R v El-Ajami, 2023 ABKB 394
Opinion
Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: R v El-Ajami, 2023 ABKB 394 Date: 20230629 Docket: 220424295Q1 Registry: Calgary Between: His Majesty the King Crown - and - Mohammad Najie El-Ajami Accused Corrected judgment: A corrigendum was issued on July 6, 2023; the correctionshave been made to the text and the corrigendum is appended to this judgment. _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Decision of the Honourable Justice Colin C.J.
Feasby _______________________________________________________ Introduction [1] This case addresses whether an accused outside Canada who is charged with offences in Canada may invoke certain Charterrights. Mr. El-Ajami, who is charged with nine counts, including possession of various drugs for the purposes of trafficking, productionof cocaine, and conspiracy to traffic several kinds of drugs, asserts that his Charter s 11(
a) right to be informed without reasonable delayof the specific offences he was charged with, his Charter s 11(
b) right to be tried within a reasonable time, and his Charter s 7 right toreceive disclosure have been violated. He seeks a stay of proceedings pursuant to Charter s 24(1). [2] The unusual issues that arise in the present case are attributable to the order of operations in which the criminal legal processagainst Mr. El-Ajami was commenced. The police charged Mr. El-Ajami prior to arresting him, knowing he was out of the country. Thepolice did not have to charge him when they did; they could have issued an arrest warrant and waited until after he was arrested tocharge him.
This is significant because the Charter rights invoked in the present case arise upon an accused being charged without anystipulation that the accused first be arrested or subject to the jurisdiction of a Canadian court. [3] Charter s 11(
a) has not been judicially considered to the same extent as many other Charter rights. The R v Morin, (SCC), [1992] 1 SCR 771 factors formerly used for assessing the reasonableness of trial delay for the purposes of Charter s11(
b) are still used to assess whether Charter s 11(
a) has been infringed. The Accused argued that since R v Jordan, 2016 SCC 27 has
supplanted Morin in the context of Charter s 11(b), with the Supreme Court of Canada specifically criticizing the prejudice component of the Morin analysis, a new approach to Charter s 11(
a) is called for that either dispenses with prejudice or presumes prejudice in cases of long delay. This requires me to decide the correct approach to Charter s 11(a). [ 4 ] The Accused was charged in December 2015 and is scheduled to be tried in November 2023. He remained in Lebanon for more than six years after he first became aware that he faced serious jeopardy in Canada. This requires me to decide for the purposes of his Charter s 11(
b) claim whether his time in Lebanon should be counted as defence delay or extraordinary circumstances beyond the Crown’s control pursuant to Jordan . [ 5 ] The Crown refused to provide disclosure to the Accused while he was unrepresented and residing in Lebanon on the basis that he had not submitted to the Canadian criminal process and his use of the disclosure material could not be controlled because he was beyond the reach of a Canadian court. Mr. El-Ajami submitted that this was a breach of his Charter s 7 right to disclosure and an abuse of process.
This requires me to decide whether an unrepresented accused outside Canada has a right to disclosure despite a refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court and a corresponding inability of the Court to control the use of the disclosure. [ 6 ] If any of the Charter breaches are established, I must evaluate whether a stay of proceedings is an appropriate remedy in the circumstances. A stay of proceedings is typically considered a remedy of last resort except in the context of unreasonable trial delay where it is considered the minimum remedy.
The appropriateness of a stay of proceedings has not been judicially considered as a remedy for a breach of Charter s 11(
a) in circumstances analogous to the present case. Overview of Facts [ 7 ] The Calgary Police Service (“CPS”) commenced an investigation of Mr. El-Ajami and others in early 2015 called “Operation Gin and Tonic.” Mr. El-Ajami was suspected of being the leader of a drug trafficking ring. [ 8 ] On October 21, 2015, CPS applied for and was granted an Authorization to Intercept Private Communications ( ie: a wiretap) with respect to Mr. El-Ajami and several others. [ 9 ] On November 4, 2015, someone attempted to kill Mr.
El-Ajami while he was sitting in his Ford F-150 outside his parents’ home by firing 17 rounds into the driver side window and door. Mr. El-Ajami survived the attack with only minor injuries. [ 10 ] Ten days later, on November 14, 2015, Mr. El-Ajami’s brother, Khaled El-Ajami, was murdered at Johnny Scissorhands Barbershop in Southeast Calgary. [ 11 ] The El-Ajami family originally came to Canada from Lebanon. The family decided that the funeral and burial of Khaled El- Ajami would take place in Lebanon in December. [ 12 ] Mr.
El-Ajami applied, on an urgent basis, for a passport so that he could travel to Lebanon for his brother’s funeral. CPS officers working on Operation Gin and Tonic were aware that Mr. El-Ajami was planning to travel to Lebanon because they were monitoring his communications pursuant to the wiretap. Mr. El-Ajami also testified that he told CPS officers involved in investigating his brother’s murder that he was leaving for Lebanon. [ 13 ] On November 24, 2015, Mr.
El-Ajami travelled to Lebanon with other members of his family for the funeral of his brother. [ 14 ] On December 10, 2015, search warrants were executed on residences associated with individuals under investigation in Operation Gin and Tonic. One of the residences searched was Mr. El-Ajami’s parents’ home where he normally resided. No one was at the residence at the time of the search as Mr.
El-Ajami and his family were in Lebanon. [ 15 ] In the days following the execution of the search warrants, several people under investigation in Operation Gin and Tonic were arrested and charged with drug offences. [ 16 ] On December 16, 2015, Detective Hollingsworth, the lead investigator for Operation Gin and Tonic, applied for a warrant for the arrest of Mr. El-Ajami. The application for the warrant set out the details that would be included in the Information charging Mr. El- Ajami. The application indicated that Mr.
El-Ajami was known by investigators to be in Lebanon. [ 17 ] The same day, Detective Hollingsworth phoned Mr. El-Ajami using Mr. El-Ajami’s Canadian cell phone number. Detective Hollingsworth asked Mr. El-Ajami to come into the police station to speak with him about the investigation. Mr. El-Ajami declined saying that he was staying in Lebanon. Mr. El-Ajami asked Detective Hollingsworth what charges he was facing. Detective Hollingsworth responded, “I can discuss that with you ... when you come in in person....
I’m not gonna discuss that with you over the phone cause I’m not hundred percent positive this is Mohamad El Ajami.” On cross-examination, Detective Hollingsworth testified that he had no doubt that it was Mr. El-Ajami that he was speaking with and that he refused Mr. El-Ajami’s request because he was not ready to discuss the charges yet. [ 18 ] Detective Hollingsworth phoned Mr. El-Ajami again the following day, December 17, 2015. Mr.
El-Ajami asked “What type of charges do I got?” Detective Hollingsworth responded “You got some trafficking charges and some conspiracy to traffic charges.” He later said that it was cocaine, fentanyl, and methamphetamine that was alleged to have been trafficked. [ 19 ] An intercepted call between Mr. El-Ajami and an unidentified woman that took place on December 18, 2015 after Mr. El- Ajami’s call with Detective Hollingsworth revealed that the Accused was under the misapprehension that he was also facing gang and organized crime charges.
How he came to believe this is unclear. [ 20 ] On December 18, 2015, an Information was sworn setting out eight charges against Mr. El-Ajami. Those charges were as follows:
Count 1: Between the 22 nd day of October, 2015, and the 10 th day of December, 2015, both dates inclusive, at or near Calgary, Alberta, did unlawfully conspire together, each with the other and others of them and with some person or persons unknown to commit the indictable offence of trafficking in a controlled substance: cocaine, contrary to section 465(1) (
c) of the Criminal Code of Canada . Count 2: Between the 22 nd day of October, 2015, and the 10 th day of December, 2015, both dates inclusive, at or near Calgary, Alberta, did unlawfully conspire together, each with the other and others of them and with some person or persons unknown to commit the indictable offence of trafficking in a controlled substance: fentanyl, contrary to section 465(1) (
c) of the Criminal Code of Canada . Count 3: Between the 22 nd day of October, 2015, and the 10 th day of December, 2015, both dates inclusive, at or near Calgary, Alberta, did unlawfully conspire together, each with the other and others of them and with some person or persons unknown to commit the indictable offence of trafficking in a controlled substance: methamphetamine, contrary to section 465(1) (
c) of the Criminal Code of Canada . Count 4: Between the 22 nd day of October, 2015, and the 10 th day of December, 2015, both dates inclusive, at or near Calgary, Alberta, did unlawfully conspire together, each with the other and others of them and with some person or persons unknown to commit the indictable offence of production of a controlled substance: cocaine, contrary to section 465(1) (
c) of the Criminal Code of Canada . Count 5: Between the 22 nd day of October, 2015, and the 10 th day of December, 2015, both dates inclusive, at or near Calgary, Alberta, did unlawfully traffic in a controlled substance, to wit: cocaine, contrary to section 5(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act . Count 6: Between the 22 nd day of October, 2015, and the 10 th day of December, 2015, both dates inclusive, at or near Calgary, Alberta, did unlawfully traffic in a controlled substance, to wit: fentanyl, contrary to section 5(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act .
Count 7: Between the 22 nd day of October, 2015, and the 10 th day of December, 2015, both dates inclusive, at or near Calgary, Alberta, did unlawfully traffic in a controlled substance, to wit: methamphetamine, contrary to section 5(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act .
Count 8: Between the 22 nd day of October, 2015, and the 10 th day of December, 2015, both dates inclusive, at or near Calgary, Alberta, did unlawfully produce a controlled substance, to wit: cocaine, contrary to section 7(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act . [ 21 ] On January 20, 2016, Detective Hollingsworth again spoke to Mr. El-Ajami. Detective Hollingsworth asked Mr. El-Ajami to provide him with an address to which he could send some paperwork. He testified that the paperwork that he intended to send to Mr. El- Ajami was a notice relating to the intercepted communications.
The address was never provided and the notice regarding intercepted communications was never sent. Detective Hollingsworth and Mr. El-Ajami did not discuss the charges on this call. [ 22 ] Detective Hollingsworth could have read the Information to Mr. El-Ajami over the telephone. He conceded in cross- examination that he could have texted the Information detailing the charges to Mr. El-Ajami at the same cell phone number that he called to speak to Mr. El-Ajami. Detective Hollingsworth said that he did not text the Information to Mr. El-Ajami because he did not understand there to be an obligation to provide Mr.
El-Ajami with the Information. [ 23 ] CPS did not try to communicate the details of the specific offences to Mr. El-Ajami via any intermediaries. CPS was aware that Mr. El-Ajami had resided with his parents in Calgary. Details of the specific offences that Mr. El-Ajami was charged with could have been sent to his parents’ home, being Mr. El-Ajami’s last known Canadian residence and a place where his family continued to reside. [ 24 ] On April 20, 2016, a Replacement Information was sworn. One charge was dropped and two charges were added.
The Replacement Information also made a small change to the date range for the offences. Neither CPS nor the Public Prosecution Service of Canada (“PPSC” or the “Crown”) made any attempt to provide Mr. El-Ajami with a copy of the Replacement Information or information concerning the changes in the charges. [ 25 ] Sometime in 2016 or 2017, Mr. El-Ajami’s father attended at a CPS facility to retrieve materials seized from his residence. While at the CPS facility, Mr. El-Ajami’s father spoke with Detective Hollingsworth. Detective Hollingsworth asked Mr. El-Ajami’s father to tell Mr.
El-Ajami to come back to Calgary to face his charges. He did not ask Mr. El-Ajami’s father to convey details of those charges to Mr. El-Ajami. [ 26 ] Mr. El-Ajami testified that he sought information concerning his charges from PPSC a couple of times per year between 2017 and 2021. There is no evidence to corroborate this assertion nor is there any evidence to refute it. I find on a balance of probabilities that Mr.
El-Ajami did seek information concerning his charges and disclosure from PPSC between 2017 and 2021 as it is consistent with his requests in late 2015 of Detective Hollingsworth for information about his charges and his requests in early 2021 of PPSC for disclosure that are reflected in recorded conversations. [ 27 ] In March 2021, Mr. El-Ajami sought disclosure from the Crown making requests by email and by telephone. Noreen at the PPSC office told him that the responsible prosecutor said that Mr. El-Ajami should not communicate directly with the Crown but instead should communicate through counsel.
At the end of April 2021, Mr. El-Ajami engaged counsel. Disclosure was eventually provided under cover of a letter dated June 4, 2021 to his counsel. [ 28 ] Mr. El-Ajami purchased a ticket for a flight from Beirut to Calgary via Frankfurt so that he could return to face his charges. On February 27, 2022, Mr. El-Ajami was detained at the Beirut airport on an Interpol hold prior to boarding his flight to Frankfurt. He was apprehended for approximately 12 hours before being released. According to Mr. El-Ajami, the Lebanese officials “slapped him
around.” [29] Mr. El-Ajami booked another flight to Frankfurt and departed the following day. On arrival in Frankfurt, he was detained byGerman authorities for approximately 6 hours. When he was released, he was told by German officials to go to the Canadian consulate inDusseldorf to resolve his issues. [30] Upon presenting himself at the Canadian Consulate in Dusseldorf, his passport was confiscated. Mr. El-Ajami then lived onthe streets of Dusseldorf for five days as he only had a small amount of money for food.
On March 4, 2022, the Canadian Consulateprovided him with an Emergency Travel Document which permitted him to travel to Calgary. He left for Canada the following day,arrived in Calgary on March 6, 2022, and made his first appearance in court on March 7, 2022. Charter s 11(a) – Right to be Notified of Specific OffenceWithout Unreasonable Delay [31] Charter s 11(
a) provides that “Any person charged with an offence has the right to be informed without unreasonable delay ofthe specific offence.” Charter s 11(
a) protects two related rights: (1) a right to information about the specific offence(
s) with which theaccused is charged; and (2) a right to that information without unreasonable delay: R v Cisar, 2014 ONCA 151 at paras 11-12. [32] The first question that must be asked is: When was Mr. El-Ajami given the information about the specific offences withwhich he was charged as required by Charter s 11(a)? There are three possible points in time when Mr. El-Ajami was given informationthat may have satisfied the requirement in Charter s 11(a):
(1) When Detective Hollingsworth spoke to Mr. El-Ajami by telephone on December 17, 2015;
(2) When Mr. El-Ajami spoke to Noreen at the PPSC office by telephone on March 18, 2021; or
(3) When disclosure was provided to Mr. El-Ajami’s counsel on or around June 4, 2021. To answer this first question, I must consider what information Charter s 11(
a) required to be disclosed in the present case. [33] A second question arises if the information provided by Detective Hollingsworth was inadequate for the purposes of Charter s11(a). Does the provision of information about the specific offences in March or June 2021 contravene the Charter s 11(
a) requirementto do so “without unreasonable delay?” Informational Component of Charter s 11(a) [34] Early in the Charter era, Linden J in Re Warren, (1983) (ON SC), 35 CR (3d) 173 at 177 concluded “thatthe right to be informed of the “specific offence” [in Charter s 11(a)] means the right to be informed of the substantive offence and theacts or conduct which allegedly form the basis of that charge.” The following year, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in R v Heit, (SK CA), [1984] 3 WWR 614 (SK CA) considered the same question.
The Court at para 6 answered by quoting EdRatushny, “The Role of the Accused in the Criminal Process” in Walter S. Tarnopolsky & Gérald A. Beaudoin, eds, The Charter ofRights and Freedoms: Commentary (Toronto: Carswell, 1982) 335 at 352: It is also important in specifying the exact conduct which is said to constitute the offence. The accused must be aware of such details asthe specific time and place, when and where the offence occurred, the manner in which it is alleged to have been committed and theidentity of the victim, if any, so that he may prepare his defence. It could be argued that s. 11(
a) requires only that the ‘offence’ bespecified (for example, rape, robbery, etc.) since it makes no reference to identifying the details of the act or transaction. However, onceagain, to take such a narrow
interpretation would render the protection a sham. [35] The Alberta Court of Appeal in R v Perdomo Lopez, 2020 ABCA 404 equated the requirement under Charter s 11(
a) toprovide information about the specific offence an accused is charged with to the obligation to particularize a charge pursuant to CriminalCode s 581: see also, R v Cancor Software Corp, (1990) (ON CA), 74 OR (2d) 65 (CA) at para 26 and Cisar at para11. The relevant part of Criminal Code s 581 provides: 581
(1) Each count in an indictment shall in general apply to a single transaction and shall contain in substance a statement that theaccused or defendant committed an offence therein specified. Form of statement
(2) The statement referred to in subsection (1) may be (
a) in popular language without technical averments or allegations of matters that are not essential to be proved; (
b) in the words of the enactment that describes the offence or declares the matters charged to be an indictable offence; or (
c) in words that are sufficient to give to the accused notice of the offence with which he is charged. Details of circumstances
(3) A count shall contain sufficient detail of the circumstances of the alleged offence to give to the accused reasonable information withrespect to the act or omission to be proved against him and to identify the transaction referred to, but otherwise the absence or
insufficiency of details does not vitiate the count [emphasis added]. [36] Rosenberg JA in Cisar at para 11 adopted the following words from R v Toth, (ON CA), [1959] OR 137(CA) at para 16: “[it is a] fundamental principle of our law that an indictment must charge an offence in such a manner as clearly to bringhome to an accused an accurate knowledge of the offence with which he is charged.” [37] The Alberta Court of Appeal in Perdomo Lopez explained in a more practical way what Criminal Code s 581 requires.
TheCourt held at para 55 that “[i]f an information states the time of the offence (even a lengthy period), the place, the victim and the offence(in the language of the enactment) then, except where there is a possibility of prejudice to the accused, it will not be quashed prior toplea.” [38] Detective Hollingsworth’s call to Mr. El-Ajami on December 17, 2015 was insufficient to satisfy the informationalcomponent of Charter s 11(a). The specific deficiencies were that: (
a) He failed to advise Mr. El-Ajami of the counts concerning the production of cocaine and the conspiracy to produce cocaine; (
b) For the conspiracy charges, he did not specify the names of the co-conspirators despite those individuals having been arrested andcharged by that time; (
c) He did not specify the time frame or location for the alleged conspiracy and trafficking offences; and (
d) None of the statutory sections for any of the charges were identified. [39] Turning to the next possible point in time, Noreen at the PPSC advised Mr. El-Ajami of the charges by telephone on March18, 2021. She identified the offences and provided the relevant statutory sections for each offence. Like Detective Hollingsworth, shefailed to identify the date of the offences, the place of the offences, or the names of the co-conspirators. Mr. El-Ajami asked for thecharges to be emailed to him, but Noreen declined.
While the information provided by Noreen was an improvement on that provided byDetective Hollingsworth, it fell short of what is required by Charter s 11(a). [40] Noreen confirmed for Mr. El-Ajami that the charges that she recited were all the charges. This confirmation was importantbecause it left no opportunity for a misapprehension that there may be additional charges as was the case after Mr. El-Ajami spoke toDetective Hollingsworth. [41] I conclude that the information required by Charter s 11(
a) was finally provided to Mr. El-Ajami, on or about June 4, 2021when his counsel received disclosure from the Crown which included the Replacement Information. Unreasonable Delay [42] The calculation of delay for the purposes of Charter s 11(
a) begins when the charges are laid and runs until the accused isinformed of the specific offence with which he is charged: R v Hill, 1993 ABCA 26 at para 35. The delay in the present case isapproximately five and a half years. Was this delay unreasonable? [43] The meaning of unreasonable delay in Charter s 11(
a) has only been considered once by the Supreme Court of Canada. Thatcase, R c Delaronde, (SCC), [1997] 1 SCR 213, was decided from the bench with the Court simply saying that theappeal was dismissed for the reasons given by the Quebec Court of Appeal. [44] Otis JA, writing for the Quebec Court of Appeal in R c Delaronde, (QC CA), [1996] RJQ 591 (CA) atpara 35, adopted for Charter s 11(
a) the approach to assessing the reasonableness of trial delay for the purposes of Charter s 11(
b) fromMorin at 787-88. The Morin factors used to determine whether a trial delay is reasonable are as follows: (1) the length of the delay; (2) waiver of time periods; (3) the reasons for the delay, including (
a) inherent time requirements of the case, (
b) actions of the accused, (
c) actions of the Crown, (
d) limits on institutional resources, and (
e) other reasons for delay; and (4) prejudice to the accused. [45] The Morin approach to delay in the context of Charter s 11(
b) did not satisfactorily address the culture of complacency anddid not encourage proactive measures to prevent avoidable trial delays. The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada observed in Jordanat para 38 “the s. 11(
b) framework is too unpredictable, too confusing, and too complex.” The prejudice component of the Morinapproach was singled out for special criticism; it was said at para 33 to be “one of the most fraught areas in the s. 11(
b) jurisprudence: itis confusing, hard to prove, and highly subjective.” Jordan replaced the Morin approach with a new framework built around“presumptive ceilings” above which delay is presumed unreasonable.
[46] The Morin approach to delay, laid to rest in Jordan for the purposes of Charter s 11(b), lives on zombie-like in the context ofCharter s 11(a). The most recent example of its use is R v Watetch, 2022 SKCA 91 where it was deployed without any consideration ofthe impact of Jordan. Richards CJS held in Watetch at para 60: The last Delaronde factor or consideration is prejudice. It is a critical aspect of the analysis given the purpose of s. 11(a). Indeed, severalauthorities go so far as to expressly say that, in the absence of prejudice, there can be no s. 11(
a) breach. I need not decide here whetherthis is the proper view of s. 11(a). It is enough to underline that prejudice is, at minimum, a central consideration in determining if therehas been a breach of s. 11(a) [citations omitted and emphasis added]. [47] Counsel for the Accused in the present case submitted that Delaronde SCC is no longer binding in the wake of Jordan. Heargued that actual prejudice cannot be required to establish unreasonable delay following Jordan and that instead prejudice should beinferred or presumed in cases of significant delay. The Crown submitted that Jordan applies only to Charter s 11(
b) and that it would bea “category error” to import Jordan principles into Charter s 11(
a) analysis. The Crown further asserted that Delaronde SCC and thecases that follow it remain good law and that this Court is bound by the principle of vertical stare decisis. [48] The Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford, 2013 SCC 72 at para 42 explained that a previouslydecided point of law “may be revisited if new legal issues are raised as a consequence of significant developments in the law, or if thereis a change in the circumstances or evidence that fundamentally shifts the parameters of the debate” [emphasis added].
In my view, thepresent case is analogous to R v Way, 2022 ABCA 1 where the Court of Appeal, at para 122, observed that Jordan may have implicitlyoverruled R v Rahey, (SCC), [1987] 1 SCR 588 such that “it should no longer be assumed that a stay is the minimum,presumptive or only remedy for breach of s. 11(
b) of the Charter.” The Court of Appeal, citing Bedford, stated at para 111 that “theSupreme Court of Canada has signaled that some of the early Charter decisions may have to be re-examined in light of the evolution ofconstitutional law.” I conclude pursuant to Bedford and Way that Jordan is a significant development in the law that requires me toconsider afresh the approach to Charter s 11(a). Purposive
Interpretation of “Without Unreasonable Delay” in Charter s 11(a) [49] Reconsideration of the approach to Charter s 11(
a) must start with an
interpretation of what Charter s 11(
a) means. Charterrights are to be interpreted purposively: R v Poulin, 2019 SCC 47 at paras 53-57. Dickson J, as he then was, explained in R v Big MDrug Mart Ltd, (SCC), [1985] 1 SCR 295 at para 117: the purpose of the right or freedom in question is to be sought by reference to the character and the larger objects of the Charter itself, tothe language chosen to articulate the specific right or freedom, to the historical origins of the concepts enshrined, and where applicable,to the meaning and purpose of the other specific rights and freedoms with which it is associated within the text of the Charter. [50] Though purposive
interpretation involves analysis of the elements identified in Big M Drug Mart, it must begin withconsideration of the text: Quebec (Attorney General) v 9147-0732 Québec inc, 2020 SCC 32 at paras 8-12. See also, Toronto(City) v Ontario (Attorney General), 2021 SCC 34 at para 14. [51] From a narrow textual perspective, an unreasonable delay is a delay that is not justified by reason.[1] And since we aredealing with rights that are enshrined in the constitution, it may be inferred that what is required is sufficient reason.
So, an unreasonabledelay is a delay which is not justified by a sufficient reason: Richard Epstein, “Some Doubts on Constitutional Indeterminacy” (1996) 19Harv JL & Pub Pol’y 363 at 365. This indicates that when considering whether Charter s 11(
a) has been infringed the sufficiency of thejustification for delay must be a focus of the analysis. [52] The origins of Charter s 11(
a) lie in the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS171, Can TS 1976 No 47 (entered into force 23 March 1976) art 14(3)(a). The word “promptly” in ICCPR art 14(3)(
a) was changed to“without unreasonable delay” in Charter s 11(a). The Department of Justice witness who testified before the Special Joint Committee onthe Constitution explained that, though Charter s 11(
a) would apply to all offences, the change was made because it was anticipated thatit would apply mainly to minor offences where there was often no arrest and notice of charges would have to be delivered by mail. Use ofthe words “without unreasonable delay” was to prevent constitutional violations arising because of, among other things, poor mailservice. The Department of Justice witness explained: “If we were dealing only with murders, rapes and such, where there was adetention for bail hearing, then the word “promptly” would have been the better word.
But we are not dealing with that, but with all ofthe range of offences”: Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commonson the Constitution of Canada, 32nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 47 (28 January 1981) at 32. [53] What can be taken from the testimony before the Special Joint Committee on the Constitution? First, the drafters assumed thatfor serious offences, details of charges would be given promptly because they would be provided prior to a bail hearing or release fromdetention.
A circumstance like the present case where a person is at liberty when charged with a serious offence was not in thecontemplation of the drafters. Second, for minor offences where there was no arrest, the drafters assumed that notice would be providedshortly after charging by mail.
Though the testimony before the Special Joint Committee on the Constitution provides interestingbackground and is supportive of some of the analysis that follows in these Reasons, I do not place any weight on the subjectiveintentions of the drafters in determining the meaning of Charter s 11(a): Re BC Motor Vehicle Act, (SCC), [1985] 2SCR 486 at para 50. [54] The inquiry into meaning must probe beyond the surface of the text and the historical origin of the concepts in the right.Martin J in Poulin at para 70 observed that the use of the word “unreasonable” in a Charter right like s 11(a), indicates that the rightrefers to an “evolving, open-ended standard[].” By this, Martin J seems to mean that because the word unreasonable is indeterminate ittakes meaning from context and evolving social norms.
The same idea may be inferred from Hunter et al v Southam, Inc, (SCC), [1984] 2 SCR 145 at 155 where Dickson CJC, writing for the Court, observed: “the meaning of “unreasonable” [in Charter s8] cannot be determined by recourse to a dictionary, nor for that matter, by reference to the rules of statutory construction.” [55] Purposive
interpretation is a teleological exercise. Dickson J in Big M Drug Mart at para 116 held that “[t]he meaning of a
right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter [is] to be ascertained by an analysis of the purpose of such a guarantee; it [is] to beunderstood, in other words, in the light of the interests it [is] meant to protect [emphasis in original].” The question that must be asked inthe present case is what interests was Charter s 11(
a) designed to protect? [56] Rosenberg JA in Cisar at para 12 concluded that Charter s 11(
a) exists “primarily to protect the right to make full answer anddefence.” The same conclusion was reached by Otis JA in Delaronde CA at para 54. As I will explain later, this is an incompleteaccounting of the purposes of Charter s 11(
a) and a mischaracterization of what is really a more remote or secondary purpose. [57] Rosenberg JA went on to say at para 13 that “[u]ntil an accused has been informed of the charge, it is only the right to a fairtrial that is impacted by delay. If the accused is not aware of the charge, they are not subject to anxiety, concern and stigma of exposureto criminal proceedings and their liberty is not impacted.” The same point is made using similar words in Delaronde CA at para 56. Butthis premise is a fundamental error. An accused may be aware of charges in at least two ways without the informational obligation inCharter s 11(
a) being satisfied. First, as the facts of the present case illustrate, an accused may have been advised of the existence ofcharges by police or the Crown but the information supplied may fall short of what Charter s 11(
a) demands. Second, an accused may beaware of the existence, but not details, of charges from a source other than the authorities (eg. a co-accused). The dismissal of concernsabout anxiety and stigma is a mistake that contributes to understanding Charter s 11(
a) only in terms of remote and abstract objectives,such as the right to make full answer and defence and the right to a fair trial. [58] The Supreme Court of Canada has found that the suite of legal rights in the Charter exists to protect the right to make fullanswer and defence and the right to a fair trial: R v Mills, (SCC), [1999] 3 SCR 668 at para 5. These rights are securedunder the umbrella of Charter s 7’s principles of fundamental justice: R v La, (SCC), [1997] 2 SCR 680 at para 24. Ifall that Charter s 11(
a) and the Charter’s other legal rights do is protect the same interests as Charter s 7, then they are surplusage. Thelaw of
interpretation holds that, where possible, Courts should avoid
interpretations that render provisions of a statute or, in this case, theconstitution, meaningless: R v Proulx, 2000 SCC 5 , [2000] 1 SCR 61 at para 28. The clear implication from the structure of theCharter is that Charter s 11(
a) and the Charter’s other legal rights protect specific aspects of a fair criminal procedure that have valueindependent of their contribution to an accused’s right to make full answer and defence or the promotion of fair trials: see, for example,R v Tran, (SCC), [1994] 2 SCR 951 at 995. [59] The problem with identifying the interest protected by Charter s 11(
a) as being the right to make full answer and defence or toensure a fair trial is that both of those things are too abstract or remote from the textual meaning. The right arises upon charging andindicates that information about the specific offences is to be provided without unreasonable delay. Nothing about the way that the rightis framed indicates that it is primarily concerned with the right to make full answer and defence or the right to a fair trial.
If theunreasonableness of delay is measured only by its impact on the ability of the accused to make full answer and defence or the fairness ofthe trial, which are both things that are evaluated at the end of the process, even delays of many months following charging may befound to be tolerable. Such an approach renders the protection in Charter s 11(
a) illusory. [60] The narrow conception of the interest protected by Charter s 11(
a) in Delaronde CA and Cisar overlooks other interests thatCharter s 11(
a) protects. Lamer CJC in his addendum to Delaronde SCC held at para 3 that Charter s 11(
a) ensured that “[a]ccusedpersons have the right to be informed rapidly of the charges against them so that they can make important decisions relating to, amongother things, their professional or family life [emphasis added].” There can be no doubt that a purpose of Charter s 11(
a) is to protect theability of those charged with crimes to order their personal affairs. [61] A narrow focus on the purpose of Charter s 11(
a) as being the right to make full answer and defence or the right to a fair trialalso neglects the critical role of negotiated outcomes in the criminal process. An accused cannot have a meaningful discussion, directlyor aided by counsel, with the Crown with respect to resolving charges without being adequately informed of the specific offences.Information about the specific offences must be given early in the process if the benefits of negotiated outcomes are to be realized byboth an accused and the justice system. [62] Clues to the purposes of Charter s 11(
a) can be gleaned from what the Supreme Court of Canada has said about anotherinformational right, Charter s 10(a). The Charter s 10(
a) right arises upon arrest or detention. McLachlin J, as she then was, wrote in R vEvans, (SCC), [1991] 1 SCR 869 at 886-87: The right to be promptly advised of the reason for one’s detention embodied in s. 10(
a) of the Charter is founded most fundamentally onthe notion that one is not obliged to submit to an arrest if one does not know the reasons for it: R. v. Kelly (1985), (ON CA), 17 C.C.C. (3d) 419 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 424. A second aspect of the right lies in its role as an adjunct to the right to counselconferred by s. 10(
b) of the Charter. As Wilson J. stated for the Court in R. v. Black, (SCC), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 138, atpp. 152-53, “[a]n individual can only exercise his s. 10(
b) right in a meaningful way if he knows the extent of his jeopardy”. Ininterpreting s. 10(
a) in a purposive manner, regard must be had to the double rationale underlying the right. [63] Charter s 10(
a) protects the ability of an accused to make informed decisions at the time of arrest and to make informeddecisions about exercising the right to counsel. Charter s 10(
a) uses the word “promptly” instead of “without unreasonable delay” toemphasize the urgency of providing the information in the context of an individual who is detained or about to be detained. The narrowfocus on the interest being protected, being informed decision-making that must be undertaken coincident with arrest, is moreappropriate than characterizing the interest protected broadly in terms of the right to make full answer and defence or trial fairness as isdone with Charter s 11(a). [64] Based on the foregoing, I conclude that the primary purpose of Charter s 11(
a) is to protect the ability of an accused to makeinformed decisions in the aftermath of being charged. The kinds of informed decision-making protected by Charter s 11(
a) include: (1)retaining and instructing counsel; (2) negotiating resolution; (3) ordering personal affairs; and (4) where the accused has not beenarrested, deciding whether to submit to arrest. The meaning of Charter s 11(
a) must be determined using this primary purpose ratherthan more remote or abstract secondary purposes such as the right to make full answer and defence or ensuring trial fairness. [65] Though the words “without undue delay” in Charter s 11(
a) suggest less urgency than the word “promptly” in Charter s
10(a), the purposes of Charter s 11(
a) indicate that the provision of information should occur within a short period of time followingcharging. Even a delay of a few days may be unreasonable if there is no adequate reason for the delay. Where, as in the present case, thepolice had the means to contact the accused and were, in fact, in contact with the accused, Charter s 11(
a) requires notice of the specificoffences charged to be provided, as Lamer CJC put it in Delaronde SCC, “rapidly.” Doctrinal Consistency Under the Charter [66] The Charter s 11 (
a) caselaw treats prejudice to the accused as a requirement for establishing a breach of Charter s 11(a). Thisenshrines in constitutional law, the playground basketball concept of “no harm, no foul.” Whatever merit there may be in the no harm, nofoul principle on the playground, it is antithetical to the concept of a constitutional right. If a Charter right is only infringed where thereis prejudice or loss, then the Charter does not stand for much at all.
As is set out later in these Reasons, if there is no prejudice resultingfrom the breach of a Charter right, that is an appropriate consideration in determining whether a remedy is required. To find that there isno breach because there is no prejudice is different than finding that there is no remedy because there is no prejudice.
A finding of aninfringement of a Charter right has meaning and value independent of the question of remedy. [67] Outside the criminal law context, the question of prejudice or other countervailing factors are not considered whendetermining whether a Charter right has been infringed: see, for example, R v Zundel, (SCC), [1992] 2 SCR 731 at 758making the point in the context of Charter s 2(
b) and Frank v Canada, 2019 SCC 1 at para 31 making the point in the context ofCharter s 3. The assessment of prejudice and other countervailing factors – balancing analysis – occurs under the rubric of Charter s 1.Under Charter s 1, a broad conception of prejudice or harm prevails. McLachlin CJC in the context of the right to vote held that thedenial of a right harms the dignity of an individual: Sauvé v Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), 2002 SCC 68 at para 35.
She went on tosay at para 59 that “[w]hen basic political rights are denied, proof of additional harm is not required.” Wagner CJC in Frank at para 82explained that the “denial of the fundamental right to vote, in and of itself, inflicts harm on affected citizens. This is particularly truewhere there is simply no convincing rationale to support the denial” [emphasis in original]. This begs the question: How are theCharter’s legal rights different? [68] For the most part, legal rights under the Charter are not different.
Sopinka J, writing for the majority in R v Carosella, (SCC), [1997] 1 SCR 80 at para 28 explained that R v Bartle, (SCC), [1994] 3 SCR 173 held “even thoughthere may not have been actual prejudice to the accused as a result of the s. 10(
b) breach, since the information would likely have beenobtained in any event, this fact is not relevant to the question of whether a Charter violation has been established.” Likewise, the Courtheld in Tran at 995 that establishing a breach of the Charter s 14 right to interpreter does not require a showing of prejudice: it would be wrong to introduce into the assessment of whether the right has been breached any consideration of whether or not theaccused actually suffered prejudice when being denied his or her s. 14 rights.
The Charter in effect proclaims that being denied properinterpretation while the case is being advanced is in itself prejudicial and is a violation of s. 14. Actual resulting prejudice is a matter tobe assessed and accommodated under s. 24(1) of the Charter when fashioning an appropriate and just remedy for the violation inquestion.
In other words, the “prejudice” is in being denied the right to which one is entitled, nothing more [emphasis added]. [69] Sopinka J in Carosella at para 27 writing in the context of an alleged breach of a Charter s 7 duty to provide disclosure opinedgenerally on the appropriate place of prejudice in the analysis of Charter rights: This Court has consistently taken the position that the question of the degree of prejudice suffered by an accused is not a consideration tobe addressed in the context of determining whether a substantive Charter right has been breached.
The extent to whichthe Charter violation caused prejudice to the accused falls to be considered only at the remedy stage of a Charter analysis. [70] An obvious exception to Sopinka J’s sweeping statement is the Charter s 11(
b) jurisprudence before Jordan.[2] The prejudiceelement of the Charter s 11(
b) analysis was borrowed from US Sixth Amendment caselaw: R v Askov, (SCC), [1990] 2SCR 1199 at 1208-10. The path not followed in Charter s 11(
b) jurisprudence wisely eschewed substantive prejudice as a necessaryelement of unreasonable delay. Lamer J, as he then was, writing for himself and Dickson CJC, in dissent in Rahey explained at para 36,“prejudice is part of the rationale for the right and is assured by the very presence of s. 11(
b) in the Charter.” He went on at para 37 tosay that “subjective prejudice is irrelevant when determining unreasonable delay. That type of prejudice will, however, be relevant to adetermination of appropriate relief.” Belatedly, in Jordan the Supreme Court of Canada dispensed with the prejudice requirement forestablishing infringements of Charter s 11(b), though not expressly for the reason stated by Lamer J in Rahey. [71] A difference between many of the legal rights discussed in the preceding paragraphs, where prejudice is only a remedialconsideration, and Charter s 11(
a) is that the obligation in Charter s 11(
a) is qualified by the word “unreasonable”. As noted earlier, theword unreasonable is indeterminate and its meaning must be ascertained through purposive analysis. The word “unreasonable” does notjustify the use of prejudice as an element in the test for whether Charter s 11(
a) is infringed. This is clear from how the protection fromunreasonable search and seizure in Charter s 8 works. There are two elements of reasonableness considered in the context of Charter s 8.First, a Court is to assess whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy, which is a contextual and objective analysis:R v Buhay, 2003 SCC 30 at para 18. Second, a Court must apply the three-part test for determining whether a search or seizure isunreasonable.
This test asks whether the search or seizure: (1) is authorized by law; (2) the law itself is reasonable; and (3) the manner inwhich the search is carried out is reasonable: R v Collins, (SCC), [1987] 1 SCR 265 at para 23. The question ofprejudice to the accused does not factor into any of the analysis. The question of prejudice, in Charter s 8 cases, is left to the remedialanalysis, typically a question of exclusion of evidence, under Charter s 24(2). [72] The rights specified in the Charter restrain state conduct; the Charter does not place obligations on individuals.
There isnothing in the text of the Charter that says that rights can only be asserted where there is prejudice. Analytical coherence and consistencyrequire that consideration of prejudice be banished from the determination of rights infringement and confined to the question of remedyas Sopinka J held in Carosella. Charter s 11(
a) is not a special exception where prejudice should be allowed a place in the determinationof rights infringement. [73] Restricting consideration of prejudice to the analysis of remedy has the additional benefit of eliminating duplication. As is set
out later in these Reasons, prejudice is central to the Charter s 24 remedy analysis. Looking at the question of prejudice once makes for a more coherent and manageable analytical framework. Modifying the Morin Factors for Charter s 11(a) [ 74 ] Based on the foregoing analysis, I conclude that a modified version of the Morin factors is appropriate for analyzing whether delay is unreasonable for the purposes of Charter s 11(a). The appropriate factors to assess whether there has been an infringement of Charter s 11(
a) are as follows: 1. the length of the delay; and 2. the reasons for the delay, including (
a) actions of the accused, (
b) actions of the Crown, and (
c) other reasons for delay. [ 75 ] Length of delay remains an important factor. The length of the delay must be assessed in the context in which it occurs. Where police or the Crown have the means of contacting an accused, anything more than a very short delay will be unreasonable. The gravity of charging someone with an offence requires authorities to act with a corresponding urgency to inform the accused. While “without unreasonable delay” in Charter s 11(
a) is a lower standard than “promptly” in Charter s 10(
a) it is nevertheless a high standard for notification. Given that the primary purpose of Charter s 11(
a) is to ensure that an accused can make informed decisions in the aftermath of being charged, a delay of more than a few days will likely be too long. [ 76 ] Waiver remains theoretically relevant but as a practical matter it will only rarely be a consideration in the context of Charter s 11(
a) delay. The reason for this is that for there to be a waiver “ [t]he accused must have full knowledge of his or her rights, as well as the effect waiver will have on those rights”: Jordan at para 61 . Typically, in the context of Charter s 11(a), if an accused has not received the information required by Charter s 11(a), the accused will be unable to fully appreciate his or her rights and the effect of a waiver. [ 77 ] Given the text of Charter s11(
a) and the interests that it protects, specifically the ability to make informed decisions on matters confronting an accused upon being charged, the reasons for the delay should typically be the central consideration. The reasons for delay analysis should focus on the actions of the accused and the actions of the Crown. There is no reason why the “time requirements of the case” identified in Morin in the context of Charter s 11(
b) should have any bearing on providing information about specific offences as that pertains only to the question of trial delay. Similarly, where the Crown has an accused’s contact information there should be no institutional resource issues that inhibit the ability to notify an accused of charges expeditiously. Institutional resource issues may be relevant where an accused is difficult to locate. [ 78 ] Prejudice has been treated as a “critical aspect” of the Charter s 11(
a) analysis: Watetch para 60 . But this approach is inconsistent with the text of Charter s 11(
a) which does not qualify an accused’s right to be informed of charges without unreasonable delay, the purpose of Charter s 11(a), and Charter jurisprudence generally. As such, the accused should not be required to prove prejudice to establish an infringement of Charter s 11(a). Do Charter s 11(
a) Rights Stop at the Border? [ 79 ] The last
interpretation question that must be considered is whether Charter s 11(
a) rights are somehow limited to only those accused who are in Canada. Is there an implied limit within Charter s 11(a)? [ 80 ] Wagner CJC, writing for the majority, in Frank refused to imply a residency requirement into the Charter s 3 right to vote finding at para 29 that it was contrary to the “clear language” of the provision. He went on to find at para 31 that “a broad and purposive
interpretation of s. 3 does not allow for residence to operate as an internal limit on the right to vote.” [ 81 ] There is no reason to approach Charter s 11(
a) differently than Charter s 3. The language of Charter s 11(
a) does not invite the implication of a limit based on where an accused is located. Similarly, the purposes of Charter s 11(
a) identified above in para 64 are equally salient if an accused is out of the country. Just as citizens do not relinquish their constitutional right to vote by residing outside Canada, so too should individuals continue to enjoy their right upon being charged to be informed of the specific offences. [ 82 ] Wagner CJC held that whether expatriates’ right to vote could be limited because they were absent from the country was an appropriate consideration under Charter s 1, though he found the justification offered for limiting the right to vote wanting.
Unlike in Frank where the restriction was imposed by statute, in the present case there is no law that purports to restrict the exercise of Charter s 11(
a) rights by individuals outside the country. Accordingly, no justification for limiting Charter s 11(
a) rights for those outside Canada has been advanced. Application to Present Case [ 83 ] Mr. El-Ajami was charged when CPS knew he was in Lebanon. Despite his absence from Canada, Detective Hollingsworth knew how to contact Mr. El-Ajami. Indeed, he spoke with Mr. El-Ajami twice by telephone immediately prior to the swearing of the Information and again a month later. There was no practical impediment to Detective Hollingsworth reading the details of the specific offences to Mr. El-Ajami. Nor, as Detective Hollingsworth acknowledged, was there anything stopping him from taking a photo of the Information and texting it to Mr. El-Ajami at the same number that he used to call Mr. El-Ajami.
[ 84 ] The evidence of Detective Hollingsworth demonstrated that he did not understand that he had any obligation to provide information concerning the specific offences to Mr. El-Ajami. In their call on December 16, 2015 he declined to provide information unless Mr. El-Ajami came to the police station. On December 17, 2015, he provided incomplete information in response to a direct inquiry seeking the charges. In the January 20, 2016 call, Detective Hollingsworth made no attempt to provide information about the specific charges to Mr. El-Ajami.
When asked on cross-examination why he failed to text the Information to Mr. El-Ajami, he said that he did not understand that he was required to do so. Though he was not required to provide the Information, he was required to provide the details of the specific offences contained in the Information to Mr. El-Ajami without unreasonable delay whether orally or in writing. [ 85 ] The obvious inference from Detective Hollingsworth’s evidence and the absence of any subsequent Crown effort to contact Mr.
El-Ajami is that for serious offences there is an assumption that the criminal process begins with an arrest and that informational obligations to an accused will be fulfilled only once the accused is engaged in the criminal process. That did not happen in the present case. Once the Crown learned that Mr. El-Ajami was out of the country, it seems they did not understand that there was any obligation to communicate the details of the specific offences to him. The Charter s 11(
a) obligation to provide details of the specific offences following an accused being charged was overlooked because of the unusual circumstances of the case. [ 86 ] A question raised by the Crown’s actions is whether Mr. El-Ajami’s presence in Lebanon at the time he was charged precludes him from asserting a Charter s 11(
a) violation. The Supreme Court of Canada observed in Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr 2010 SCC 3 (“ Khadr II ”) at para 14 “[a]s a general rule, Canadians abroad are bound by the law of the country in which they find themselves and cannot avail themselves of their rights under the Charter .” See also, Canada v Boloh 1(a) , 2023 FCA 120 at para 56 . [ 87 ] The Supreme Court of Canada found that the Charter does not apply to the actions of Canadian officials operating outside Canada: R v Hape , 2007 SCC 26 ; R v McGregor , 2023 SCC 4 .
The present circumstances are different because the officials in question were in Canada throughout the relevant time and, as such, were subject to the Charter . Further, Charter s 11(
a) is an informational right that does not imply or require physical presence in Canada. Where an accused’s contact information is known to police, as in the present case, they can discharge their informational obligations just as easily as if the individual was in Canada and without any impact on the sovereignty of a foreign nation or causing any affront to the principle of comity. The accused in the present case was reachable at a Canadian cell phone number during the key period following the swearing of the Information. [ 88 ] I find that there was no sufficient reason for the 5.5-year delay in providing Mr.
El-Ajami with the details of the specific offences with which he was charged and the delay far exceeds any conception of what is reasonable. Mr. El-Ajami’s Charter s 11(
a) right was breached. Charter s 11(b) – Right to be Tried Within a Reasonable Time [ 89 ] Mr. El-Ajami asserts that his Charter s 11(
b) right to be tried within a reasonable time has been infringed. The Supreme Court of Canada established a new framework for assessing delay for the purposes of Charter s 11(
b) in Jordan . The Court set a ceiling of 30- months from the charge to the actual or anticipated time of trial for cases in a superior court. Delay that exceeds the ceiling is presumptively unreasonable. [ 90 ] Delay that exceeds the ceiling may not be unreasonable where the delay is attributable to the defence’s conduct or there are exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the Crown. There are two categories of delay attributable to the defence: (1) waiver; and (2) conduct. [ 91 ] Waiver does not come into play in the present case because the Charter s 11(
a) informational obligation was not satisfied so it cannot be said that the accused had full knowledge of his rights and the effect that a waiver would have on those rights. [ 92 ] Can the delay be attributed to Mr. El-Ajami because he was in Lebanon? Mr. El-Ajami says that he did not return to Canada because he was concerned for his safety. The attempt on his life and the murder of his brother in November 2015 led him to believe that it was unsafe for him to return to Calgary. He says that this was the reason that he remained in Lebanon, not the fact that he was charged with serious offences. I accept that Mr.
El-Ajami was genuinely concerned for his safety. [ 93 ] Earlier in these Reasons I found that Mr. El-Ajami’s Charter s 11(
a) right to information about the specific offences with which he was charged was infringed. Does this infringement prevent his time in Lebanon from being accounted for as defence delay for the purposes of Charter s 11(b)? [ 94 ] Though the information provided to Mr. El-Ajami was not sufficient to meet the standard required by Charter s 11(a), there can be no doubt that Mr. El-Ajami understood – both from Detective Hollingsworth and from others with whom he was speaking – that he was facing serious jeopardy in Canada.
Armed with this knowledge, incomplete though it may have been, he made a strategic decision to remain in Lebanon, out of the reach of Canadian authorities. [ 95 ] Would Mr. El-Ajami have made a different decision if he had complete and accurate information about his charges as required by Charter s 11(a)? There is ample reason to be skeptical that he would have made a different choice, but it cannot be known what he would have done. Any conclusion that Mr.
El-Ajami would have done something different in a hypothetical world where he had received the constitutionally required information about his charges is speculative. I conclude that given the Crown’s breach of Charter s 11(a), it is inappropriate to attribute the time from when he was charged on December 18, 2015 to when his counsel received the required information about his charges on June 4, 2021 to defence delay. However, the period from June 4, 2021 to his return to Canada on March 6, 2022 counts as defence delay. [ 96 ] There is nothing that the Crown could have done to bring this matter to trial while Mr.
El-Ajami remained in Lebanon. There is no extradition treaty between Canada and Lebanon. As I noted earlier, even if police or the Crown had satisfied their Charter s 11(
a) obligations, it cannot be known if it would have secured the Accused’s return from Lebanon, at an earlier date. I am satisfied that his presence in Lebanon fits within what Justices Moldaver, Brown, and Karakatsanis in Jordan considered exceptional circumstances. They
held at para 72 “[c]ases with an international dimension, such as cases requiring the extradition of an accused from a foreign jurisdiction,may also meet the definition [of exceptional circumstances].” [97] The Alberta Court of Appeal in R v Steadman, 2021 ABCA 332 at para 82, citing Jean c R, 2020 QCCA 1455 at para 13 andR v Singleton, 2014 BCCA 232 at paras 96-101, held that “delay related to an offender being in an extraditable country would not countunless the Canadian authorities failed to act reasonably to seek extradition.” In the present case, the authorities could not seek extraditionbecause there was no treaty between Canada and Lebanon.
The logic of categorizing delay as extraordinary circumstances for theaccused being out of the country in Steadman applies a fortiori when the accused is in a country with which Canada has no extraditiontreaty. [98] The period prior to March 6, 2022 when Mr. El-Ajami returned to Canada should not be counted as Crown delay as hispresence in Lebanon was an exceptional circumstance. The Jordan clock began to run on March 6, 2022 and the trial is scheduled forNovember 2023. The pre-trial period is well below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for trials in superior courts. Accordingly, I findthat Mr.
El-Ajami’s Charter s 11(
b) right has not been infringed.
Charter s 7 [99] The Accused asserted several Charter s 7 breaches which he says separately and together constitute an abuse of process.Justice Devlin in R v Truong, 2020 ABQB 779 at para 26, citing R v Jewitt, (SCC), [1985] 2 SCR 128 at paras 24-25,explained “the essence of the abuse of process doctrine is to prevent the administration of criminal justice from being brought intodisrepute by the Courts’ process becoming allied with state conduct that violates our fundamental norms of decency and moral conduct.” [100] The alleged Charter s 7 breaches can be grouped into three categories. First, Mr.
El-Ajami asserted that the police and Crown’sfailure to provide details of the charges within a reasonable time after charging constituted a breach of Charter s 7. This alleged breach isduplicative of the alleged Charter s 11(
a) breach, so I will not repeat that analysis here. Second, the Accused alleged that the cancellationof his passport and the ordeal he experienced in returning to Canada breached Charter s 7. Counsel for the Accused advised the Court atthe commencement of the proceeding that this category of alleged breach was withdrawn. Third, Mr. El-Ajami alleged that he requesteddisclosure and was denied disclosure multiple times.
The analysis that follows deals only with this third category of alleged Charter s 7breach. [101] The Crown submitted that the right to disclosure does not arise until an accused has been arrested and is subject to thejurisdiction of the Court. The right to disclosure from the Crown protects the right of an accused to make full answer and defence, so itcan only arise once the accused has submitted to the criminal process through an arrest and is required to mount a defence. This view isconsistent with the way that criminal proceedings for serious offences often work.
The present case, however, is different because theAccused was charged before he was arrested. Sopinka J in R v Stinchcombe, (SCC), [1991] 3 SCR 326 at 343 made itclear that the right to disclosure arises upon being charged, just like the Charter s 11 rights: “The obligation to disclose will be triggeredby a request by or on behalf of the accused. Such a request may be made at any time after the charge [emphasis added].” As withCharter s 11(a), had CPS waited to arrest Mr. El-Ajami before charging him, he would not have had a right to disclosure while he wasout of the country. [102] The disclosure package for Mr.
El-Ajami was completed by March 2016. Mr. El-Ajami requested disclosure by telephone andemail in March 2021. His calls to the Crown in March 2021 were recorded. He testified that he made similar calls to the Crown seekingdisclosure between 2017 and 2021 that were not recorded. As set out earlier, there is no evidence to contradict Mr. El-Ajami’s assertionand making such calls is consistent with his recorded interactions with CPS and the Crown. As such, I find that Mr.
El-Ajamiconsistently sought disclosure from about 2017 until it was provided to his counsel in June 2021. [103] Both the recorded conversations and email communications in March 2021 show that the Crown did not want to engage withMr. El-Ajami on the question of disclosure. The Crown’s communications to Mr. El-Ajami and later with his counsel indicate that theCrown was not prepared to provide disclosure directly to Mr. El-Ajami while he was in Lebanon and would only provide disclosure tocounsel once counsel was retained. I find that the Crown’s position was consistent throughout the period of Mr.
El-Ajami’s requestsfrom 2017 to 2021. [104] To justify its position, the Crown points to the Public Prosecution Service of Canada Deskbook,
Part II: Principles GoverningCrown Counsel’s Conduct, s 2.5 Principles of Disclosure, footnote 4 which provides: This guideline assumes that the accused is before a court in Canada charged with an offence in a domestic criminal proceeding. Ifcharges were laid but the accused fled Canada or for some other reason is not before a Canadian court, there is no obligation to providefull disclosure. It may, however, be appropriate to provide counsel with a brief
summary of the case. Where an accused absconds duringa preliminary hearing or trial, and the hearing is continued in his absence pursuant to ss. 475 and 544 of the Code, the obligation to makedisclosure to his counsel continues if counsel continues to act [emphasis added]. [105] Unlike many of the other propositions of law in the footnotes of the PPSC Deskbook discussion of disclosure, footnote 4 is notsupported by any reference to a statute or case authority. [106] The idea that if an accused “is not before a Canadian court, there is no obligation to provide full disclosure” is incorrect.
TheSupreme Court of Canada in Canada (Justice) v Khadr, 2008 SCC 28 (“Khadr I”) found that Charter s 7 required disclosure to beprovided to an individual being prosecuted by the United States and held in a military prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. While thecircumstances of Khadr I were extraordinary, the Court’s decision refutes the categorical assertion in the PPSC Deskbook that there isno obligation to provide disclosure to individuals not before a Canadian court.
See also, Purdy v Canada (Attorney General), 2003BCCA 447, where the Court concluded that an order made pursuant to Charter s 7 requiring provision of Stinchcombe disclosure to anindividual facing charges in the US was not an extra-territorial application of the Charter. [107] The disclosure in Khadr I was ordered to be vetted by a Justice of the Federal Court. The resulting disclosure package was then,
presumably, provided to Khadr’s counsel because he was represented. Even though Mr. Khadr was absent from Canada, his lawyerswere present in Canada and subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the Federal Court. The Crown in the present case followed thepractice in Khadr I, not footnote 4 of the PPSC Deskbook, and provided disclosure to Mr. El-Ajami’s counsel once he was engaged. [108] The present case is different than Khadr I because when Mr. El-Ajami made disclosure requests from 2017 to early 2021, hewas self-represented.
The difference is meaningful because when an accused is self-represented and located outside the country, theaccused cannot give an enforceable undertaking. Put simply, there is no way for the Crown or the Court to prevent the informationdisclosed to the accused from being misused. The question, then, is whether a practical inability to enforce conditions on the use ofdisclosure negates the Crown’s Charter s 7 disclosure obligation. [109] Counsel for Mr. El-Ajami submitted that the Crown was required to provide Mr. El-Ajami with disclosure despite his absencefrom Canada and the fact he was self-represented.
The law is clear that self-represented litigants are entitled to disclosure: Stinchcombeat para 28. The disclosure given to self-represented litigants, however, may be made subject to conditions or controlled access wheresensitive information such as intercepted communications are contained in the disclosure: R v Papageorgiou, (2003) (ON CA), 65 OR (3d) 1 (CA) at para 8. [110] Counsel for Mr. El-Ajami submitted that there was no impediment to the Crown providing Mr. El-Ajami with the vast bulk ofthe disclosure for his case.
Cross-examination of Detective Hollingsworth established that much of the disclosure, including almost all ofthe Report to Crown Counsel, was not sensitive and could have been disclosed to Mr. El-Ajami without posing a risk to the investigationor any other cognizable interest. [111] The Crown submitted that disclosure could not be provided to Mr. El-Ajami because he was self-represented and out of thecountry.
The reason for this is that the disclosure contained sensitive information (intercepted communications, information subject toprivacy obligations, and confidential informant information) which either could not be provided to him or required controlled access oraccess subject to conditions. [112] I cannot accept the Crown’s argument with respect to the presence of sensitive information being an obstacle to disclosing thenon-sensitive parts of the disclosure. The sensitive information could have been held back until such time that Mr.
El-Ajami returned toCanada or otherwise was able to provide an enforceable undertaking. Alternatively, if the sensitive information was of such a nature thatit could not be provided at all or could only be provided subject to controlled access, it could have been held back. In either case, theexistence of sensitive information should not have impeded the disclosure of non-sensitive information. [113] The Crown submitted that even disclosure of any non-sensitive material would have to be made pursuant to conditions to ensurethat Mr.
El-Ajami complied with his obligation not to disclose the information to the world at large: R v Beckett, 2015 BCSC 1165 atpara 7. Any conditions attaching to the provision of disclosure would have to be enforceable through a court order. However, given thatMr. El-Ajami was in Lebanon beyond the reach of the Court, any conditions would be unenforceable. Accordingly, in the Crown’s view,no disclosure could be provided. The Crown relied on the Public Prosecution Service of Canada Deskbook,
Part II: Principles GoverningCrown Counsel’s Conduct,
chapter 2.5 Principles of Disclosure which provides at s 4.3: Counsel should ensure that, where disclosure is made to an unrepresented accused, it is made subject to conditions governing theappropriate uses and limits upon the use of disclosure material. In cases in which there are no sensitive disclosure materials, these basicconditions provide fair warning for accused persons that the disclosure material is not to be disseminated or used for purposes other thanto assist them in making full answer and defence in the prosecution.
Violations by an accused of the conditions (contained in a coverletter) would likely give rise to a Crown request to impose those conditions on the accused by court order. Any breach of the court ordercould be dealt with pursuant to the court’s contempt powers. Counsel should be particularly mindful of the sensitivityof McNeil disclosure information, when dealing with self-represented accused persons [emphasis added]. [114] Neither the Accused nor the Crown was able to provide a court case on point. The Ontario Securities Commission considered asimilar issue in Re Ciccone, (2012) 35 OSCB 10061.
The disclosure requirement in securities commission prosecutions is the same as incriminal law under Stinchcombe: Deloitte & Touche LLP v Ontario (Securities Commission), 2003 SCC 61 at para 23. In Ciccone aMexican company subject to prosecution by the OSC demanded disclosure be sent to Mexico. OSC Staff refused on the grounds thatneither the Mexican company nor its Mexican lawyers could give an undertaking enforceable in Canada. OSC Staff accordinglyinformed the Mexican company that the disclosure was available for review only at the OSC offices unless Canadian counsel wereengaged.
OSC Staff relied on the version of the Ontario Crown Policy Manual which was then in effect in taking this position.Commissioner Krishna rejected the position of OSC Staff and held at para 37: A fundamental problem with Staff’s position is that it draws an unsupportable distinction between respondents living in Canada at thetime of disclosure and those living abroad. In answer to questions from the Panel during the hearing, Staff counsel agreed thatdocuments, including compelled evidence, are routinely provided to unrepresented respondents living in Canada.
Those respondents arefree to leave Canada, taking the compelled evidence with them. In such cases, Staff are equally powerless to stop misuse of thedocuments upon their removal from Canada. If Staff’s concerns about the potential misuse of compelled evidence beyond Canada’sborders warrant restrictions on their disclosure obligations, such restrictions would apply equally to all unrepresented respondents, notsimply those living outside Canada. [115] He continued at para 40: Meaningful disclosure is a subjective concept and may vary depending on the circumstances of each case.
Where, as here, a respondentresides in Mexico and has not retained Ontario counsel, meaningful disclosure requires Staff to provide copies of the disclosure materialto the respondent.
In the circumstances of this case, providing copies of the disclosure material is not only required to ensure proceduralfairness and natural justice, but also to comply with the Commission Rules of Procedure.... [116] Commissioner Krishna ordered disclosure to the Mexican company subject to the company and its Mexican legal counselsigning an undertaking that provided, among other things, that the material provided was to be kept secure and not to be used for acollateral purpose.
[117] Commissioner Krishna’s reasoning in Ciccone is sound. There is no good reason that the Stinchcombe disclosure obligation, atleast as it pertains to non-sensitive information, should not apply when an accused is absent from Canada. Where, as in the present case,much of the disclosure is not sensitive information, the risk of mischief that cannot be controlled by the Court is outweighed by theimportance of the right to disclosure. [118] Stinchcombe at 339 provides that the Crown has discretion with respect to the timing and manner of disclosure.
The scope ofthe Crown’s discretion to delay disclosure was explained by Charron J in R v McNeil, 2009 SCC 3 at para 18. The Crown may withholdor limit access to disclosure in circumstances where disclosure “may result in harm to anyone or prejudice to the public interest.” Courtshave justified the Crown’s discretion with respect to the timing of disclosure as existing primarily to protect ongoing investigations andthe safety of individuals involved in such investigations: see, for example, R v Grant, 2015 SCC 9 at para 52.
Absent suchconsiderations, there should be “early disclosure”: Stinchcombe at 343. [119] The disclosure in the present case was ready in March 2016. By that time, the investigation phase of Operation Gin and Tonicwas complete. The Crown’s only reasons for not providing the disclosure when requested were that Mr. El-Ajami was self-representedand located outside the country. As I have explained, these are not valid reasons for denying provision of the non-sensitive portions ofthe disclosure.
The Crown’s discretion as to the timing and manner of disclosure of non-sensitive material does not extend to withholdingdisclosure until an individual returns from abroad. [120] I find that Mr. El-Ajami’s Charter s 7 right to disclosure was infringed by the Crown’s failure to provide him with the non-sensitive information in the disclosure package when he requested it during the period 2017 to 2021. Charter s 24(1) Remedy [121] The Accused seeks a stay of proceedings. No lesser or alternative remedy was proposed.
Indeed, counsel for the Accusedsubmitted in his written brief that “the only available remedy for the breaches of s. 11(a), s. 11(
b) and s. 7 is a Judicial Stay ofProceedings” [emphasis added]. Accordingly, I consider in the following paragraphs whether a stay of proceedings is appropriate in thecircumstances. [122] A stay of proceedings is a remedy that is reserved for “rare occasions” and the “clearest of cases”: R v Babos, 2014 SCC 16 atpara 31; R v O’Connor, (SCC), [1995] 4 SCR 411 at para 68. Watson JA called it a “nuclear remedy”: R v Mamouni,2017 ABCA 347 at para 36.
But in the context of Charter s 11(b), a stay of proceedings is the “minimum remedy, to which others maybe added, such as, possibly, damages...”: Rahey at para 51. [123] Moldaver J, writing for the majority of the Court, in Babos at para 31 explained that there are two general categories of caseswhere a stay of proceedings may be appropriate: “(1) where state conduct compromises the fairness of an accused’s trial (the “main”category); and (2) where state conduct creates no threat to trial fairness but risks undermining the integrity of the judicial process (the“residual” category).” [124] The present case does not fit into the main category.
There is no evidence before me to indicate that the breach of Charter s11(
a) that occurred in this case will have any adverse effect on the fairness of Mr. El-Ajami’s trial nor do I accept that prejudice to trialfairness should be inferred or presumed from the long delay in providing him with details of the specific offences with which he wascharged. I agree that prejudice to the primary interests protected by Charter s 11(a) – informed decision-making on matters arising in theaftermath of being charged – should be presumed by reason of the long delay, but that is not a relevant consideration under the Babosmain category for a stay of proceedings.
The Babos main category is only concerned with prejudice to the right to a fair trial. [125] With respect to the Charter s 7 breach, the disclosure was provided, albeit late, while the Accused was in Lebanon and theJordan clock had not started to run. Further, there is no claim that the disclosure is incomplete. There is no prejudice to Mr. El-Ajami’sright to a fair trial arising from the Charter s 7 breach. [126] The more difficult question is whether the present case fits into the Babos residual category.
Is this a case where theinfringements of constitutional rights call into question the integrity of the judicial process? And if so, is a stay of proceedings required touphold the integrity of the judicial process? These questions are considered as part of the test for a stay set out in Babos. [127] Moldaver J outlined the test for a stay of proceedings in Babos at para 32. The test for a stay is to be used for both the main andresidual categories of cases. An accused must establish the following elements before a Court will grant a stay:
(1) There must be prejudice to the accused’s right to a fair trial or the integrity of the justice system that “will be manifested,perpetuated or aggravated through the conduct of the trial, or by its outcome;”
(2) There must be no alternative remedy capable of redressing the prejudice; and
(3) Where there is still uncertainty over whether a stay is warranted after steps (1) and (2), the court is required to balance the interestsin favour of granting a stay, such as denouncing misconduct and preserving the integrity of the justice system, against “the interest thatsociety has in having a final decision on the merits” [citations omitted]. [128] There is, as I noted earlier, no prejudice to the Accused’s right to a fair trial, but the infringements of Charter rights in this casedo impugn the integrity of the justice system. Mr.
El-Ajami seeks only a stay of proceedings and there is no other remedy that canaddress the reputational harm to the justice system. Granting a stay, however, undermines the interests of justice in different ways.Whether a stay should be granted in the present case must be determined through the balancing analysis in t
[…]
Loading document…