R v El-Ajami, 2023 ABKB 489
Opinion
Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: R v El-Ajami, 2023 ABKB 489 Date: 20230828 Docket: 220424295Q1 Registry: Calgary Between: His Majesty the King Crown - and - Mohamad El-Ajami Accused _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Decision of the Honourable Justice Colin C.J. Feasby _______________________________________________________ Introduction [ 1 ] Mr. El-Ajami applies to have Mr. Frank Polak removed as counsel for the Crown in this proceeding. Mr. El-Ajami asserts that Mr.
Polak is personally responsible for the Charter breaches found in R v El-Ajami , 2023 ABKB 394 , that Mr. Polak may be required to testify if Mr. El-Ajami is convicted and there is a sentencing hearing, and that Mr. Polak has lost objectivity. Separately and together, these things are asserted to be an abuse of process that justifies the removal of Mr. Polak as counsel in this proceeding.
Law and Principles Governing Removal of Crown Counsel [2] Applications to remove counsel in criminal proceedings are often analyzed using a Charter rubric; however, the authority toremove Crown or defence counsel is part of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction. McLachlin CJC, writing for the Court, in CanadianNational Railway v McKercher LLP, 2013 SCC 39 at para 13 explained that the power to remove counsel is rooted in the supervisorypower over litigation possessed by Courts of inherent jurisdiction.
Similarly, Trafford J in R v Brown, 1996 CarswellOnt 5551 at para23 explained that the power to remove counsel was “an incident of [the Court’s] inherent power to control its own processes.” [3] McLachlin CJC stated in McKercher at para 61 that a Court may disqualify counsel in three circumstances: (1) to avoid the risk of improper use of confidential information; (2) to avoid the risk of impaired representation; and/or (3) to maintain the repute of the administration of justice. [4] The Accused contends that Mr.
Polak’s continued presence as counsel in this case would bring the administration of justiceinto disrepute. Accordingly, Mr. Polak must be removed as counsel. This position requires me to consider the appropriate role of aCrown prosecutor. [5] The goal of a Crown prosecutor is not to obtain a conviction; instead, a Crown prosecutor is to act in the public interestwhich is comprised of objectives beyond simply obtaining a conviction.
As Gonthier J, dissenting on other grounds, put it for himselfand McLachlin and Iacobucci JJ in R v Bain, [1992] SCR 91 at 118: “The single-minded pursuit of convictions cannot be compatiblewith the responsibilities of Crown prosecutors.” [6] The Law Society of Alberta, Code of Conduct (February 23, 2023), Rule 5.1-4 explains that “[w]hen acting as a prosecutor, alawyer must act for the public and the administration of justice resolutely and honourably within the limits of the law while treating thetribunal with candour, fairness, courtesy and respect.” [7] Justice Rand explained the duty of a Crown prosecutor in R v Boucher, (SCC), [1955] SCR 16 at 23-24 interms that remain relevant today: It cannot be over-emphasized that the purpose of a criminal prosecution is not to obtain a conviction, it is to lay before a jury what theCrown considers to be credible evidence relevant to what is alleged to be a crime.
Counsel have a duty to see that all available proof ofthe facts is presented: it should be done firmly and pressed to its legitimate strength but it must also be done fairly. The role ofprosecutor excludes any notion of winning and losing; his function is a matter of public duty than which in civil life there can be nonecharged with greater personal responsibility.
It is to be efficiently performed with an ingrained sense of the dignity, the seriousness andthe justness of judicial proceedings. [8] Karakatsanis J, writing for the Court, in R v Kahsai, 2023 SCC 20 quoted Rand J’s classic statement of a Crownprosecutor’s role and added at para 55: The Crown also has considerable responsibility in ensuring trial fairness.
As local ministers of justice and officers of the court, Crowncounsel have a duty to preserve the fairness of the criminal justice system for all parties, including the accused, victims, and the public.Because of the public and quasi-judicial dimension to the Crown’s role, their function is not adversarial or partisan in the traditionalsense. Rather, it is driven by their purpose to advance the public interest [citations omitted]. [9] A failure to maintain the standard of conduct required of a Crown prosecutor may bring the administration of justice intodisrepute.
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in R v O’Connor, (SCC), [1995] 4 SCR 411 at para 63 observed that “conducting aprosecution in a manner that contravenes the community’s basic sense of decency and fair play and thereby calls into question theintegrity of the system is also an affront of constitutional magnitude to the rights of the individual accused.” [10] The common law doctrine of abuse of process, in the criminal context, has been “subsumed ... into the principles of theCharter”: R v Regan, 2002 SCC 12 at para 49.
There are two categories of abuse of process that may be considered pursuant to Charters 7: “(1) prosecutorial conduct affecting the fairness of the trial; and (2) prosecutorial conduct that ‘contravenes fundamental notions ofjustice and thus undermines the integrity of the judicial process’”: R v Nixon, 2011 SCC 34 at para 36. Both categories are asserted inthe present case. Should Mr. Polak be Removed as Crown Counsel in thisProceeding? Removal for Participation in Charter Breaches? [11] Mr. El-Ajami states that Mr. Polak was personally involved in the Charter breaches found in El-Ajami.
He contends theCharter breaches have affected or will affect the fairness of his trial and impugn the integrity of the judicial process. As such, hesubmits that Mr. Polak must be disqualified. [12] Previously, Mr. El-Ajami asked the Court to remedy the Charter breaches by issuing a stay of proceedings. My analysis andconclusions in El-Ajami dispose of the question of whether prosecutorial conduct has or will affect the fairness of the trial. I concludedat para 124, “[t]here is no evidence before me to indicate that the breach of Charter s 11(
a) that occurred in this case will have any
adverse effect on the fairness of Mr. El-Ajami’s trial nor do I accept that prejudice to trial fairness should be inferred or presumed fromthe long delay in providing him with details of the specific offences with which he was charged.” I further concluded at para 125,“[t]here is no prejudice to Mr. El-Ajami’s right to a fair trial arising from the Charter s 7 breach.” [13] My analysis and conclusions in El-Ajami also address the second category of abuse of process in Regan.
At para 128, Iconcluded “the infringements of Charter rights in this case do impugn the integrity of the justice system.” I went on to find that despitethe abuse of process, the requested remedy – a stay of proceedings – was not appropriate in the circumstances. The question now iswhether granting a different remedy, the disqualification of Mr. Polak, is justified. [14] Mr. El-Ajami submits that Mr. Polak was personally involved in the Charter breaches and that to preserve the integrity of thejustice system it is necessary for him to be removed as Crown counsel. Mr.
Polak, as the senior prosecutor assigned to the case, wasinvolved in the acts and omissions in issue. He did not take steps to ensure that Mr. El-Ajami’s Charter s 11(
a) rights had been compliedwith and he made the decision not to provide disclosure to Mr. El-Ajami until after he had counsel. [15] Though Mr. Polak was personally involved with both the Charter s 11(
a) breach and the Charter s 7 breach, there is noevidence to suggest that either of these breaches were a result of personal animus toward Mr. El-Ajami. I concluded in El-Ajami at para129 “[t]he Charter infringements in this case were not malicious nor should they be characterized as misconduct on the part of the policeor the Crown.” I went on to explain that the failure to provide information about the specific charges as required by Charter s 11(
a) wasunderstandable because Charter s 11(
a) is not well known and the unusual circumstances of Mr. El-Ajami being charged with seriouscrimes prior to being arrested and while out of the country. I further concluded that the Charter s 7 breach occurred because Mr. Polakwas following the procedure set out in the PPSC Deskbook. As I put it at para 130, “[t]his does not excuse the Charter breach; to thecontrary, it indicates that it is a systemic not an individual issue.” [16] Crown counsel who recklessly or intentionally breach an accused’s Charter rights impugn the integrity of the justice systemand should be removed. This, however, is not such a case.
I am satisfied that Mr. Polak’s actions were consistent with prevailingprosecution practices and standards. Just because I have found those practices and standards wanting does not mean that Mr. Polakshould be disqualified. Removal Because of Personal Actions in Issue and Possibility of Being a Witness? [17] There is no realistic possibility that Mr. Polak will be required to testify at trial or defend his prosecutorial decisions at trial. Mr. El-Ajami is on trial for acts alleged to have taken place between October 20, 2015, and December 10, 2015. None of the Charterbreaches took place during that timeframe. Mr.
Polak should not be disqualified from conducting the trial of this case because histestimony is not relevant, nor will he be in a position of conflict where he could be tempted to defend his prosecutorial decisions insteadof fulfilling his public role. [18] Mr. El-Ajami says that Mr. Polak is in a conflict of interest because, if Mr. El-Ajami is convicted, Mr. Polak may be requiredto testify at the sentencing hearing.
The reason for this is that in El-Ajami at para 136 I observed that the Trial Judge may take accountof the Charter breaches in determining a just and appropriate sentence. [19] The Code of Conduct, Rule 5.2-4 provides that “[a] lawyer who appears as advocate must not testify or submit his or her ownaffidavit evidence before the tribunal unless permitted to do so by law, the tribunal, the Rules of Court or the rules of procedure of thetribunal, or unless the matter is purely formal or uncontroverted.” Other Provinces have similar professional conduct rules. [20] Justice Laskin in R v Leduc, (2003) (ON CA), 66 OR (3d) 1 (ONCA) at para 133 observed that: “[g]ivingevidence from the counsel table puts in question the advocate’s personal credibility, compromises the advocate’s objectivity andpotentially puts the advocate in a conflict of interest.” Twaddle JA writing for the Court in R v Deslauriers, (MBCA)at 9 held: Counsel’s objective role is also compromised ... where his own conduct or judgment has to be taken into account by the court inresolving an issue between parties.
Counsel ends up in these circumstances justifying his own conduct and judgment and attacking thoseof opposing counsel. This is a situation which should be avoided. Whenever possible, other counsel should be retained. [21] Before I address whether Mr. Polak’s evidence may be relevant to sentencing, it is important to note that the issue of Mr.Polak’s evidence was a live issue before the Court in the Charter applications. The need for Mr. Polak to give evidence was obviated bycounsel for both sides agreeing to certain facts.
I commended counsel for coming to a pragmatic solution that allowed the Charterapplications to go ahead without delay. Though Mr. El-Ajami acceded to an arrangement that allowed Mr. Polak to avoid testifying onthe Charter applications he cannot be taken to have relinquished his right to call Mr. Polak as a witness at a future sentencing hearing. [22] Justice Lebel writing for the Court in R v Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6 held at para 48 “incidents alleged to constitutea Charter violation can be considered in sentencing, provided that they bear the necessary connection to the sentencing exercise.
Asmitigating factors, the circumstances of the breach would have to align with the circumstances of the offence or the offender, as requiredby s. 718.2 of the Code.” He went on to observe “the more egregious the breach, the more attention the court will likely pay to it indetermining a fit sentence.” My findings in El-Ajami do not suggest that examination of Mr. Polak’s conduct will be fertile ground forMr. El-Ajami. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that evidence of Mr. Polak’s actions and his knowledge of Crown practices may providesome information relevant to a potential sentencing of Mr. El-Ajami.
I am persuaded that it would be inappropriate to foreclose thepossibility of Mr. Polak testifying in a sentencing hearing at this stage of the process. [23] The question of whether Mr. Polak should be disqualified from participating in a sentencing hearing for Mr. El-Ajami ispremature as Mr. El-Ajami is presumed innocent until proven guilty. Following the trial, if there is a conviction, the contours of thesentencing hearing will be more apparent to everyone. At that time, both Mr. El-Ajami and the Crown should have a betterunderstanding as to whether Mr. Polak should participate in the sentencing hearing or not.
Nothing in these Reasons prejudges theanswer to that question, forecloses a future application, or the possibility of an agreement to avoid the necessity of Mr. Polak testifying as
occurred previously. Removal Because of Loss of Objectivity? [ 24 ] Mr. El-Ajami submits that Mr. Polak has lost objectivity with respect to the prosecution of Mr. El-Ajami. He contends that the Charter breaches, misrepresentations to the Court, and even his initial intention to appear on this application are all indicative of a loss of objectivity. [ 25 ] As discussed earlier in these Reasons, I concluded in El-Ajami that the Charter s 7 breach was an issue of Crown practice rather than something personal to Mr. Polak. To the extent that the Charter s 11(
a) issue was not a matter of police and Crown practice, it was quite unusual and Mr. Polak’s actions after taking the reins of the prosecution were understandable given the lack of clarity in Charter s 11(
a) caselaw. I do not consider the Charter breaches to be indicative of any loss of objectivity on the part of Mr. Polak. [ 26 ] An email between counsel for Mr. El-Ajami and Mr. Polak shows that when initially presented with the possibility of this removal application, Mr. Polak intended to argue the application himself. Mr. El-Ajami submits that Mr. Polak’s intention to argue this application demonstrates his loss of objectivity. [ 27 ] The correct practice on a motion to disqualify counsel is for the party whose counsel is targeted for removal to retain different counsel to argue the application.
When the application is to disqualify Crown counsel, the Crown should designate a different Crown counsel to argue the application or, in exceptional circumstances, engage external counsel. The engagement of different counsel for a disqualification motion is required because a conflict of interest exists when counsel is put in a position where she is forced to defend her actions rather than the interests of her client or, as in the case of Crown counsel, the public interest. [ 28 ] I do not consider Mr. Polak’s initial intention to argue the present application to be indicative of a loss of objectivity.
Lawyers sometimes react badly to a disqualification motion because such motions can be taken as an assault on a lawyer’s professional integrity. A natural initial response on the part of a lawyer is to want to personally resist the disqualification motion. But most lawyers, with some time to reflect, conclude that they must step aside in favour of other counsel for the purpose of the disqualification application. Mr. Polak correctly recused himself from this application so that it could be argued by Ms. Tkatch. This is as it should be, and I do not consider Mr.
Polak’s reflexive reaction captured in an early email to counsel for Mr. El-Ajami to show a loss of objectivity. [ 29 ] Mr. El-Ajami accuses Mr. Polak of misleading the Court by making factual statements that he knew or ought to have known were untrue. Misleading the Court by making factually incorrect statements is not acceptable. The Code of Conduct, Rule 5.1-2 makes this clear: When acting as an advocate, a lawyer must not: ... (
g) knowingly attempt to deceive a tribunal or influence the course of justice by offering false evidence, misstating facts or law, presenting or relying upon a false or deceptive affidavit, suppressing what ought to be disclosed or otherwise assisting in any fraud, crime or illegal conduct; (
h) knowingly misstate the contents of a document, the testimony of a witness, the substance of an argument or the provisions of a statute or like authority; (
i) knowingly assert as true a fact when its truth cannot reasonably be supported by the evidence or as a matter of which notice may be taken by the tribunal.... [ 30 ] The Code of Conduct applies to all lawyers. The duty not to mislead the Court is more salient in the criminal context where, as noted earlier in these Reasons, the Crown’s role is defined by the public interest.
As MacDonald J put it in R v Boudreau , 2021 ABPC 175 at para 107 : “ Hyperbole and overstatement have no place in a Crown’s submissions to the Court when the liberty of the subject is at stake.” [ 31 ] According to the Code of Conduct, for there to be misconduct a lawyer must know that the facts stated to the Court are untrue. The law concerning the disqualification of Crown counsel imposes a higher standard of conduct.
Justice Archibald in R v Colson , 2002 CarswellOnt 1431 at para 19 observed: “the foundation of an appropriate recusal application against Crown counsel must be based on evidence to support the proposition that the Crown has misconducted themselves either intentionally, recklessly, or with unacceptable negligence for the purpose of undermining the integrity of the administration of justice.” [ 32 ] Justice Binder in R v Trang , 2002 ABQB 286 at para 27 explained that to disqualify Crown counsel for loss of objectivity “evidence of loss of objectivity is required”: see also, R v Cochrane , 2013 ABQB 214 at para 13 .
In my view, there need not be an overt admission of bias or enmity; loss of objectivity may be inferred from actions and statements. [ 33 ] The evidence that Mr. El-Ajami submits should lead me to draw the inference that Mr. Polak has lost objectivity is found in the Crown’s written submissions for the Charter applications. Mr. El-Ajami points to statements in Mr. Polak’s submissions that he submits are inconsistent with my findings of fact in El-Ajami . The allegedly misleading statements may be summarized as follows: • “Mr. El-Ajami knew the nature of the charges against him.” • Mr.
El-Ajami was attempting to “avoid arrest and prosecution respectively for the current charges.” • “Once the Applicant discovered that he was charged with serious offences whilst in Lebanon, he was reticent to return to Canada to face inevitable prosecution.”
• “It must be remembered that the Applicant had the benefit of counsel while he was hiding in Lebanon.” • “Moreover, he was hiding in Lebanon ... to actively avoid facing the charged offences.” • Mr.
El-Ajami “concealed his whereabouts.” • “While it is true that [the] Crown is obligated to seek the return of an accused remaining outside Canada, that obligation is notabsolute particularly when the police exercised reasonable diligence to locate the Applicant.” • “[In December 2015] He twice spoke over the phone to the police regarding this matter and was advised of the charges and theexistence of a warrant for his arrest.” [34] Counsel make closing submissions based on the evidence that was adduced at an application or trial.
When submissions aremade by counsel, they cannot know which facts the Court will accept. As such, counsel’s statement of facts in submissions to the Courtwill often be different than the facts that the Court finds in its decision. An inconsistency or conflict between the facts submitted bycounsel and the facts found by the Court is not proof, without more, of misconduct or loss of objectivity. [35] Counsel, including Crown counsel, advancing a position are entitled to present the facts as they understand them and to placethose facts within a narrative framework.
This process includes inviting the Court to infer the existence of other facts, to drawconclusions about an individual’s state of mind, and offer explanations for the actions in dispute. This is the nature of advocacy andwhen done fairly and responsibly it falls short of what MacDonald J called “hyperbole and overstatement.” [36] Some might point to the Crown prosecutor’s special role as a local Minister of Justice to say that even advocacy isinappropriate.
Lamer J, as he then was, in Nelles v Ontario, (SCC), [1989] 2 SCR 170 for himself and Dickson CJC andWilson J at 191, quoted Morris Manning, “Abuse of Power by Crown Attorneys,” [1979] LSUC Lectures 571 at 580 to the effect that aCrown prosecutor “ought to regard himself as part of the Court rather than as an advocate.” In my view, this statement should be viewedas an articulation of the importance of the public interest in defining the role and responsibilities of a Crown prosecutor rather than anadmonition against advocacy. [37] The job of a Crown prosecutor is not to secure a conviction at all costs; instead, it is to present the Crown’s positioneffectively, persuasively, and fairly.
As Rand J said in Boucher, a Crown prosecutor advancing a case must act “firmly” and impressupon the Court “its legitimate strength but it must also be done fairly.” Fairness does not require a Crown prosecutor to abandon thetechniques of advocacy. In my view, what Mr. Polak did was within the acceptable bounds of advocacy and not unfair in thecircumstances. [38] Mr. El-Ajami says that because I found a breach of Charter s 11(
a) it cannot be said, as Mr. Polak did, that “Mr. El-Ajamiknew the nature of the charges against him” or that he was “advised of the charges.” Mr. El-Ajami was given some information aboutthe charges to be laid by Detective Hollingsworth, though not enough to satisfy the requirements of Charter s 11(a), and it appeared thathe may have learned some information about the charges from other sources. There is no doubt that Mr. El-Ajami had some awarenessof some of the charges. The Crown’s position that the information provided by Detective Hollingworth to Mr. El-Ajami about thecharges was sufficient for the purposes of Charter s 11(
a) was not accepted, but it was a position that had enough basis in the facts thatthe Crown was entitled to advance it in argument. Mr. Polak’s submissions were not unfair, nor did he mislead the Court. [39] Mr. Polak’s statements that Mr. El-Ajami was “hiding,” “concealed his whereabouts,” was attempting to “avoid arrest,” andwas in Lebanon “actively avoid[ing] facing the charged offences” are all, in my opinion, within the bounds of permissible advocacy. Mr.
El-Ajami was not hiding or concealed in the sense that his location was a secret, but he was in a country that does not have anextradition treaty with Canada. To characterize this as “hiding” or something similar is not unfair. Mr. Polak ascribed a motive to Mr.El-Ajami – that he was trying to avoid facing the charges – which was open to him on the facts. As to the suggestion that it was unfair tocharacterize Mr. El-Ajami as “actively” avoiding prosecution, I find that within the acceptable bounds of advocacy.
A Crown prosecutorshould not be disqualified for his choice of adverbs. [40] In El-Ajami at para 134, I observed: “The Court cannot be blind to the reality that Mr. El-Ajami knew that he was facingserious jeopardy in Canada – though the precise scope of that jeopardy may have been unclear to him – and yet he decided to remain inLebanon out of the reach of Canadian authorities.” This conclusion is different than what Mr. Polak submitted, but it is more of adifference of degree than in kind. [41] The statement that the “police exercised reasonable diligence to locate the Applicant” is not correct.
The police knew Mr. El-Ajami was in Lebanon and there was no evidence that anyone did anything to locate him or secure his return. But it is not clear to mewhether the quoted statement was meant to be a statement of fact about this case or part of a more general statement about police duties. Regardless, when viewed in the context of the balance of the submissions and the evidence before the Court, this cannot be seen as anattempt to mislead the Court. [42] The statement that Mr.
El-Ajami “twice spoke over the phone to the police regarding this matter and was advised of thecharges and the existence of a warrant for his arrest” is incorrect. He spoke to Detective Hollingsworth twice in December 2015. Thesubject of charges and a warrant were touched upon but at the time of the conversations the charges had not been laid nor had the arrestwarrant been issued. The charges and arrest warrant were issued the day following the second conversation between Mr. El-Ajami andDetective Hollingsworth.
Nothing turned on the timing of the calls relative to the laying of the charges and the issuance of the arrestwarrant. And given that both conversations were recorded and there were transcripts of the recordings, there was no potential for thismisstatement to mislead the Court. [43] Mr. Polak’s submission that Mr. El-Ajami was advised of the charges and the warrant by telephone is regrettable, but it doesnot demonstrate a loss of objectivity. There is no evidence that Mr. Polak intentionally misrepresented anything to the Court, so themisstatement was an error.
Despite the best efforts of counsel, mistakes are made every day in Court. Perfection is the goal, not thestandard. A mistake on a non-material point like that made in this case is not misconduct and does not rise to the standard of
unacceptable negligence stated in Colson . More to the point of this application, it is not evidence of a lack of objectivity. Conclusion [ 44 ] The application to remove Mr. Polak as trial counsel is dismissed. If Mr. El-Ajami is convicted at trial, he may apply to have Mr. Polak removed as counsel for the sentencing hearing. Heard on the 14 th day of August, 2023. Dated at the City of Calgary, Alberta this 28 th day of August, 2023. Colin C.J. Feasby J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: Shelley L. Tkatch, KC for the Crown Gregory Lazin, for the Accused
Loading document…