Edden v Foley, 2023 ABKB 364
Opinion
Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Edden v Foley, 2023 ABKB 364 Date: 20230616 Docket: FL03 22666 Registry: Edmonton Between: Jolene K. Edden Applicant - and - Tyler A. Foley Respondent _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice M. J. Lema _______________________________________________________ I. Introduction [ 1 ] A child-support recipient seeks increased support back to 2011. For 2011-2015, she points to the payor’s increased and tax- reported (and not disclosed) income, in comparison to his imputed-in-2010-at-$50,000 income.
For 2016 to the present, during which years the payor’s income apparently dropped below $50,000, she asks for income imputation of $660,000 (in line with a Guideline- income report’s tentative gauging of his income) or alternatively $250,000 (in line with his 2011-2015 income). [ 2 ] The payor resists. For the first period, he acknowledges higher-than-initially-imputed income but says that the recipient never asked for more support and that the child here was adequately supported via his 2010-level support payments plus the mother’s
own income and that of her new spouse. [ 3 ] The 2010 order directed the standard exchange of income tax returns and assessments. Neither party complied until in or around 2021. [ 4 ] Since 2021, the recipient has been seeking income-related disclosure from the payor, who has provided some, but not all, of the requested information.
The focus here is the payor’s income from 2017 onwards, when he started a new business. [ 5 ] I find that the father owes retroactive child support for 2011-2015 (as detailed below), that his 2016 income for child-support purposes is his tax-reported income for that year (i.e. no income imputation), that further disclosure is required before determining his actual income for 2017 to the present, that the mother’s income imputation request for 2017 to the present hinges on whether the father’s to-be-determined incomes for those years is less than the sought-to-be-imputed levels, that no interest is payable on the identified child support arrears, that security for and payment of the child support arrears requires further submissions, and that costs will be determined once the outstanding issues are determined.
II. Analysis A. Further support for 2011-2015 [ 6 ] The mother seeks increased support back to January 1, 2011. 1. 2010 consent order [ 7 ] The starting point is the February 16, 2010 consent order granted by Yamauchi J. It set the mother’s Guideline income at $28,000 and the father’s at $50,000 (order
preamble). [ 8 ] With the mother then, and throughout, having primary care of the child (born in 2009), child support of $425 was payable by the father, directed to start in October 2009. [ 9 ] The order included this exchange-of-tax-information provision: Each party shall provide the other party with a complete copy of his or her income tax return and any notices of assessment and reassessment issued to him or her by the Canada Revenue Agency on an annual basis , on or before June 30 th of each year, as long as there remains a dependent child for whom child support is payable.
In the event that a party has not filed an income tax return for the previous year, he or she shall provide the other party with copies of his or her T4, T4A and all other relevant tax slips and statements disclosing any and all sources of income, including self-employment income. 2.
No disclosure by father during 2011-2015 (or at all until 2021) [ 10 ] The mother’s evidence, uncontradicted by the father’s, is that she “never received any form of financial disclosure [from the father] for the year 2010, or ongoing” (part of para 5 of her November 4, 2021 affidavit in support of her application for disclosure by the father). [ 11 ] She elaborated: Over the years, I have attempted to get income information from the [father], and I have always been met with a blunt refusal to do so.
I believe the [father’s] circumstances are such that he is doing well, and that he is making well in excess of $50,000 per year, although, I am not sure for how long. I note that [he] does live in a rather nice neighborhood in the Laurier Heights area of Edmonton. I believe I am entitled to receive and review the retroactive disclosure of the [father].
It is relevant in these proceedings. [para 7]. [ 12 ] On March 23, 2022, Sanderman J. granted a Without Prejudice Consent Order directing (in part) both parties to disclose their “Income Tax Returns, Notices of Assessment, and any Corporate Financial Statements for the period of 2010 to 2021 by June 30, 2022, or such other date as may be agreed upon by counsel.” [ 13 ] The order also continued the annual-exchange provision from the 2010 order, adding (among other elements) “shareholder in a corporation” disclosure under the Guidelines. 3.
Father’s income in 2011-2015 (as eventually disclosed) [ 14 ] A filed-August-9-2022 Notice to Attend Family Docket Court from the mother stated that the father provided his tax returns for 2010-2015 on August 3, 2022 but no returns or other information for 2016 onwards. [ 15 ] Per his 2011-2015 tax returns, the father’s income was as follows: 2011 $158,662.00 2012 $330,589.00 2013 $265,804.00 2014 $162,287.00
2015 $355,146.00 [ 16 ] The father acknowledges these incomes for these years. 4. Child support paid and payable (per mother) [ 17 ] The mother prepared this chart showing child support paid, child support payable at those actual-income levels, and the difference for each year. Year Child support paid Child support payable Difference 2011 $5,100 $16,608 $11,508 2012 $5,100 $35,136 $30,036 2013 $6,000 $27,924 $21,924 2014 $6,000 $16,956 $10,956 2015 $10,200 $37,788 $27,588 TOTALS : $32,400 $134,412 $102,012 [ 18 ] Payments-wise, the fathers says: I have always paid child support and kept records of my payments.
Between 2012 and 2016, I paid [the mother] $1,000 per month in child support. … [ 19 ] He did not offer any evidence on his payments for 2011. Accordingly, for that year, I accept the mother’s figure of $5,100 in child-support payments. [ 20 ] For 2012-2016, the total payments per the mother are $27,300. If the father is correct ($1,000 monthly support paid), his credits are actually $48,000 for those four years.
The difference is $20,700. [ 21 ] The mother did not provide back-up to support her payment calculations for these years, but neither did the father i.e. despite his assertion of having “kept records of [his] payments.” (He did provide records of (some of) his payments between January 2019 and February 2023.) [ 22 ] I note that the mother’s figure of $5,100 for 2012 squares with the 2010 order i.e. with monthly support of $425. If the father is correct, he was paying more than twice what had been ordered in 2010.
And he did not describe his payments in those years as doubled (or more). [ 23 ] For 2013 and 2014, the mother’s payment chart squares with $500 in monthly payments. For 2015, her chart squares with $850 in monthly payments. These figures are all below the father’s asserted $1,000 in monthly payments. [ 24 ] I find for the mother here. A payor asserting payments in excess (here, more than twice as much) of court-ordered support bears the onus of proving such payments.
I also note that the mother’s figures for 2013-2015 reflected some months of higher-than- ordered support i.e. she did not mechanically stick with the base-level support i.e. she was prepared to recognize support paid in excess of the base. As between the two payment accounts, hers is more plausible. 5. Father’s no-further-support-payable arguments [ 25 ] The father disputes his responsibility to pay any further child support for 2011-2015, for these reasons: [The child] lives a luxurious life and is not in need [concise letter, page 1, footnoted to para 38 of his March 16, 2023 affidavit].
Here is that paragraph: … my understanding is that the [mother] and her husband are substantially more wealthy than I, and that my daughter now has a maid taking her to and from school (at least in so far as I am aware). I understand this does not have any bearing on the amount I am paying currently, but wish to say that between both her parents, [the child] is well taken care of. [The mother] did not make any requests for financial disclosure or [indicate] [the child] was in need prior to 2021 .
In fact, the first occasion for which there is any record or reference to a request for more funds was on August 26, 2021 by [the mother’s] now- husband … [He] admits in a text message to [the father] that “we never ask you to help with anything regarding [the child] financially.
We’ve also never asked you to submit tax returns so that [the] actual amount of child care is paid properly and on the correct date, which is pretty standard.” There is no other record or request for disclosure or funds prior to this text . [concise letter, page 2] This Court has found that simply not disclosing annual disclosure was not necessarily blameworthy conduct. [footnote to Hussey v Hussey , 2014 ABQB 656 at para 26] [concise letter, page 3] While the Court retains discretion to depart from the presumptive date of retroactivity where the result would otherwise be unfair where a payor has failed to disclose a material increase in income, [the mother] is seeking retroactive support backdating to 2011 and provides no reason for the inordinate delay .
The Court in DBS [ v SRG , 2006 SCC 37 ] was clear that recipient parents should “not be encouraged to delay in seeking the appropriate amount of support for their children . From a child’s perspective, a retroactive
award is a poor substitute for past obligations not met.” In Hussey v Hussey [cited above], this Court found that despite a findingblameworthy conduct existed in failing to disclose an increase in income, the recipient’s delay in failing to bring an application forover seven years supported the application of the usual ‘three year’ retroactivity.
Another factor for consideration is the means of the child and any corresponding hardship a retroactive award may place on a payor. [reference to luxurious lifestyle noted above] She lives in a household where the reported household income (it also being self-employment income) is upwards of $250,000 some years. There is no suggestion that [the child] is not living a high standard of living orthat she is in need.
With respect to hardship, [the father’s] income substantially decreased after his termination in 2016 and anyretroactive payments beyond 3 years would presumably result in insolvency or an inability to meet his and his [new] wife’s needs. [abovetwo paragraphs from concise letter, pp 3 and 4] Any time [the mother] asked for more money, we would come to an agreement and I gave it to her. … When she needed more money, Iprovided that to her. [father’s affidavit sworn March 16, 2023, parts of paras 7 and 9] 6. Father breached disclosure obligation [26] The father misunderstands.
Per the 2010 order, he was required to provide annual disclosure of his tax returns andassessments to the mother. (And vice versa.) His obligation was not dependent on the mother asking for that disclosure, or even on herproviding her tax information to him. (On the latter point, see Johannson v Haaranen, 2019 ABCA 73 at para 20.) [27] As for Hussey v Hussey, 2014 ABQB 656 (Ross J.) finding non-disclosure not necessarily blameworthy, the payor there “wasnot in violation of any disclosure obligation in the divorce judgment, or under court rules, as there was no provision in the divorcejudgment requiring annual disclosure” (para 25 – emphasis added).
Unlike here. [28] On the possible consequences of non-disclosure, the SCC’s decision in Michel v Graydon, 2020 SCC 24 is clear: Retroactive child support awards will commonly be appropriate where payor parents fail to disclose increases in their income.Again, D.B.S. is instructive: “a payor parent who knowingly avoids or diminishes his/her support obligation to his/her childrenshould not be allowed to profit from such conduct” (para. 107).
And where the strategy for avoiding child support obligationstakes the form of inadequate or delayed disclosure of income, the effect on the child support regime is especially pernicious. Thisis because the methodology adopted by the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175, which are expressly incorporated in theFLA, results in information asymmetry. Apart from shared parenting arrangements, the Guidelines calculate child support paymentssolely from the payor parent’s income.
At any given point in time, therefore, the payor parent has the information required todetermine the appropriate amount of child support owing, while the recipient parent may not. Quite simply, the payor parent isthe one who holds the cards. While an application-based regime places responsibility on both parents in relation to child support(D.B.S., at para. 56), the practical reality is that, without adequate disclosure, the recipient parent will not be well-positioned tomarshall the case for variation. Failure to disclose material information is the cancer of family law litigation (Cunha v.
Cunha (1994), (BC SC), 99B.C.L.R. (2d) 93 (S.C.), at para. 9, quoted in Leskun v. Leskun, 2006 SCC 25, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 920, at para. 34). And yet, payor parentsare typically well aware of their obligation as a parent to support their children, and are subject to a duty of full and honestdisclosure — a duty comparable to that arising in matrimonial negotiations (Brandsema, at paras. 47-49). The payor parent’sobligation to disclose changes in income protects the integrity and certainty afforded by an existing order or agreementrespecting child support.
Absent full and honest disclosure, the recipient parent — and the child — are vulnerable to the payorparent’s non-disclosure. It follows that I agree with the hearing judge that Mr. Graydon’s failure to accurately disclose his income at the time of the March29, 2001 order, and failure to disclose material changes in his income for the 11 years that followed, constituted blameworthyconduct, which justifies an order for retroactive child support (and which also eliminates any need to protect Mr. Graydon’s interestin the certainty of his child support obligations (D.B.S., at para. 125)).
As I have explained, failure to disclose material changes in incomeundermines the child support regime imposed by the Guidelines. ... [paras 32-34] [emphasis added] [29] That applies here: • the father had a duty to provide annual disclosure of his income (via tax returns and CRA assessments); • he did not perform that duty during the years 2011-2015 (or at all until 2021); • as noted, the mother’s failure to cross-disclose does not excuse that failure and is immaterial in any case, with her having primarycare of the child throughout and not seeking any
section 7 expense support at present; • the mother did not have to ask the father for his tax returns and assessments; • in any case, she did at least one time, per a September 4, 2012 email to the father: … Please submit your 2010 and 2011 tax returns so we can get this [child support] settled. I would also like you to square up any and allmonies outstanding[; and] • in her April 12, 2023 affidavit, she deposed (in part) that “ … there were other occasions where I had asked for disclosure andsimply been rejected. I have additional emails asking the [father] to file his tax returns properly.
I would be happy to provide additionalemails/correspondence if required, or as necessary” [from paras 9 and 10]. [30] The described non-disclosure constitutes blameworthy conduct by the father. Per Colucci v Colucci, 2021 SCC 24:
It is also helpful to summarize the principles which now apply to cases in which the recipient applies under s. 17 to retroactively increasechild support: The court retains discretion to depart from the presumptive date of retroactivity [i.e. the date of effective notice of an intention to seekincreased support, up to three years before formal notice] where the result would otherwise be unfair. The D.B.S. factors continue toguide this exercise of discretion, as described in Michel.
If the payor has failed to disclose a material increase in income, that failurequalifies as blameworthy conduct and the date of retroactivity will generally be the date of the increase in income. [para 114(d)][emphasis added] 7. “Material change of circumstances” [31] As for the threshold condition of a “material change in circumstances” (addressed in para 114(
a) of Colucci, the markedincreases in the father’s income here, compared to the 2010 baseline of $50,000, are plainly such changes. [32] I turn next to the other DBS factors: reasonable excuse for delay by the recipient parent, the child’s circumstances, and unduehardship. 8. “Reasonable excuse” not required here [33] I find that the recipient here does not have to provide a” reasonable excuse” here, as explained below. [34] The reasonable-excuse analysis in DBS presumes the support recipient had some reason to know or at least suspect highersupport was payable i.e. to bear at least prima facie responsibility for the delay Here are the key paragraphs (101-103): Delay in seeking child support is not presumptively justifiable.
At the same time, courts must be sensitive to the practical concernsassociated with a child support application. They should not hesitate to find a reasonable excuse where the recipient parent harbouredjustifiable fears that the payor parent would react vindictively to the application to the detriment of the family. Equally, absent any suchan anticipated reaction on the part of the payor parent, a reasonable excuse may exist where the recipient parent lacked the financial oremotional means to bring an application, or was given inadequate legal advice: see Chrintz v.
Chrintz (1998), (ONSC), 41 R.F.L. (4th) 219 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)), at p. 245. On the other hand, a recipient parent will generally lack a reasonableexcuse where (s)he knew higher child support payments were warranted, but decided arbitrarily not to apply. Not awarding retroactive child support where there has been unreasonable delay by the recipient parent responds to two importantconcerns. The first is the payor parent’s interest in certainty.
Generally, where the delay is attributable to unreasonableness on the part ofthe recipient parent, and not blameworthy conduct on the part of the payor parent, this interest in certainty will be compelling. Notably,the difference between a reasonable and unreasonable delay often is determined by the conduct of the payo parent. A payor parent whoinforms the recipient parent of income increases in a timely manner, and who does not pressure or intimidate him/her, will havegone a long way towards ensuring that any subsequent delay is characterized as unreasonable: compare C. (S.E.) v. G. (D.C.).
Inthis context, a recipient parent who accepts child support payments without raising any problem invites the payor parent to feel thathis/her obligations have been met. The second important concern is that recipient parents not be encouraged to delay in seeking the appropriate amount of support for theirchildren. From a child’s perspective, a retroactive award is a poor substitute for past obligations not met. Recipient parents must actpromptly and responsibly in monitoring the amount of child support paid: see Passero v. Passero, (ON SC), [1991]O.J. No. 406 (QL) (Gen. Div.).
Absent a reasonable excuse, uncorrected deficiencies on the part of the payor parent that are knownto the recipient parent represent the failure of both parents to fulfill their obligations to their children. [emphasis added] [35] In the present case, the father did not provide evidence that, absent his disclosure, the mother had or even should have hadknowledge of his increased income in any of 2011-2015. [36] Nothing in the record shows that she had any particular window into his “economic life”, at least during this period.
In fact, itpoints the other way (i.e. no awareness of his increased income). [37] In her November 2, 2021 affidavit, she deposed (in part): “I believe that the [father’s] circumstances are such that he is doingwell and that he is making well in excess of the $50,000 per year, although I am not sure for how long.” [emphasis added] [38] In her April 12, 2023 affidavit, she deposed that “[w]hile I was struggling in the first years after our separation, while workingso hard to put a roof over my head and [the child’s] head, I see now that the [father] was making well over 6 digits.
He never onceincreased his payments even though he should have.” [39] Per her January 27, 2023 affidavit (in part): “Upon seeing just how high the [father’s] income was over those years, 2011 to2015 [i.e. via his August 2022 disclosure of tax returns], I became greatly disheartened.” [para 14]. [40] Accordingly, we are not in “reasonable excuse” territory at all.
With the father not disclosing his materially increased incomefor 2011 to 2015, and with the mother having no awareness or even suspicion of it, she had no DBS-imposed or other duty, formal orinformal, to apply for increased support or even to raise that topic with the father. [41] His non-disclosure kept her in the dark and reasonably believing that his per-2010-income-level support was all that wasrequired from him. [42] Per Michel v Graydon (cited above): “... without adequate disclosure, the recipient parent will not be well-positioned tomarshall the case for variation” (para 32).
Or even know one should be brought.
[ 43 ] All to say: the recipient does not need any excuse for not applying or asking for more support – she did not know that any was or could be due. 9. Child’s circumstances [ 44 ] As noted, the father asserted a “luxurious life” for the child in the mother’s household. Here he emphasized the combined income of the mother and her husband and the child having a “maid” to take her to and from school. (Per the mother, the “maid” is actually a part-time caregiver for another child, of the mother and her husband, who requires close-in medical attention.
Part of her duties include helping with driving the children to and from school.) [ 45 ] The record does not show when the mother and her husband married or whether they shared a household before marriage. It also does not include evidence of her husband’s income at any point. [ 46 ] The mother’s income in 2011-2015, which the father did not dispute, was: 2011 $46,761.00 2012 $32,140.00 2013 $21,777.00 2014 $2,400.00 2015 $14,281.50 [ 47 ] The mother’s uncontradicted evidence is that she struggled financially in those years or at least some of them: “...
I was struggling in the first years after our separation, ... working so hard to put a roof over my head and [the child’s] head ...” (April 12, 2023 affidavit, para 6). [ 48 ] She also stated (same affidavit, para 5): “If I didn’t have my parents throughout all of this and upon our separation, I would have had nothing.” [ 49 ] I cannot conclude on this evidence that, for 2011-2015, the mother and child lived a “luxurious life” and had no need of child support from the father. [ 50 ] I find instead, on this evidence, that the mother and child needed both the baseline support they received and the increased child support that would have flowed their way had the father paid squaring-with-actual-income support. [ 51 ] In any case, “need” or not, the child was entitled to that level of support from her father.
By definition, her life was not as comfortable or easy or financially stable as it should have been. [ 52 ] Per Henderson v Micetich , 2021 ABCA 103 : ... It would be a most unusual circumstance to say that a child will not benefit from the provision of monies to which they are entitled, and which were previously withheld. [para 62] 10.
Hardship [ 53 ] The focus here is any hardship endured by the payor in having to pay increased support for previous years, as well as any by the recipient and child from under-payment of support in those years. [ 54 ] In Henderson v Micetich (cited above), the Court of Appeal provided the following hardship-gauging guidance (drawing in part on its decision in Goulding v Keck , 2014 ABCA 138 ): The approach to hardship in this context was explained in Goulding v Keck at paras 56 – 58 : In awarding retroactive support, the court is entitled to consider fairness to all parties.
Hardship to the payor is typically at the forefront of an application. Equally relevant, however, is the hardship suffered by the recipient parent and the child as a result of the lack of sufficient support. Hardship, however, is not an abstract or impressionistic concept to be asserted by a payor in an effort to avoid a retroactive award. To weigh against granting retroactive child support, the payor parent must establish real facts from which a reasonable finding of serious hardship could be made. A bald or vague assertion of hardship is not sufficient.
The obligation to pay support at the Guidelines amount for a prior period is not a hardship ( Greene at para 87). The payor does not suffer hardship by having to pay money which he or she may otherwise owe. Even where hardship is established, courts have broad discretion to mitigate hardship to the payor through a structured payment plan . Indeed, statutory regimes provide judges with discretion to structure child support awards as a lump sum, a series of periodic payments, or a combination of the two: see, e.g.,
section 11 of the Guidelines . [paras 56-58] The claim of hardship must be tangible and supported by evidence, and the hardship must be undue. There is often financial difficulty when an immediate lump sum cash payment is awarded. However, without more, it is neither undue nor unfair. An assessment of hardship requires the court to have regard to unfairness created in all the circumstances, including hardship to the payor, the recipient, and the child. It is incumbent on courts to recognize that failure to provide a retroactive award will have the
effect of depriving children of payments to which they are entitled. Moreover, the analysis must recognize who has benefitted from failing to fulfill the obligation in the meantime; usually that would be the payor. Hardship is a broad concept and a legitimate concern, but the focus cannot be exclusively on the payor.
Rather, the analysis must be in keeping with the purpose of the legislation. [paras 69-70] [emphasis added] [ 55 ] This approach echoes (in part) the minority judgment (Wagner CJ and Martin J.) in Michel v Graydon , 2020 SCC 24 (paras 124-126 ), where the majority judgment did not explore this aspect (confirming the first-level assessment that the retroactive support ordered would not cause hardship for the payor), including these passages form paras 124 and 125: ...
If there is the potential for hardship on the payor’s part, but there is also blameworthy conduct which precipitated or exacerbated the delay, it may be open to the courts to disregard the presence of undue hardship ( D.B.S. , at para. 116 ; Tschudi v. Tschudi , 2010 BCCA 170 , 86 R.F.L. (6th) 23, at paras. 4-5 ). In all cases, hardship may be addressed by the form of payment ( Purba v. Purba , 2009 ABCA 32 , 466 A.R. 175, at para. 15 ). ... it is clear that hardship cannot be measured in the abstract but must be grounded in the facts and the totality of the circumstances.
For example, the payor may be able to establish that paying past due child support in the amount of $20,000 would create hardship because the payor does not have the funds on hand and would be required to obtain a loan or sell property to discharge that child support debt.
However, it must be taken into account that the payor had the benefit of the unpaid child support for the full time in which it was unpaid and such monies may have funded a preferred lifestyle or the very purchase of property which may now need to be sold. [emphasis added] [ 56 ] Here is the father’s ability-to-pay evidence, put forward (in part) to show hardship if additional child support were ordered for any period before 2020: • his line 150 income since 2015 is as follows: 2016 $104,030 2017 $24,474 2018 $46,400 2019 $28,750 2020 $46,000 2021 $46,000 • he submits that ongoing support (from May 2023) should be set using an estimated income of $46,000; • per the father, his 65 per cent ownership of a wholesale car sales company is (effectively) a modest asset, despite annual revenues averaging approximately $14,000,000 in each of 2018-2021, because of its modest profit margins (ranging between 1.5 and 1.6 per cent); • per his
Schedule A (Statement of Income, Assets and Liabilities), sworn January 13, 2023, his total assets are limited to approximately $420,000, comprised of: o his residence (estimated value of $475,000, with a line of credit on which $266,000 is owing i.e. equity of $209,000); o a condominium (for rental income) (estimated value of $150,000); o financial assets (approximately $60,000); and o his 65 per cent interest in the company (unvalued); • as for liabilities (beyond the noted line of credit), he noted unsecured debts of approximately $103,000; • in other words, a net worth (aside from whatever his corporate interest is worth) of approximately $315,000; • the father also stated having a shareholder-loan receivable from the company of $321,832 (as of March 31, 2021).
Per him: “[m]uch of my shareholder loan account is to pay off the Line of Credit [balance in January 2023 noted above i.e. $266,000] I incurred on my family home to fund the cash flow of the company”; • concerning his rental property, he added: “I have not had renters in the unit for at least 3 or 4 years. This is for numerous reasons, including flooding to the unit and the RCMP entering the unit with force (in error). I have a real estate agent who is aware that the condo is to be rented out or sold.
I am advised by the real estate agent that a sale in today’s market would result in over a $30,000 loss”; and • per his concise letter, “any retroactive payments beyond 3 years [i.e. for years before 2020] would presumably result in insolvency or an inability to meet [my] and [my] wife’s needs.” [ 57 ] I do not see undue hardship here i.e. if the father is required to pay the incremental child support for 2011 to 2015 reflected in the mother’s shortfall calculation i.e. the noted $102,012: a. taking the father’s
Schedule A and shareholder-loan information at face value, he has (or has recently had, given the currency of the information) a net worth of approximately $635,000 (i.e. with the $266,000 line of credit factored in i.e. as reducing the residence equity by that amount i.e. with no need for a second deduction from the shareholder-loan receivable);
b. plus, the father did not include any value for his shareholding in the corporation.
And the opinion of the mother’s Guideline- income expert is that the stated profit margin for the company is markedly (about five times) below industry average, sparking concerns its profit margins, and thus overall value of his shareholding, is (to say the least) a material asset; c. this links to the still-outstanding-at-time-of-application disclosure shortfalls from the father, primarily concerned detailed financial information of the company’s operations, including the costs of goods sold and other expense items i.e. the underlying source documents i.e. moving beyond general (expense totals) information, which would assist the Court and the parties in properly evaluating the company and the father’s stake in it (as discussed further below); d. even if the father’s income for 2016 onwards is accepted as reasonable (i.e. with no imputation of further income required), which might limit income-based arrears payments to modest amounts, as noted the father has considerable total equity against which arrears might be secured and out of which arrears can be paid, at whatever pace the parties might agree or the Court might order (as discussed further below); and e. the father did not provide a budget or include any information about the income of his spouse (if any). [ 58 ] Applying the teachings of Henderson and Michel reproduced above, I find no potential hardship given the state of equity outlined above and, in any case, any hardship to the payor being outweighed by that experienced by the mother and child from the underpayment of support. [ 59 ] In any case, the father’s blameworthy conduct here undercuts the force of any arrears-payment-caused hardship for him.
By definition, he had the income to pay all required support, year by year. Not disclosing his increased income allowed him to devote the incremental-support monies to other purposes. [ 60 ] If he saved the money otherwise required for increased support (or some of it), he can draw on those savings to pay the support now. If he spent the money otherwise required for that support (or some of it), effectively saving other assets from which he would have drawn for that spending, he can draw on those assets now. [ 61 ] In any case, savings or assets or not, he should still have to pay the required support.
Where his misconduct enabled him to drain a pool of resources, earmarked by child-support law for the recipient, for his own purposes, could his efficiency in doing so really be an answer to the recipient? That is, can “I spent it all” really be a defence?
No: in such circumstances, remedying the consequences of the blameworthy conduct trumps avoiding hardship to the payor. [ 62 ] As the BC Court of Appeal observed in Tschudi v Tschudi , 2010 BCCA 170 : The unfortunate effect of the judge’s hardship ruling [finding hardship and thus no retroactive support] is that it allows the [payor] to take advantage of his own default .
Moreover, the cost of putting the [payor’s] financial affairs in order is at the child’s expense , because the money would otherwise have gone to the child’s support. [para 11] [emphasis added] [ 63 ] The Supreme Court of Canada built on that foundation: If there is the potential for hardship on the payor’s part, but there is also blameworthy conduct which precipitated or exacerbated the delay, it may be open to the courts to disregard the presence of undue hardship ( D.B.S. , at para. 116 ; Tschudi v Tschudi , 2010 BCCA 170 , 86 R.F.L. (6th) 23, at paras. 4-5 ).
In all cases, hardship may be addressed by the form of payment ( Purba v. Purba , 2009 ABCA 32 , 466 A.R. 175, at para. 15 ). [para 124] [ 64 ] So too here. Requiring the payor to pay the noted arrears will not cause hardship. Alternatively, any hardship is outweighed by shortfall-support-hardship experienced by the mother and child. Or, in any case, remedying the shortfall is more important than minimizing payor hardship. 11.
Conclusion on 2011-2015 child support [ 65 ] In all the circumstances, no sound reason exists to excuse the father from paying the child support he should have paid, for 2011-2015, years for which the mother and child needed and were in any case entitled to that support. [ 66 ] This is a classic case of a payor privileging his (or her) own interests over those of his (or her) child.
The father’s income here skyrocketed in comparison to the per-2010-order level, increasing from $50,000 to (on average) over $254,000 over 2011-2015. [ 67 ] It was not for the mother “to request” more support or even to ask for disclosure (and, in any case, she did ask, in 2012 (at minimum), for tax returns).
It was for the father to perform his court-ordered duty to disclose his income to the mother, year by year. [ 68 ] If he had done that and the mother had not applied for more support or even asked, he might have a good argument against having to square up now. [ 69 ] But he did not. [ 70 ] So he must pay now, and he can afford it, all aside from uncertainty over his current income i.e. whether the company is effectively generating more income for his (and his co-shareholder) than indicated in its financial statements.
With payments at a pace the parties agree on or, failing agreement, I will set, and same for whether the payments should be secured and, if so, how (as discussed below). B. Further support for 2016
[ 71 ] The father reported losing his auto-industry job in 2016 and receiving severance and (later) employment-insurance benefits for a total income that year of $104,030.
Per his concise letter: [The father] spent a brief amount of [time] unemployed between in or about March 2016 to in or about January 2017, ‘trying to figure out what to do with’ his life. [His] religious beliefs were no longer in line with an industry that allowed “[burying] people in interest.” [ 72 ] In early 2017, the father and another person started an auto wholesaling business, which they have been pursuing ever since, generating annual incomes for the father considerably lower than his 2011-2015 incomes and even his 2016 transition-year income i.e. between approximately $24,500 and $46,000 (as discussed later). [ 73 ] The mother includes 2016 among the years for which she seeks to impute income to the father, in line either with his 2011- 2015-level incomes or (for 2017 to the present) squaring (net-income-wise) with the wholesaling business’s total revenues, using industry benchmarks. [ 74 ] For 2016 in particular, she effectively argues that the father did not relaunch quickly enough i.e. after losing his 2011-2015-era position. [ 75 ] Here I find, using a somewhat generous scale, that the father moved with reasonable speed i.e. in making the transition from his auto-retailing position to launching the wholesaling business, given the need to examine different ways to relaunch in the automotive world and the pros and cons of the different alternatives and, having selected one, to launch a new business. [ 76 ] The gap period was also reasonably explained, at least in party, by father’s awakening, or possibly deepening, religious beliefs, triggering a re-examination of his overall business philosophy. [ 77 ] I will examine later (after receiving the further submissions discussed below) whether the father should have accepted a retail- industry job offer (apparently paying in the neighbourhood of his 2011-2015 average income) made shortly after his lost his position in 2016. [ 78 ] For now, I simply find that the gap period here was reasonably explained. [ 79 ] Accordingly, I accept the father’s tax-reported income for 2016 as described above i.e. decline to impute a different income to him for that year. [ 80 ] If the parties do not agree on what payments the father made in 2016, I will decide after being so advised and directed to the available evidence on this point.
C.
Income imputation for 2017 to the present [ 81 ] The mother argues that the father’s decision to launch the wholesaling business was unreasonable, with his income dropping markedly from his retail-side income, and, in any case, that his tax-reported income from wholesaling does not accurately represent his ability-to-pay-child-support income i.e. once various income-earned-through-corporation adjustments are made. [ 82 ] The father defends his industry-sector shift and the accuracy of his income, aside from the minor acknowledged adjustments for certain corporation-borne personal expenses (cell-phone and vehicle expenses). [ 83 ] The mother retained a Guideline-income expert to examine the father’s wholesaling income in 2017 through 2022.
His (tentative) core finding was that the father appears to have a higher-than-reported income, based on industry averages. However, he was not able to offer firm conclusions for any of the years under review, largely because he did not have sufficiently detailed information from the wholesaling business i.e. to perform line-by-line analyses of various expense categories. [ 84 ] The expert offered (again, tentative) estimates of the father’s annual income in 2017 through 2022 ranging from approximately $55,500 to $79,200 i.e. on the assumption that “typical adjustments” are made.
He then offered a second set of (tentative) estimates making the same adjustments plus further “average industry profitability” adjustments, producing a range for the same years of between $503,796 and $660,179. [ 85 ] The expert’s inability to perform a more granular analysis of the corporation’s expenses links to the overall state of disclosure on this file. [ 86 ] The mother’s position is that the father’s (belated, in her view) disclosure remains incomplete, including outstanding undertakings from recent cross-examinations. [ 87 ] The father’s position on disclosure is that he provided timely disclosure (i.e. when asked) and that he has largely provided full disclosure, albeit acknowledging some (limited) outstanding undertakings. [ 88 ] At the start of the recent application, the mother (through her counsel) acknowledged that one way forward here was to obtain the outstanding disclosure (however measured i.e. whether limited to outstanding undertakings or otherwise) and then factor that further disclosure (whether full, partial, or none i.e. if no additional disclosure is made) into the determination of the father’s Guideline incomes for 2017 to 2022. [ 89 ] I find that that is the appropriate course here. [ 90 ] The first step is for the father to complete his outstanding disclosure.
If the parties cannot agree, by June 23, 2023, on what precisely remains to be disclosed or undertaking-answered, I will decide that after receiving 3-page-maximum letters from each side, due by June 28, 2023, which should also address proposed deadlines for the production of any outstanding disclosure, the preparation of a
supplemental Guideline-income report by the mother’s expert, and supplementary submissions by each side on the father’s actual child- support-leviable income arising from the wholesaling business. (As well as the subject of security for and payment of the child-support arrears, as discussed below.
Plus, as necessary, references to the available evidence on the father’s child-support payments in 2016, as discussed above.) [ 91 ] Once I receive those addition submissions, I will then decide the father’s actual income in 2017-2022. [ 92 ] I will then also decide, if the incomes found for the father for those years fall below the levels sought to be imputed to the father by the mother, original or (as applicable) revised (i.e. in light of further disclosure and any supplemental Guideline-income report), whether additional income should be imputed to the father for any of those years. [ 93 ] I will then also set the father’s income for 2023 to date and ongoing. [ 94 ] For now, and on an interim without-prejudice basis, I set the father’s income for ongoing child support purposes, starting July 1, 2023, at the $46,000 level i.e. as reflected in his tax-reported income for 2021.
D. Interest [ 95 ] At the recent application, I raised the issue of interest i.e. whether the mother was seeking interest on any retroactive child support found to be payable. [ 96 ] Her counsel advised that interest should be paid, per the Judgment Interest Act . [ 97 ] The father’s counsel acknowledged that interest for some periods might be payable and that the JIA might provide the applicable rate for some of those periods. [ 98 ] On reflection, I should have examined the pleadings first, before raising the subject of interest.
The reason is Rule 13.6(2)(c) (iii), which states: A pleading must state any of the following matters that are relevant: (
c) the remedy claimed, including (iii) a statement of any interest claimed, including the basis for the interest, and the method of calculating the interest .... [ 99 ] I do not see anything in
Part 12 (Family Law Rules) at odds with R. 13.6(2)(c)(iii), meaning that the latter applies to family- law proceedings (per R. 12.3 – “Subject to this Part and any enactment, other Parts of these rules apply to proceedings and appeals under this Part.”). [ 10 0] The mother’s application did not include interest among the “remedy claimed or sought” or otherwise refer to interest. [ 10 1] Accordingly, I will leave for another day the issue of when and what interest is payable on retroactive child-support arrears. E.
Security for child-support arrears [ 10 2] The mother asked for permission to address the issue of security for any child-support arrears found owing. [ 10 3] As noted above, I invite submissions from both parties on that subject as well as proposed arrears-payment terms, as part of their follow-up submissions. III.
Conclusion [ 10 4] The father is responsible for the identified child-support arrears for 2011-2015. [ 10 5] As noted, I will decide his actual income for 2017 through 2022, plus 2023 to date and ongoing, once I receive the follow-up submissions. [ 10 6] As necessary, I will also decide whether further income should be imputed to him, applying the Court of Appeal’s analyses in Peters v Atchooay , 2022 ABCA 347 . [ 10 7] If it turns out that further child-support arrears are ostensibly owing, I will also decide whether, on the existing record concerning the father’s assets and the supplemented record concerning his income, whether imposing the additional arrears or any portion of them, would pose undue hardship to the father and, if so, possibly adjust the amount of additional arrears owing by him. [ 10 8] On costs, I will invite submissions on costs, of the overall application, from the parties once these additional issues are decided. [ 10 9] I thank the parties for their helpful written and oral submissions to date.
Heard on the 24 th day of May, 2023. Dated at Edmonton, Alberta this 16 th day of June, 2023.
M. J. Lema J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: Erik L. Bruveris Stillman LLP for the Applicant Rana Ghanem Ogilvie LLP for the Respondent
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