Smit v Alberta (Director of SafeRoads), 2023 ABKB 435
Opinion
Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Smit v Alberta (Director of SafeRoads), 2023 ABKB 435 Date: 20230725 Docket: 2203 03916 Registry: Edmonton Between: Inge Marli Smit Applicant - and – Director of SafeRoads Alberta Respondent Corrected judgment: A corrigendum was issued on August 1, 2023; the corrections have been made to the text and the corrigendum is appended to this judgment. _______________________________________________________ Memorandum of Decision of the Honourable Mr. Justice N.J. Whitling _______________________________________________________ I.
Introduction and Overview [ 1 ] The Applicant, Ms. Inge Smit, seeks judicial review of a decision of Adjudicator K. Bokhari of SafeRoads Alberta dated January 17, 2022, confirming a Notice of Administrative Penalty (“NAP”) issued against her on December 16, 2021. The legal effect of
the NAP was to disqualify the Applicant from operating a motor vehicle in the Province of Alberta, and to impose a fine of $1,000. Concurrently, the Applicant has brought an application pursuant to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging that the police violated her right to counsel under s. 10(b) , and seeking an order quashing the NAP pursuant to s. 24(1). [ 2 ] These reasons address the merits of the Applicant’s judicial review application and a preliminary jurisdictional objection to the Applicant’s Charter application.
In that objection, the Respondent, the Director of SafeRoads Alberta, submits that the Applicant is prohibited by the SafeRoads regime of Alberta from seeking a Charter remedy from this court. [ 3 ] I find that two of the four grounds of judicial review raised by the Applicant must be allowed. I conclude that the Adjudicator erred and reached an unreasonable decision by admitting a photograph of an Approved Screening Device (“ASD”) submitted by a police officer despite non-compliance with the applicable regulations.
The Adjudicator also reached an unreasonable decision and rendered the proceedings before him unfair by concluding that the Applicant was not entitled to be provided with any video or audio recordings created by the RCMP with respect to the events at issue in the hearing. [ 4 ] In relation to the Director’s jurisdictional objection to the Applicant’s Charter application, I find that the objection must be overruled, and that the application must proceed to a hearing.
The Applicant has a constitutionally protected right to seek an appropriate and just remedy for any violation of her Charter rights that may have been committed by the police. Given that there is no other court or tribunal with jurisdiction to hear this application, the default court of competent jurisdiction is this court.
Depriving the Applicant of any ability to seek a s. 24(1) remedy would be tantamount to depriving her of her Charter rights. [ 5 ] Given that the Applicant’s Charter application must proceed, the issue of what remedy is to be granted in this matter is deferred pending the hearing and determination of that application. II. Facts [ 6 ] The following
summary sets out the facts of this matter that appear to be non-contentious. Given that the Applicant’s Charter application must proceed to a hearing, different or additional facts may be found in the future. [ 7 ] On December 16, 2021, near Ponoka County, Alberta, RCMP officers Cst. Lal and Cst. Hill of the RCMP responded to a report of a single vehicle collision. Upon arrival at 22:16, they observed an SUV in a ditch up against a lamp pole. The vehicle was registered to the Applicant.
A witness at the scene reported that he had observed the SUV swerve and hit the lamp pole, a female exit from the driver’s seat, and a male exit from the passenger seat. Those two individuals were still present at the scene. The female individual was the Applicant. [ 8 ] Based upon her conversation with the witness, Cst. Lal believed that the Applicant had been the driver of the vehicle and that she may have been drinking earlier in the evening. [ 9 ] Cst. Hill spoke with the Applicant and obtained an identity document from her, noting that she did not have an Alberta driver’s license. While Cst.
Hill accompanied the male occupant to fill out a witness statement, Cst. Lal directed the Applicant to a police vehicle. As the Applicant went to the police vehicle, Cst. Lal noted an odour of alcohol coming from her, that her eyes were glossy, and that she could not balance well. [ 10 ] Cst. Lal read the Applicant an ASD demand at 22:34. Cst. Hill then administered the ASD and the Applicant provided a “FAIL” sample at 22:38. While Cst. Hill and the Applicant were waiting for the result of the breath test to come back, the Applicant advised Cst. Hill that she and the male occupant had been at a Christmas party.
Cst. Hill asked the Applicant how much she had to drink and she stated that she had only consumed a few drinks. [ 11 ] Cst. Lal advised the Applicant that she would be receiving an Immediate Roadside Suspension sanction. According to her report, Cst. Lal also advised the Applicant that “she has the right to request a second test to confirm blood alcohol concentration” but that Ms. Smit declined “that request”.
The Applicant was then served with a NAP, a seizure form, a tow form, and a ticket for operating a vehicle without a subsisting operator’s license. [ 12 ] Boxes checked on the NAP indicate that it was issued on the basis of reasonable grounds to believe that (1) the Applicant had operated a motor vehicle while her ability to do so was impaired by alcohol or a drug or a combination, and (2) that within 2 hours of ceasing to drive a motor vehicle, the Applicant’s blood alcohol concentration exceeded 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood. [ 13 ] The Applicant applied for a review of the NAP on December 20, 2021, by filling out an online form entitled Request for Review.
The Applicant’s form included the following request: The Applicant is requesting full disclosure, including all hand-written notes, typed reports, video from the police vehicles and police station, and all other relevant records and materials. [Emphasis added] [ 14 ] Also on December 20, 2021, Cst. Lal uploaded a collection of electronic records respecting the Applicant’s matter to the Administrative Penalty Information System (“APIS”).
Those records included both officers’ handwritten notes and typewritten reports, as well as a photograph of an ASD with a tag exhibiting a “Calibration Date” and a “Calibration Expiry” date. The records did not include any video or audio recordings, and no advice was provided as to whether any such recordings existed. [ 15 ] The records uploaded to APIS by Cst. Lal were accompanied by an electronic form that she had completed. That form does not contain an actual signature or an electronic signature.
Instead, the “Declaration” at the end of that electronic form reads: Full Name of Officer Date of Submission Rita Lal 20 Dec, 2021
I solemnly declare the information that I have authored in this my contravention submission, and I make this solemn declaration conscientiously believing it to be true and knowing that it is of the same force and effect as if made under oath. Yes [ 16 ] The hearing proceeded before the Adjudicator on January 4, 2022, by videoconference. The attendees were the Adjudicator, the Applicant, and the Applicant’s counsel. There were no police officers or other witnesses in attendance.
Instead, the Adjudicator relied upon the records that had been uploaded to the APIS portal, noting that such materials are generally admissible in such proceedings. As is customary, no one attended the hearing on behalf of the Director or the police. The Adjudicator emphasized at the outset that the hearing was limited to 30 minutes. [ 17 ] The Applicant’s counsel submitted written submissions to the Adjudicator in advance of the hearing. Those submissions were subject to a limit of 50 pages, inclusive of case law. The Applicant’s counsel also presented oral submissions to the Adjudicator.
Although there was no formal testimony, the Applicant was asked by her counsel to confirm that she had read the written submissions and to confirm that they were complete and accurate. In answer, the Applicant stated: “Yes, I have, and I confirm that.” [ 18 ] In her submissions, the Applicant raised and argued the following grounds of review before the Adjudicator: 1. Pursuant to sections 4(e)(iii) and 4(f)(iii) of the SafeRoads Alberta Regulation [ SAR ], the Director did not provide complete records to the recipient as required by
section 12 of the Provincial Administrative Penalties Act ( PAPA ). The appellant ought to have been provided with the audio and video recordings from the police vehicle and, pursuant to s. 2(c)(
i) a record indicating the expiry date of the last annual maintenance performed on the device. 2. Cst. Lal’s evidence is both unreliable and inadmissible. 3. The appellant was not impaired in her ability to operate a motor vehicle and the NAP should be cancelled pursuant to s. 4 (e)(iv) of the SAR . 4. The appellant’s right to counsel was breached contrary to s. 10(
a) and s. 10(
b) of the Charter . 5. The appellant was not properly informed of her rights to a roadside appeal. The NAP should be cancelled pursuant to s. 4e(
v) and 4 (f) (viii) of the SAR . [ 19 ] On January 17, 2022, the Adjudicator provided a written decision finding that the Applicant had not established any ground of review and confirming the NAP. The relevant aspects of that decision will be addressed later in these reasons. [ 20 ] The proceedings before this court were commenced by the Applicant by the filing of an Original Application for Judicial Review on February 15, 2022. That Application sets out numerous grounds of review as well as a paragraph indicating an intention to seek Charter relief.
The relief sought in that Originating Application includes orders in the nature of certiorari and mandamus . [ 21 ] The Applicant’s Charter Notice was filed as a separate document on February 15, 2022. At the hearing of this matter, the Applicant was granted permission to file an Amended Charter Notice which she did on June 12, 2023.
Among other things, the Charter Notices seek an Order pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter quashing the NAP. [ 22 ] The Applicant’s Charter Notice also seeks a declaration that various provisions of Alberta’s SafeRoads regime are of no force or effect, but the Applicant is not pursuing that request for relief. [ 23 ] The Applicant’s written submissions before this court do not reflect a clear distinction between her judicial review arguments and her Charter arguments, and s. 24(1) of the Charter is not mentioned in those submissions.
Nevertheless, the Applicant’s Charter notice did provide the Director with sufficient notice that Charter relief was being sought, and the Director’s written submissions set out arguments and case law objecting to the hearing of that application. [ 24 ] At the oral hearing of this matter, counsel for the Applicant provided greater clarity and detail respecting the Applicant’s request for Charter relief.
At that time, it was agreed that it would be most efficient for me to issue a preliminary ruling dealing with the Director’s objection to the Applicant’s Charter application before proceeding to any necessary merits hearing. It was also agreed that, in the meantime, the Applicant would prepare an amended Charter application setting out the basis for that application with greater clarity and detail, so as to ensure that the Director is accorded a fair opportunity to respond. III. Issues [ 25 ] The Applicant’s grounds for judicial review raise the following issues:
(1) Did the Adjudicator err and act unreasonably in admitting and relying upon the photograph of the ASD?
(2) Did the Adjudicator err and act unreasonably in finding that the police’s delay in obtaining a breath sample did not render the admission of the ASD result unfair?
(3) Did the Adjudicator properly apply the burden of proof in determining that the photograph of the ASD submitted by Cst. Lal depicted the particular device used in the investigation of the Applicant?
(4) Did the Adjudicator err and act unreasonably in finding that the Director’s failure to provide the Applicant with any existing video recording of the events at issue did not render the proceedings unfair?
[ 26 ] The Director’s preliminary objection to the Applicant’s Charter application raises the following issue:
(5) Does the applicable SafeRoads legislation prohibit the Applicant from seeking a remedy pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter in the provincial superior courts? IV. Did the Adjudicator err and act unreasonably in admitting and relying upon the photograph of the ASD? [ 27 ] The Applicant’s first ground of review is that the Adjudicator erred in admitting and relying upon the photograph submitted by Cst. Lal which depicts an ASD device and attached tags indicating its calibration date and calibration expiry date. This record appears at page REC053 of the record of proceedings.
The Applicant submits that since that photograph does not meet the statutory requirements applicable to the admission of photographs, the Director did not provide complete records to the Applicant as required by s. 12 of the Provincial Administrative Penalties Act , SA c.
P-30.8 (“ PAPA ”), being a ground prescribed in ss. 4 (e)(iii) and 4(f)(iii) of the SafeRoads Alberta Regulation , AR 224/2020 (“ SAR ”) for quashing the NAP. [ 28 ] The standard of review applicable to this ground of review is reasonableness. [ 29 ] In support of this ground of review, the Applicant submits that since the Declaration subscribed to and uploaded by Cst.
Lal does not state that the photograph “has not been altered in any material way” as required by s. 17(2) of the Provincial Administrative Penalties Regulation , AR 217/2020 (“ PAPR ”), the photograph has not been “confirmed” for the purposes of s. 14 of the PAPA , and consequently is not “deemed to have been made under oath” for the purposes of that s. 14. [ 30 ] In support of this argument, the Applicant relies upon several decisions of this Court which have accepted substantially these same arguments: Demars v Alberta (Director of SafeRoads) , 2022 ABKB 620 , paras 18-19 ; Wildman v Alberta (Director of SafeRoads) , 2022 ABKB 756 at para 35 ; Nichol v Alberta (Director of SafeRoads) , 2023 ABKB 72 ; Knull v Alberta (Director of SafeRoads) , 2023 ABKB 119 .
I am advised by counsel that Demars and Wildman are currently under appeal. [ 31 ] In response, the Director submits that I am not bound to follow the four decisions of this court cited in the previous paragraph. Referring to the framework applicable to horizontal stare decisis in R v Sullivan, 2022 SCC 19 at para. 75 , it is argued that “the relevant provisions of PAPA (ss. 14, 18, and 32) and PAPR ( ss. 12 through 17) were not appropriately considered” in those cases.
In brief overview, the Director acknowledges that the photograph was not “confirmed” in accordance with s. 17(2) of the PAPR , and that consequently it is not deemed by s. 14 of the PAPA to have been given under oath. But the Director points out that the legislation does not require records submitted by an officer to be confirmed or to be under oath in order to be admitted. On the contrary, such provisions as s. 18(2) of the PAPA and s. 12 of the PAPR state that records submitted by an officer may be considered by an adjudicator. No confirmation or oath requirements are present.
Further, s. 13 of the PAPR states that a document “signed” by an officer “shall” be admitted in evidence.
The net effect of Demars , Wildman , Nichol and Knull is to insert a confirmation requirement into s. 18(2) of the PAPA and s. 12 of the PAPR , and to substitute the word “confirmed” for the word “signed” in s. 13 of the PAPR , at least insofar as those provisions pertain to photographs submitted by an officer. [ 32 ] Although I recognize the force of the Director’s arguments, substantially the same arguments were raised and rejected in the aforementioned decisions of this court, notably in Wildman , where Woolley J. considered all of the legislative provisions now relied upon by the Director.
Consequently, it cannot be said that those earlier decisions were reached per incuriam , and I am bound by Sullivan to follow them. [ 33 ] I find that the Adjudicator erred in relying upon the photograph of the ASD and its attached tags since Cst. Lal did not “confirm” that record in accordance with s. 17(2) of the PAPR . The Applicant’s first ground of review is allowed. V.
Did the Adjudicator err and act unreasonably in finding that the police’s delay in obtaining a breath sample did not render the admission of the ASD result unfair? [ 34 ] In the Applicant’s second ground of review, she argues that the Adjudicator failed to adequately consider what was alleged to be Cst. Lal’s failure to comply with the immediacy requirement in ss. 320.27(1) (
b) and 320.27(2) of the Criminal Code . That immediacy requirement has since been considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Breault , 2023 SCC 9 . In overview, the Applicant argues that by detaining the Applicant for approximately 18 or 19 minutes before obtaining an ASD sample, the officers failed to comply with that immediacy requirement, thereby violating ss. 8 and 10(
b) of the Charter .
While acknowledging that the Adjudicator had no Charter jurisdiction, the Applicant argues that the Adjudicator was nevertheless required to consider the important interests at stake when applying the duty to act fairly, and in conducting the balancing exercise required by Doré v Barreau du Québec , 2012 SCC 12 , and Loyola High School v Quebec (Attorney General) , 2015 SCC 12 . [ 35 ] At the oral hearing of this matter, the Applicant’s counsel fairly acknowledged the previous decisions of this court which hold that the Doré / Loyola framework does not apply to proceedings before an Adjudicator: Isley v Alberta (Director of Saferoads) , 2022 ABQB 249 at paragraph 51 ; Rose v Alberta (Director of SafeRoads) , 2022 ABQB 297 at paras. 36-41 . [ 36 ] The Director submits that the Adjudicator’s assessment of this issue was reasonable for the purposes of the applicable standard of review.
[ 37 ] I agree with the Director. [ 38 ] In his reasons for decision, the Adjudicator correctly noted that he did not have authority to find Charter breaches or to grant Charter remedies, but that Charter values could be considered in assessing whether the admission of evidence would render the proceedings unfair (para. 4 and Appendix A). He then found that none of the alleged Charter breaches would affect the relevance or reliability of the ‘FAIL’ result obtained on the ASD (para. 31), or the “existence” of the indicia of impairment relied upon by Cst. Lal (para. 33).
Finally, the Adjudicator concluded that the Applicant “has not established and I do not find the officer’s behavior was abusive, flagrant, or otherwise egregious such that the alleged breaches outweigh the purpose of promoting traffic safety or issuance of the NAP.” (para. 53) [ 39 ] The Adjudicator’s analysis and conclusions respecting the Applicant’s Charter arguments were reasonable. Since the Adjudicator’s decision did not implicate any Charter protected interests, he was not bound to follow the balancing framework established in Doré / Loyola .
Instead, he was only required to consider whether the acceptance of the evidence uploaded by Cst. Lal would render the proceedings before him unfair in the common law sense. It cannot be said that the Adjudicator’s conclusions on this subject were unreasonable, and I agree with them. [ 40 ] The Applicant’s second ground of judicial review is dismissed. VI. Did the Adjudicator properly apply the burden of proof in determining that the photograph of the ASD submitted by Cst.
Lal depicted the particular device used in the investigation of the Applicant? [ 41 ] The Applicant submits that the Adjudicator applied the wrong burden of proof in the following passage of his decision: While the reports of the officers do not explicitly state the serial number of the ASD used, I do not agree with Counsel’s submission. Counsel’s argument that it is not clear the photo had anything to do with the investigation does not establish that the ASD was not the one used to test the Recipient. I find it is logical that Cst.
Lal would have uploaded the information of the ASD used to obtain a sample in this investigation. I have no reason to believe that an unrelated or random ASD photograph would be uploaded by the officer, and to think so would be conjecture. [ 42 ] The Applicant submits that in the above manner, the Adjudicator placed an impossible burden upon the Applicant since it was not within her power to prove which ASD was used by Cst. Lal.
She submits further that in the absence of any initial showing of proof by the police, this issue ought to have been resolved in her favour. [ 43 ] I conclude that the inference and conclusion drawn by the Adjudicator in the above passage was reasonable, and was not reached in violation of the applicable burden of proof. In this regard, it must be emphasized that the evidence before the Adjudicator included not only the photograph itself, but also the following representation in the “APIS Contravention Export” report respecting the photograph, which was attested to by Cst.
Lal: Picture of device with tags that show model, maintenance expiry and calibration Impairment Screening Test (Required) File Name: asd.pdf 51.93kb Published Uploaded by Rita Lal on Dec 20, 2021 [ 44 ] In my view, this entry constituted an implicit representation by Cst. Lal that the ASD depicted in the photograph that she uploaded was the ASD that she used to obtain a breath sample from the Applicant. Under these circumstances, it was reasonable for the Adjudicator to conclude that the Applicant had been provided with the records required by s. 2 (
c) of the SAR . [ 45 ] The Applicant’s third ground of judicial review is dismissed. VII.
Did the Adjudicator err and act unreasonably in finding that the Director’s failure to provide the Applicant with any existing video recording of the events at issue did not render the proceedings unfair? [ 46 ] In her third ground of judicial review, the Applicant submits that the Adjudicator erred and acted unreasonably in finding that the Director was not required to provide her with any video recordings of the events at issue that existed, and that the withholding of such evidence did not render the proceedings before the Adjudicator unfair. A.
Standard of Review [ 47 ] In Gordey v Alberta (Director of SafeRoads) , 2023 ABKB 228 , Harris J. found that the police are required to disclose all
police notes and reports in the context of SafeRoads proceedings, or alternatively, to advise that no such materials exist. In doing so, Harris J. found that the standard of review applicable to issues of procedural fairness, including the disclosure of relevant information, is reasonableness. I reach the same conclusion for somewhat different reasons. [ 48 ] Harris J.’s conclusion in Gordey respecting the applicable standard of review was derived from the presumptive standard of reasonableness in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov , 2019 SCC 65 ( Gordey at paras. 20-23 ).
However, Vavilov makes clear that that presumptive standard does not apply to issues of procedural fairness ( Vavilov at para. 23 ). [ 49 ] Many cases released prior to Vavilov state that the standard of review applicable to issues of procedural fairness is correctness ( Khela v Mission Institution , 2014 SCC 24 at para. 79 ; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa , 2009 SCC 12 at para. 43 ; I.B.E.W., Local 894 v Ellis-Don Ltd. , 2001 SCC 4 at para. 65 ).
Other pre- Vavilov cases reflect the view that, strictly speaking, no standard of review applies to issues of procedural fairness, such that no standard of review analysis is necessary, but that the nature of the review may be described as something akin to correctness ( C.U.P.E. v. Ontario (Minister of Labour) , 2003 SCC 29 at para. 102 ; Brooks v. Ontario Racing Commission , 2017 ONCA 833 at para. 5 ; 1657575 Ontario Inc. v.
Hamilton (City) , 2008 ONCA 570 at para. 23 ). [ 50 ] Prior to Vavilov , the Alberta Court of Appeal had held that the fairness of administrative proceedings is not measured on a correctness or a reasonableness standard, but based on whether the proceedings met the level of fairness required by law ( Johnston v Alberta (Director of Vital Statistics) , 2008 ABCA 188 at para. 12 ; Boardwalk Reit LLP v Edmonton (City) , 2008 ABCA 220 at para. 174 ; Hennig v Institute of Chartered Accountants of Alberta (Complaints Inquiry Committee) , 2008 ABCA 241 at para 12 ; Fitzpatrick v College of Physical Therapists of Alberta , 2019 ABCA 254 at para. 29 ).
The Court of Appeal has reiterated this approach since Vavilov while recognizing that some courts continue to refer to a correctness standard ( R v Ferzli , 2020 ABCA 272 ; Baron Real Estate Investments Ltd. v Edmonton (City) , 2021 ABCA 64 at para. 17 ). [ 51 ] Substantially the same approach adopted by the Alberta Court of Appeal has been adopted in many other Canadian cases.
In Canadian Pacific Railway Company v Canada (Attorney General) , 2019 FCA 69 , Rennie J.A. noted at para. 54 that “ even though there is awkwardness in the use of the terminology, this reviewing exercise is “best reflected in the correctness standard” even though, strictly speaking, no standard of review is being applied” (quoting from Eagle’s Nest Youth Ranch Inc. v Corman Park (Rural Municipality #344) , 2016 SKCA 20 at para. 20 ). [ 52 ] Although the above authorities confirm that no standard of review is applied to questions of procedural fairness, these authorities also confirm that where an applicable statute expressly defines the applicable standard of review, that standard must be applied: Vavilov at paras. 34-35 ; R v Owen , 2003 SCC 33 at paras. 31-32 .
In the present case, the Legislature has expressly stated in s. 24(3) of the PAPA that the applicable standard of review is reasonableness: 24(3) On an application for judicial review under subsection (2), the standard of review is reasonableness. [ 53 ] Given that the aforementioned cases state that there is no standard of review applicable to issues of procedural fairness, it is unclear whether the reasonableness standard imposed by s. 24(3) is to be applied to issues of this nature. [ 54 ] Further complications arise where, as in the present case, the applicable legislation confers a discretion upon an administrative decision-maker respecting matters pertaining to procedural fairness.
The leading case on this point, Khela , addressed the non-disclosure of information in the context of prison transfer proceedings where the applicable statutes conferred a discretion upon correctional authorities to withhold records where there were “reasonable grounds to believe” that disclosure would raise a security risk . Lebel J. held at para. 70 that since this was an issue of procedural fairness, the standard of review was correctness. However, he also held at para. 89 that a decision to withhold documents for security reasons “is entitled to a margin of deference”.
It has been stated that these aspects of Khela have created “ untenable uncertainty plaguing the jurisprudence on procedural fairness review” ( Law Society of Saskatchewan v.
Abrametz , 2022 SCC 29 at paras. 171-79 , Côté J. dissenting ) and a “jurisprudential muddle” ( Bergeron v Canada (Attorney General) , 2015 FCA 160 , 474 N.R. 366 at paras. 67-71 , per Stratas J.A.). [ 55 ] The conceptual difficulty created by Khela arises in the present case since the SAR only entitles the Applicant to be provided with records that are “in the opinion of the Director” relevant and necessary: Records to be provided to recipient for review 2 The Director shall provide the following to a recipient on receipt of an application for review: [...] (
h) any other relevant records and representations of the officer who issued the notice of administrative penalty or any other officer, including peace officers’ reports that have not been certified, sworn or solemnly affirmed, that are in the opinion of the Director relevant and necessary to determine the basis for issuing the notice of administrative penalty . [Emphasis added] [ 56 ] The Adjudicator in the present case quoted s. 2 (
h) and provided the following reasons reflecting his
interpretation of that provision: 15.With regard to
Section 2(
h) of the Regulation, I note this
section does not require any additional records that might be available, but only additional records that are in the opinion of the Director (of SafeRoads Alberta) relevant and necessary to determine the basis for the issuance of the NAP. In most cases, this function is fulfilled by the records required under Sections 2(
a) and 2(
b) of the Regulation, and I am satisfied that this case is no exception. I am not satisfied additional information, such as video and audio records from the RCMP interaction with the Recipient, should they even exist, would be required pursuant to
Section 12 of PAPA. The Recipient was provided with a valid NAP with the required particulars and received Cst. Lal report with particulars and details. Counsel has also not established that such records even exist. In light of the evidence that was provided to the Recipient, I find that the audio and video recordings are not necessary records to determine the basis for issuing the NAP.
16. The Recipient has not made out this ground to cancel. [57] The analysis above constitutes a decision by a SafeRoads Adjudicator respecting a SafeRoads regulation. A presumption ofreasonableness review is applicable to decisions in which administrative decision makers interpret their home statutes: Vavilov at para.25; Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2011 SCC 61 at para. 30; Mouvement laïquequébécois v Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16 at para. 46; Edmonton (City) v Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres Ltd., 2016SCC 47 at para. 22. [58] In D.
McKee, “The Standard of Review for Questions of Procedural Fairness” (2016), 41 Queen’s L.J. 355, the authorconsiders discretionary procedural decisions of this nature, and opines that the applicable standard of review will generally bereasonableness: B. Procedural Choices as Decisions In CUPE v Ontario, as quoted above, Binnie J drew a distinction between the “manner” of making a decision and the “end product” ofsuch a process. In practice, however, such a distinction is not always evident.
In some cases, agencies’ procedural choices may be treatedas decisions in their own right and thus subjected to judicial review according to the standards set out in Dunsmuir. When this happens,such decisions are likely to be characterized either as questions of discretion or as questions of the
interpretation of the agency’s homestatute. In either case, the standard of review applied to these procedural choices will usually be reasonableness. The possibility oftreating procedural choices as decisions thus provides a further source of uncertainty as to the applicable standard of review forprocedural questions. [59] The above review does not lead to a clear conclusion as to the standard of review applicable to questions of non-disclosure inthe present proceedings. Given, however, that s. 2(
h) turns upon a measure of discretion by the Director, and given that the Adjudicatorrendered a decision on this procedural issue based upon an
interpretation of his home statute, I will apply the standard of review ofreasonableness to this particular issue of procedural fairness. C. The Requirements of Procedural Fairness [60] In determining whether or not the duty of fairness entitled the Applicant to disclosure of any video recordings of herinteractions with the police, it is helpful to identify the values that are served by the concept of procedural fairness.
In the criminal caseof R v Harrer, (SCC), [1995] 3 SCR 562 at para. 45, McLachlin J. (as she then was) held that “[a] fair trial is one whichsatisfies the public interest in getting at the truth, while preserving basic procedural fairness for the accused.” [61] Similar considerations are implicated by the duty of fairness in the administrative context. In D. J. M. Brown and J. M.
Evans,Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada at §7.3 the authors identify the “Quality of Decision-Making” as an important valueunderlying the duty of fairness: The underlying premise of this rationale is that the observance of appropriate procedures will increase the likelihood that decisions aremore accurate, better informed and thoughtful.
Moreover, if appropriate procedures are in place it is less likely that individuals will bedenied their rights or will suffer some other form of prejudice that might result if the administrative action was based on erroneous,incomplete or ill-considered findings of fact, conclusions of law, or exercises of discretion. [62] Brown and Evans go on to identify the second value underlying the duty of fairness as “Acceptability of Decisions”, anddescribe it as follows: From the point of view of those affected, participatory procedures tend to enhance the acceptability of administrative action.
Suchprocedures satisfy the desiderata that before action is taken that adversely affects an individual, the person concerned must be advised ofthe measure contemplated, be afforded an opportunity to respond, and subsequently be informed of the reasons for the decision made. Aswell, it is the essence of the democratic ideal that citizens participate in the making of decisions of importance to their lives, and thatgovernment should be accountable for its actions.
In short, participatory procedures underwrite the legitimacy of governmental action. [63] On the other side of the scales, Brown and Evans emphasize that the benefits of procedural safeguards must be measuredagainst the inevitable delays and other costs that will accompany their introduction: It is equally important to recognize that significant costs will almost certainly accompany a requirement that government provide ameaningful opportunity for those interested to participate in the decision-making process.
Public resources are limited, and any agency that is compelled to devote some of its limited resources to the conduct of hearings or otherforms of participation before taking any significant decision may be deterred from pursuing its statutory mandate with the appropriatevigour. Moreover, in some contexts the requirement that trial-like procedures be followed may not enhance the quality of decision-making.
Indeed, to require such procedures may lead to inappropriate “judicialization” of the decision-making process. [64] Against this background, the applicable authorities direct that questions of procedural fairness are to be determined in light ofthe factors identified in Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 817: (1)the nature of the decision being made and process followed in making it; (2) the nature of the statutory scheme and the terms of thestatute pursuant to which the body operates; (3) the importance of the decision to the individual or individuals affected; (4) thelegitimate expectations of the person challenging the decision; (5) the choices of procedure made by the agency itself. [65] Regarding the first Baker factor, being the nature of the decision being made, a SafeRoads Adjudicator must decide, on abalance of probabilities, whether the suspended driver has established any of the prescribed grounds of review in s. 4 of the SAR.
Someof these grounds, such as ss. 4(e)(iv) and 4(f)(iv) require the Adjudicator to determine whether the applicant committed conduct that
amounts to the commission of a criminal offence. Although the burden of proof lies on the applicant, and although the civil standard ofproof applies, the decision being made is an assessment of individual responsibility for criminal conduct. [66] Regarding the statutory scheme within which Adjudicators operate, the language of the applicable legislation reflects anintention to place the disclosure of relevant documents within reasonable limits.
Section 12 of the PAPA expressly limits a recipient’sright of disclosure to those documents prescribed by the regulations. Hence, Stinchcombe disclosure rights are not present. The particularprovision relied upon by the Applicant in the present case is s. 2(
h) of the SAR which confers a discretion upon the Director to determinethe documents that are to be disclosed on the basis that they are “relevant and necessary to determine the basis for issuing the notice ofadministrative penalty”. [67] Regarding the importance of the decisions to the individuals affected, an Adjudicator’s decision to confirm or deny a NAP isof great importance. As Slatter J.A. held in Sahaluk v Alberta Transportation Safety Board, 2017 ABCA 153, permission to drive amotor vehicle, while not engaging Charter interests, “is recognized as a very valuable privilege”.
He continued: 92 Our society and economy are structured in ways that are heavily reliant on the automobile. Dr. Beirness noted that removal of drivingprivileges is “a tremendous inconvenience that can cause serious hardship through disruption of routine and lifestyle” (JEKE R34). ManyCanadians depend on an automobile for economic, social, educational, and recreational purposes. As noted in Moloney [2015 SCC 51] atpara. 56: . . . Driving is unlike other activities. For many, it is necessary to function meaningfully in society.
As such, driving often cannot be seenas a genuine “choice”: R v White, (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 417, at para. 55. The effect of the provincial schemeundoubtedly amounts to coercion in that regard.
As a consequence, it has long been recognized that withdrawing the privilege of driving has a punitive effect, and plays a significant rolein deterring socially undesirable behaviour: R. v Ladouceur, (SCC), [1990] 1 SCR 1257 at p. 1284. “Privileges” maynot themselves attract Charter protection, but the withdrawal of privileges as a sanction for alleged criminal conduct does. [68] Finally, the procedures before Adjudicators are swift and simple. Applicants may generally make oral submissions, at least byvideoconference. Charter applications may not be raised or determined. Applicants may be represented by counsel.
Although theDirector is not represented at the hearing, the prosecutorial role is generally filled by the contents of the documents submitted by thepolice. The documents to be disclosed to the applicants are those listed in s. 2 and include police reports and police notes which reflectevidence gathered through investigative powers conferred by the Criminal Code. Strict time limits and page limits apply to submissions.There is no oral testimony, and no cross examination is permitted. Adjudicators generally provide written decisions explaining theirreasons. [69] In
summary, although the proceedings before Adjudicators are not judicial in nature, they do share some commonalities withcriminal prosecutions.
The matters at issue often include the commission of conduct amounting to a criminal charge, the evidence againstthe applicant is that gathered and submitted by law enforcement officers pursuant to investigative detentions and seizures of bodilysubstances, and the consequences of the proceedings amount to a severe sanction that can have a profound impact upon an individual’sability to function meaningfully in society. [70] In my view, these considerations support the need for a relatively high degree of procedural fairness. D.
Video and Audio Recordings Created by Law Enforcement [71] With these considerations in mind, I turn to an assessment of the costs and benefits associated with the disclosure, admission,and use of video and audio recorded evidence created by law enforcement agencies. [72] The frequent use of vehicle and body-mounted video recording equipment by the RCMP in recent years is well known.
TheRCMP’s website currently provides the following information regarding the use of such equipment as of February 7, 2020: In-Car Digital Video System National Traffic Services of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), headed by the Commissioner of the RCMP, has implementedthe In-Car Digital Video System (ICDVS) as a long-term program. The ICDVS is used by law enforcement agencies to captureaudio/video recordings of incidents and interactions with the general public, witnesses and/or suspects as they occur to aid ininvestigations and gather evidence.
The intention is to enhance transparency and accountability if questions, concerns, or accusationsagainst the RCMP arise after an incident, and to provide evidence for prosecution should an incident constitute a crime. [...] The ICDVS has evolved from analog systems recording audio/video evidence on tapes to digital media evidence (DME) being recordedby digital video recorders (DVR) on DVD or, more recently, on other types of digital removable media. In-Car Video Systems have beenused in RCMP vehicles since the early 1990s. There are currently over 2500 police vehicles equipped with cameras.
The objectiveremains to provide RCMP officers with tools that allow them to meet the challenges of modern policing in a constantly changingenvironment. The current ICDVS consists of five in-vehicle groups of components when deployed: the front vehicle audio/video capturing equipment,the back seat audio/video capturing equipment, the display and control equipment, the recording equipment, and wire/wireless exportequipment.
Recordings will be automatically started when the police vehicle’s emergency lights or sirens are activated, the vehicle speedis over 140 km/h, the vehicle is involved in a collision, the member turns on the wireless microphone, or when the ICDVS is manuallyturned on. Any time the system is turned “on” the previous 30 seconds are automatically saved to the hard drive.[1]
[ 73 ] The Government of Alberta, through the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Services, has recently announced that all police services in Alberta will be required to equip officers with body-worn cameras. The news release accompanying this announcement provides the following rationale for that policy: Once deployed provincewide, Albertans and police services will be assured that engagements between the public and police services will be more transparent. With body cameras in place, it will be easier to review interactions with police services, which will help promote accountability for all parties.
The most effective way to keep Albertans safe and secure in their communities is to build relationships and trust with the police that serve them. [2] [ 74 ] In October of 2022, the RCMP published a body-worn cameras operational policy. The current RCMP policy page includes the following comment: Why we will use body-worn cameras We are committed to ensuring that Canadians feel protected by, and have trust in their national police force.
Body-worn cameras can help increase trust between police and the communities they serve because the video evidence collected will provide an independent, unbiased, and objective way to capture interactions between the community and police officers. [3] [ 75 ] Although some of the formal policies quoted above were not in place at the time of the events in question in the present case, the use of body worn cameras and dashboard cameras by the police has been commonplace for many years.
In R v McCoy , 2016 ABQB 240 at paras. 34-36 , Dario J. observed that as of 2013, RCMP policies required officers to use in car video systems in all instances where their police vehicles were equipped with such equipment. Although McCoy and other cases have rejected the notion of a constitutional right on the part of a detainee to have their interactions with police video or audio-recorded, many cases recognize the practical importance of such recordings, both to aid in the search of truth, and to conserve public resources.
In R v Cheema , 2016 ONCJ 548 , O’Donnell J. commented on this subject area as follows: 52 Being from away, I do not know definitively what portions of the process are routinely recorded on audio or video or both. To the extent that such recordings may exist, perhaps more so with one police service than another for all I know, I do not know the extent to which they are routinely disclosed or the extent to which they are routinely relied on in court. Moving on from what I do not know, I do know this: a. It is 2016. b.
Audio and video recording equipment is both omnipresent and cheap, to the point that some police services are graduating from car- based systems to body-cameras. If the average mountain-biking enthusiast can afford to record his every manoeuvre, it is a valid question as to why such capacity is not routinely employed when police interactions with the public are concerned. c. The Crown bears the burden of proof. In many cases the outcome will depend on the frailties of subjective observation, officers’ notekeeping skills and the like.
Bad driving and other signs of impairment or intoxication are ideally suited for objective capture on video- and audio-recordings. Failing to video- and audio-record such interactions compromises the Crown’s ability to obtain convictions and as such appears like a false economy, not only for the police who invest investigative resources in cases that might fail for the lack of available evidence but for defendants and for the state, who spend a lot of money doing trials that might be either shortened or avoided entirely if such recordings were made. d.
This case is a perfect demonstration of the virtues of recording. Almost every drink-driving case would be. [ 76 ] The importance of video recorded evidence has also been emphasized in the administrative context. In Lockyear v Wawanesa Mutual Ins. Co. , 2022 ONSC 94 (Div Ct) a person injured in an accident applied to a “Licence Appeal Tribunal” to determine whether he qualified as “catastrophically injured”. The resolution of this issue required the tribunal to consider the applicant’s interactions with a certain paramedic, Mr. Drew, at the time of the accident.
The police had provided the Applicant with a security video of the incident from a nearby gas station and he sought to introduce it at the hearing to confirm Mr. Drew’s testimony. The tribunal excluded the video on the basis that it was irrelevant since Mr. Drew had a reasonably good memory of the incident and had other ways to refresh his memory. It later rejected Mr. Drew’s version of events. These decisions were repeated in a reconsideration decision. On judicial review, Lederer J., writing for a unanimous panel held that the exclusion of the video had rendered the proceedings unfair: 45...
At the risk of relying on an overused cliché, if a picture is worth a thousand words, how many words is an appropriately described video worth? 44 The paragraph [in the reconsideration decision], continues and ends as follows: In submissions, J.L. does not offer a compelling explanation why he felt the footage was so needed, other than to aide in [ sic ] Mr. Drew’s memory. In my view, it is unclear what value video footage would provide in the context either, since Mr. Drew testified that he recalls many details of the accident and prepared a contemporaneous report that could have aided his memory just as well.
On these facts, I see no reason to interfere with the Tribunal’s decision to exclude the video evidence. 45 The assertion that it was unclear what value the video would have, given its relevance, would stand in favour of, not against, its admission as evidence so that its probative value (its weight) could be tested. The proposition that Adam Drew’s ability to otherwise recall what happened misses the point. Adam Drew’s evidence was not accepted. His credibility was questioned.
Could the video have served not just to help him remember but more importantly confirm what he otherwise said? 46 Refusing to admit the video was a denial of the right of Jeffrey Lockyear to be heard and a breach of procedural fairness. [ 77 ] In
summary, government policies, police policies, judicial decisions, and common sense all confirm the importance of video and audio recorded evidence to the search for truth. Such evidence, where it exists, is highly reliable and objective. It is for this very
reason that video recordings are regularly created by the police. Consequently, the “public interest in getting at the truth” weighs heavily in favour of the production and use of any video or audio recorded evidence that may be available to litigants like the Applicant. [ 78 ] Further, given the utility of video and audio recorded evidence, a person facing the severe consequence of a driving suspension would be less likely to accept or respect a decision premised upon a refusal to consider such evidence in the absence of any clear and cogent justification.
To adopt the words of Brown and Evans, allowing affected persons to make use of such material would enhance the acceptability of administrative action. [ 79 ] On the other side of the scales are any costs which may be associated with the production and use of video and audio recorded evidence, whether in terms of time, money, or other resources. [ 80 ] In this regard, it must be emphasized that the Applicant does not suggest that the police were required to create video or audio recordings of the events at issue.
Rather, she simply seeks disclosure of any such records that were created. [ 81 ] In terms of equipment costs that would result from the disclosure of such evidence, audio and video recording equipment is “omnipresent and cheap” ( Cheema ). The same can be said of the equipment required to store, transfer, and display video and audio recordings. That technology is already used by the police to upload photographs and other documents to the APIS portal from which they can be retrieved by an applicant.
I would anticipate that any additional costs arising from additional technology and equipment to upload video and audio recordings to that portal would be relatively small. [ 82 ] It may be argued that the time needed to review video recorded evidence would lengthen review hearings. But this is not necessarily the case. Parties could still be required to comply with any reasonable time limits, and would thereby be encouraged to use their time judiciously.
Additionally, the irrefutable nature of such evidence has the potential to settle contentious issues, thereby shortening proceedings, or avoiding them entirely. [ 83 ] In conclusion, it is my view that the common law principles of fairness require the disclosure of any existing video or audio recordings to applicants seeking license suspension reviews before SafeRoads Adjudicators, or advice that no such recordings exist. Such proceedings engage important interests, and turn upon individual responsibility for the commission of criminal conduct.
Given that the use of such evidence aids in the search for truth, enhances the acceptability of administrative action, and costs little to produce, share, and review, its exclusion from SafeRoads adjudications is unfair. E. The Applicable Legislation [ 84 ] Against the common law principles of fairness, I turn to the legislation which governs disclosure in SafeRoads adjudications. In this regard, it is well established that common law principles of fairness may be ousted or overruled by the legislature “by clear and explicit language”.
However, when c onfronted with silent or ambiguous legislation, courts generally infer that Parliament or the legislature intended the tribunal’s process to comport with principles of fairness and natural justice: Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v British Columbia , 2001 SCC 52 at paras. 22-24 , 42-43; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa , 2009 SCC 12 at para. 50 ; Anglin v Alberta (Chief Electoral Officer) , 2020 ABQB 31 at para. 55 . [ 85 ] As noted above, the legislation applicable to disclosure of records in the context of SafeRoads adjudications is s. 12 of the PAPA and s. 2 (
h) of the SAR : Duty to provide records to recipient 12(1) The Director shall, after receiving a request for review and the prescribed fee, provide to the recipient, in accordance with the regulations, relevant records as prescribed in the regulations or the regulations under a prescribed enactment.
(2) Unless required by the regulations or the regulations under a prescribed enactment, the Director is not required to provide a recipient with any records, representations or arguments in respect of an alleged contravention beyond the records referred to in subsection (1).
(3) Where the Director is unable to provide relevant records in accordance with subsection (1), the Director may cancel the notice of administrative penalty. [...] Records to be provided to recipient for review 2 The Director shall provide the following to a recipient on receipt of an application for review: [...] (
h) any other relevant records and representations of the officer who issued the notice of administrative penalty or any other officer , including peace officers’ reports that have not been certified, sworn or solemnly affirmed, that are in the opinion of the Director relevant and necessary to determine the basis for issuing the notice of administrative penalty. [Emphasis added] [ 86 ] In my view, s. 12 of the PAPA and s. 2 (
h) of the SAR do not contain clear and explicit language ousting the principles of fairness in relation to the disclosure of relevant documents. Like Harris J. in Gordey at para. 46 , I conclude that there is nothing in the wording of s. 2 (
h) to suggest that disclosure in the SafeRoads process should not reflect the underlying principles of fairness. Although this provision does confer an initial discretion upon the Director to determine whether records are relevant and necessary, that discretion must be exercised reasonably ( Khela at para. 89 ; Gordey at para. 32 ). F. The Adjudicator’s Reasons
[ 87 ] In the present case, no reasons were provided to the Applicant by the Director or the police for refusing to disclose video or audio recorded evidence, or to advise whether or not such evidence existed. [ 88 ] However, the Adjudicator did provide reasons in support of the conclusion that the Applicant was not entitled to be provided with any existing video or audio evidence and those reasons will be reviewed on a deferential standard of reasonableness.
This assessment requires me to consider the issues that were raised at the hearing before the Adjudicator, and the extent to which the unavailability of any existing video or audio recorded evidence impacted upon the resolution of those issues. [ 89 ] The grounds of review raised by the Applicant included that contained in s. 4 (e)(iv) of the SAR , which requires her to prove that her ability to operate a motor vehicle was not impaired to any degree by alcohol or a drug or a combination of alcohol and a drug.
Although no sworn testimony was submitted to the Adjudicator, the Applicant orally confirmed the accuracy of her written submissions which included an assertion that: “The [Applicant]’s ability to operate a motor vehicle was not impaired to any degree by alcohol or a drug or a combination of alcohol and a drug.” With respect to the police reports raised against her on this issue, she argued that the evidence of the two police officers was unreliable insofar as they purported to observe indicia of impairment due to certain inconsistencies in their notes and reports, and that those observed indicia were insufficient to establish impairment. [ 90 ] At para. 24 of his reasons, the Adjudicator concluded that in order to assess the credibility of the evidence respecting impairment, “I must look at the totality of the evidence before me”, reviewed the details of officers’ notes and reports, and concluded that “I am not convinced that there exists discrepancy that reaches the level of causing me to question the accuracy of the officers’ observations”.
Given this assessment, the Adjudicator went on to conclude that he could rely upon the indicia of impairment observed by Cst. Lal, such as glossy eyes and lack of balance when the Applicant walked to the police vehicle. Relying upon this evidence and the ASD result, the Adjudicator concluded at para. 36 that there was sufficient evidence that the Applicant was impaired in her ability to drive. [ 91 ] The Applicant also argued before the Adjudicator that she had not been properly advised of her right to a roadside appeal for the purposes of ss. 4 (e)(
v) and 4 (f)(viii) of the SAR . In her submissions, she stated that she had no recollection of any conversation pertaining to providing a second sample on a different device, and that she did not understand that she had the right to provide a second sample into a different device. The Adjudicator disposed of this issue by accepting the entries contained in the police officers’ notes and reports, and declined to accept the Applicant’s evidence on this point. [ 92 ] In denying the Applicant’s ground of review respecting ss. 4 (e)(iii) and 4(f)(iii) of the SAR on the basis that video recordings had not been disclosed, the Adjudicator provided the following reasons: 14. Regarding
Section 2(h), Counsel submits that the audio and video recordings from the police vehicle are also required and have not been provided. Counsel highlights that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (“RCMP”) vehicles are equipped to provide such audio and video and would readily be available in this incident. Counsel also submits that access to such audio and video would help clarify what transpired during certain portions of the investigation. 15. With regard to
Section 2(
h) of the Regulation, I note this
section does not require any additional records that might be available, but only additional records that are in the opinion of the Director (of SafeRoads Alberta) relevant and necessary to determine the basis for the issuance of the NAP. In most cases, this function is fulfilled by the records required under Sections 2(
a) and 2(
b) of the Regulation, and I am satisfied that this case is no exception. I am not satisfied additional information, such as video and audio records from the RCMP interaction with the Recipient, should they even exist, would be required pursuant to
Section 12 of PAPA. The Recipient was provided with a valid NAP with the required particulars and received Cst. Lal and Cst. Hill’s report with particulars and details. Counsel has also not established that such records even exist.
In light of the evidence that was provided to the Recipient, I find that the audio and video recordings are not necessary records to determine the basis for issuing the NAP. 16.The Recipient has not made out this ground to cancel. [ 93 ] I find that the Adjudicator’s decision respecting non-disclosure of video recordings to be unreasonable for the following reasons. [ 94 ] As an initial matter, the Adjudicator acted unreasonably in dismissing the Applicant’s arguments on the basis that she had not proven that any video recordings existed.
The Applicant submitted an express written request for any video recordings. Given that she had no access to the police’s internal records, there was nothing more that the Applicant could have done to prove that such records existed. The police did not deny that any such recordings existed. Instead, they simply ignored the request. Under these circumstances, an adverse inference against Cst.
Lal and the Director regarding the existence of such evidence was at least available. [ 95 ] Further, the fact that the police frequently use both body and vehicle mounted equipment to record their interactions with members of the public, particularly in impaired driving matters, is now an appropriate subject for judicial notice.
In R v Find , 2001 SCC at para. 48, McLachlin C.J.C. stated the applicable test for judicial notice at para. 48: [T]he threshold for judicial notice is strict: a court may properly take judicial notice of facts that are either: (1) so notorious or generally accepted as not to be the subject of debate among reasonable persons; or (2) capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resort to readily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy. [ 96 ] The fact that police agencies in Alberta frequently, though not universally, create video recordings of their roadside interactions with members of the public meets both of these alternatives.
Such video has often been entered as evidence before the courts of this province, and has been considered in many judicial decisions. The RCMP and the Government of Alberta have each adopted public policies requiring the creation of such evidence where the necessary equipment is available. [ 97 ] The Adjudicator was aware that the Applicant had made a written request for any video evidence, and that that request had been disregarded.
The Applicant also submitted that “RCMP vehicles are equipped with Watchguard video which would have been available for this incident”, thereby inviting the Adjudicator to take notice of this fact. The Adjudicator declined to acknowledge, weigh,
or consider this submission, declined to consider an adverse inference from the police’s failure to respond, and held the Applicant to an impossible burden. [ 98 ] The reasons provided by the Adjudicator in relation to this issue failed “ to meaningfully grapple with key issues or central arguments” ( Vavilov at para. 128 ) respecting the importance of any available video recordings to the inquiry. That is, the Adjudicator failed to consider that any such existing evidence would be highly reliable and potentially dispositive of the events at issue, and would be relatively easy and inexpensive to produce.
In other words, the Adjudicator failed to consider that the search for truth was seriously compromised by Cst. Lal’s refusal to disclose the best available evidence, or alternatively, to advise that it did not exist. [ 99 ] Instead, the Adjudicator’s primary basis for dismissing the Applicant’s submissions in relation to this ground was that “In most cases, this function [of determining the basis for the issuance of the NAP] is fulfilled by the records required under Sections 2(
a) and 2(
b) of the Regulation, and I am satisfied that this case is no exception” (para. 15). With respect, the fact that other evidence exists is not a valid basis for excluding the best evidence that exists, and the Applicant was not required to bring herself within any “exception”, since no such exception is known to the law. [ 100 ] The Applicant submits that the reasons of the Adjudicator as well as those of other SafeRoads Adjudicators reflect the view that the words referring to “the basis for issuing the notice of administrative penalty” in s. 2(
h) encompass only the NAP’s legal basis and not its factual basis. In other words, the Adjudicator may have concluded that if the NAP and the accompanying police documents indicate that the NAP was issued on “the basis” of impaired operation of a motor vehicle, then no further records need to be disclosed or considered. I do not agree with that
interpretation of s. 2(h). Such an
interpretation would reduce the scope of s. 2(
h) to the point of vanishing.
Section 2(h)’s reference to “the basis” for the NAP must encompass both the legal and the factual basis for its issuance. G. Conclusions on the Fourth Ground of Judicial Review [ 101 ] In conclusion, I find that the Director acted unreasonably in failing to disclose any video recordings of the events in question, or alternatively, to advise that no such evidence existed, and that the Adjudicator acted unreasonably in conducting the review before him without the benefit of any such evidence that may have existed. [ 102 ] The Applicant’s fourth ground of judicial review is allowed. VIII.
The Director’s Preliminary Objection to the Applicant’s Charter Application A. Introduction [ 103 ] I will deal next with the Director’s preliminary objection to the hearing and determination of the Applicant’s Charter application. [ 104 ] In a separate document from her Originating Application for judicial review, the Applicant filed a formal Charter Notice on February 15, 2022.
Among other things, that Notice includes the following paragraphs: AND FURTHER TAKE NOTICE that, since the SafeRoads adjudicator was not a court of competent jurisdiction, pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter , the Applicant applies to this Honorable Court for a hearing to call evidence to establish that her
section 7 , 10(
a) and 10(
b) Charter rights were breached by the police officer and to apply to this Honorable Court for a just and appropriate remedy for the breaches. [...] AND FURTHER TAKE NOTICE that the Applicant will seek the following, remedies: [...] 3. Pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter , the Notice of Administrative Penalty against Ms. Smit be quashed as a personal remedy for the Charter breaches. [ 105 ] The Applicant was permitted to file an Amended Charter Notice which she did on June 12, 2023. That Notice provides greater detail as to the merits of the alleged breach of her Charter rights.
For present purposes, it is sufficient to state that she pleads that the police violated her right to counsel under s. 10(b). [ 106 ] The Director submits that this court has no jurisdiction to hear, or alternatively ought to decline to hear the Applicant’s Charter application. In support of this position, the Director relies upon the oral decision of Kubik J. of this court in Packham v Alberta (Director of SafeRoads) (unreported, 12 January 2023), Lethbridge 2106-00508 (ABKB). [ 107 ] I conclude that the Applicant’s Charter application must be heard and determined.
Given that there is no alternative forum for the hearing of this application, it must be heard and determined by the provincial superior court. In reaching this conclusion, I must respectfully disagree with the analysis of Kubik J. in Packham . B. Mills and s. 24(1) of the Charter
[108] I begin my analysis of the Director’s objection with the language of s. 24(1): Enforcement of guaranteed rights and freedoms 24
(1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competentjurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances. [109] The foundational case on the
interpretation and application of s. 24(1) is R v Mills, (SCC), [1986] 1 SCR 863.Since the Court split 4-3 and issued four sets of reasons, it is sometimes difficult to discern a majority view on some aspects of the case.But all of the justices in Mills at least agreed upon the purpose and function of s. 24(1). At p. 881, Lamer J. (as he then was) (dissentingon other grounds, Dickson C.J. concurring), wrote: “Court of competent jurisdiction” is not defined in the Charter. Yet its
interpretation is central to the scope and effectiveness of s. 24. Indetermining the meaning of that term, the purpose of the section, which, in my view, is succinctly expressed in the marginal note, mustbe ever present: the “enforcement of guaranteed rights and freedoms”. It is that purpose, the provision of an enforcement mechanism,which above all else ensures that the Charter will be a vibrant and vigorous instrument for the protection of the rights and freedoms ofCanadians.
Section 24(1) establishes the right to a remedy as the foundation stone for the effective enforcement of Charter rights... [Emphasis added] [110] The above passage from Lamer J.’s dissent in Mills was adopted by McLachlin C.J. for a unanimous Court in R v 974649Ontario Inc. c.o.b. as Dunedin Construction, 2001 SCC 81 (“Dunedin”) at paras. 19-20, who added that “a right, no matter howexpansive in theory, is only as meaningful as the remedy provided for its breach”. [111] Lamer J.’s dissent in Mills continued as follows at p. 882: I am of the view that a person whose Canadian Charter rights have been infringed or denied has the right to obtain the appropriate andjust remedy under the circumstances.
A corollary which flows from this is the fundamental principle that there must always be a courtavailable to grant, not only a remedy, but the remedy which is the appropriate and just one under the circumstances. [Emphasis added] [112] The above passage from Lamer J.’s dissent in Mills was adopted by a unanimous Court in Okwuobi v Lester B.
Pearson SchoolBoard, 2005 SCC 16 at para. 54. [113] Writing for himself as the fourth member of the majority in Mills at pp. 971-72, LaForest J. wrote: It should be obvious from the foregoing remarks that I am sympathetic to the view that Charter remedies should, in general, be accordedwithin the normal procedural context in which an issue arises. I do not believe s. 24 of the Charter requires the wholesale invention of aparallel system for the administration of Charter rights over and above the machinery already available for the administration of justice.
Nonetheless, it is the Charter that governs, and if the ordinary procedures fail to meet the requirements of the Charter fully, then ameans must be found to give it life. In Ashby v. White (1703), 2 L Raym. 938, 92 E.R. 126, at p. 136, Holt C.J. instructs us that “it is avain thing to imagine a right without a remedy”. The problem does not directly arise here, of course, because the Charter by s. 24(1)provides that a court of competent jurisdiction may provide such remedy as it considers appropriate and just in the circumstances. Butthere must at all times be a court to enforce this remedy.
The notion that the remedy must fail or be ineffective for lack of a competentcourt within the confines of the ordinary procedures for the administration of criminal justice can no more be imagined than can thenotion of a right without a remedy. While, therefore, the trial court will ordinarily be the appropriate court to grant the remedy, situationscan arise where a trial court has not yet been set at the time when a remedy is required, or where a court is an inappropriate forum to seeka remedy because it is itself implicated in the breach of a constitutional right.
In such cases, the competent court must be the superiorcourt of the province in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. To this extent, I agree with Lamer J. on this issue. [Emphasis added] [114] LaForest J. reiterated the above statements from Mills when writing for a majority of the Court in Kourtessis v M.N.R., (SCC), [1993] 2 SCR 53 at p. 91. [115] The principles enunciated in the above passages from Mills have been adopted and applied by the Supreme Court of Canada onseveral subsequent occasions.
In Nelles v Ontario, (SCC), [1989] 2 SCR 170, Lamer J. (as he then was), writing for 3out of 6 members of the Court wrote: ...The question arises then, whether s. 24(1) of the Charter confers a right to an individual to seek a remedy from a competent court. Inmy view it does. When a person can demonstrate that one of his Charter rights has been infringed, access to a court of competentjurisdiction to seek a remedy is essential for the vindication of a constitutional wrong.
To create a right without a remedy is antithetical toone of the purposes of the Charter which surely is to allow courts to fashion remedies when constitutional infringements occur... [Emphasis added] [116] Finally, I will refer to Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), 2003 SCC 62, where Iacobucci and Arbour JJ.,for the majority, made the following observations respecting the remedial jurisdiction created by s. 24(1) of the Charter: 25 Purposive
interpretation means that remedies provisions must be interpreted in a way that provides “a full, effective and meaningfulremedy for Charter violations” since “a right, no matter how expansive in theory, is only as meaningful as the remedy provided for its
breach” (Dunedin, supra, at paras. 19-20). A purposive approach to remedies in a Charter context gives modern vitality to the ancientmaxim ubi jus, ibi remedium: where there is a right, there must be a remedy. More specifically, a purposive approach to remediesrequires at least two things.
First, the purpose of the right being protected must be promoted: courts must craft responsive remedies.Second, the purpose of the remedies provision must be promoted: courts must craft effective remedies. [...] 45 The purposive reading of s. 24(1) and also the ordinary meaning of the drafter’s language make it clear that s. 24(1) guarantees thatthere must always be a court of competent jurisdiction to hear anyone whose rights or freedoms have been infringed or denied (see Nellesv. Ontario, (SCC), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170, at p. 196, and Mills, supra, at p. 881).
The default court of competentjurisdiction is a superior court established under s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867. It is also plainly contemplated in s. 24(1) that a courtof competent jurisdiction will have the authority to grant a remedy that it considers appropriate and just in the circumstances. [Underlining added] [117] From these authorities I conclude that there must always be a court of competent jurisdiction from which a claimant may seekan appropriate and just remedy for any infringement or denial of her Charter rights.
In Alberta, absent any more appropriate forum, the“default court of competent jurisdiction” is this court. C. Access to Charter Relief in the Administrative Context [118] Of course, the fact that the provincial superior court is the “default court of competent jurisdiction” for the purposes of s. 24(1)does not necessarily mean that litigants may proceed directly to that court to seek Charter relief. The existing rules of criminal and civilprocedure must still be observed to the extent reasonably possible.
In the words of McIntyre J. in Mills at pp. 956-57, applications forCharter relief must be “fit into” the pre-existing rules of procedure: Problems have arisen in connection with the procedure to be followed relating to Charter remedies and some confusion has existed invarious courts. As has been said on many occasions, the Charter was not enacted in a vacuum. It was created to form a part -- a veryimportant part -- of the Canadian legal system and, accordingly, must fit into that system. It will be noted at once that s. 24(1) gives nojurisdictional or procedural guide.
This absence makes it clear that the procedures presently followed must be adapted and used for theaccommodation of applications for relief under s. 24(1). [119] Where there exists another forum which is better able to deal with an application for Charter relief, the provincial superiorcourts “may and should” decline to exercise their discretionary jurisdiction in favour of the more appropriate forum. The burden is on theclaimant to establish to the court’s satisfaction that the case is an appropriate one for the superior court’s immediate determination: Millsat p. 896 per Lamer J.
Where there is an extant criminal prosecution, the most appropriate forum to seek Charter relief is generally thecriminal trial court.
If the provincial superior court is not the trial court, then it should decline to exercise its discretionary s. 24(1)jurisdiction unless, in the opinion of the superior court and given the nature of the violation or any other circumstance, it is more suitedthan the trial court to assess and grant the remedy that is just and appropriate: R v Rahey, (SCC), [1987] 1 SCR 588 atpp. 603-04. [120] Similarly, where Parliament or the provincial legislatures have bestowed administrative tribunals with the jurisdiction to grantCharter remedies, litigants are expected to exhaust that jurisdiction before coming to the provincial superior courts.
As Kent W.
Roach explains in Constitutional Remedies in Canada, 2nd ed., §6:12, “[t]he constitutionally guaranteed role of the provincial superior courts ascourts of competent jurisdiction does not mean that applicants can as of right seek remedies in those courts when the same remedies areavailable in other administrative venues.” [121] In support of this statement, Roach refers to Weber v Ontario Hydro, (SCC), [1995] 2 SCR 929, whichinvolved an attempt by a unionized employee to sue his employer in the courts for Charter damages despite legislation and a collectiveagreement which required that labour disputes be submitted to arbitration.
McLachlin J. (as she then was) for the majority held that sincea labour arbitrator did have jurisdiction to grant Charter remedies, the employee was required to first submit his Charter claim toarbitration.
In doing so, she emphasized at para. 67 that despite this obligation to exhaust, the courts of inherent jurisdiction retaineddiscretionary power to grant those Charter remedies that were beyond the jurisdiction of the arbitrator: I conclude that mandatory arbitration clauses such as s. 45(1) of the Ontario Labour Relations Act generally confer exclusive jurisdictionon labour tribunals to deal with all disputes between the parties arising from the collective agreement. The question in each case iswhether the dispute, viewed with an eye to its essential character, arises from the collective agreement.
This extends to Charter remedies,provided that the legislation empowers the arbitrator to hear the dispute and grant the remedies claimed. The exclusive jurisdiction of thearbitrator is subject to the residual discretionary power of courts of inherent jurisdiction to grant remedies not possessed by the statutorytribunal... [Emphasis added] [122] McLachlin C.J.C. revisited this subject area in Dunedin. In that case, the issue was whether a justice of the peace presiding overa quasi-criminal trial has the authority to award costs as a s. 24(1) remedy.
In holding that such jurisdiction was present, McLachlinC.J.C. emphasized that this result was “necessary to prevent frequent resort to superior courts to fill gaps in statutory jurisdiction” (para.79) and to prevent “fracturing the availability of Charter remedies between provincial offences courts and superior courts” (para. 82). Inthis manner, McLachlin C.J.C. confirmed that an absence of jurisdiction on the part of the justices of the peace to grant such Charterrelief would not, of course, mean that such relief was entirely unavailable.
Rather, it would mean that such relief would have to besought from the provincial superior court after the completion of proceedings before the justice of the peace. [123] Another illustrative case cited by Roach in relation to this subject area is Okwuobi. In that case, some parents living in Quebecwished to send their children to English-language public schools. Rather than bringing their claim before the administrative tribunal
specifically designed to deal with such disputes, they brought motions before the Quebec Superior Court for Charter remedies, includinga declaration of invalidity with respect to certain legislation. In a
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