R v Nguyen, 2023 ABKB 519
Opinion
Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: R v Nguyen 2023 ABKB 519 Date: 20230914 Docket: 220937833Q1 Registry: Calgary Between: His Majesty the King Respondent - and - Van Thi Nguyen, Van Duc Hoang, Donald Hoang, Grace Tang Applicants Docket: 220876544Q1 Registry: Calgary Between: His Majesty the King Crown - and - Cynthia Thi Nguyen, Yuong Van Nguyen, Lien Hung Ha Accused _______________________________________________________
Interim Ruling on Entitlement to Access Seized Funds of the Honourable Justice N.E. Devlin _______________________________________________________ [ 1 ] The seven Applicants are charged, on two direct indictments. with operating a “professional money-laundering organization” [“PMLO”] within their extended family. The investigation leading to their arrests took place over many years and in multiple jurisdictions.
It culminated with the seizure and detention of over $16 million in cash, deposit accounts, and real property in Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario. [ 2 ] The Applicants have brought identical applications seeking access to the seized property to fund their defence, principally pursuant to
section 462.34(4) (
c) of the Criminal Code , which permits an order of restoration of property or revocation or variation of an order for the purpose of meeting reasonable legal expenses. [ 3 ] There are two-stages to this application. First, the Applicants must satisfy the court that they should be granted access to the seized cash and or property.
If they succeed in doing so, then a second in-camera hearing is held, without the presence of the Crown, for the purpose of determining the reasonableness of the Applicants’ proposed legal expenses and making orders disbursing the funds. [ 4 ] This Application raises a number of novel and complex issues relating to the release of seized assets. Specifically, the Applicants: (
i) rely solely on the Crown’s theory of the case, as articulated in the Report to Crown Counsel and excerpts from disclosure, to establish their interest in the restrained property; (ii) assert a collective interest in all the restrained property, again in line with the Crown’s theory of the case; and (iii) express a preference to access first the equity contained in certain real properties held in the name of unindicted co- conspirators, who are also closely related family members. [ 5 ] The Crown, despite choosing not to cross-examine on any of the affidavit materials filed by the Applicants, opposes permitting access to the restrained property to fund the legal expenses associated with defending this case on several bases, namely that: (
i) there is no jurisdiction to return offence related property (“ORP”) held pursuant to
section 490 orders for this purpose; (ii) the Applicants have not demonstrated a “sole interest” in the assets they seek to access; and (iii) the Applicants have not demonstrated financial need and an inability to otherwise fund their defences. [ 6 ] Given the size, age, and complexity of this file, I am satisfied that the interests of justice are best served by ruling on this matter in a narrow manner, which will permit the file to move forward in a timely fashion, without need to address the most contentious and complex legal issues for the time being.
Essential facts [ 7 ] All the Applicants and affected individuals are close family members. Specifically, the alleged PMLO consists of an elder couple, their respective children, and those children’s spouses and partners. Counsel appeared at the outset of the hearing, indicating that he represented the unindicted parties whose assets the Applicants sought to have first resort to, and stated that they “did not oppose” the application. [ 8 ] The assets in question include real properties restrained under
section 490.8 orders, bank accounts containing cash restrained under those same orders, and cash seized during
section 487 search warrants. [ 9 ] The disclosure provided in this case has been described as comprising several terabytes of information. I am satisfied that this is a complex investigation, that has generated large and complex disclosure, producing a prosecution that a layperson would have great difficulty mastering or defending. [ 10 ] The investigators in the present case, apparently together with the Canada Revenue Agency (the” CRA”), conducted an exhaustive multi-year analysis of the Applicants’ financial lives.
The express intent of this investigation was to find and restrain all assets which are potentially linked to the PMLO. An essential premise of the investigation, and the restrained orders, is that none of the Applicants have anything near the financial means to generate the assets held nominally in their names.
The investigation, through the restraint orders and search warrants, also expressly aimed to effectively seize all the Applicants’ assets. [ 11 ] The Crown theory of the case, as expressed in the materials filed before the Court, is that the seized assets were generated through collective money-laundering activities undertaken by the Applicants and the unindicted co-conspirators. During the hearing, counsel effectively use the disclosure to demonstrate the extent to which assets nominally held in one individual’s name were effectively derived from a complex of transactions between several of them.
[12] The Crown did not cross-examine on the affidavit material tendered. Analysis [13] The test for access to seized or restrained funds is well-established; see R v Murtaza, 2011 ONSC 7577; R v Kaleniuk, , 186 CCC (3d) 408. There is no dispute that, at present,
section 462.34, and the jurisprudence interpreting it, is the onlystatutory route of access to seized funds. The relevant provision, 462.34 provides as follows: Application for review of special warrants and restraint orders 462.34
(1) Any person who has an interest in property that was seized under a warrant issued pursuant to
section 462.32 or in respect ofwhich a restraint order was made under subsection 462.33(3) may, at any time, apply to a judge ... Order of restoration of property or revocation or variation of order
(4) On an application made to a judge under paragraph (1)(
a) in respect of any property and after hearing the applicant and the AttorneyGeneral and any other person to whom notice was given pursuant to paragraph (2)(b), the judge may order that the property or a partthereof be returned to the applicant or, in the case of a restraint order made under subsection 462.33(3), revoke the order, vary the orderto exclude the property or any interest in the property or part thereof from the application of the order or make the order subject to suchreasonable conditions as the judge thinks fit... (
c) for the purpose of... (ii) meeting the reasonable business and legal expenses of a person referred to in subparagraph (i), or... if the judge is satisfied that the applicant has no other assets or means available for the purposes set out in this paragraph and that noother person appears to be the lawful owner of or lawfully entitled to possession of the property. ... Application of property restitution provisions 462.341 Subsection 462.34(2), paragraph 462.34(4)(
c) and subsections 462.34(5), (5.1) and (5.2) apply, with any modifications that thecircumstances require, to a person who has an interest in money or bank-notes that are seized under this Act, the Controlled Drugs andSubstances Act or the Cannabis Act and in respect of which proceedings may be taken under subsection 462.37(1) or (2.01) or 462.38(2). [Emphasis added] [14] Therefore, at the initial stage of the access-to-funds process, the Applicants bear the burden of satisfying the Court that: i. the property sought to be released is eligible for this purpose; ii. they have an interest in the property; iii. they are in financial need and cannot otherwise fund their defence; and iv. no other person is entitled to the property in question. 1.
Eligibility of the property for return under 462.34 [15] Put simply, the provisions of the Criminal Code, read and applied literally, do not extend the power to release propertyrestrained as ORP under
section 490 of
Part XV. Trotter J, (as he then was) identified this problem in R v Jackson, 2011 ONSC 366 atparas 2-6. A variety of interpretive glosses have been placed on that decision, seeking to distinguish it in circumstances which do notprecisely mirror the facts in the present case. [16] The Applicants advanced a creatively crafted interpretive argument, suggesting that Jackson is inconsistent with the spirit, aswell as potentially the letter, of an entire line of jurisprudence regarding access to funds which do not fall precisely within the ambit ofsection 462.34.
These arguments, framed in a variety of ways, all sought to advance the common-sense proposition that there is noprincipled basis to deny access to property seized as ORP under
Part XV, as opposed to funds or assets seized as “proceeds of crime”under the regime found in
part XII.2 of the Criminal Code. Indeed, the characterization of the seized funds or property can be dictatedsolely by the Crown’s chosen post-seizure actions. [17]
Section 462.341, quoted above, appears to have been enacted largely in response to the paradoxical treatment of these twocategories of assets. It broadens the reach of the return provision to “money or banknotes” seized in any way pursuant to the Code andrelated criminal statutes. [18] In the present case, the Crown does not contest that this
section operates to make the cash-accounts restrained under section490 eligible for a return application. It draws the line, however, in respect of real property, arguing that there is simply no route orjurisdiction for the Court to release those assets when they are restrained as ORP. The Crown argues that
Part XV provides a completecode, especially when read in light of
section 462.49(1) which provides that “This Part does not affect the operation of any other
provision of this or any other Act of Parliament respecting the forfeiture of property.” [ 19 ] Therefore, without engaging the novel and much more complex argument advanced by the Applicants, I am satisfied that the following assets are eligible for a 462.34 return order in this case: • four TD Bank accounts containing an aggregate of $1,339,355.05; • $370,000 in cash seized during a search warrant at 2806 Cheyenne Ave., Vancouver; and • $330,000 in cash seized during a search warrant at 119 Colle Melito Way, Vaughn Ontario. [ 20 ] If the other criteria for the release of funds are met in this case, these amounts are more than sufficient to satisfy reasonable legal expenses relating to this case at the present time.
Therefore, I declined to decide whether the real properties restrained under
section 490 are also eligible for access. This is without prejudice to the Applicants to pursue that line of argument at a future juncture if necessary. 2. The Applicants’ “interest” in the property [ 21 ] The onus is on the applicant to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that he/she had the necessary interest in the property: Canada (Attorney General) v Markovic , [2000] OJ No. 3528 (SCJ) . The Applicants’ approach to establishing their “interest” in the seized property is novel in two respects.
First, to establish their possessory interest in the property at issue, they rely almost exclusively on the evidence disclosed by the Crown and its theory of their criminal activity. [ 22 ] Second, the Applicants eschew detailing their specific personal connection to any of the assets and instead advance a general collective claim to/interest in the assets, again on the basis that the Crown’s theory is that these properties and monies were collectively acquired, owned, and administered by the PMLO to which they are all said to have belonged. [ 23 ] I am satisfied that, on the individual facts of this case, the Applicants are both able and entitled to satisfy the threshold to apply for access to seized property in this manner: R v Jones , 2017 SCC 60 at para 32 .
When considering whether an applicant under 462.34 has an “interest” in the assets that are the subject of the application, the Court is not concerned with whether the Applicant had lawful possession of it. Indeed, such an inquiry would render this entire scheme nugatory. Rather, the salient question is whether the applicant had a possessory interest in that asset: R v Clayton , 2003 BCSC 284 at para 10 .
In respect of the cash and cash-equivalents seized in this case, certain of the applicants have a direct established possessory interest — the property was either held in their name or seized in their home. [ 24 ] For the other Applicants, and in respect of their argument for a collective interest in all the seized property, the totality of disclosure in this case, as summarized in the materials put forward on this application, demonstrates that the property in question was, to use the Applicants’ words, for the benefit of the PMLO as a whole.
I am satisfied that this permits their bringing of the application. [ 25 ] At the intersection of Jones and Rafilovich , the following principle may be found: where the state proposes to prosecute an individual based upon their possession of, dealing with, or association to specific property, that individual has an “interest” in that property within the meaning of
section 462.34(1). While this connection to the property at issue does not satisfy the other specific criteria for the release of funds to pay for legal expenses, it does satisfy the threshold requirement to seek access under 462.34. 3. Financial need of the applicants [ 26 ] Individuals who seek access to seized funds must be financially forthcoming as to their basis for demonstrated need: R v Giles , 2014 BCSC 1313 at para 39 .
The law is clear that the Court’s inquiry into the financial situation of the accused “must be more than cursory” and that a “significant and in-depth review of the facts is required”: R v Rafilovich , 2019 SCC 51 at para 36 . In practical terms, this will mean that the applicant in most cases must provide a sworn package of financial disclosure that resembles the information required to be exchanged between divorcing spouses. [ 27 ] The affidavits provided in support of the application in this case are rather thin on the Applicants’ means and assets.
In most cases, this could be seen as coy and wholly insufficient. What differentiates the present case, making it somewhat unique, is that the investigative authorities effectively did this work for them, through their exhaustive inquiries into the Applicants’ legitimate means and total net assets. [ 28 ] Each of the Applicants swore that they lack the resources to fund a defence in this case and the Crown declined to challenge those factual assertions.
Taken in conjunction with the information presented, on oath to restrain the subject properties, and the evidence of net-worth analyses having been undertaken by the CRA, I am satisfied that there are, on balance of probabilities, no undisclosed assets or income streams through which the Applicants could retain counsel for what will be a significant legal undertaking. [ 29 ] On the totality of the evidence before me, and in particular the nature of the investigation and its financial results, I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that none of the Applicants have the means to personally fund defence of this case. [ 30 ] Finally, I am also satisfied that resort to Legal Aid applications is not a prerequisite to an application under
section 462.34. The issue was not extensively litigated before me, and I am aware that there is a significant divide in the jurisprudence on this question. However, I am more attracted to the reasoning of Nordheimer J (as he then was), on this issue in R v Bedi , 2003 OJ 5825 at paras 9-14 . There, the Court observed that the rules governing Legal Aid eligibility often come into tension with the presence of significant seized funds, making it impractical, and often contrary to the interests of the administration of justice and the prompt completion of trials, to insist that an accused attempt to obtain legal aid before advancing a
section 462.34 application.
[ 31 ] I further agree with Cavanaugh J in R v Janisse , 2020 ONSC 1537 that the Supreme Court’s majority decision in Rafilovich , while not deciding this issue, laid out a series of principles and observations that are more consistent with separating Legal Aid from access-to-funds applications. The failure of these Applicants to apply for public legal funding does not foreclose them from seeking access to seized funds in which I have found them to have a threshold interest. 4.
Absence of another party with an interest in the property [ 32 ] Similarly, I am satisfied that the assets held in Applicants’ names are not subject to a legal interest held by anyone else. There is nothing to be found in any of the materials justifying the seizure and restraint of these monies that suggests any outside interests, and none was identified by the investigation. [ 33 ] On the other hand, the unindicted co-conspirators whose properties the Applicants’ sought access to so constitute “other persons…lawfully entitled to possession of the property”.
The fact that title to those properties is held by individuals who are neither party to this application nor the underlying prosecution creates, in my respectful view, a bar to accessing them under
section 462.34(4) . The Applicants provided no evidence to undo these facts. Most pertinently, TD account 646-9122 is held by Min Hoang who, despite being the daughter of a principal accused Van Duc Hoang and being implicated in the Crown’s theory of the case, is a stranger to these proceedings. Those properties are thus unavailable for return under
section 462.34. Conclusion [ 34 ] The Applicants have satisfied the Court that they should be granted access to the cash and cash equivalents seized in this case, save and except for the bank account in the name of Min Hoang, who is neither an applicant nor an accused person. The appearance of a lawyer purporting to represent the unindicted co-conspirators jointly, stating that they did not oppose this application, is insufficient to establish that “no other person appears to be the lawful owner of or lawfully entitled to possession of” Mr.
Hoang’s bank account. [ 35 ] Consistent with the position taken by the Applicants, being their collective theory of entitlement in the seized property, they may each seek access to the money held in the three restrained bank accounts and the cash seized at the two residential locations on an equal basis. [ 36 ] Counsel may contact the Court to
schedule a second-stage hearing at which the reasonable disbursement of those assets will be determined. Heard July 25-27, 2023. Dated at the City of Calgary, Alberta this 14 th day of September 2023. N.E. Devlin J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: Tyler Lord and Frank Polak for the Public Prosecution Service of Canada Greg DelBigio K.C. for Van Thi Nguyen Elliot Holzman For Van Duc Hoang
Kelsey Sitar For Donald Hoang Andrea Urquhart for Grace Tang Derek Jugnauth for Cynthia Thi Nguyen Gavin Wolch for Yuong Van Nguyen Daniel Song KC for Lien Hung Ha
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