not depleting [GK’s] Property or forcing current creditors and stakeholders to bear any litigation risk ; (ii) is designed to efficiently resolve both the Fraud Claim and the Indepth Claim [i.e. the crossclaim], in accordance with the objectives of the BIA; (iii) contemplates that all Net Proceeds will accrue to the benefit of [GK’s] estate, creditors and stakeholders; (iv) will ensure that all Net Proceeds are distributed, in an orderly fashion , in accordance with the BIA, and, (
v) is superior to an assignment under
section 38 of the BIA , in which only creditors who fund the Fraud Action would obtain the benefits thereof. … There is no provision in the BIA which expressly provides for the creation of a litigation trust. Express statutory authority is however not required. Instead, the equitable and inherent jurisdiction of this Court may be exercised in further of the objectives of the BIA. As summarized by this Court in Re Residential Warranty Co. of Canada Inc. : The BIA expressly preserves the Bankruptcy Court’s equitable and ancillary powers.
Accordingly, inherent jurisdiction is maintained and available as an important but sparingly used tool. There are two preconditions to the Court exercising its inherent jurisdiction: (1) the BIA must be silent on a point or not have dealt with a matter exhaustively; and (2) after balancing competing interests, the benefit of granting the relief must outweigh the relative prejudice to those affected by it.
Inherent jurisdiction is available to ensure fairness in the bankruptcy process and fulfillment of the substantive objectives of the BIA, including the proper administration and protection of the bankrupt’s estate . [ Residential warranty Co. of Canada Inc. , Re
(2006) ABQB 235 at para 26 … affirmed 2006 ABCA 293 …. [emphasis in original] In Re Residential Warranty Co. of Canada Inc , this Court also recognized the importance of adopting pragmatic and flexible solutions: Solutions to BIA concerns require consideration of the realities of commerce and business efficacy. A strictly legalistic approach is unhelpful in that regard.
What is called for is a pragmatic problem-solving approach which is flexible enough to deal with unanticipated problems, often on a case-by-case basis. […] [ Residential Warranty at para 27] [emphasis in original] In 9354-9186 Quebec Inc v Callidus Capital Corp , the Supreme Court of Canada … held that the overarching remedial objectives of Canada’s insolvency statues include: … providing for timely, efficient and impartial resolution of a debtor’s insolvency; preserving and maximizing the value of a debtor’s assets; ensuring fair and equitable treatment of the claims against a debtor; protecting the public interest; and, in the context of a commercial insolvency, balancing the costs and benefits of restructuring or liquidating the company. [ Residential Warranty at para 26; 9354-9186 at para 40] [emphasis in original] Canadian courts have exercised their inherent jurisdiction to create trusts both in insolvency proceedings and under the common law.
For instance, within insolvency proceedings, creditor trust have been settled in favour of lien claimants (as in Otter Bay Developments [2010 CarswellBC 3883 (SC) at para 23 ; affd 2011 BCCA 90 ]) or creditors generally (as in Vert Infrastructure [2020, Ontario CV-20- 06642256-00CL (SC)], including in connection with sales processes, reverse vesting orders, and plans of arrangement [Amended Reverse Vesting Order granted on April 6, 2021, In the Matter of the Compromise or Arrangement of JMB Crushing Systems Inc and 2161889 Alberta Ltd , ABKB No. 2001-05482]. [emphasis added] The GK Litigation Trust is reasonable, appropriate, and furthers the objectives of the BIA , as the creation and funding of the GK Litigation Trust: (
i) is a practical solution allowing [GK] to actually realize and, in fact, maximize recoveries for stakeholders , consistent with the objective of preserving and maximizing the value of a debtor’s estate; (ii) will not prejudice any creditor or stakeholder ; (iii) in conjunction with the Claims Process Order, will allow for the timely, efficient and impartial resolution of claims by and against [GK] while ensuring that the Fraud Action proceeds in an expeditious and cost-effective manner ; (iv) preserves the Net Proceeds for all Litigation Trust Benenficiaries; and ([v]) is superior to an assignment of the Fraud Claim under
section 38 of the BIA. [emphasis added] Furthermore, • the Fraud Claim is meritorious and should be preserved and pursued. [GK’s] confidence in the merits of the Fraud Claim is demonstrated by: (
i) the negotiation of the Amended Litigation Financing Term Sheet; and, (ii) the continued commitment of [GK’s] senior management to participate in the Fraud Claim, including the consent of James Dai to act as Litigation Trustee for the purpose of preserving, protecting, prosecuting, and realizing upon the Fraud Claim; • the Litigation Trustee and [GK’s] management have the necessary knowledge and ability to prosecute the Fraud Claim. Outside of these individuals , the Fraud Claim likely has little to no market value . Mr.
Dai has significant knowledge with respect to the Fraud Claim and is best placed to serve as the Litigation Trustee. Since 2017, [he] has been [GK’s] corporate representative and sole affiant in the Fraud Action.
Further, [he] is anticipated to be a primary witness at trial (which is anticipated to bbe 5 weeks), as he was primarily responsible for the investigation into [GK’s] records and documents, starting in December 20143, which formed the basis of the Fraud Claim [information-source reference omitted]; • the creditor trust mechanism is a practical solution allowing [GK] to efficiently pursue the resolution of the Fraud Action, while simultaneously maximizing recoveries., through the preservation of all Net Proceeds and decreasing litigation risk through outside funding, all for the benefit of [GK’s] creditors and stakeholders; • the GK Litigation Trust is financially viable and is expected to result in the recovery of Net Proceeds to [GK’s] estate.
Specifically, (
i) the Proposal Trustee is of the view that creation of the GK Litigation Trust maximizes the possibility of realizing funds from the Fraud Claim in these NOI Proceedings; and, (ii) the maximum principal amount of the advances to be authorized under the Amended Litigation Financing Term Sheet is $3,289,170 , while the Fraud Claim seeks damages of over $9,100,000 ; • as there are insufficient funds in [GK’s] estate to fund the Fraud Action and the Security for Costs Amount [i.e. $289,170], without the benefit of the GK Litigation Trust and the Litigation Financing Facility, the Fraud Claim is unlikely to be continued by a bankruptcy trustee , to the detriment of [GK’s] creditors.
In contrast, the Litigation Trust Order will ensure that the Fraud Claim is advanced and the proceeds thereof distributed in accordance with the BIA; • the GK Litigation Trust ensures a fair, efficient, and equitable treatment of the claims by and against [GK], without corresponding risk, as: (
i) the GK Litigation Trust maintains the priority of [GK’s] creditors against the Net Proceeds; (ii) the Litigation Trust Order preserves any rights of set-off the Fraud Claim defendants may assert (the existence of which is specifically denied); and (iii) the Net Proceeds shall be paid to the Litigation Trust Beneficiaries identified by the Claims Process.
As a result, the Litigation Trust Beneficiaries will benefit from and receive the full net value of the Fraud Claim (being the Net Proceeds) without any corresponding depletion of [GK’s] current assets; and • as noted in the [Proposal Trustee’s] Second Report, the Litigation Trust Order is superior to an assignment of the Fraud Claim under
section 38 [BIA], as (
i) it is unlikely that any third party creditor taking an assignment of the Fraud Action pursuant to
section 38 of the BIA could advance the Fraud Action as efficiently, if at all ; and (ii) in a
section 38 assignment, the proceeds of the Fraud Claim would first satisfy the claims of those creditors who fund the litigation , whereas the Net Proceeds of the GK Litigation Trust will be distributed to the Litigation Trust Beneficiaries , in accordance with their interests, as determined under the Claims Process. [emphasis added] [ 21 ] It added these arguments in support of the Amended Litigation Financing Terms Sheet: The [ALFTS] is appropriate and, in fact, necessary in the circumstances.
Section 50.6 of the BIA provides this Honourable Court with jurisdiction to approve interim financing in proposal proceedings.
Section 50.6(5) sets out the following non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered in an application for approval of interim financing: • the period during which the debtor is expected to be subject to proceeding under this Act; • how the debtor’s business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings; • whether the debtor’s management has confidence of its major creditors; • whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable proposal being made in respect of the debtor; • the nature and value of the debtor’s property;
• whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security or charge; and • the trustee’s report referred to in paragraph 50(6)(
b) or 50.4(2)(b), as the case may be. While the [ALFTS] does not contemplate debtor-in-possession interim financing, the factors set out in
Section 50.6 of the BIA also provide guidance in the context of litigation financing and support the approval of the [ALFTS], as [GK] is anticipated to be subject to these NOI Proceedings for the duration of [a certain sales process]; however, the GK Litigation Trust requires funding through to the conclusion of the Fraud Action. V.
Proposal trustee’s position [ 22 ] In its first report (February 23, 2023), the proposal trustee offered these (highly caveated) comments on the proposed litigation trust and related arrangements: The Proposal Trustee understands that [GK] has been engaged in litigation against various individuals and corporations, including Indepth and Mr. Song [i.e. the former insider and his corporation], since February, 2016 …. Certain details of the claim are outlined in the First Dai Affidavit [reviewed above]. The Proposal Trustee has not reviewed or evaluated the Litigation Claim or the proceedings derived therefrom.
Conceptually speaking , by separating the Litigation Claim into the Litigation Trust through the proposed funding arrangement, the Proposal Trustee understands that the litigation asset may be preserved and funded to its completion.
In the event any awarded judgment arising out of the Litigation Claim is paid that exceeds the value of the litigation funding, there will be value for the beneficiaries of the proposed Litigation Trust, being the Alberta Energy Regulator and [GK’s] creditors. … The Proposal Trustee is advised by [GK] that the creation of the Litigation Trust maximizes the possibility of generating funds from the litigation for the benefit of [GK’s] creditors … and that without the Litigation Trust, there is a risk this asset may be lost.
On this basis, the Proposal Trustee is not able to comment on the nuances of the Litigation Claim and the impact the proposed Litigation Trust may have on the defendants involved, the structure created by the Litigation Trust does appear to have the potential for creating benefit to the Company’s stakeholders. [emphasis added] [ 23 ] In its second report (April 6, 2023), the proposal trustee offered these further (slightly less caveated) comments at the proposed litigation trust and related arrangements: Since the last hearing (February 28, 2023), [GK] and the Proposal Trustee have engaged in discussions with the stakeholders that raised objections at the Feb 28 Application to the Additional Relief, in an attempt to address their concerns through amendments to the various relief sought.
In that regard and as discussed below, … the Litigation Trust has … been amended to provide a more economic funding structure . … The Proposal Trustee obtained and reviewed summaries of the [Fraud] Claim from the respective counsel to Indepth and [GK]. While the Proposal Trustee now has a better understanding of the nature of the claims alleged and the quantum of such claims , the Proposal Trustee is not able to reach any factual conclusions regarding the likelihood of success at trial, due to the complexity of the issues and the abundance of evidence to be reviewed .
The Proposal Trustee understands that the primary amount sought in the [Fraud] Claim is approximately $9.1 million representing the alleged proceeds of the “Fraudulent Scheme” …. The sources of the proceeds are understood to include the overpayments from the drilling program as well as direct payments from [GK] to the defendants …. The defendants in the [Fraud] Claim deny the allegations.
By transferring the [Fraud] Claim to the Litigation Trust and funding it through the Litigation Financing Facility, the [Fraud] Claim can be preserved and funded to its completion without any direct contributions from [GK] or its estate .
Any judgment awarded in [GK’s] favoru that exceeds the amounts advanced and incurred under the Litigation Financing Facility will be transferred to the Proposal trustee for the purpose of distribution to the Litigation Trust Beneficiaries, being [AER] and [GK’s] creditors and stakeholders. … Additionally, after a number of concerns were raised with [i.e. about] the Litigation Financing Facility and the Litigation Trust proposed, [GK] has presented various amendments including: … reducing the default rate of interest from an additional 10% to an additional 5% ; and … clarifying the Events of Default such that a default is not obviously imminent .
The Proposal Trustee is of the view that the creation of the Litigation Trust maximizes the possibility of realizing funds from the [Fraud] Claim for the benefit of [GK’s creditors]. Without the Litigation Trust, there is a risk that [GK] would not be able to advance the [Fraud] Claim any further and any potential realization to [GK’s] creditors would be lost.
On this basis, while the Proposal Trustee is not able to comment on the nuances of the [Fraud] Claim and the impact the proposed Litigation Trust may have on the defendants involved, the structure created by the Litigation Trust does appear to have the potential for creating benefit to [GK’s] stakeholders.
If the Litigation Trust is not approved in the within proposal proceedings, another alternative available to preserve the Litigation Trust Assets is by way of a
section 38 order under the BIA. In this scenario, [GK] would be bankrupted and a creditor could apply to take the [Fraud] Claim in its own name and at its own expense and risk . In this scenario, however, any recoveries from the from the [Fraud] Claim would first go to satisfy the creditor’s litigation costs, as well as the entirety of the creditor’s claims , before any remaining benefit is transferred to the bankrupt’s estate for the benefit of the general body of creditors. While
section 38 in a bankruptcy scenario provides another mechanism for the [Fraud] Claim to be preserved, the Proposal Trustee has some concerns with this scenario as: … as noted, the benefit to the estate as a whole would be limited; and … the Proposal Trustee is of the view that a bankruptcy could impair the overall value of the estate , at least at this stage of the proceedings before a [certain sales process] is concluded.
As a result and taking into account the amendments to the Litigation Trust proposed since the last hearing date, the Proposal Trustee is of the view that the Litigation Trust is the best way to preserve the value of the [Fraud] Claim in the current proceedings . [emphasis added] VI.
Analysis [ 24 ] I find that much material information is missing here, preventing me from performing a fully informed assessment of the litigation-trust-and-related-financing proposal: 1. the proposal trustee says (first report) that “[it] is advised by [GK] … that without the Litigation trust, there is a risk [the Fraud Claim] may be lost.” But no details are provided, such as how much it would or might cost GK itself to fund the litigation through trial, how that compares to GK’s existing and expected resources, whether GK explored borrowing any shortfall (whether from litigation lenders or otherwise) and, if so, what options it uncovered and, if any, why they were unsuitable or otherwise why they were not pursued; 2. similarly, the proposal trustee did not provide evidence of having explored possible contingency-fee arrangements for the pursuit of the litigation with its counsel; 3. nor did it provide evidence of any settlement-attempt history or even having raised the subject with GK (i.e. recognizing the potential limits on disclosable information imposed by settlement privilege); 4. as well, neither GK nor the proposal trustee explained how the $3.289 million funding cap was arrived at or otherwise why that is a reasonable figure for seeing this litigation through trial.
Especially for a claim in gear for seven years, with questioning and undertakings largely completed, and even recognizing the joint estimate of a five-week trial with expert evidence. I understand that the $289,170 figure represents security for costs awarded against GK in favour of two other defendants. But the remaining ($3 million) amount is completely unexplained.
And I note that the proposed cap amount can be increased if the litigation trustee, the litigation funder, and the proposal trustee agree; 5. on the last point, GK did not even provide evidence of the amount expended to date on the litigation i.e. as a presumably useful benchmark in gauging, or helping gauge, the reasonableness of the proposed $3.289 million cap; 6. plus, it is impossible to gauge the likely pace or overall quantum of the litigation-funding advances , with the “litigation milestones” element left blank in the financing term sheet and, in any case, with the litigation lender apparently free (i.e. at its discretion) to advance at a faster pace or in larger instalments – in theory, free to advance the entire amount at any time and thus start the interest clock (set at prime plus 8 per cent) running on the entire amount; 7. the proposal trustee did not explain why, under the proposed arrangement, the litigation trustee is given complete control over the claim , presumably including a decision to settle and, if so, on what terms i.e. why it is in the best interests of GK’s creditors and stake holders (i.e. equity owners) to cede that control, versus giving them (for example, through a settlement committee) the power to decide on settlement, or at least a voice on settlement, or providing for court approval of any proposed settlement, or anything akin.
Neither pointed to any litigation-funding, or particularly any litigation-trust, cases where the funder is given exclusive control over the litigation (including settlement decisions). In any case, the weight of the cases and commentaries is that the funding entity or litigation trustee does not obtain such control; Expressed differently, GK and the proposal trustee did not explain why the “litigation trust” model is being proposed, versus “litigation funding” i.e. under which GK (or the proposal trustee) would retain ownership of the claim and the right to decide on litigation strategy and settlement; 8.
GK says that the Fraud Claim is “meritorious and should be preserved and pursued.” But neither GK nor the proposal trustee offered any meaningful evidence from which to gauge, even in a general way, the overall strength of the fraud claim . Instead, GK offers this indirect and puzzling evidence: “[GK’s] confidence in the merits of the Fraud Claim is demonstrated by: (
i) the negotiation of the Amended Litigation Financing Term Sheet; and, (ii) the continued commitment of [GK’s] senior management to participate in the Fraud Claim, including the consent of James Dai to act as Litigation Trustee for the purpose of preserving, protecting, prosecuting, and realizing upon the Fraud Claim.” How does negotiating these financing terms (i.e. that the litigation funder will front the remaining litigation costs, up to $3 million, in return receiving prime plus 8 per cent interest (and more if one or more faults occur), plus first call on any litigation recoveries, plus complete control over the litigation) reflect any “GK confidence” in the merits of the fraud claim?
Such an arrangement seems equally
consistent with GK having next-to-no confidence in the claim, effectively agreeing with the litigation financier to “see what you can do with this and send us whatever net amount you end up getting.” As for the management team (including Mr.
Dai) staying involved, GK did not offer any evidence directly or indirectly bearing on how these people would or would not stay involved under other litigation-funding or litigation-pursuit scenarios; 9. concerning s. 38 BIA , the proposal trustee first says that, to make that claim- assignment mechanism available, GK would have to be bankrupted. (In a bankruptcy, all of the insolvent person’s property, including choses in action (such as the litigation here), vests in the bankruptcy trustee.
Under s. 38, a creditor can put the trustee to the option of either pursuing the claim for the estate or, failing that, assigning the claim to the creditor.) GK and the proposal trustee noted that, in the usual case, a proposal maker retains possession of its own property i.e. the property is not vested in the proposal trustee. In any case, with no proposal yet here, any such vesting-property-in-proposal-trustee provision has yet to materialize.
All to say: GK remains in control of its own property, with nothing vested in the proposal trustee to pursue and nothing to be assigned by the proposal trustee to creditors. However, conceptually, nothing would prevent GK from assigning its litigation claim to the proposal trustee (even in advance of any proposal being finalized and circulated), for pursuit by the proposal trustee (however financed) or, if not pursued, for assignment to an interested creditor. (Here,
section 38 would be made applicable to the proposal trustee (i.e. extended beyond its usual operation in a bankruptcy context) via s. 66 BIA , which makes, or can make, bankruptcy-focused provisions of the BIA applicable to proposals.) The point here is that neither GK nor the proposal trustee offered any evidence on the prospects of one or more creditors of GK stepping up to ask the proposal trustee (assuming it came to have rights over the litigation) to pursue the claim or assign it to one or more of them.
Or even about approaching the creditors, or any of them, to see if they might do this; 10. no evidence was offered on the strength of Indepth’s cross-claim , which (on the face of it) has the potential to effectively create a wash of the two claims (both in the neighbourhood of $9 million).
Or (cross-claim aside) on the likelihood of recovering the face amount of the fraud claim, or whatever is seen as a materially defensible subset of that claim, from Indepth and the other defendants. (GK presumably prepared, or participated in, some kind of x-ray of the fraud claim i.e. which sparked or at least assisted in bringing about the proposed litigation-trust proposal); 11. in any case, the proposed litigation trustee and litigation funder did not offer any evidence from which to gauge, or help gauge, the reasonableness of their proposal e.g. how much work remains to be done on the litigation claim, why (up to) $3 million represents a reasonable amount to spend to pursue that claim through trial, why interest of “prime plus [8] per cent” is reasonable in these circumstances (e.g. what risk assessment is driving its proposal and whether similar-risk investments yield such returns); 12.
GK says that the litigation-trust proposal will “efficiently resolve” the fraud claim, with no explanation of why the proposed arrangement will be more efficient on that score than GK’s efforts to date or, in any case, than GK pursuing the claim with its own resources (if possible) or borrowed resources (litigation funding or otherwise) or via a contingency-fee arrangement or otherwise i.e. how in fact the proposed arrangement will increase efficiency; 13. it says that the proposed arrangement will harvest the net proceeds of the claim for the benefit of GK’s creditors and stakeholders and that those proceeds will be distributed in an orderly fashion.
But how is that different from what would happen in any conceivable alternative here i.e. why would the net proceeds in any litigation-funding or litigation-pursuit scenario not be treated the same way? and 14. the proposal trustee refers to “concerns” raised (presumably by one, some or all of GK’s creditors or stakeholders) that apparently sparked the two noted amendments to the litigation-financing terms. But it did not provide any details of the concerns, whether all of them produced changes, if not which concerns remain unaddressed (if any), and whether the concerned person(
s) see the amendments as satisfactory. VII. Conclusion [ 25 ] Overall, the proposal trustee and GK present the litigation-trust-and-financing proposal in a vacuum.
Without the noted missing evidence as to exactly why GK is unable to pursue the litigation on its own, what other litigation-funding options it explored, whether contingency-fee pursuit of the litigation was or is an option, whether it explored ways for GK, its creditors, or stakeholders to have a say in overseeing the litigation or (at minimum) in approving or commenting on any proposed settlement, and the other dimensions noted above, how are GK and the proposal trustee truly able to say that the proposed plan “maximizes” the likelihood of recovering net proceeds for the creditors and stakeholders? [ 26 ] I find that, on the current evidence, they cannot. [ 27 ] I dismiss the application for approval of the litigation-trust arrangement and the associated financing transaction, without prejudice to Goldenkey and the proposal trustee’s right to apply again on more evidence. [ 28 ] Given that decision, I decline to address the linked request to unconsolidate the currently consolidated actions. [ 29 ] If Goldenkey and the proposal trustee apply for approval of the proposed arrangements again, they must also address the potential application of s. 65.13 BIA i.e. whether the proposed arrangements constitute a “sale or other disposition” of a Goldenkey asset and, if so, address the factors outlined in ss. 65.13(4) and, as applicable, those in ss. 65.13(5).
[ 30 ] On costs, I invite the parties’ submissions (maximum 3 pages exclusive of any draft bills of costs, cases or other attachments) due by May 15, 2023 for the Indepth parties and May 22, 2023 for the Goldenkey parties. Heard on the 13 th day of April, 2023. Dated at Calgary, Alberta this 28 th day of April, 2023. Justice M. J. Lema J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: Pantelis Kyriakakis, Erinn Wilson and Nathan Stewart McCarthy Tetrault LLP For GoldenKey Oil Inc.
Keith Marlowe, K.C. and Jessica Mackinnon Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP For the Indepth Defendants Robyn Gurofsky and Anthony Mersich Fasken Martineau Dumoulin LLP For the Proposal Trustee (Price Waterhouse Cooper Inc.) John Regush, Derek Pontin Dentons LLP For Baytech Energy Investments Inc. Candice A. Ross Alberta Energy Regulator For Alberta Energy Regulator Lukas Rasmussen De Waal Law For Qiping Men and other Defendants in the Fraud Action
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