Henderson v Peerani, 2023 ABKB 301
Opinion
Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Henderson v Peerani, 2023 ABKB 301 Date: 20230519 Docket: 1501 04627, B201 830399, B201 830398, B201 780266 Registry: Calgary Between: 1501 04627 Peggy Henderson Plaintiffs - and – Sadru Peerani, Din Peerani also known as Mohameddin Peerani, Simone Skaff, Amin Peerani, Shiraz Peerani, Mavingo Holdings Inc., FFG Incorporated, Forbidden Clothing Inc., Forman’s Men’s Shop Inc., Umeta Holdings Ltd. Defendants -and- Between: B201 830399 Matter In the Matter of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act , RSC 1985 c B-3 And in the Matter of the Bankruptcy of Mohameddin H. Peerani, also known as Din Peerani -and- Between: B201 830398
Matter In the Matter of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act , RSC 1985 c B-3 And in the Matter of the Bankruptcy of the Bankruptcy of Sadru Mhameddin Peerani -and- Between: B201 780266 Matter In the Matter of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act , RSC 1985 c B-3 And in the Matter of the Bankruptcy of Simone Skaff also known as Simone Habib Corrected judgment: A corrigendum was issued on May 23, 2023; the corrections have been made to the text and the corrigendum is appended to this judgment. _______________________________________________________ Memorandum of Decision of the Honourable Justice M.J.
Lema _______________________________________________________ I. Introduction [ 1 ] A creditor applies for leave to continue an action against various defendants notwithstanding their assignments into bankruptcy and the resulting stays of proceedings. [ 2 ] She relies on para 178(1)(
e) BIA , which exempts certain claims anchored in fraudulent misrepresentation or false pretences from the general release of claims on a debtor’s discharge from bankruptcy. [ 3 ] In her view, these defendants obtained property from her (borrowed monies) on the strength of false statements or least inhibited her from taking steps to recover such monies, making her claim discharge-proof and thus worthy of continued pursuit in the action. [ 4 ] The defendants deny the false statements. In any case, they claim a timing defence, with any impugned statements coming long after the plaintiff’s loan advances and, by definition, not sparking those advances.
[ 5 ] I find that, whatever statements were made and whatever their truth or falsity, they indeed came after the plaintiff’s debt claims arose. As well, whatever the inhibiting effect of those subsequent statements, the defendants did not obtain any further property from her because of them. Accordingly, the para 178(1)(
e) shelter is out of reach. [ 6 ] With para 178(1)(
e) not applying and other survival grounds not made out here (as discussed below), I decline to lift the stay of proceedings. II. Analysis A. Requirements of para 178(1)(
e) BIA [ 7 ] The wording of paragraph 178(1)(
e) is critical here: An order of discharge does not release the bankrupt from (
e) any debt or liability resulting from obtaining property or services by false pretences or fraudulent misrepresentation …. [ 8 ] The “property” element here is obviously the loaned monies. [ 9 ] Ms. Henderson did not assert any “false pretences”, focusing on “fraudulent misrepresentation[s].” [ 10 ] Did the individual defendants (all currently bankrupt or recently discharged from bankruptcy) “obtain” those monies and, if so, did they obtain them “by … fraudulent misrepresentation”? [ 11 ] I will first explore whether Ms.
Henderson’s loans to the three corporate defendants were made as a result of the asserted fraudulent misrepresentations. [ 12 ] I will then examine whether she made any additional loans or otherwise moved property to any of the defendants after and, if so, as a result of the asserted misrepresentations. B. Whether advances obtained by misrepresentations 1. Timing of advances [ 13 ] Ms.
Henderson claims to have advanced approximately $204,717.55 to Umeta Holdings Ltd between 2006 and 2011 (plus a further $60 in 2016), $273,430.21 to Forman’s Men’s Shop Inc between 2003 and April 2012, and $98,192.70 to Mavingo Holdings Inc between 2003 and 2009. [ 14 ] For Din Peerani and Sadru Peerani, Mr. Paredes-Canavari argued that Ms. Henderson errs on or grossly overstates her advances, having made none or, at most, a maximum of $37,000. [ 15 ] I do not have to decide how much Ms. Henderson advanced, if any.
I will assume she made all the asserted advances and when asserted. [ 16 ] Key is that her last material advances were made in 2009 (Mavingo), 2011 (Umeta), and April 2012 (Forman’s), per her loan tables (ex 8 to her affidavit sworn December 20, 2022). (She asserted no advances to Mavingo or Formans after the dates indicated; for Umeta, the only asserted advance after the date indicated was $60 in April 2016). 2. Timing of misrepresentations [ 17 ] I will proceed on the basis (here and below) that one or more of the misrepresentations outlined below were made to Ms.
Henderson i.e. without making any findings either way. [ 18 ] In her amended statement of claim, Ms. Henderson described various misrepresentations to her (echoed in certain affidavits as described below) and asked for various relief anchored in fraudulent conduct (in particular, fraudulent preferences and transactions contrary to the Statute of Elizabeth). [ 19 ] In her affidavit sworn December 12, 2014, she referred to various representations to her, none occurring any earlier than May 18, 2014.
The thrust of the asserted misrepresentations is that approximately $360,000 of the sale proceedings of the Umeta building were required to clear a caveat filed by a related corporation. In Ms. Henderson’s view, that corporation had no financial claim against Umeta or, if it did, it was not actually secured against the building. In a nutshell, her assertion that these misrepresentations were used as a cover for Umeta moving that portion of its building proceeds to related persons, for no consideration, all aimed at prejudicing her position as an Umeta creditor. [ 20 ] In her affidavit sworn December 20, 2022, Ms.
Henderson provided further particulars of these (Umeta-related) misrepresentations to her (first two bullets below) and described other misrepresentations on other fronts (next two bullets): • “Sadru, Din and Skaff represented that the sale proceeds [of a Umeta building] were transferred to Formans to cover part of a debt that Umeta allegedly owed to Formans and Din, and to release the Formans Caveat in order for the sale to proceed” and “Sadru, Din and Skaff’s representation that the debt was secured by the Umeta Building was entirely false” (para 15.4);
• in May 2014, per Sadru, “… $350,000 [of the Umeta building sale proceeds] was transferred to release a caveat on the property. Without this release the sale would not have been able to proceed.
As such, the building would have gone into foreclosure and Interbay would pursue a judgment on all the shareholders for their losses on liquidation of the property in addition to the full value of the caveat, and the legal costs they would incur on the judgment” (para 17, incorporating para 34 of her affidavit sworn December 12, 2014); • in March 2016, certain representations were made about the calculation of the net sale proceeds of the sale of a building owned by Mavingo and certain deductions paid or to be paid out of the gross proceeds (as detailed in paras 21 to 27); and • in March 2016, further representations were made concerning the terms, priority and pay-out status of a certain vendor take-back mortgage on the Mavingo sale.
On the available evidence, these representations were made no earlier than March 17, 2016 (paras 42- 46). [ 21 ] Her affidavits sworn September 17, 2012 and April 20, 2023 do not outline any asserted misrepresentations to her. [ 22 ] To summarize, Ms. Henderson did not allege any misrepresentations to her occurring any earlier than May 2014. 3. Relative timing of advances and misrepresentations [ 23 ] I find that, as shown above, Henderson made all material advances before any of the asserted misrepresentation were made to her. [ 24 ] This was the position advanced by Ms. Turnbull-Wallace for Ms. Skaff 4.
Advances not obtained by misrepresentation [ 25 ] By definition, Ms. Henderson’s advances were not sparked by or otherwise the result of any of those impugned statements. [ 26 ] The question becomes whether Ms. Henderson made any loans or otherwise moved property to any of the defendants after, and as a result of, the asserted misrepresentations. [ 27 ] Or, on her reading of para 178(1)(e), whether she allowed property (i.e. the advanced monies) to remain with one or more of the defendants, to her prejudice. C. Application of para 178(1)(
e) to post-misrepresentations period 1. No additional advances after misrepresentations [ 28 ] Ms. Henderson concedes making no material loans or other contributions to any of the defendants after the misrepresentations. In other words, that they did not “obtain … any [additional] property” from her in that period. 2.
Non-pursuit of recovery of advances [ 29 ] She argues instead that, as a result of the asserted misrepresentations to her, which left in the dark about certain transactions, she (effectively) allowed the now-challenged transactions to occur and, by extension, the debtor corporation’s assets to be diminished, resulting in eliminated or reduced opportunities to recover her debts from them.
In other words, that she detrimentally relied on the statements. [ 30 ] Her counsel elaborated (written reply submissions dated May 2, 2023): It was submitted that the fraud alleged in this case does not come within the meaning of section 178(1)(
e) of the BIA because [Ms. Henderson] loaned funds to Mavingo, Umeta and Formans prior to the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations and therefore could not have relied on the misrepresentations to her detriment. The submission assumes that the only form of detrimental reliance is the provision of funds by Henderson. The Court of Appeal in Hennig [i.e. Alberta Securities Commission v Hennig , 2021 ABCA 411 ] confirmed that fraudulent misrepresentation within the meaning of section 178(1)(
e) is usually identified with the tort of deceit (para. 58). [ 31 ] I disagree with that reading of Hennig . Here is the key excerpt from para 58: … Fraudulent misrepresentation is usually identified with the tort of deceit …. The element [of deceit] are: (1) representation (2) that was false (3) made knowingly, without belief in its truth or recklessly indifferent to whether it was true or false (4) the creditor relied on the representation to his detriment. … Nevertheless, the language of s. 178(1)(
e) requires a transfer of property as a result of the fraudulent misrepresentation …. [emphasis added] [ 32 ] In other words, a particular kind of detrimental reliance (such a transfer). On this aspect, see also Shaver-Kudell Manufacturing Inc v Knight Manufacturing Inc , 2021 ONCA 925 (paras 5 and 22-50 ) and CMHC v Gray , 2014 ONCA 236 (paras 31 , 39 and 40). [ 33 ] In her reply submissions, Ms. Henderson’s counsel cited two deceit cases in the same vein. In XY, LLC v. Zhu , 2013 BCCA 352 the British Columbia Court of Appeal confirmed that the reliance element in the tort of deceit can
be satisfied by other forms of legal detriment, even where a plaintiff is not induced to make any payment – please see paras. 25, 32, and 41 of XY, LLC v. Zhu and Roy v. Krestchmer , 2014 BCCA 429 , para. 60-62 . The Peeranis and Ms. Skaff made false statements to Ms. Henderson for a reason: to obtain her approval of the Umeta and Mavingo Building transactions and to prevent her from taking steps to restrain their diversion of the sale proceeds . Had the Bankrupts disclosed their intention to divert the sale proceeds in each transaction, Ms.
Henderson would not have approved the transactions and could have taken steps to restrain the diversion of the sale proceeds. [emphasis added] [ 34 ] These deceit cases do not assist Ms. Henderson here, with neither featuring property obtained as a result of the deceit (even it amounted to fraudulent misrepresentation) or examining para 178(1)(
e) or the bankruptcy survival of debts generally. 3. No further property obtained via misrepresentation [ 35 ] Ms. Henderson offered this synopsis of her position, revealing its fatal flaw: The Peeranis and Ms. Skaff made false statements to Ms. Henderson for a reason: to obtain her approval of the Umeta and Mavingo Building transactions and to prevent her from taking steps to restrain their diversion of the sale proceeds . Had the Bankrupts disclosed their intention to divert the sale proceeds in each transaction, Ms.
Henderson would not have approved the transactions and could have taken steps to restrain the diversion of the sale proceeds. [emphasis added] [ 36 ] Assuming the false statements were made and Ms. Henderson was induced to act (or not act) as described, she was not induced to transfer any further property to anyone. [ 37 ] Hennig confirms this required linkage: … there must be a “link” between the debt or liability and the fraudulent statement.
The need for a link is explicit in the language of s 178(1)(e), which refers to “any debt … resulting from obtaining property … by … false misrepresentations.” [footnote omitted] [para 74] [ 38 ] That link is missing here. [ 39 ] The corporate defendants already had obtained her property, via the loan advances. [ 40 ] Via those advances, the loaned monies became the property of the corporate debtors, with Ms. Henderson exchanging monies in hand for debt claims against them.
She did not have a continuing property (i.e. beneficial) interest in the loaned monies. (No evidence showed that any of the borrower corporations had any obligation to hold the transferred monies in trust for her or even to use those monies in defined ways; once borrowed, they became the corporations’ monies to use as they saw fit.) [ 41 ] Assuming Ms. Henderson’s evidence of the impugned transactions is accurate, the corporate debtors moved some or all of their property to third parties. [ 42 ] Such transfers may have had the effect of eliminating or diminishing Ms.
Henderson’s chances of repayment of the loans. [ 43 ] But they did not represent any further movement of property by her to any of them, let alone movement spurred by the misrepresentations. Ms. Henderson continued to have the same debt claims, in the same amount, against the same debtors. [ 44 ] The realizable value of those claims may have changed, but that is not the province of para 178(1)(e), which requires property transfers triggered by the misrepresentations. [ 45 ] Such transfers are lacking here. 4. Ms. Henderson’s actual remedies [ 46 ] Ms.
Henderson’s real complaint is not that the misrepresentations pulled property from her but that they possibly enabled the debtor corporations to move out their assets , to her prejudice as a creditor. [ 47 ] This is the zone of fraudulent preferences or undervalue transfers i.e. steps by a debtor to pay a subset of its creditors, leaving others un- or underpaid, or moving its assets away from creditors entirely. [ 48 ] Both kinds of transfers are neutral on the creditor’s “property position”: before and after such transfers by the debtor, the creditor has the same property i.e. the same “account receivable” claim against the debtor. [ 49 ] The BIA provides remedies for fraudulent preferences and undervalue transfers by now-bankrupt or formerly bankrupt persons (ss. 95 and 96).
They aim at returning to the debtor (or, more precisely, the debtor’s bankruptcy estate) assets moved out of the debtor via off-side transactions. [ 50 ] A bankruptcy trustee can also invoke provincial statutes addressing one or both types of off-side transfers. (On these remedies generally, see Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law of Canada (Houlden, Morawetz and Sarra – 4 th edition) at 5:484 to 5:540.) [ 51 ] The recourse of a creditor in Ms.
Henderson’s position is to ask the bankruptcy trustee to investigate and, as appropriate, to pursue the recovery, for the bankruptcy estate, of property moved out by perceived fraudulent preferences or undervalue transfers. Or, if the trustee declines to act, to take the reins of the estate’s remedies via s. 38 BIA .
5. No bankruptcy survival in these circumstances [52] Parliament did not grant bankruptcy survival to the claims of creditors prejudiced by fraudulent preferences or undervaluetransfers, focusing instead on the noted remedies for recovering the property moved out via off-side transactions. [53] In the universe of fraud, bankruptcy survival is reserved to persons whose very claims resulted from fraudulentmisrepresentations (para 178(1)(e)) – not the case here, as explained above -- and to those defrauded by persons acting in a fiduciarycapacity (para 178(1)(d)). Ms. Henderson did not argue that the latter applies here. [54] This
interpretation of para 178(1)(
e) was confirmed in Re Kramer (1975) 20 CBR (NS) 97. Per MacLeod J.: Section 148(1) [predecessor to ss 178(1)] sets out those debts which are not released by an order of discharge; the pertinent parts of thesection are: … An order of discharge [from bankruptcy] does not release the bankrupt from … (
d) any debt or liability arising out of fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity; [or] (
e) any debt or liability for obtaining property by false pretences or fraudulent misrepresentation. These subsections refer to debts “arising out of” or created by fraud. In this case the debts were created by the indebtedness ofAlberta Building Co Ltd and Kramer’s guarantee of that indebtedness [i.e. the initial granting of credit and the individual’sguarantee of that debt]. The alleged fraudulent preference clearly occurred at a later date, after the indebtedness was created, and was intended as anavoidance of that indebtedness. Section 148(1)(
d) and (
e) does not apply in the case of a fraudulent preference which is not involved in the creation of the debt.[emphasis added] [55] See also Long and McQuade Ltd v Torres, 2010 BCSC 1842 (Burnyeat J.) (para 24) and Citizens Bank of Canada vPastore, (ONSC) (McMahon J.) (paras 48-52). 6. No prospect of success here [56] A creditor asserting a ‘will survive’ claim, who has not already obtained a judgment, is obliged to show that it has at leastsome prospect of proving [para 178(1)(e)] or other ‘survival’ grounds: Re Gagnon, 2021 ABQB 583 (paras 104-110). [57] As explained above, Ms.
Henderson has no prospect of being able to prove that the target individual defendants (or any party)obtained property from her via fraudulent misrepresentations. [58] Accordingly, with the claimed survival of Ms. Henderson’s claims under para 178(1)(
e) not possible, that provision is not abasis for continuation of the actions in question against the target individuals. D. “Necessary parties” [59] Ms. Henderson also argued that her claims against the target individuals should continue because they “are part of an action inwhich [a given target individual] is a necessary party for the complete adjudication of the matters at issue involving other parties” (para12.2 of her lift-stay application).
This refers to a broader trial, set for June 2023, involving the target individuals, other individuals, andvarious corporations involved (or assertedly involved) in the impugned transactions. [60] The parties did not devote much argument to this point at the application. Ms. Henderson’s counsel said the targets arenecessary parties without elaborating. As I recall, the other counsel did not address this point at all. [61] The onus here was with Ms.
Henderson i.e. to explain why the targets here are indeed necessary parties for the broaderlitigation. [62] It is not apparent why the actions against the target individuals must continue for them to participate in the broaderproceeding. [63] Here I invoke Romaine J.’s analysis in Law (Re), 2021 ABQB 452: With respect to the second circumstance, whether the bankrupts are necessary parties for the complete adjudication of matters at issueinvolving other parties, as noted previously, the judgments render the causes of action pled against the bankrupts in the litigationadmitted by the bankrupts.
It is unclear why it would be necessary to lift the stays in order to effectively proceed against theremaining defendant.
The appellants would be able to subpoena the bankrupts as witnesses at the trial if they are of the view thattheir testimony is necessary, including with respect to the allegation of conspiracy. [para 11] [emphasis added] [64] See also Lagimodiere v Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Co, 2020 MBQB 154 (para 23). [65] On the evidence here and given the absence of detailed argument on this point, I am not able to conclude that the actions inquestion must or should continue for “necessary parties” reasons.
E. “Complex proceeding” [ 66 ] Finally, Ms. Henderson argued that the actions should continue because they raise complex issues beyond the evaluative capacity of the bankruptcy claims-review process. [ 67 ] Here I accept Mr. Paredes Canevari’s submission: evaluating Ms. Henderson’s claim of having made various advances to the three companies over the years (possibly with determination of any crossclaims) is essentially an accounting exercise. That is, determining what advances were made and when, what repayments (if any) were made and when, and what cross-claims may exist.
Without any need to explore (as discussed above) anything to do with the asserted misrepresentations. [ 68 ] Such an exercise is not beyond the capacity of the bankruptcy trustee. III. Conclusion [ 69 ] With Ms. Henderson’s claims against the target individual defendants not sheltered by para 178(1)(
e) and with the other survival grounds not made out here, I dismiss her application for leave to continue those actions. The existing stays under s. 69.3 BIA of pursuit of her claims against the target individuals will continue to operate. [ 70 ] The target defendants are entitled to their costs of the application under the applicable column of
Schedule C. Heard on the 28 th day of April, 2023. Dated at Calgary, Alberta this 19 th day of May, 2023. M.J. Lema J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: Karolina Kluz DE WAAL Law Barristers For the Plaintiff (Applicant) Peggy Henderson Jocelyn Turnbull-Wallace McCarthy Tetrault LLP For the Defendant (Respondent) Simone Skaff Felipe Paredes Canevari Reliance Legal Group LLP For the Defendants (Respondents) Sadru Peerani and Din Peerani _______________________________________________________
Corrigendum of the [Judgment Type] of The Honourable Justice M.J. Lema _______________________________________________________ Style of Cause on Action # 1501 04627 name of Mavingo Holdings Inc. removed from list of Plaintiffs. Style of Cause on Action #1501 04627 name of Peggy Henderson removed from list of Defendants. Style of Cause and Action # B201 830399 added. Style of Cause and Action # B201 830398 added. Style of Cause and Action # B201 780266 added.
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