R v AL, 2023 ABKB 374
Opinion
Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: R v AL, 2023 ABKB 374 Date: 20230620 Docket: 211025135Q1 Registry: Edmonton Between: His Majesty the King Crown - and - AL Accused Restriction on Publication Identification Ban – See the Criminal Code ,
section 486.4 . By Court Order, information that could identify the victims must not be published, broadcast, or transmitted in any way. NOTE: Identifying information has been removed from this judgment to comply with the ban so that it may be published. _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Decision of the Honourable Justice Peter Michalyshyn _______________________________________________________ I.
Introduction [ 1 ] These are reasons in the sentencing of the offender AL following his guilty plea to unlawfully touching for a sexual purpose a part of the body of the complainant, contrary to s 151 of the Criminal Code . [ 2 ] For reasons which follow AL is sentenced to 18 months to be served in the community pursuant to a Conditional Sentence Order (CSO).
II. The sentencing record [ 3 ] Agreed facts before the court establish the following:
a) The complainant MH is the daughter of NH (“the Mother”); AL and the Mother were in a relationship between March and October, 2020. MH was 13 years old during that time;
b) The Mother had a second daughter, LH, aged 11 at the material time;
c) NH, LH and the Mother lived in the same apartment household as AL between May and October, 2020;
d) Between March and October, 2020 AL and the Mother were in a relationship. In the spring, 2020 AL and the Mother were having relationship problems. The Mother came up with the idea that integrating her two daughters into their sex life would help fix the issues that she and AL were having. AL was resistant to this idea, but the Mother assured him that she would coach him on exactly what to do and say;
e) On the Mother’s direction, AL has two interactions with MH and one with LH. AL told the Mother he did not want to, and that he did not think it was right. The Mother told AL she had talked to both MH and LH and that they were both interested in and open to the Mother’s plan;
f) The first time, AL went into MH’s bedroom in the evening. The two remained fully clothed. AL laid down on MH’s bed next to her. He asked her how her evening was going how school was going, and placed his hand on her hip. He then asked her “are you uncomfortable?” and “Are you alright?” When she did not answer, AL asked her “Do you want me to leave?” to which MH responded “yes”. AL left;
g) The second incident occurred again at the Mother’s direction. AL went into MH’s room. He recalled being scared and nervous and was physically shaking. He was thinking “This is fucked up” but proceeded anyways. Again, he laid down on MH’s bed and asked her how her day was. Both AL and MH remained fully clothed. He suggested they go see a movie the next day, or perhaps go for a bike ride. She said “no” and slid away. AL noticed MH did not look comfortable and asked her if she wanted him to leave, to which she responded that she did. AL then left. This incident last about two minutes. It was the last interaction between AL and MH;
h) Some two-three weeks later the Mother suggested AL approach LH. At the Mother’s direction, and when the Mother and MH had left the apartment to run errands, AL knocked on the bathroom door while LH was showering and said “would you like to shower together?”;
i) LH went quiet, and AL felt nauseous. He immediately went to his bedroom where he continued to feel sick to his stomach. When the Mother and MH returned home, LH was upset and could be herd crying from her room. After this incident, AL told the Mother that he was done, and that he was not willing to do this again;
j) Following summer 2021 disclosures by MH and LH regarding these events, AL and the Mother turned themselves in and were both arrested and charged with numerous offences;
k) AL was cooperative with police and participated in a lengthy nearly four-hour interview during which he expressed remorse. In particular, AL stated: 1. “I was very depressed, on CERB, unemployed, not looking at life in the greatest of eyes. I won’t say I tried to kill myself, but I felt that low at times. I wasn’t sitting there with a knife in my hand but I thought about just giving up.” 2. “I do take responsibility for my actions in this investigation, I do. I’m not saying I’m innocent.
I’m not saying I was drugged and had no control, but um I didn’t want to do these things, I didn’t think they were right.” 3. “My moral compass and inhibitions were not where they needed to be” 4. “I feel horrible about this, I truly do. [MH and LH] don’t fucking deserve that” 5. “I want those two girls to have a good life, without this.”
l) In the spring, 2020, AL was struggling with depression. He had lost his job due to COVID-19 and had been unemployed for nearly a year. He was drinking alcohol in excess on a daily basis. [ 4 ] In addition to the Agreed Statement of Facts, the sentencing record before the court includes a Victim Impact Statement of LH pursuant to s 722 Criminal Code .
The victim impact statement is relevant and helpful in understanding of the impact of AL’s misconduct on LH in particular, even though LH is not a named complainant in the offence to which AL was found guilty. [ 5 ] The sentencing record also includes a statement by AL and 14 letters of reference. The statement and letters of reference are helpful in understanding what is by all accounts the isolated nature of the offence of which AL was found guilty. [ 6 ] Finally, the sentencing record includes psychologist Dr. Nesca’s report of August 5, 2022. Coming out of his report:
a) It appears that AL was manipulated by the Mother into his criminal misconduct by claiming it would improve their relationship and would be welcomed by the daughters;
b) By all accounts AL was struggling with depression and alcohol abuse at the material time;
c) A series of character references “converge on the portrait of [AL as] a caring sensitive man for whom the behaviors in question are highly uncharacteristic”;
d) A psychiatric assessment of Dr. Sopara indicates amongst other things a history for depression and a personal history of childhood sexual victimization (including fondling and digital penetration by an older male relative and fondling by an adult acquaintance);
e) AL had an education history for completing grade 8;
f) AL had a vocation history for entering the workforce thereafter; other than COVID-related joblessness, AL had a consistent record for workplace involvement;
g) At the time of the August 2022 assessment however AL was unable to working owing to mental illness, and was living with his mother and receiving assistance; his depression was “unusually intense, falling in a range which is typically only seen in inpatient populations”. (page 6);
h) At the time of the August 2022 testing, response bias measures resulted in valid profiles. He also presented as an individual well motivated for treatment;
i) There was little if anything in AL’s sexual and relationship history to suggest he was a sexually deviant offender. Test outcomes supported the conclusion that he posted a low risk of sexual recidivism. Further support for low recidivism risk included his strong remorse and victim empathy;
j) His medical history supported full diagnostic criteria for Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) and Generalized Anxiety Disorder GAD); both conditions were active at the material time (consistent with additional medical records provided during the sentencing), as was active alcohol abuse;
k) He had some history for methamphetamine and cocaine under during his ‘20s but historically he was more affected by alcohol dependence; notwithstanding his then-recent completion of a Henwood substance abuse program, AL had not achieved full abstinence. [ 7 ] As to the offence itself, AL’s narrative to Dr. Nesca was consistent with the agreed facts. Dr Nesca noted that during the assessment AL “wept profusely as he described these events, and he broke down completely when describing how the victim’s voice quivered when he approached her”.
He attributed AL’s emotional presentation as driven by overwhelming feelings of remorse and regret linked to the offence. [ 8 ] Dr. Nesca noted that: “Although he claimed to have felt pressured by [the Mother], AL accepted ultimate responsibility for his actions. He impressed me as genuinely remorseful, and his thoughts remained focused on victim impact issues throughout this entire interview.” (page 5) [ 9 ] In Dr. Nesca’s opinion, little if anything pointed to sexual deviance as the motivation for the offence in question.
Instead, he stated, “The index offence emerges as the product of compromising medical illness which undermined AL’s capacity for carefully reasoned behavior. Recall that depression has a profoundly compromising effect on judgment and decision-making. In my view, the index offence is the direct result of this compromised judgment, acting in concert with a significant substance abuse problem and the separation insecurity captured by objective testing.” III.
Principles of sentencing [ 10 ] The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect of the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the objectives set out in ss 718(
a) to (
f) of the Criminal Code : (
a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct; (
b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; (
c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary; (
d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; (
e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and (
f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community. [ 11 ] The fundamental principle of sentencing as stated in
section 718.1 is that the sentence imposed “must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.” [ 12 ] That a fit sentence must be proportional has been reiterated time and again by the Supreme Court of Canada and in countless other judgments of courts in Canada. A recent example is R v Parranto , 2021 SCC 46 , at paragraph 12 , in which the court reiterated that sentencing is a discretionary endeavor and an inherently individualized process: As to the relationship of individualization to proportionality and parity, this Court in Lacasse aptly observed:
Proportionality is determined both on an individual basis, that is, in relation to the accused him or herself and to the offence committedby the accused, and by comparison with sentences imposed for similar offences committed in similar circumstances. [para. 53] Individualization is central to the proportionality assessment. Whereas the gravity of a particular offence may be relatively constant, eachoffence is “committed in unique circumstances by an offender with a unique profile” (para. 58). This is why proportionality sometimesdemands a sentence that has never been imposed in the past for a similar offence.
The question is always whether the sentence reflectsthe gravity of the offence, the offender’s degree of responsibility and the unique circumstances of each case (para. 58). [13]
Section 718.2 of the Criminal Code sets out several additional principles that shall be considered by a sentencing judge whencrafting a fit sentence. Relevant in particular to this sentencing include that: (
a) a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offenceor the offender, including the statutory aggravating factors of the complainant being under the age of 18, and of being in a position oftrust or authority in relation to the complainant (
b) a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances; (
d) an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and (
e) All available sanctions, other than imprisonment, which are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done tovictims or to the community should be considered for all offenders… [14] In the context of sex-related crimes against children, no one disagrees that R v Friesen, 2020 SCC 9 is the most importantauthority interpreting ss 718, 718.1 and 718.2 of the Criminal Code. Numerous Alberta trial courts have helpfully summarized thelengthy and detailed reasons in the Friesen case, for example R v DCH, 2020 ABQB 510, at paras 67-74.
A more recent example is R vCollins, 2023 ABKB 134 at paras 32-39: [32] In R v Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, the Supreme Court of Canada comprehensively restated the correct approach to sentencing such cases,instructing Courts to impose sanctions that “fully reflect and give effect to the profound wrongfulness and harmfulness of sexual offencesagainst children”. [33] At the heart of the Friesen decision lies a definitive judicial recognition that the harms of sexual offences against children areuniquely serious, long-lasting, and pervasive: Friesen at para 74; R v D(D), (ON CA) at para 72.
Experiencingsexual violence in childhood can and often does have “life altering consequences”: R v Woodward, 2011 ONCA 610 at para 76.
Suchviolence “can interfere with children’s self-fulfillment and healthy and autonomous development to adulthood precisely because childrenare still developing and learning the skills and qualities to overcome adversity”: Friesen at para 58. [34] Sexual violence against children is also known to damage relationships within families even where the perpetrator lies outside thecircle of trust, and this harm can spread to the child’s other social relationships at school and in the community more broadly: Friesen atparas 60-61.
Even more tragically, it is well-established that “children who are victims of sexual violence may be more likely to engagein sexual violence against children themselves when they reach adulthood.
Sexual violence against children can thus fuel a cycle ofsexual violence”: Friesen at para 64. [35] The dated and retrograde conception of sexual contact with children being a form of poorly chosen sexual activity has beendefinitively replaced with an understanding that touching children sexually is a form of violence, aggravated by the dimension ofinterference in the victim’s sexual integrity during vulnerable and developmentally critical phases of life: Friesen, at para 77. Suchcrimes are seriously harmful per se, even in the absence of additional physical violence or cruelty: Friesen at para 82.
Even whereevidence of case-specific harm to the victim is absent, courts can and should presume considerable potential harm in the future as aforeseeable consequence: Friesen at paras 84-86. [36] For these reasons, the objectives of denunciation, general and specific deterrence, and the need to separate offenders from societymust take precedence in such cases, save for exceptional circumstances: DD at para 72; Woodward at para 76.
This principle conformswith Parliament’s enactment of s. 718.01 of the Criminal Code, which elevates these sentencing objectives to a primary position incrimes involving the abuse of people under the age of 18. [37] Finally, Friesen expressly invited upward departures from prior precedents in the sentencing of sexual offensives against childrenwhere this is necessary to give effect to the governing principles articulated in that case. [38] By way of specific guidance, the Supreme Court offered five non-exhaustive factors which sentencing courts should consider inassessing a proportionate penalty. These include: (
i) the likelihood of re-offence; (ii) abuses of trust or positions of authority; (iii) theduration and frequency of the assaults involved; (iv) the age of the victim; and (
v) the degree of physical interference with the child:Friesen at para 121-147. [39] Notwithstanding the recent jurisprudential focus on the nature and severity of sexual violence against children, sentencing for theseoffences must continue to follow the prime directive of proportionality and engage a specific factual consideration of every individualoffender and their unique circumstances: Criminal Code ss. 718.1, 718.2(a); Friesen at para 30; R v Safarzadeh-MarkhALi, 2016 SCC 14at para 70; R v Parranto, 2021 SCC 46 at paras 10-12. [15] In addition to this review of Friesen and related cases, I have taken into account the following additional authorities. [16] With regard to the impact of s 718.01 of the Criminal Code, in R v Germain, 2022 ABCA 257 at paras 70-71 the court notedthe sentencing judge’s limited discretion to elevate other sentencing objectives over the primary objectives of denunciation anddeterrence.
Nevertheless, the court went on to state:
[71] However, even when Parliament has prioritized some sentencing objectives – as with s 718.01 for offences involving the abuse ofchildren – the sentencing judge still has discretion to accord “significant weight” to other objectives, such as rehabilitation: Friesen atpara 104.
Even then, sentencing judges are not required to maximize the denunciatory and deterrent effect of sentences, provided thatadequate weight is given to those objectives and the sentence is otherwise proportionate. [17] With regard generally to the important factors of denunciation and deterrence, the court in R v Bissonnette, 2022 SCC 23stated that deterrence, while important was also in a sense uncertain, and that again generally speaking a proportionate sentence would beone that kept in sight of the principle of rehabilitation in the individual circumstances of the case: [47] …When this objective [of deterrence] is being pursued, the offender is punished more harshly in order to send a message to thepublic or, in other words, to serve as an example.
General deterrence is an objective that must be weighed by a court, but theeffectiveness of which has often been questioned.
These legitimate reservations notwithstanding, the fact remains that the certainty ofpunishment, together with the entire range of criminal sanctions, does produce a certain deterrent effect, Albeit one that is difficult toevaluate, on possible offenders (Ruby, at §1.31; Canadian Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Reform: A Canadian Approach (1987), atpp. 136-38). [48] Lastly, the objective of rehabilitation is designed to reform offenders with a view to their reintegration into society so that they canbecome law-abiding citizens.
This penological objective presupposes that offenders are capable of gaining control over their lives andimproving themselves, which ultimately leads to a better protection of society. M. Manning and P. Sankoff note that rehabilitation “isprobably the most economical in the long run and the most humanitarian objective of punishment” (Manning, Mewett & Sankoff:Criminal Law (5th ed. 2015), at ¶1.155). Along the same lines, I would reiterate my comment in R. v.
Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3S.C.R. 1089, that “[r]ehabilitation is one of the fundamental moral values that distinguish Canadian society from the societies of manyother nations in the world” (para. 4). [49] The relative importance of each of the sentencing objectives [of denunciation, deterrence and rehabilitation] varies with the natureof the crime and the characteristics of the offender (R. v. Lyons, (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, at p. 329). There is nomathematical formula for determining what constitutes a just and appropriate sentence.
That is why this Court has described sentencingas a “delicate art which attempts to balance carefully the societal goals of sentencing against the moral blameworthiness of the offenderand the circumstances of the offence, while at all times taking into account the needs and current conditions of and in the community”(M. (C.A.), at para. 91). [50] But sentencing must in all circumstances be guided by the cardinal principle of proportionality.
The sentence must be severe enoughto denounce the offence but must not exceed “what is just and appropriate, given the moral blameworthiness of the offender and thegravity of the offence” (R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, at para. 42; see also R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, [2012] 1S.C.R. 433, at para. 37). Proportionality in sentencing is considered to be an essential factor in maintaining public confidence in thefairness and rationality of the criminal justice system. The application of this principle assures the public that the offender deserves thepunishment received (Re B.C.
Motor Vehicle Act, (SCC), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at p. 533, per Wilson J., concurring). [51] It follows that “a person cannot be made to suffer a grossly disproportionate punishment simply to send a message to discourageothers from offending” (Nur, at para. 45). In a similar vein, Vauclair J.A. aptly stated that [translation] “striving for exemplarity to thedetriment of evidence of the merit of rehabilitation objectives is incompatible with the principle of individualization” (Lacelle Belec v. R.,2019 QCCA 711, at para. 30 , citing R. v. Paré, 2011 QCCA 2047, at para. 48 , per Doyon J.A.).
Proportionality has arestraining function, and in this sense serves to guarantee that a sentence is individualized, just and appropriate. [emphasis added] [18] To a similar effect with regard to the uncertain effect of incarceration on deterrence: R v Proulx, 2000 SCC 5 at para 107. [19] Finally, with regard to what sentence may give effect to deterrence, the court in R v TJH, 2022 YKSC 45 at para 57 hasrecently reiterated long-standing authority that: “…deterrence and denunciation can take many forms, including community sentences.
As well, the Supreme Court of Canada in Proulxnoted a conditional sentence can achieve both punitive and restorative objectives. At para. 41, the Court wrote: … A conditional sentence may be as onerous as, or perhaps even more onerous than, a jail term, particularly in circumstances where theoffender is forced to take responsibility for his or her actions and make reparations to both the victim and the community, all the whileliving in the community under tight controls. [20] To a similar effect, R v LFW, 2000 SCC 6 , [2000] 1 SCR 132 at para 21. IV.
A fit and proportionate sentence in this case [21] With the sentencing record and principles of sentencing now in mind, it remains to consider what sentence is fit andproportionate in AL’s case. [22] The Crown seeks a period of incarceration of 18 months, following by a period of probation, together with certain ancillaryorders which will be addressed toward the end of these reasons. [23] The offender AL seeks a conditional sentence of 18 months, together with a period of probation, and again with certainancillary orders. [24] Friesen requires the court to have regard to the following in its understanding of the gravity of the offence (at paras 74-86):
a) the inherent wrongfulness of the offence
b) the potential harm suffered and
c) the actual harm suffered. [ 25 ] No one doubts the inherent wrongfulness of the offence. Nor is there any question of the potential harm suffered by both MH and LH. As noted in Friesen , at paras 82-84: [82] We would emphasize that courts should reject the belief that there is no serious harm to children in the absence of additional physical violence ( Benedet, at p. 299). As we have explained, any manner of physical sexual contact between an adult and a child is inherently violent and has the potential to cause harm.
Even in child luring cases where all interactions occur online, the offender’s conduct can constitute a form of psychological sexual violence that has the potential to cause serious harm (see Rafiq , at paras. 44-45; Rayo, at paras. 172-74 ; L.M. , at para. 26). [83] In many cases, it will be impossible to determine whether these forms of harm have occurred at the time of sentencing. If the victim is an adult at the time of sentencing, the court may be able to conclude that these forms of potential long-term harm have materialized into actual harm.
However, as Moldaver J.A. (as he then was) recognized in D. (D.) , if the victim remains a child at the time of sentencing, “[t]ime alone will tell” whether that child will experience particular forms of harm as an adult (para. 38). It may also be impossible to determine the nature and extent of the harm that the victim will experience during childhood, since particular forms of harm may materialize following the date of sentencing. [84] As a result, courts must consider the reasonably foreseeable potential harm that flows from sexual violence against children when determining the gravity of the offence.
Even if an offender commits a crime that fortunately results in no actual harm, courts must consider the potential for reasonably foreseeable harm when imposing sentence ( A. Manson, The Law of Sentencing (2001), at p. 90). When they analyze the gravity of the offence, sentencing judges thus must always take into account forms of potential harm that have yet to materialize at the time of sentencing but that are a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the offence and may in fact materialize later in childhood or in adulthood.
To do otherwise would falsely imply that a child simply outgrows the harm of sexual violence (see Wright , at p. 88). [ 26 ] The actual harm suffered in this case is somewhat more elusive in that the only Victim Impact Statement is from LH who is again not a named complainant in the offence to which AL was found guilty. Little other evidence of actual harm was before the court.
There was nothing for example in the sentencing record with regard to evidence of either MH or LH seeking or attending therapy, being prescribed or taking medication, exhibiting fear generally of men/relationships, being thwarted in their scholastic ambitions, or any of the other consequences commonly before sentencing courts following findings of childhood sexual misconduct. [ 27 ] This said, I have noted and take into account the admonition again in Friesen , at para 86, that: [86] Where direct evidence of the actual harm to the child is unavailable, courts should use the harm to the child as a lens through which to analyze the significance of many particular aggravating factors.
Courts may be able to find actual harm based on the numerous factual circumstances that can cause additional harm and constitute aggravating factors for sexual violence against children, such as a breach of trust or grooming, multiple instances of sexual violence, and the young age of the child. We stress that direct evidence from children or their caregivers is not required for the court to find that children have suffered actual harm as a result of sexual violence.
Of course, we do not suggest that harm to the child is the exclusive lens through which to view aggravating factors. [ 28 ] I have taken into account LH’s Victim Impact Statement which describes a degree of fear coming out her brief encounter in the bathroom as set out in the agreed statement of facts. LH’s statement is marked also by the expression of a great deal of anger and condemnation toward AL. To the extent is fails significantly to address harm, I do not doubt and indeed endorse those authorities which again confirm that harm may be presumed when there is sexual misconduct against children.
This concept and these authorities apply of course also to the named complainant and victim MH – that harm to her may be presumed on account of the two instances of sexual touching set out in the Agreed Statement of Facts. [ 29 ] Friesen also requires the court to have regard for the following as significant factors in determining a fit and proportionate sentence (at paras 121-154)
a) The likelihood to re-offend [ 30 ] There is little evidence before me that AL will re-offend and commit a sexual offence against a person under 18. Indeed, Dr Nesca’s report and opinion suggests otherwise; no doubt was expressed in submissions before me regarding the weight to be given Dr. Nesca’s report.
b) Abuse of a position of trust or authority [ 31 ] Friesen states that trust relationships are not all the same. It speaks of a "spectrum of positions of trust". A breach of trust "is likely to increase the harm to the victim and thus the gravity of the offence" ( Friesen para 126). More harm will be suffered where there is a closer relationship as with family members. [ 32 ] The nature of the trust relationship here is of the Mother being engaged in a romantic relationship with AL. During the relationship, for a relatively short period of time, AL was living with the Mother and the girls in their household.
Little other evidence otherwise characterizes the trust relationship. This is not to diminish but rather to contextualize the harm done to the complainant. Still, on the spectrum of abuse of trust, AL’s misconduct would not rank at the high end.
c) Duration and frequency [ 33 ] There was touching only of MH. The duration of it was only moments, and was on MH’s hip as distinct, for example, on her breasts, buttocks or vagina as is the case in many of the comparator cases. Here, the sexual touching occurred on two separate occasions.
This clearly increases AL’s moral blameworthiness in that it is evidence of a certain level of planning and a lack of spontaneity. Indeed, while the agreed evidence is that AL was very reluctant to approach MH even on the first of the two occasions, the fact is that he very consciously overcame that reluctance and engaged in the misconduct, and not once but twice. [ 34 ] There was no touching of the victim LH. On one occasion and for a brief moment AL victimized her in the bathroom, again as set out in the Agreed Statement of Facts.
d) Age of victim [ 35 ] MH was just 13 when these incidents occurred, and LH was 11.
e) Degree of Physical interference [ 36 ] This is as set out in the Agreed Statement of Facts. AL laid down next to MH and placed his hand on her hip on two occasions. While this may not seem to be a high degree of physical interference, I have taken into account that AL’s actions are compounded by the elements of breach of trust, and the multiple occasions of the sexual misconduct.
f) Victim participation [ 37 ] There is nothing in the facts that suggest any victim participation in this case. A. Aggravating and mitigating factors [ 38 ]
Section 718.2 (
a) of the Criminal Code requires that a sentencing judge considers all aggravating and mitigating factors of a case when arriving at a fit and proportionate sentence. [ 39 ] The Crown relies on the following aggravating factors which I agree exist in AL’s case: 1. That the complainant MH and her sister LH were both well under the age of 16 and that they were, in a manner of speaking, family members in that AL was living in the same household and was in a relationship with the Mother; in this sense AL had a unique opportunity to prey on MH and LH in circumstances where they were entitled to feel safe; 2.
That regarding MH, the offence occurred not once but twice; [ 40 ] The Crown acknowledges the following mitigating factors, which I also agree exist in AL’s case: 1. That AL entered a guilty plea – no one disagrees that AL’s guilty plea to one count on the 12-count indictment should be treated as a timely plea worthy of significant mitigating credit; the guilty plea came after AL’s cooperation with police including his confession as noted in the Agreed Statement of Facts; it also saved witnesses from having to testify, and saved court time; 2.
That there is genuine remorse on AL’s part, as evidenced by his guilty plea, Dr. Nesca’s observations, and AL’s own statement to the court; As stated in R v Rabbit , 2023 ABCA 170 at para 50 , remorse is a relevant mitigating factor, and can be of particular significance where it reflects insight and a reduced likelihood of offending in the future. 3. AL’s own personal circumstances, including again Dr.
Nesca’s observations regarding his relationship with the Mother, and mental health considerations; An offender who has a significant mental illness may be considered to have less moral blameworthiness than someone operating with an unimpaired view of the world: R v Shevchenko , 2018 ABCA 31 at para 28 . 4. AL’s steps taken to date to address his mental health and addictions issues, all speaking to his prospects for rehabilitation; 5. AL’s own history for sexual abuse and victimization; 6. AL’s ample support in the community as evidenced by multiple and fully informed references. B.
Parity analysis [ 41 ] The principle of parity in s. 718.2(
b) mandates that a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances. Friesen at paras 32-33 states that “parity and proportionality do not exist in tension; rather, parity is an expression of proportionality… In practice, parity gives meaning to proportionality.” [ 42 ] As also noted by Kraus J in R v EF , 2021 ABQB 639 , at para 84 : [84] The principle of parity is not absolute and cannot divert attention from the governing principles, such as the nature and seriousness of the offence and the individual characteristics of the offender.
Each sentence must be individualized and must be decided based on its own facts after taking into account all relevant sentencing principles. This does not mean that the sentence in this case must be identical to another case, but the Court must bear in mind the principle of parity and have regard to the cases which have a longer sentence and cases which have a shorter sentence. [ 43 ] In the recent decision in Collins , Devlin J reviewed decisions coming before and after Friesen under s 151 of the Criminal
Code that include oral or penile intercourse, then concluded the court should begin its analysis in that case in the range of three years prior to applying factually specific considerations, in particular those regarding the offender himself. [ 44 ] That being said, in the circumstances of the sentencing now before the court no one suggests that the analysis should begin at three years. Again, the range in the submissions of counsel is between 18 months’ incarceration and 18 months to be served in the community. [ 45 ] In addition to cases already mentioned, the Crown referred to the following authorities: 1.
R v MM , 2022 ONCA 441 at para 16 for the proposition that conditional sentences for sexual offences against children will only rarely be appropriate and will be limited to exceptional circumstances. To a similar effect, R v BM , 2023 ONCA 224 at para 2 : on its facts, BM was a case in which the reviewing found the sentencing judge “completely ignored” denunciation and deterrence in favour of rehabilitation in circumstances extraordinarily more grave than those AL faces in this sentencing; 2.
R v Lafrance , 2022 ABCA 351 , is on its face a challenging case in that the sentencing judge imposed 2-years’ incarceration for the offence of invitation to sexual touching on facts that the offender whispered in the victim’s ear that she “had only been with little boys and that if it was up to him, it would take him hours to get his mouth off” of her vagina.
The sentence was held to be “on the higher end” but was affirmed as the outcome of an individualized sentencing process: in Lafrance the offender was convicted after trial and showed no remorse or rehabilitation – indeed no mitigating factors were found; the two year consecutive term was part of a 6.5 year overall sentence for four sex-related convictions against children. There was no application for a conditional sentence; 3.
R v EF , 2021 ABQB 639 was a case in which a two-year sentence was imposed after a trial finding of guilt of a s 151 offence and on facts that the offender lifted the victim’s shirt, touched her breasts and squeezed her nipples. This occurred while the offender held the victim’s hands and arms pinned above her head. The touching lasted about a full minute. It was not, as the sentencing judge found, “a simple grope”.
The sentencing judge also found few mitigating factors; he found the psychological report and references before the court were entitled to limited weight; he found nothing in the offender’s conduct or background that tended to decrease his personal responsibility for the offence. The sentencing judge noted the concern expressed in R v RBL , 2005 ABPC 63 at para 42 , that: [42] Sexual abuse of young children causes a visceral reaction of revulsion towards the offender in caring people and a caring society. Because of that passionate and understandable human reaction, sentencing is particularly challenging.
It is important to temper the impassioned reaction, to recognize the humanity of the offender, to sentence in a way that expresses society’s outrage without crushing all hope and without tipping the balance so far as to become vengeful. Equally, however, the sentencing judge also noted that even before Friesen the Supreme Court of Canada had recognized that even mild non-consensual touching of a sexual nature can have profound implications for the complainant: R v JA , 2011 SCC 28 at para 63 .
Keeping in mind like authorities coming both before and after Friesen , the sentencing judge in EF concluded, at para 111 , that: [111] Direct evidence of harm is not a prerequisite to establishing a serious sexual offence.
Instead, what is required is a finding of contemptuous disregard for the feelings and personal integrity of the victim, sexual activity of a sort or intensity such that a reasonable person would know beforehand that the victim likely would suffer lasting emotional or psychological injury, and that the victim has suffered notable psychological or emotional harm which may be inferred from the very nature of the assault: Sayers. In EF , there was no application for a conditional sentence. 4.
R v Lloyd , (Ontario Court of Justice per Wheeler J, unreported reasons dated September 16, 2020, wherein after trial for sexual assault the offender was sentenced to 15 months incarceration. There was no application for a conditional sentence. The facts were of the 47-year-old offender touching the then-10-year-old victim over her clothes in the area of her vagina. [ 46 ] The defence referred to the following additional authorities. 5. R v WMW 2023 ABPC 14 , a s 151 case in which a 49-year-old woman pleaded guilty to sexually touching her daughter, aged 13, but who functioned at the age of an eight-year-old.
The touching was of three or four instances of the victim’s breasts and clitoris. On one occasion the offender inserted a vibrator in the victim’s vagina. Alongside obvious aggravating factors, the offender expressed remorse, and had reduced moral culpability owing to Gladue factors and mental health concerns. A conditional sentence was ordered for a period of two years less a day. Worth noting, a case considered persuasive to the sentencing judge’s thinking in WMW has since been reversed on appeal: R v PRJ , 2023 BCCA 169 , reversing R v PRJ , 2021 BCSC 2537 .
In PRJ , the sentencing judge had imposed a 23-month CSO on the accused after trial. The sentencing proceeded on a count of s 151 sexual touching. The facts were that PRJ, the victim’s 44-year-old parent, digital penetrated the vagina of the victim, her daughter, who was then eight years old. P also disclosed that PRJ had kissed her vagina. PRJ was also found to have directed P to touch PRJ’s own vagina. The CSO was reversed on appeal. 6. R v DM , 2021 BCSC 379 , a case in which a 90-day intermittent sentence was imposed following the offender’s conviction at trial for the offence of sexual interference. 7.
R v DAD , 2022 YKSC 62 , a case of sexual interference of the 28-year-old accused’s 15-year-old cousin. DAD’s sexual misconduct was placing his hand on the victim’s virginal area over her shorts and moved it over her crotch. A conditional sentence was ordered by the sentencing judge but was overturned in favour of a 90-day intermittent sentence. It was held the trial judge erred – when concluding the misconduct was at “the lower end of the scale” – by not considering the evidence of significant and profound ongoing negative impact to the victim as part of the gravity of the offence.
The sentencing judge was also faulted for failing to give effect to the principle articulated in R v GK 2022 YKSC 61 that sexual offences involving children should generally not result in conditional sentences.
The Court recognized that DAD was indigenous and that Gladue factors were to be considered, but alongside the gravity of the offence and other circumstances of the offender, the court noted that DAD “was somewhat ambivalent about his responsibility for the offence” and concluded a CSO was not appropriate in the circumstances. 8. R v JLM , 2016 ABPC 285 , a pre- Friesen case but one involving an extensive review of authorities and principles of sentencing including those relating to conditional sentence orders.
The Court declined to order a conditional sentence, favouring instead a six-month period of incarceration, on facts that the victim’s stepfather kissed her neck and chest and touched her breasts both over and under her clothes and underclothes. This occurred some 15 times over about a two-month period. On two further occasions the offender attempted to move his hand down the victim’s pants. 9. R v TS , 2022 ABPC 167 , affirmed in R v TS , 2023 ABKB 157 , a s 271 case in which the sentencing judge agreed with a Crown submission in favour of a conditional sentence as an appropriate sanction.
An appeal was taken by the offender on the basis that the CSO ordered was unduly harsh. The 19-year-old offender pleaded guilty to sexually assaulting his 16-year-old stepsister. The facts were of events that occurred in the victim’s home and after she was plied with alcohol to the point of almost passing out. The non-consensual sexual contact began with repeatedly touching the victim’s leg, kissing her neck, groping her buttocks, touching her breast under her shirt, and pulling her on top of him. The sexual touching stopped when AO physically pushed the Appellant off her.
The offender had no record, was youthful, expressed remorse, and had taken steps toward rehabilitation. In dismissing the appeal, Hayes-Richards J considered numerous sentencing cases in which CSOs were ordered (at paras 49-54), then concluded, at para 55, that an 18-month CSO was within the range of sentences available for the offence committed by the offender in the circumstances. [ 47 ] Additional cases that have come to the court’s attention include the following: 10.
R v SS , 2023 NUCJ 15 , a case in which the offender, while intoxicated, approached 13-year-old and 14-year-old girls in their home and asked the girls to have sex with him, and offered them alcohol and cigarettes, but they refused multiple times. He offered the girls $35 each to remove their pants, which was captured on cellphone video. This request was also refused. No further criminal misconduct occurred. The offender pleaded guilty, had no criminal record, presented with a positive pre-sentence report which included some Gladue factors. A four-month CSO was ordered. 11.
R v TJH , 2023 YKCA 2 , in which the Court of Appeal refused leave to hear an appeal from a
summary conviction appeal judgment itself reported as R v TJH , 2022 YKSC 45 . The
summary conviction appeal judge reversed the sentencing judge who declined to order a conditional sentence. The facts were of an offender who groped a 10-year-old victim under her clothes and underwear, touching her chest, legs, vaginal areas and buttocks. Some months later the offender victimized a 7-year-old by pulling down her pants and underwear and rubbed his clothed body against her buttocks and vaginal area while he masturbated inside his pants. The offender was intoxicated on both occasions. Sentences of eight- and 10-months incarceration were substituted for an 18-month conditional sentence.
Critical in the appeal was the sentencing judge’s failure to account for Gladue factors and other mitigating factors. C.
A fit and proportionate carceral sentence [ 48 ] To this point in the proceedings, I have considered the principles of sentencing, the circumstances of the offence and of the offender, including aggravating and mitigating factors, and I have considered previously-decided cases mindful that to the extent possible AL’s sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances. [ 49 ] With regard to the gravity of the offence, I find that AL’s criminal misconduct – while still serious – is clearly the least grave as compared to the parity cases reviewed above. [ 50 ] With regard to the moral blameworthiness of AL himself (and leaving aside those cases involving Gladue factors) I find that for reasons already stated on the whole AL’s moral blameworthiness is again on the lower end when compared to the balance of the parity cases. [ 51 ] With these considerations in mind, and but for my final conclusion in favour of a conditional sentence, I would have concluded that a fit and proportionate sentence in AL’s case would be within a range of 9-12 months’ incarceration, together with a period of probation of 12 months.
V. Conditional Sentence Order [ 52 ]
Section 742.1 of the Criminal Code lists four criteria that a court must consider before deciding to impose a conditional sentence: (1) the offender must be convicted of an offence that is not punishable by a minimum term of imprisonment; (2) the court must impose a term of imprisonment of less than two years; (3) the safety of the community would not be endangered by the offender serving the sentence in the community; and (4) a conditional sentence would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in ss. 718 to 718.2 . [ 53 ] No one disagrees that in AL’s case the first two criteria are met: (1) there is no longer a minimum period of imprisonment ( R v Ford , 2019 ABCA 87 ), and
(2) I have found that a fit and proportionate carceral sentence would be between 9-12 months. [ 54 ] With regard to (3) the safety of the community, the focus of the analysis is on the risk posed by the individual offender while serving his sentence in the community: R v Proulx , 2000 SCC 5 , at para 68 . The analysis must account for the risk of the offender re- offending, and for the gravity of the damage that could ensue in the event of re-offence.
[ 55 ] As to the risk of AL re-offending, it is relevant to consider that he has previously complied with court orders and has no criminal history. There is no reason to conclude he would not abide by a conditional sentence order. Further, for the reasons stated by Dr.
Nesca, AL poses little risk of recidivism. [ 56 ] As to the gravity of the potential damage in case of re-offence, in my view on the record before me this prerequisite does not stand in the way of further consideration of a conditional sentence. [ 57 ] I find on the sentencing record before me that AL serving his sentence in the community would not endanger the safety of the public. [ 58 ] With these prerequisite criteria dealt with, it remains to consider (4) whether a conditional sentence would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in ss. 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code . [ 59 ] Before turning to this stage of the analysis, I will first discuss briefly what is sometimes referred to in the authorities as the need for “exceptional circumstances” in cases involving child sexual misconduct as a further prerequisite for a conditional sentence order.
A. Exceptional circumstances [ 60 ] As noted, the Ontario cases of R v MM at para 16, and R v BM at para 2, stand for the proposition that conditional sentences for sexual offences against children will only very rarely be appropriate and will be limited to exceptional circumstances. The court in MM gave as an example where a sentence of incarceration would give rise to a medical hardship that could not adequately be addressed within the correctional facility.
That said, the court also declined to attempt any further enumeration of what else could be an exceptional circumstance. [ 61 ] In the case of R v BS , 2023 ONCA 6 the court relies on both MM , and on Friesen at paras 114-116 in support of the conclusion again that conditional sentences will only rarely be appropriate and must be limited to exceptional circumstances that render incarceration inappropriate. [ 62 ] However, paras 114-116 of Friesen might be read to support the general proposition of an “exceptional circumstances” test, it must be said that neither of those paragraphs – nor indeed any other paragraphs in the case – actually contain any such specific admonition.
What paragraph 114 of Friesen does say is this: [114] D. (D.) , Woodward, S. (J.), and this Court’s own decisions in M. (C.A.) and L.M. make clear that imposing proportionate sentences that respond to the gravity of sexual offences against children and the degree of responsibility of offenders will frequently require substantial sentences. Parliament’s statutory amendments have strengthened that message. It is not the role of this Court to establish a range or to outline in which circumstances such substantial sentences should be imposed.
Nor would it be appropriate for any court to set out binding or inflexible quantitative guidance — as Moldaver J.A. wrote in D. (D.) , “judges must retain the flexibility needed to do justice in individual cases” and to individualize the sentence to the offender who is before them (at para. 33). Nonetheless, it is incumbent on us to provide an overall message that is clear ( D. (D.) , at paras. 34 and 45 ).
That message is that mid-single digit penitentiary terms for sexual offences against children are normal and that upper-single digit and double-digit penitentiary terms should be neither unusual nor reserved for rare or exceptional circumstances. We would add that substantial sentences can be imposed where there was only a single instance of sexual violence and/or a single victim, as in this case, Woodward , and L.M . In addition, as this Court recognized in L.M. , maximum sentences should not be reserved for the “abstract case of the worst crime committed in the worst circumstances” (para. 22).
Instead, a maximum sentence should be imposed whenever the circumstances warrant it (para. 20). [ 63 ] In another case of R v Friesen , 2022 ABCA 147 , a possession of child pornography case, the court discusses that courts have imposed conditional sentences, or intermittent sentences, where they have found exceptional circumstances. [ 64 ] The court did not however state a test that exceptional circumstances will invariably be required to justify a conditional sentence for the crime of possession of child pornography.
It did find that the case on appeal before it was one such example of circumstances that were “exceptional enough” (at para 24): [24] Lastly, the sentencing judge considered the principles applicable to imposing a conditional sentence order and why one was appropriate in this case.
He concluded that a 24-month conditional sentence order with restrictive conditions (12 months house arrest followed by a curfew, and community service) was appropriate because it would not endanger the safety of the community, would serve the primary objectives of denunciation and deterrence, would fairly reflect that the respondent had suffered significant informal sanctions in the community through the loss of his career and would serve the secondary objective of restraint for a youthful first time offender.
In short, this case was exceptional enough that a custodial sentence was not required. [ 65 ] The court reviewed further the sentencing judge’s consideration of exceptional enough circumstances, for example at paras 53-59: [53] The sentencing judge found that the range of sentences for possession of child pornography, where there is a guilty plea and no criminal record to be between six and 18-months’ incarceration. Neither party questioned that range on appeal.
The sentencing judge departed from that range, imposing a 24-month less a day conditional sentence order, implicitly finding the respondent’s circumstances to be exceptional. In particular, he pointed to the early guilty plea, the respondent’s active pursuit of treatment (and completion of it), his insight into the harms of child pornography and the fact that he suffered public humiliation due to press coverage of his crime resulting in the loss of his music career.
The sentencing judge also found that the collateral consequences of the respondent’s crime, in combination with the conditional sentence order, would sufficiently promote the aims of denunciation and deterrence. [54] On appeal, the Crown argues that it was an error to find that the respondent’s circumstances were exceptional, warranting a non- custodial sentence. According to the Crown, the mitigating factors (set out at para 23 above) are not exceptional, whether considered
individually or together. [55] In our view, this argument fails. [56] It is clear that, for the sentencing judge, what separated the respondent’s circumstances from other perpetrators of the same offence were: (1) the extent of the collateral consequences suffered by the respondent were greater than those normally suffered by offenders convicted of possessing child pornography; and (2) that he had deep insight into the wrongfulness of child pornography, he was remorseful, had taken considerable steps to treat his predilection for child pornography and was completely rehabilitated. [57] We have already addressed the issue of collateral consequences.
It was open to the trial judge to find that the impact on the respondent for the loss of his music career was exceptional. [58] Complete or near complete rehabilitation at the time of sentencing is unusual. Meaningful rehabilitation is an arduous process that takes sustained effort. It is not common to see it before the courts: R v Black, 2014 ABCA 214 at para 26 .
It was not unreasonable to categorize the respondent’s rehabilitation as exceptional, nor to give it some weight as a consideration against imposing a custodial sentence. [59] Ultimately, the Crown’s argument about demonstrable unfitness comes down to whether the sentence imposed is clearly disproportionate and fails to provide adequate denunciation and deterrence. This case has unusual features which explain its departure from the range identified by the sentencing judge. conditional sentence orders are punitive.
In this case, the duration of the conditional sentence order (24 months less a day) was significantly longer than the jail term sought by the Crown (13 months) and the Crown acknowledges that the conditions imposed were very restrictive (12 months’ house arrest followed by a curfew, and community service). This was followed by a further 24-months’ probation.
When the conditional sentence order is coupled with the ruin and humiliation that the respondent brought down on himself by his crime, it provides sufficient denunciation and general deterrence. [ 66 ] In R v Hagen , 2021 BCCA 208 the court stated, again in the context of the offence of possession of child pornography, that “a non-carceral sentence for an offence under s. 163.1(4) tends to be the exception , rather than the rule” (at para 41, emphasis added). [ 67 ] And in R v TJH , 2023 YKCA 2 , a justice of the Court of Appeal hearing a leave application had before her an argument, relying on R v GK , 2022 YKSC 61 , that conditional sentences “are not appropriate in sexual offences involving children, other than in exceptional circumstances”.
In TJH , the court did not endorse any such test in those terms and denied leave to appeal from the
summary conviction appeal judge who said nothing about an “exceptional circumstances” test: R v TJH , 2023 YKSC 45 . [ 68 ] In conclusion with regard to “exceptional circumstances”, it appears that most authorities consider whether exceptional circumstances exist yet stop short of creating a hard-and-fast rule that they must, as an invariable prerequisite to the availability of a conditional sentence. [ 69 ] To bring this discussion home to the sentencing of AL before me, for reasons to follow I find that the circumstances in AL’s case are ‘exceptional enough’: R v Friesen , 2022 ABCA 147 , at para 24 . B.
Is a conditional sentence consistent with ss 718 to 718.2? [ 70 ] I now turn to further consider whether a conditional sentence – including its duration and specific conditions, would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing. [ 71 ] Other than as noted in the s 742.1 prerequisites above, there is no presumption for or against a conditional sentence for the s 151 offence for which AL is being sentenced. That being said, in Proulx the court stated that: [90] …a consideration of ss. 718.2(
d) and 718.2(
e) leads me to the conclusion that serious consideration should be given to the imposition of a conditional sentence in all cases where the first three statutory prerequisites are satisfied. Sections 718.2(
d) and 718.2(
e) codify the important principle of restraint in sentencing and were specifically enacted, along with s. 742.1, to help reduce the rate of incarceration in Canada. Accordingly, it would be an error in principle not to consider the possibility of a conditional sentence seriously when the statutory prerequisites are met.
Failure to advert to the possibility of a conditional sentence in reasons for sentence where there are reasonable grounds for finding that the first three statutory prerequisites have been met may well constitute reversible error. [ 72 ] Underlying this comment is the recognition in Proulx that sentencing reforms in the Criminal Code were meant to reduce the use of incarceration as a sanction and to give greater prominence to the principles of restorative justice in sentencing – the objectives of rehabilitation, reparation to the victim and the community, and the promotion of a sense of responsibility in the offender: Proulx , para 98 . [ 73 ] Of course, other principles of sentencing strongly influence the consideration and may militate against a conditional sentence in cases of sexual misconduct toward children, not least of which is s 718.01, and the admonitions in Friesen and like authorities already noted. [ 74 ] But also already noted, a conditional sentence may be capable of achieving both punitive (denunciation and deterrence) and restorative (rehabilitation, reparation, the offender’s sense of responsibility) objectives.
As stated in Proulx at para 100 : [100] …To the extent that both punitive and restorative objectives can be achieved in a given case, a conditional sentence is likely a better sanction than incarceration. Where the need for punishment is particularly pressing, and there is little opportunity to achieve any restorative objectives, incarceration will likely be the more attractive sanction.
However, even where restorative objectives cannot be readily satisfied, a conditional sentence will be preferable to incarceration in cases where a conditional sentence can achieve the objectives of denunciation and deterrence as effectively as incarceration. This follows from the principle of restraint in s. 718.2 (
d) and (e), which militates in favour of alternatives to incarceration where appropriate in the circumstances.
[ 75 ] Conditions should have a punitive aspect: thus the common conditions of house arrest, curfew, reporting and close supervision. [ 76 ] Conditions should also have a restorative aspect: for example, when appropriate orders for mandatory treatment including psychological assessment, alcohol and/or drug rehabilitation; and community service tailored to address reparation and to promote a greater sense of responsibility. [ 77 ] With these observations in mind, I make the following findings: 1.
In the circumstances the conditional sentence to be imposed on AL is consistent with the principles of sentencing set out in the Criminal Code in that it is proportionate as to the gravity of the offence and the moral blameworthiness of the offender; 2. It is a conditional sentence with strict conditions that will achieve the still-primary objectives of denunciation and deterrence as emphasized by Parliament and in Friesen and like cases; 3.
Similarly it will serve the secondary but still critical objectives of rehabilitation, reparation, and the promotion of a sense of responsibility in the offender – it will do so by way of its length of 18 months (as compared to what would be a 9-12 month carceral sentence) and by way of punitive conditions, including strict house arrest for the first 12 months followed by a curfew for the remaining six months; and a requirement of 150 hours of community service within the first 15 months of the order. It will be followed by a period of 12 months probation. VI.
Conclusion and ancillary orders [ 78 ] For the reasons given, AL is sentenced to a period of 18 months to be served in the community pursuant to a conditional sentence order, followed by a period of 12 months’ probation. The further and other particulars of the conditional sentence order and probation are those spoken to in these proceedings on Thursday, June 15, 2023. [ 79 ] Ancillary orders are as follows: 1. AL will provide his DNA pursuant to s. 487.051(2) by the end of June, 2023; 2. AL is prohibited pursuant to s 109(2) of the Criminal Code ; 3. AL will pay aVictim Fine Surcharge of $200; 4.
No order is made pursuant to s 161(1) of the Criminal Code . While I am obliged to consider an order of prohibition, having done so I disagree with the Crown that an order is appropriate in the circumstances, which include the unique opportunity the offender had to engage in his criminal misconduct, and the opinion of Dr. Nesca pointing away from any significant concern for sexual deviancy, and thus recidivism. [ 80 ] The matter of a SOIRA exemption is reserved. Orally delivered on June 15, 2023 Dated at Edmonton, Alberta this 20 th day of June, 2023. Peter Michalyshyn J.C.K.B.A.
Appearances: Veronica Alexander for the Crown Laura Matalas Pringle Law for the Offender
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