McDermott (Re), 2023 ABKB 387
Opinion
Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: McDermott (Re), 2023 ABKB 387 Date: 20230626 Docket: B103 555781/ B103 555764 Registry: Edmonton In the Matter of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985 c B-3 And in the Matter of the Bankruptcy of Marcia Susan McDermott Between: B103 555781 Moses Advisory Group Inc. Applicant - and - The Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Respondent - and - In the Matter of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985 c B-3 And in the Matter of the Bankruptcy of Robert Allan John McDermott Between: B103 555764 Moses Advisory Group Inc. Applicant - and -
The Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Respondent _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice M. J. Lema _______________________________________________________ I. Introduction [ 1 ] Could these then-married insolvent persons have made “viable proposals” within the meaning of para 173(1)(
n) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act i.e. instead of both assigning into bankruptcy? [ 2 ] If so, would such proposals have collectively yielded greater recoveries for the creditors than those achieved in the bankruptcies? [ 3 ] In any case, did the trustee in bankruptcy’s failure to so indicate (“viable proposals could have been made”) when the bankrupts applied for discharge lead to reduced recoveries for the estates here? [ 4 ] In either case, should the trustee’s fees be reduced as a result? [ 5 ] The learned Registrar in Bankruptcy concluded that viable proposals could and should have been made, that such proposals would have yielded greater recoveries, and that the trustee’s failure to so indicate at the discharge applications required a reduction in its fees. [ 6 ] On appeal, I find that viable proposals were not possible here and accordingly that the reduction in the trustee’s fees, based on the Registrar’s finding otherwise, was not warranted.
II.
Background [ 7 ] Per OSB Directive No. 6R3 (“Assessment of an Individual Debtor”), the version in force in fall 2011, a licensed insolvency trustee (LIT) was required, when initially consulting with individual debtors, to assess their circumstances, included gauging whether a debtor “has the potential to file a viable proposal”, per s. 11 of the Directive. [ 8 ] Both debtors here initially owed more than $200,000 to creditors, placing a consumer proposal out of reach but leaving a Division I (or “ordinary”) proposal as a potential option. [ 9 ] Per s. 11 of the Directive, the LIT had to consider the following factors on the “viable proposal” aspect: a. [whether] the debtor i. has sufficient property available to make a "lump sum payment" proposal, or ii. has surplus income in accordance with Directive No. 11R2, Surplus Income , and also has the capacity at the time of assessment to sustain continued payments to a proposal for a period of time; b. the family or personal situation of the debtor; c. the financial situation of the debtor; d. the number and type of creditors of the debtor, both secured and unsecured; e. the likelihood of acceptance of a proposal by the creditors; and
f. whether the return to creditors from a potential proposal would be greater than the return from a bankruptcy. [ 10 ] The Assessment Directive imposed the following associated obligations on LITs: If the trustee determines the debtor has the potential to file a viable proposal, the trustee shall inform the debtor of the trustee's duty pursuant to paragraph 14 of this Directive. If the trustee determines the debtor has the potential to file a proposal, but it is unlikely that a proposal would be viable because of other circumstances, the trustee shall describe those circumstances in the
section 170 report. If the trustee determines the debtor has the potential to file a viable proposal, and the debtor chooses to file an assignment in bankruptcy rather than a proposal, the trustee shall comment in the
section 170 report that a viable proposal could have been filed. [paras 12-14] [ 11 ] The latter element links with para 173(1)(n), one of the “Facts for which discharge may be refused, suspended or granted conditionally”, namely: ... the bankrupt, if the bankrupt could have made a viable proposal, chose bankruptcy rather than a proposal to creditors as the means to resolve the indebtedness. [ 12 ] In this case, during their initial consultations, the LIT concluded that these debtors could not make viable proposals. [ 13 ] Accordingly, when the bankrupts later applied for discharge, the LIT did not comment in the (discharge-focused) s. 170 report that viable proposals could have been filed. [ 14 ] Despite the absence of that potential ground for objecting to the bankrupt’s discharge, the discharges of both bankrupts were objected to on a separate ground (that their assets were worth less than fifty cents on the dollar of their unsecured liabilities and such was not because of circumstances beyond their control).
As a result, absolute discharges were not available.
Instead, both bankrupts were discharged on conditions including the payment of certain arrears of surplus-income payments. [ 15 ] Eventually both bankrupts paid the required amounts and were absolutely discharged. [ 16 ] When the trustee later sought approval of its fees in both bankruptcies, the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy (OSB) argued that viable proposals could, and should, have been filed, that the estate recoveries under such proposals would have been greater than those achieved in the bankruptcies, and that the trustee’s fees should be reduced to compensate the estates for the resulting under- recoveries. [ 17 ] Registrar Schlosser accepted the OSB’s position and taxed down the trustee’s fees. [ 18 ] The trustee appeals that decision.
III. Analysis A. Standard of review [ 19 ] I accept the OSB’s standard-of-review submissions (brief, paras 11-15) i.e. this is a true appeal, the critical issue was the Registrar’s finding that proposals were viable here, that is a question of fact or of mixed fact and law, and the applicable standard is palpable and overriding error. B. What is meant by a “viable proposal”? [ 20 ] The BIA refers to the concept of a “viable proposal” in various contexts, in none of them defining it. [ 21 ] However, as noted, the Assessment Directive itself outlines the factors to considered.
The Directive has legal force, emanating from paras 5(4)(
b) and (
c) BIA : The Superintendent may (
b) issue, to official receivers, trustees, administrators of consumer proposals made under Division II of
Part III and persons who provide counselling pursuant to this Act, directives with respect to the administration of this Act ...; [and] (
c) issue such directives as may be necessary to give effect to any decision made by the Superintendent pursuant to this Act or to facilitate the carrying out of the purposes and provisions of this Act and the General Rules, including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing , directives relating to the powers, duties and functions of trustees .... [emphasis added] [ 22 ] Accordingly, at least for the purposes of the Assessment Directive, the viability of a proposal must be gauged by examining the six factors identified above. C.
Directive not requiring specifics of “viable proposal” assessment [ 23 ] The Directive imposes a very limited reporting obligation on the trustee i..e on the “viable proposal” aspect. It requires the trustee to certify, via an “Assessment Certificate”, that “I ... hereby certify that I have complied with [the Directive].”
[ 24 ] Similarly, a Directive-required acknowledgement from the debtor does not address details of the assessment, instead referring only (on this aspect) to “discuss[ing] my financial situation and the merits and consequences of each option available” with the LIT, followed by the debtor’s selected option i.e. as between consumer proposal, ordinary proposal, or bankruptcy. D.
The trustee’s proposals-not-viable assessments [ 25 ] Accordingly, it was not until the OSB asserted, in the fee taxations, that viable proposals could have been made that the trustee detailed, via affidavits from the two LITs involved in these files, its proposals-not-viable position here. [ 26 ] Each LIT provided two affidavits on this subject, the second set providing more details.
I focus primarily on the second set. [ 27 ] In her affidavit sworn August 29, 2022, Kathleen Jacob, LIT, deposed (in part) as follows: During the assessment, we present all options to the debtors, including BIA and non-formal options, such as talking with ... creditors to work out an arrangement. In this case, the McDermotts decided on a formal option, given [certain] foreclosure actions [against them]. They felt their family situation was too uncertain at [that] time. They had just moved to Drayton Valley, both accepting new positions ; Mr. McDermott had just accepted a new job as Assistant Fire Chief, and Ms.
McDermott transferred to the Drayton Valley RCMP division. Ms. McDermott was eight months pregnant and planned to go on employment insurance for the next year during her maternity leave, decreasing the family income . They already had a two-year-old, and assuming [Ms. McDermott] had taken a year’s maternity with the first child, [she] would only have been back at work for less than a year and [a] half. She was soon to take another leave, fully understanding the additional stress and reduced income.
With a second child on the way, they expected a decreased family income and increased family (baby-related) expenses . Ms. McDermott was concerned that the medical issues she had experienced after her first child (2 years earlier) would reoccur with her second child . She was worried that her medical condition would cause additional family stress and the possibility of her being unable to return to work in the longer term (making a proposal difficult). It should be noted that Ms. McDermott is currently retired from the force dealing with PTSD. Mr.
McDermott had previously filed a consumer proposal and therefore was fully aware of the benefits and consequences of a proposal versus filing [into] bankruptcy. Unfortunately, he did not complete that proposal, which was annulled. [ 28 ] More details of the “viable proposal” assessment came from James Moses, LIT, in his affidavit sworn August 29, 2022. In large part, it responds to the OSB’s financial calculations pointing (in its view) to the viability of proposals. Here I will outline the OSB’s key submissions, followed by Mr.
Moses’s rebuttals (in brief). [ 29 ] In his September 14, 2021 comment letter for the OSB on Ms. McDermott’s bankruptcy, Scott Guertin (Senior Bankruptcy Analyst) observed, on “viable proposals”, as follows: The bankrupt and [her] spouse made combined surplus income payments totalling $50,132.04 plus $5,600 in voluntary payments during their bankruptcies. The bankrupt had estimated surplus income payments of $906.38 per month at the time of filing for bankruptcy and her spouse, [Mr. McDermott] had estimated surplus income payments of $1,019.62 per month. The LIT reported in the
section 170 report dated June 11, 2013 [in the lead-up to the discharge applications] that the [bankrupt’s] surplus income amounts had increased to $1,782.61 per month. The LIT reported in the
section 170 report dated June 6, 2013 that [Mr. McDermott’s] surplus income amounts increased to $1,519.68 per month. The bankrupt was employed as an officer with the RCMP and her spouse was an Assistant Fire Chief. IT would have been reasonable to believe that the income of each spouse was regular and secure. As indicated above, the bankrupt’s Statement of Affairs dated October 30, 2011 lists unsecured debts of $122,250 and secured debts of $384,500. The liabilities of [Mr. McDermott] were substantially the same.
The LIT’s dividend sheet for the bankrupt indicates there are proven unsecured debts of $201,402.62 and proven secured debts of $214,426.16. The LIT’s dividend sheet for [Mr. McDermott] indicates there are proven unsecured creditors of $202,231.60 and proven secured debts of $224,160.29. Payments of $1,900 per month x 60 months would have generated $114,000 for a joint consumer proposal by the bankrupt and her spouse. The LIT’s administration of the bankrupt’s estate provided as distribution of $6,803.21 to creditors. The spouse’s estate provided a distribution of $1,194.44 to creditors.
The combined total distribution to creditors for the two bankruptcy estates if $7,997.65. [emphasis added] [Note: as noted earlier, the McDermotts were not eligible for consumer proposals, which the OSB later recognized.] [ 30 ] Notably, the OSB’s “viable proposal” analysis here keyed largely on one factor i.e. apparently available surplus income (and
the resulting perceived greater recovery in proposals versus bankruptcy), as discussed further below. [ 31 ] I return to Mr. Moses’s noted affidavit. His central point on proposal viability (or lack thereof) was that the McDermotts could not realistically have made proposal payments at the scale suggested by the OSB. However, his surplus-income calculations appear to be off-target, keying on the net amounts showing as left over for each spouse each month (i.e. $660 for Mr. McDermott and $770 for Ms. McDermott), when those amounts were apparently net of agreed-to payments by each to the trustee ($1,019.62 for Mr.
McDermott and $906.38 for Ms. McDermott). Per the Monthly Income and Expense Statement of the Bankrupt and the Family Unit (Form 65) for each insolvent person here, they and the trustee had apparently already agreed to make the noted (larger) monthly payments to the estate, with the smaller figures representing “left-over monies” for them. E. Surplus-income calculations [ 32 ] Here is how I calculate the circa-fall-2011 surplus income for this family. First, I accept the reported collective monthly family income as $7,300, with $500 deducted as a non-discretionary expense (“child care”), leaving $6,800.
Adding back $300 (“payment to secured creditor”, no longer required after becoming bankrupt) increased the collective income to $7,100.
Deducting from that figure the total reported discretionary expenses ($4,820) and a monthly “trustee fee” of $200, the net family surplus was $2,080. [ 33 ] Per the noted Form 65 calculations, the McDermotts had apparently agreed to pay effectively that entire amount to the trustee as surplus income i.e. between the two of them. [ 34 ] As noted above, the suggested proposal (or one of them) from the OSB would also have called for payments at effectively the same level i.e. $1,900 monthly (for 60 months). [ 35 ] Both approaches seem to disregard the “pay half of surplus income” approach directed in the surplus income guideline (11R2) i.e. with one-half of a surplus (calculated as illustrated above) to be paid to the trustee and the other half left with the bankrupt person or family. [ 36 ] I recognize that that guideline focuses on surplus-income payments to be paid to a bankruptcy trustee i.e. does not expressly address payments in proposals.
However, it provides a useful benchmark for estimating ability to pay in the latter context, especially given the practical need to build in a material cushion or buffer amount e.g. to account for increased expenses (e.g. increased expenses associated with the expected arrival of the McDermotts’ second child) and reduced income (e.g. Ms. McDermott’s expected income reduction during her parental leave). [ 37 ] I will accept that, even on that reduced (one-half) scale, the McDermotts had the ostensible ability to fund a proposal offering payments of $1,000 monthly.
And, if I am off-target in estimating the circa-fall-2011 ability to fund a proposal (with the actual figure equal or closer to the OSB’s calculations), that they had an even greater ostensible ability to make monthly proposal payments. [ 38 ] Does that mean that proposals were viable here? F. Proposals not viable here [ 39 ] The answer is no, for these reasons: 1. as reported by the trustee, Ms.
McDermott’s income was about to shift from full-time RCMP pay to employment-insurance-level earnings for her parental-leave year; 2. at the same time, the family’s expenses were about to increase, with the arrival of their second child; 3. the medical issues Ms. McDermott had experienced with birth of the couple’s first child had the potential of recurring, casting a material shadow on her ability to return to work after her parental leave; 4. Mr. McDermott had just started a new job (assistant fire chief). I disagree with Mr.
Guertin’s assessment that he necessarily had “stable income” at this point i.e. with no track record in that position, nothing in the evidence showing that he had worked in a such a position previously, and no evidence showing that his employment was permanent from day 1 i.e. as opposed to being probationary for some even minimal period. As it turned out, Mr. McDermott apparently left that position for another, and then that position for yet another, in the first 21 months after assigning into bankruptcy.
Even recognizing that he apparently moved into higher-paying positions, from the perspective of fall 2011, his employment status was realistically best described as “potentially stable but dependent on performance and willingness to remain in position.” On the inadvisability of proposals for insolvents in states of flux, see Bankruptcy of Daniel Walter Szun , 2003 MBQB 257 (Reg. Sharp) at para 15 ; 5. Mr.
McDermott had previously (1999) made, and failed to complete, a consumer proposal i.e. his track record in meeting proposal commitments, while limited, was poor; 6. the McDermotts did not present, circa fall 2011, as prudent money managers or as persons especially likely to adhere to any kind of payment plan, whether surplus income payments to the bankruptcy trustee or proposal payments to a proposal trustee i.e. in light of the number and scale of secured and unsecured creditors reflected in their respective statements of affairs on assigning into bankruptcy (and even recognizing that many of the those debts were joint) e.g. over $120,000 in assorted credit-card, overdraft and other bank debt.
In any case, as it turned out, and despite the noted “will pay surplus income” amounts (collectively $1,900 monthly), the McDermotts were only able, or willing, to pay the combined grand total of $2,300 in the 21 months between assigning into bankruptcy and applying for discharge i.e. versus the $39,900 to which they had committed; 7. the “lump-sum payment” kind of proposal contemplated above (as one of the “viable proposal” factors) was not a realistic prospect
for the McDermotts, with their very limited net assets (as reflected in their respective statements of affairs); 8. one of the “viable proposal” trustee factors – “the likelihood of acceptance of a proposal by the creditors” – was not expresslyaddressed by the trustee i.e. in their long-after-the-fact explanations of why proposals were not viable. (It may be that the trusteeexamined this factor at the time of the assessments, concluding that the creditors were not likely to accept a proposal or, if they were, thatthat factor was outweighed by the “not viable” factors.) As for the OSB, it did not address this factor or, in any case, offer any evidence of how these particular creditors would or might havereacted to the proposal.
And I take the reference in this factor to “the creditors” as requiring at least some exploration of how theseparticular creditors would have reacted i.e. versus just “creditors in general: see O’Shaughnessy (Re), (ONSC) (Reg.Nettie) at paras 37, 38 and 42-45; Butterfield (Re), 2008 BCSC 495 (Master McCallum) at para 34; and Jefferson (Re), 2004 BCSC 144(Master Baker) at para 41; Accordingly, we have another strike against the “viable proposals” position i.e. with one of the required factors either not examined or, ifit was, not explained i.e. as a consideration here.
On this aspect, with the OSB taking the “viable proposals” position, it was incumbenton it to show viability in light of all of the viability-scrutiny factors; 9. more generally on evidence (or the lack thereof) as to proposal viability, the OSB had a practical duty to bring evidence bearing onproposal viability i.e. on the full set of six factors in s. 11 of the Assessment Directive, not just the surplus income and associated net-return aspects.
The OSB neither introduced nor pointed to evidence bearing on the “likely creditor reaction” aspect (as noted above) orany of family situation, general financial situation or “number and type of creditors” i.e. whether refuting the evidence emphasized bythe trustee or otherwise. On this aspect generally, see Bull (Re), 2015 BCSC 606 (Master McCallum): [A creditor] says the bankrupt could have made a proposal to avoid bankruptcy. He offers no particular evidence to support thatassertion and the trustee says specifically that was not the case. There is no evidence that Ms.
Bull could have made a viableproposal. … [para 19] [emphasis added] 10. further on the evidence point, the trustee’s s. 170 reports (filed here on both discharge applications) are accorded evidence status:see Royal Bank of Canada v Sharma, 2019 SKQB 237 (Reg. Thompson); appeal dismissed 2020 SKQB 264 (Gabrielson J. – nodiscussion of “no viable-proposal possibility” point): The Trustee’s report indicates that the Bankrupt did not have the resources to make a viable proposal to his creditors at the timeof his assignment.
The Trustee has the resources and information required to assess the potential viability of a debtor’s proposal.Moreover, as noted, statements in the Trustee’s report are to be considered evidence unless the statements are rebutted on abalance of probabilities. Based on the financial information provided by the Trustee and its conclusion that Mr. Sharma was not in a position to make a viableproposal, I find that Mr.
Sharma was not in a position to make a viable proposal at the time of his bankruptcy assignment. [paras 66 and67] [emphasis added] The “report considered evidence” comment refers to ss. 170(5) BIA: “For the purposes of a [discharge] application …, the report of thetrustee is evidence of the statements contained therein.” (On this aspect, see also Gothe (Re), (BCSC) (MacdonaldLJSC) at para 13.) In the present case, the trustee’s s. 170 reports included its conclusions that neither bankrupt could have made a viableproposal rather than proceeding with bankruptcy. See also King (Re), 2015 NSSC 143 (Reg.
Cregan): As to [para 173(1)](n), paragraph 4(6) of the Trustee’s Report says that Ms. King could not have made a viable proposal rather thanproceed with bankruptcy. Trustees are bound to exercise professional judgment in determining whether such a proposal could bemade. I see no reason to question the judgment of the Trustee. Defence is due to trustees on this point. [para 12] [emphasis added] 11. even more fatally, no proposal could have gotten off the ground here in any case. Subsection 59(3) BIA imposes a “reasonablesecurity” hurdle in certain proposal contexts, including these insolvencies.
It says: Where any of the facts mentioned in
section 173 are proved against the debtor, the court shall refuse to approve the proposal unless itprovides reasonable security for the payment of not less than fifty cents on the dollar on all the unsecured claims provable againstthe debtor’s estate or such percentage thereof as the court may direct.
One of the “section 173 facts” is the following: ... the assets of the bankrupt are not of a value equal to fifty cents on the dollar on the amount of the bankrupt’s unsecured liabilities,unless the bankrupt satisfies the court that [that] fact ... has arisen from circumstances for which the bankrupt cannot be held responsible[para 173(1)(a)] In both bankruptcies here, as reflected in the s. 170 reports, the trustee concluded that this “s 173 fact” was present here i.e. neitherbankrupt’s assets met or exceeded the fifty per cent threshold, and neither could shelter under the “not my responsibility” exception.
As a result, no proposals could have been approved by the court here without the “reasonable security” required by ss. 59(3). And as reflected in their statements of affairs, the McDermotts had no material “clear” assets and no material equity in encumbered assetsi.e. nothing material with which to secure proposal payments to the minimum half-of-unsecured-liabilities level. Or to any level. And no evidence showed that any third parties were willing to guarantee or otherwise secure any proposal payments here.
As for whether the court might have exercised its discretion to reduce the required percentage, I adopt this analysis of Topolniski J. in Re Wandler , 2007 ABQB 153 : In Dolson [ (1984) 49 CBR (NS) 255 (Ont HCJ) ] Anderson J. ... stated that the lack of any performance security is fatal to a proposal, but suggested that the court might exercise its discretion to reduce the percentage of security required, at least in extraordinary circumstances. Presumably he meant that the court could reduce the security to zero. I disagree.
I prefer the view taken in Houlden and Morawetz that if no performance security is offered under a proposal, the court cannot approve it since s. 59(3) requires that there be a percentage of fifty cents on the dollar and zero is not a percentage of fifty cents. In any event, there must be some evidence presented to justify the court exercising its discretion to lower the percentage of performance security, and here there was non other than the creditors’ approval of the Proposal, which alone is insufficient. The desirability of promoting proposals over bankruptcies is obvious.
However, even such a laudable objective cannot override Parliament’s directive that there be reasonable creditor protection by way of performance security for Division I proposals if, as here, a s. 173 “fact” is established. [paras 36 and 37] [emphasis added] As noted, the McDermotts had no material assets to offer any security here. And, in any case, the court is not prone to reduce the amount of security required where a debtor (here, Mr. McDermott) has “previously taken advantage of the BIA ” i.e. via his earlier and unsuccessful consumer proposal.
Per Anderson J. in Dolson (cited above): “[In such a case], only extraordinary circumstances would justify the court in exercising its discretion to reduced the percentage of the performance security.” I do not see that any such circumstances were present here.
Accordingly, given ss 59(3) and the circumstances here, no proposal, viable or otherwise, was practically possible here. [ 40 ] All to say: even if the bankrupts ostensibly had surplus income, and even if proposals built on that income (or a material percentage of it) would have yielded more for the creditors here, the identified counter-factors here heavily outweighed those (largely theoretical) factors. [ 41 ] In a nutshell, the McDermotts were in a state of flux, with an around-the-corner income drop for Ms.
McDermott and worries of a permanent loss of income due to medical problems, increased (child-related) expenses, and a new job for Mr. McDermott (with no evidence any track record of performance in such a position), coupled with a poor history (for him) of performing proposal obligation and a demonstrated joint history of poor money management. [ 42 ] These insolvent persons were very poor candidates to actually perform whatever possible-on-paper proposals might have been conceived. [ 43 ] And, in any case, ss. 59(3) effectively precluded proposals here.
G. “Viable proposals not made” argument should have been raised earlier [ 44 ] In any case, the OSB had the core information it needed, via the s. 170 reports and the supplementary reports filed by the trustee, to perform its own “viable proposal” assessments in advance of the bankrupt’s applications for discharge and thus to object to the bankrupts’ discharges on the “viable proposals not made” ground in para 173(1)(n). [ 45 ] Or at least to raise that issue at the discharge hearing e.g. pointing to the ostensibly available surplus income at the start of the bankruptcies and throughout the initial (up to discharge application) bankruptcy period and asking the presiding registrar to rule on or at least inquire into the existence of the “should have filed proposals” objection ground (para 173(1)(n)) and, if established, to seek not only the outstanding surplus-income payments from both bankrupts but also whatever additional surplus-income payments the OSB maintained would yield a recovery equivalent to that if “viable proposals” had been filed. [ 46 ] The bankruptcy discharge applications were the appropriate occasion for the viable-proposal issue to be raised and decided by the presiding registrar i.e. with the “viable proposals not made” ground existing, as with the other “s 173 facts”, precisely to allow any interested party (trustee, OSB, or creditors) to put forward an “objection ground” and have the registrar decide whether it has been proven and, if so, remove an absolute discharge as an option i.e. shift the focus to the appropriate conditions for the bankrupt’s discharge (e.g. additional payments) or other forms of non-absolute discharge (e.g. a suspended or refused discharge). [ 47 ] In any case, the trustee here did object to the bankrupt’s discharge, on the “not equal to fifty cents” ground, expressly advising in its s. 170 and supplementary reports that it would be seeking conditions discharges requiring the bankrupts to square up on the unpaid surplus-income payments over the 21 months between assigning into bankruptcy and applying for discharge. [ 48 ] Nothing would have prevented the OSB from “riding” on that objection from the trustee and making its own submissions about the need for further surplus income payments i.e. not just for the initial 21 months but (in theory) for whatever period the OSB thought a proposal should have run and continue to run i.e. even if the OSB did not invoke the “viable proposals not made” ground. (On this aspect, see Butterfield (Re) , cited above: “The determination of whether a viable proposal could have been made is moot here given the fact that a conditional order is required in any event” (para 34).) [ 49 ] In other words, the BIA provided a mechanism for the OSB to advance its “viable proposals not made” argument (via objecting to the discharges on this ground) and the jurisdiction to the presiding registrar to explore and decide that issue. [ 50 ] But the OSB did not engage it.
IV.
Conclusion [ 51 ] The learned Registrar taxed down the trustee’s fees solely because, in his perception (possibly anchored on the OSB’s “apparent surplus income is the paramount factor” approach), viable proposals could and should have been made here. [ 52 ] For the reasons outlined, that view was off-target i.e. once all the Assessment Directive factors are considered. [ 53 ] In these circumstances, I find that the “proposals were viable” conclusion was the result of a palpable and overriding error i.e. with the other noted “viable proposal” factors not examined or, in any case, not expressly considered in that assessment. [ 54 ] By extension, so was the conclusion (anchored on that finding alone) that the trustee’s fees had to be taxed down. [ 55 ] In the end, no proposals were viable here, and no taxing down was warranted on that ground. [ 56 ] As for the other taxing-down grounds raised by the OSB before the Registrar and (as far as I can tell) not expressly addressed by him, his implicit finding may have been that none of them warranted any fee reduction here.
If the parties have differing views on that, I invite them to check with the Registrar. If it turns out that his findings, express or implicit, were limited to the “viable proposals” issue, and if the OSB continues to seek fee reductions on one or more of the other grounds, I would ask the Registrar to provide his decision on those other grounds. [ 57 ] The trustee’s counsel requested the opportunity to address costs on the release of this judgment. The OSB stated up front that no costs should be payable by it. [ 58 ] I invite Ms.
Poburan’s submissions on costs (maximum two pages, exclusive of any supporting cases and materials) by July 7, 2023, with Mr. Body having until July 14 (same content rules) to make any further submissions. [ 59 ] I thank the parties for their helpful written and oral submissions. Heard on the 12 th day of April, 2023. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 26 th day of June, 2023. M. J. Lema J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: Amber M. Poburan Sharek & Co Barristers & Solicitors For the Appellant Moses Advisory Group Inc. George F.
B ò dy Senior Counsel Department of Justice Canada For The Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy
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