North American Polypropylene ULC v Williams Canada Propylene ULC, 2023 ABKB 276
Opinion
Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: North American Polypropylene ULC v Williams Canada Propylene ULC, 2023 ABKB 276 Date: 20230505 Docket: 1601 10614 Registry: Calgary Between: North American Polypropylene ULC Plaintiff - and - Williams Canada Propylene ULC, Williams Energy Canada ULC, The Williams Companies, Inc., and Inter Pipeline Ltd. Defendants _______________________________________________________ Anti-Suit Injunction Decision of the Honourable Justice R.A. Neufeld _______________________________________________________ I.
Overview [ 1 ] North American Propylene ULC (“NAPP”) was incorporated in 2015 for the purpose of developing a polypropylene project (the “PP plant”) near Edmonton, Alberta. Had it been built the PP plant would have been co-located with an adjacent Propane Dehydrogenation (“PDH”) plant under development by the Defendant Williams Canada Propylene ULC, (“Williams”), which was owned by Williams Energy Canada ULC (“WEC”), which in turn was owned by a U.S. parent company, The Williams Companies Inc.
[ 2 ] PDH is used to provide feedstock for production of polypropylene, which is used in the manufacture of a variety of products such as automobile parts and packaging. [ 3 ] After lengthy discussion and negotiation, NAPP and Williams signed a propylene sales agreement (PSA), on August 16, 2015. The PSA has three essential components: 1. The measures to be taken by each side in advancing their projects until final decisions are made as to whether to proceed with construction; 2. The coordination and completion of construction activities once each company has decided to proceed; and 3.
The sale of propylene feedstock by Williams to NAPP during the operating life of the two plants. [ 4 ] In the summer of 2016, NAPP concluded that it would not be able to meet the deadline set out in the PSA to obtain debt financing for its plant. [ 5 ] It blamed the Defendants for that failure. It terminated the PSA, alleging that Williams had breached its promise to cooperate with NAPP in NAPP’s attempt to obtain financing.
It commenced an action in Alberta for breach of contract and misuse of confidential information. [ 6 ] On the same day, NAPP filed an Original Petition against the Williams Companies Inc, WEC and two executives (John Deerborn and David Chappell) in the District Court of Harris County, Texas. Mr. Deerborn resided in Texas and was employed by The Williams Companies Inc. Mr. Chappell lived in Calgary, Alberta and was the CEO of WEC and Williams . II. The Alberta Action [ 7 ] The Alberta action has proceeded to trial. The trial took place from February 6, 2023 to March 9, 2023.
During the trial, the Court heard testimony from 15 witnesses, (fact and expert) and received into evidence nearly 1000 documents and generated 1466 pages of transcripts. The evidence spanned the time period of 2012-2017. [ 8 ] On behalf of NAPP, the Court heard testimony from almost all of its executive and project team, including Vijay Goradia (Chairman of the family-owned Goradia Group of Companies), Hemant Goradia, Thomas Wells and Nitin Dalal (Commercial Project Lead).
The Court also heard expert evidence presented by NAPP dealing with the financeability of the PP plant and the lost opportunity suffered by NAPP by virtue of its inability to proceed with the project. [ 9 ] This evidence was adduced in support of the claims made by NAPP regarding the conduct of the Defendants both before and after the PSA was entered into. The former are described at paragraphs 7 to 28 of the Amended Amended Statement of Claim ( “AASC “ or “Statement of Claim”). [ 10 ] The allegations of misrepresentations contained in the Statement of Claim serve to provide a factual matrix to contextualize the
interpretation of the PSA (for example the objective intentions of the parties in promising to cooperate and act in good faith). They also provide the underpinning of the claim that the Defendants failed to act honestly and in good faith and hence, breached their overarching contractual duty to do so as a matter of common law. In this context, the Court heard oral evidence from witnesses called by both NAPP and Williams at trial regarding pre-contractual discussions and negotiations. [ 11 ] The factual and expert evidence tendered by NAPP was also directed at the issue of damages, as claimed.
These include approximately $42 MM in project development expenditures, and approximately $670 MM in lost profit, equating to the net present value of the income that would have been earned had the PP plant been built and operated over a 25 year time horizon. III.
The Texas Action [ 12 ] The Texas action was commenced on August 11, 2016 (the same day that the Alberta action was commenced). [ 13 ] The original Texas petition was brought by NAPP alone. [ 14 ] The Defendants named were: 1) The Williams Companies Inc. 2) Williams Canada Energy ULC 3) John Deerborn 4) David Chappell [ 15 ] Williams Canada Propylene ULC (the PSA signatory) was not named. [ 16 ] NAPP described the nature of the action as follows: 1. This case arises from the serious consequences of a lack of corporate candor.
In the past two years, the Williams defendants carelessly, recklessly, or deliberately used false and misleading representations and omissions to induce plaintiff to spend enormous resources in a wasted effort to develop a chemical plant in Canada. The plant, had it been built, would have created much needed new
jobs and products, as well as significant sales and profits. 2. In 2015, the Williams defendants convinced plaintiff to commit to build a major polypropylene plant next to a Williams propane dehydrogenation plant. Defendants touted the combined project as a valuable and urgent opportunity for Williams and plaintiff to pursue together.
Before a deal was reached on the project, defendants knew of internal Williams developments, including negotiations toward a proposed merger and consideration of a sale of project assets, which called into question the feasibility of the project and defendants’ ability to perform their promises. In fact, these now-public developments have stymied progress of the project, the future of which is up to the new owner of the assets.
Had the Williams defendants been honest and admitted these threshold uncertainties and contingencies, plaintiff would not have committed to the project at all or at least under the same or similar terms. 3. The misrepresentations, omissions, and lack of candor by the Williams defendants about this project have been predictably damaging. They have cost plaintiff hundreds of millions of dollars in out-of-pocket losses and in profits it would have derived from similar or other lost opportunities.
This suit is to collect for those damages to plaintiff. [ 17 ] Four causes of action in tort were pleaded: 1) Fraudulent concealment of information that would have shown previous assurances by Williams regarding its commitment to build, own and operate to the Williams plant to be untrue or unachievable (i.e. merger discussions between Williams Inc and Energy Transfer) and information about the intention of Williams to sell Williams Propylene and/or its assets. 2) Fraudulent inducement (to enter into the PSA), based on the same alleged misrepresentations. 3) Common Law fraud by virtue of making the alleged misrepresentations knowing them to be false, or reckless. 4) Negligent misrepresentation by virtue of not exercising reasonable care or competence in communicating the misrepresentations to NAPP. [ 18 ] The relief sought included out of pocket and benefit-of-the-bargain damages estimated as exceeding $400 million, as well as punitive damages. [ 19 ] Since filing of the Original Petition on August 11, 2016, the Texas Petition has been amended five times.
Among the amendments were changes to the named Plaintiffs; changes to the named Defendants; and the addition (and/or removal) of certain claims, such as a claim against Inter Pipeline Ltd (a Canadian company that purchased the shares of Williams Propylene in 2016) for misappropriation of trade secrets, conversion and civil conspiracy. [ 20 ] The most recent Petition is brought on behalf of 14 Plaintiffs. These are comprised of NAPP and 13 individuals, trusts or companies that are owners of an interest in NAPP.
These are primarily members of the Goradia family, or corporations or trusts controlled by them. [ 21 ] The most recently named Defendants are companies affiliated with Williams Pipeline (other than Williams Energy Canada ULC) and two individuals who were employed by a Williams company during the negotiation and/or administration of the PSA between NAPP and Williams Propylene Canada ULC from 2013 to 2016. [ 22 ] The Texas action is based on tort.
The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants fraudulently induced them to enter into the PSA with Williams Canada Propylene LLC in August 2015; and fraudulently or negligently misrepresented Williams’ commitment to proceed with its part of the remaining project. [ 23 ] The current petition contains only three causes of action: fraudulent concealment, common law fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. [ 24 ] The description of the nature of the action presented at paras 1-3 of the most recent petition, demonstrates the shift in the claim brought about by adding members of the Goradia family to the action: 1.
This case arises from the serious consequences of a lack of corporate candor. From 2013 to 2016, Defendants carelessly, recklessly, or deliberately used false and misleading representations and omissions to induce Plaintiffs to incur significant expenses in a wasted effort to develop a chemical plant. Their misconduct caused Plaintiffs to be deprived of the opportunity to develop and pursue other highly valuable projects. 2. Through a series of false statements and misrepresentations, Defendants convinced Plaintiffs to commit to build a major polypropylene plant next to a Williams propane dehydrogenation plant.
Defendants touted the combined project as a valuable and urgent opportunity for Williams and Plaintiffs to pursue together. Before a deal was reached on the project, however, Defendants knew of internal Williams developments, including negotiations toward a merger and a possible sale of project assets, which called into question the feasibility of the project and Defendants’ ability and intent to perform their promises.
Had Defendants been honest and admitted these threshold uncertainties and contingencies, Plaintiffs would not have incurred millions of dollars in expenses in pursuing the project and would have instead used their resources to develop other profitable projects. 3. Defendants’ misrepresentations, omissions, and lack of candor about the project have been damaging.
They cost Plaintiffs millions of dollars in out-of-pocket losses, incurred prior to execution of a Propylene Purchase and Sale Agreement (“PSA”) on August 19, 2015, as well as millions more from lost opportunities that Plaintiffs were unable to pursue, with respect to substantial funds they set aside at the insistence of Williams to pursue the project and with respect to other valuable opportunities that could have been pursued in lieu of the failed project. This suit is to collect damages owed to Plaintiffs. IV. The Anti-Suit Injunction Application
[25] After NAPP and Williams had closed their respective cases in the Alberta action, it was agreed that written argument wouldbe filed by April 6, 2023, with reply argument filed by April 27, 2023, and oral argument heard on May 15, 2023. [26] Counsel for Williams then advised that they had received instructions to apply for an anti-suit injunction against NAPP.
TheCourt learned that an action had been commenced by NAPP in Texas alleging that the conduct of Williams was tortious and that the trialof that action is scheduled to commence May 15, 2023. [27] I subsequently directed that the anti-suit application would be heard on April 12, 2023. V. General Principles [28] Anti-suit injunctions are an equitable remedy.
In general, they are available in circumstances where a foreign court isproceeding to hear a claim (after being requested by the Defendant not to do so) that should properly be heard in a domestic court andwhere the foreign proceeding would unfairly prejudice the defendant (Amchem Products Inc v B.C. (W.C.B.), (SCC),1993 1 SCR 897 at 912-913). [29] The analytical framework set out in Amchem involves the following three steps: 1. The Applicant should first seek (and have been denied) a stay of proceedings in the foreign court. 2.
The domestic court must determine if based on relevant factors the foreign forum is the most appropriate forum to hear the action. 3. The domestic court must weigh the relative prejudice in restricting access to a foreign court versus the prejudice in allowing theaction to proceed in the foreign jurisdiction. [30] Where the subject matter of the dispute relates to an agreement that contains a forum selection clause a somewhat differentapproach is taken.
In that case, the court will enforce such a clause by way of an anti-suit injunction “unless the party suing in the non-contractual forum (the burden being on [them]) can show strong reasons for suing in that forum”: Z.I. Pompey Industrie v ECU-LineN.V., 2003 SCC 27 at para 21 [“Pompey”]. [31] The Defendants argue that because the PSA contains a forum selection provision, the strong reasons test applies. [32] However, even if the applicable test is that set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Amchem, the Defendants say anti-suitinjunction should be granted.
NAPP argues that because the Texas action is based in tort, the forum selection clause in its contract withWilliams Propylene Canada has no application. It says that when applied to the facts of this case, the Amchem test favours dismissal ofthe anti-suit application. In both Amchem and this case the Texas Court correctly found jurisdiction over the tort action – a decision thatmust be respected by the Canadian Court. It also argues that the anti-suit application has been brought far too late, and should bedismissed based on delay alone. VI. Assessment [33] Anti-suit injunctions are rare.
Although directed at parties to an action in Canada, they have the effect of constrainingproceedings in a foreign court, even after that court has determined that it has jurisdiction to hear the dispute. [34] Common sense and the principle of comity dictate that the anti-suit remedy should only be invoked when the Canadian courtis satisfied that such an order is necessary for the administration of justice and is fair to the parties.
The pursuit of such objectivesunderlies the analytical framework articulated in both Pompey and Amchem. [35] In this case the Williams group of companies have repeatedly challenged the jurisdiction of the Texas courts to adjudicate thetort claims brought by NAPP and/or NAPP’s investor/sponsors. The Texas courts have repeatedly rejected those challenges, either ontheir merits or on appellate review (based on the absence of grounds for orders of mandamus).
Most recently the Texas District Courtrejected a request for a stay of the pending jury trial pending the issuance of a decision of this Court . [36] In result it has been open for the Williams group of companies for several years to bring an anti-suit injunction application inAlberta. Presumably such an application would have been made on the basis that the entire dispute ought to be adjudicated in one action(rather than two), and that given the forum selection agreement between the parties the most appropriate and natural forum would beAlberta.
If brought on a timely basis, it would have been open for the plaintiff to amend its claim if necessary to specifically plead thetorts of negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation in the Alberta action so as to properly place both the breach of contract and tort claimsbefore the Court. [37] For reasons that are not entirely clear, the Williams group did not bring an anti-suit application until the parties had closedtheir respective cases in the trial of the Alberta action.
At that juncture it was too late for NAPP to seek relief in Alberta in respect of thealleged breach of duty in tort arising from negligent and fraudulent misrepresentations. [38] In these circumstances, it is clear that whether evaluated under the analytical framework of Pompey or Amchem , the result isthe same : while Alberta may at one time have been the most appropriate and natural forum for adjudication of the NAPP tort claims,that is no longer the case . Relief, if available at all , must be obtained from the Texas courts.
It would be inappropriate for this court torestrain NAPP from pursuing such relief when it can offer no alternative. [39] Although not conceding this point, the Applicants fairly acknowledge the potential unfairness to NAPP if it was to bepermanently enjoined from proceeding in Texas. They suggest an alternative remedy: that NAPP be enjoined from proceeding in Texas
until the Alberta court has rendered its decision. They argue that this would reduce costs of unnecessary litigation and reduce the potential for conflicting decisions. [ 40 ] In my view, the decision by NAPP to split its case between two jurisdictions has already created unnecessary duplication of financial and judicial resources , on both sides of the border.
It has also created the possibility of inconsistent findings of fact on issues that are common to the two actions, such as whether the parties acted honestly and in good faith in pursuing their business venture. [ 41 ] I do not accept that either of these problems would be mitigated by a temporary anti-suit injunction. The Texas District Court has already decided that its trial will proceed without regard for the completion of the Alberta trial (and decision). Presumably, it neither needs nor desires to have the benefit of this court’s findings of fact or law , nor the results of the Alberta action.
From this Court’s perspective any verdict rendered by the Texas jury on the issue of liability would be of very limited value, given that such a verdict would be based on the evidence received at that trial only , and would be given without reasons. [ 42 ] I do not anticipate therefore that there would be any need for this court to render a decision in advance of that of the Texas court-particularly in respect of the issue of liability. [ 43 ] There is a possibility that damage awards in Alberta and Texas could be duplicative , resulting in over-recovery if liability is found in both jurisdictions.
In that case, the latter of the two decisions may need to accommodate and address the over-recovery issue. However a temporary anti-suit injunction would not solve that problem. It would simply mean that the problem (if one arises at all) would be for the Texas court to address, rather than the Alberta court. In any event , this issue is a matter of speculation at present and is best left for the future. Should it be necessary, the parties may seek further direction in that regard should a decision be made in the Texas action prior to my decision. VII.
Conclusion [ 44 ] In conclusion , the application for an anti-suit injunction is denied. [ 45 ] While a permanent injunction may have been available had in been sought in a timely manner, at this stage it would be inequitable to enjoin NAPP from proceeding with the Texas tort action. A temporary injunction pending a decision on the Alberta action would not materially reduce the costs and risks of inconsistent findings of fact on common issues that have been created by the splitting of NAPP’s case between two jurisdictions and will not be granted either. Heard on the 12 th day of April, 2023.
Oral Decision given on the 1 st day of May, 2023. Dated at the City of Calgary, Alberta this 5 th day of May, 2023. R.A. Neufeld J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: Maureen Killoran, Melanie Gaston, Matthew Huys and Erin Bower for the Applicants/Defendants Peter Linder, Gavin Matthews, Mark Antonvich, Justin Tschoepe for the Respondent/Plaintiff
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