R v Daignault, 2023 ABKB 533
Opinion
Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: R v Daignault, 2023 ABKB 533 Date: 20230922 Docket: 200630762Q2 Registry: Calgary Between: His Majesty the King - and - Robert Gordon Daignault _______________________________________________________ Reasons on Jordan Application of the Honourable Justice Eleanor J. Funk _______________________________________________________ I. Introduction [ 1 ] I gave a
summary of these Reasons orally in Court on September 22, 2023. Immediately afterwards, I gave the parties a filed copy of these Reasons. [ 2 ] Mr. Daignault is charged with second degree murder. His trial on that charge is scheduled for nine days, starting on November 6, 2023. This is the third time this matter has been scheduled for trial. [ 3 ] Mr. Daignault brings this application, pursuant to ss 11(
b) and 24(1) of the Charter . He alleges his right to be tried in a
reasonable time has been breached. He seeks, as a remedy, a stay of proceedings. [ 4 ] The alleged offence date is December 29, 2019. Mr. Daignault was charged with this offence on June 12, 2020; the parties agree this is the date when the Jordan clock started to run. [ 5 ] The overall delay, from the date Mr. Daignault was charged to November 17, 2023 (the last scheduled trial date) is 1254 days, or 41 months and 24 days. [ 6 ] The first trial dates were set in January of 2022. This trial was ultimately adjourned first, because Mr.
Daignault’s unit at the Remand Centre was on isolation due to an exposure to Covid and then when Mr. Daignault tested positive for Covid. [ 7 ] The second trial dates were scheduled in January of 2023. Days before that trial was scheduled to start, counsel for Mr. Daignault sought and was granted leave to withdraw.
The parties agree the delay from January 20 – November 17, 2023 (302 days), should be deducted as Defence delay, leaving a delay of 953 days (31 months and 23 days). [ 8 ] The issues for me to decide are how much further delay should be deducted as Defence delay and how much, if any, delay should be deducted as an exceptional circumstance. II. Relevant law [ 9 ] The parties agree the governing legal framework for this application was set by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Jordan , 2016 SCC 27 , and that the 30-month presumptive ceiling applies.
In Jordan , the Court articulated the procedure to be followed when calculating delay for the purposes of s 11(
b) applications. [ 10 ] At the first stage, the overall delay is calculated from the date of charge to the anticipated end of trial. At the second stage, any Defence delay is deducted from the overall delay. [ 11 ] If the remaining delay is over the presumptive ceiling, the delay is presumptively unreasonable, and the Crown bears the burden of justifying the delay based on exceptional circumstances. [ 12 ] If the remaining delay is under the presumptive ceiling, then the burden shifts to the Defence to establish unreasonable delay by showing:
i) the Defence took meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings, and ii) the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have. [ 13 ] The Defence brings this application on the basis of the overall delay exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling. III. Background [ 14 ] Mr. Daignault’s trial was scheduled to start on January 4, 2022, and to continue until January 14, 2022. On the first scheduled trial date, the parties were advised that the Remand Centre had placed Mr. Daignault’s unit on isolation following an exposure to Covid on December 26, 2021.
The entire unit refused to take Covid tests. Without a negative Covid test result, and pursuant to the Institution’s policy, the unit was placed on isolation for 21 days. The earliest date the Remand Centre would transport Mr. Daignault to Court was January 17, 2022. [ 15 ] By January 10, 2022, Mr. Daignault tested positive for Covid and was then subject to the Public Health Order that was in force at the time, which required isolation for at least five days. [ 16 ] The Court and Counsel attempted to find dates on which to adjourn Mr.
Daignault’s trial. [ 17 ] The parties contacted ACJ Rooke (as he then was) in an effort to canvass earlier trial dates. They were advised that ACJ Rooke approved trial dates in June of 2022. The parties were additionally invited to contact ACJ Rooke to request trial dates in the summer months. [ 18 ] The trial coordinator provided additional dates throughout September – December 2022, and January 2023.
The first common dates were in January of 2023, which is when the second set of trial dates was ultimately scheduled to take place. [ 19 ] The Crown takes the position that the entire delay between January 2022 and January 2023 should be deducted for Defence delay and exceptional circumstances. [ 20 ] The Defence agrees that part of this time should be deducted as Defence delay. The Defence argues the delay caused by the unilateral decision of the Remand Centre to not bring Mr. Daignault to Court for his trial should not be categorized as an “exceptional circumstance.” IV. Analysis A.
How much additional time should be deducted as Defence delay?
[ 21 ] The Court in Jordan explained that Defence delay has two components. The first is delay waived by the Defence and the second is delay caused solely by the conduct of the Defence. An example of Defence delay occurs where the Court and Crown are ready to proceed, but the Defence is not.
This period of delay resulting from the unavailability of Defence counsel will be attributed to the Defence: Jordan , at paras 60-64 . [ 22 ] The Supreme Court, in R v Hanan , 2023 SCC 12 , rejected a “bright line” rule under which all delay until the next available date following Defence counsel’s rejection of a date offered by the Court must be deducted as Defence delay.
Instead, all relevant circumstances must be considered in determining how to apportion the delay: Hanan , at para 9. [ 23 ] In the lower court decision, in R v Hanan , 2022 ONCA 229 , the dissenting justice at the Court of Appeal, rejected the argument that the entire period of delay between trial dates should be counted as Defence delay. Citing the Supreme Court in R v Godin , 2009 SCC 26 at para 23 , Justice Nordheimer stated, at para 136: Scheduling requires reasonable availability and reasonable cooperation; it does not, for s 11(
b) purposes, require defence counsel to hold themselves in a state of perpetual availability... “To hold that the delay clock stops as soon as a single available date is offered to the defence is not acceptable, in circumstances where the Crown is responsible for the case having to be rescheduled , is not reasonable”. [Emphasis in original.] [ 24 ] The record before me clearly reflects the first assigned Trial Justice and the Crown were available to reschedule the trial up to March of 2022. ACJ Rooke approved trial dates in June of 2022.
The trial coordinator offered additional trial dates throughout September – December of 2022 and into January of 2023. The Crown was available for all of the dates offered up to the end of October. The Defence was not available until November and December of 2022. [ 25 ] As early as January of 2022, Defence counsel indicated he would speak to Mr. Daignault about having other counsel appointed who could be available for trial dates in September. Mr.
Daignault chose to stay with his counsel. [ 26 ] I reject any suggestion that the entire delay that followed the first dates offered by Court and Crown should be deducted as Defence delay. Such an approach would be contrary to the “bright line” rule that the Supreme Court specifically rejected in Hanan . [ 27 ] While the Court and Crown were available between January and March, and again in June 2022, in my view it would be unreasonable to expect Defence counsel to be available or to reschedule other matters in such a short time frame.
However, by September 2022, when Defence counsel continued to be unavailable, the delay becomes attributable to the Defence. [ 28 ] The record shows that the Court and Crown were available for trial dates between September 12 and October 21, 2022. When this additional delay (39 days) is deducted as Defence delay, the overall delay is reduced to 914 days, or 30 months and 14 days. [ 29 ] The Court additionally offered trial dates at the end of October and into December 2022.
Because the Crown was not available during these dates, this delay should not be attributed to the Defence. [ 30 ] Because I have found that the overall delay breaches the presumptive ceiling, I will go on to consider if the Crown has rebutted the presumption of unreasonableness by demonstrating exceptional circumstances. B. Should any time be deducted as an exceptional circumstance? 1.
Relevant law [ 31 ] In Jordan , the Supreme Court defined exceptional circumstances as those that lie outside the Crown’s control in the sense they are 1) reasonably unforeseen or unavoidable and 2) the Crown cannot reasonably remedy the delays emanating from those circumstances once they arise: Jordan , at para 69 . [ 32 ] The Crown cannot simply point to a past difficulty as an exceptional circumstance.
Instead, the Crown must show that it took reasonable available steps to avoid and address the problem before the delay exceeded the ceiling: Jordan , at para 70 . [ 33 ] Generally speaking, ‘exceptional circumstances’ will fall into two broad categories: discrete events and particularly complex cases.
Medical or family emergencies (whether on the part of the accused, key witnesses, counsel, or the trial judge) will generally qualify as exceptional circumstances in the ‘discrete events’ category: Jordan , at paras 71-72 . [ 34 ] The Court in Jordan was mindful that trials are not “well oiled machines.” The list of circumstances that will be “exceptional” for the purposes of s 11(
b) applications is not closed. In addition to medical or family emergencies, discrete events may arise at trial that cause trials to go awry, leading to delay: Jordan at paras 71 – 75 ; R v KJM , 2019 SCC 55 at para 98 . [ 35 ] Some courts have described the Covid pandemic, not just individual cases of Covid, as a discrete, exceptional circumstance for the purpose of s 11(
b) applications: R v Mella , 2021 ABQB 785 at paras 41-47 . 2. Analysis [ 36 ] The Defence argues Mr. Daignault’s January 2022 trial dates were lost, not because of Covid but, because of the unilateral decision made by the Remand Centre to not bring Mr. Daignault to Court. Noting there was a Judge’s Order to compel Mr. Daignault’s attendance at Court and there was no evidence that Mr.
Daignault had contracted Covid, the Defence argues the resulting delay should not be deducted as a Covid-related exceptional circumstance. [ 37 ] The Defence argues the trial could have started on January 4, but for the unilateral decision of the Remand Centre to not bring Mr. Daignault to Court. The Defence concedes that even if the trial had started on January 4, it would not have continued into its second
scheduled week after Mr. Daignault tested positive for Covid. [ 38 ] The Defence further argues the parties would have been able to reschedule a one-week trial continuation more quickly than they were able to re-schedule the entire two-week trial. For the reasons that follow, I do not accept either of these arguments. [ 39 ] The Public Health Order that came into effect on January 3, 2022 (CMOH Order 01-2022), required all persons to isolate who
a) exhibited Covid symptoms or
b) were a confirmed case of Covid. Fully vaccinated people were required to isolate for at least five days. Those who were not fully vaccinated were required to isolate for at least 10 days. [ 40 ] I have no evidence as to whether Mr. Daignault was exhibiting Covid symptoms when his trial was scheduled to start. I have no evidence as to whether Mr. Daignault was fully vaccinated at this time. I do have evidence that Mr. Daignault refused to be tested for Covid after his unit was exposed to Covid on December 26, 2021. Once Mr.
Daignault agreed to be tested for Covid, he tested positive. [ 41 ] Against this backdrop, I am not prepared to speculate that Mr. Daignault’s trial could have started on January 4, 2022, but for the decision of the Remand Centre to not bring him to Court. Had Mr.
Daignault agreed to be tested for Covid before the scheduled start of his trial, and had that test result been positive, he would have been under isolation, for at least five days, under the authority of the Public Health Order in force at the time. [ 42 ] I find the Defence argument that the parties could have found earlier dates for a one-week continuation, had the trial started during its first scheduled week, speculative and unsupported by the evidence. [ 43 ] There is no evidence on the record that any of the parties canvassed the possibility of scheduling continuation dates if the January 2022 trial started but could not finish within its scheduled time. [ 44 ] There is evidence that the assigned Trial Justice would have significantly reduced availability after March 2022, as he was about to become supernumerary.
What’s more, experience teaches us that scheduling trial continuations, with seized judges, generally makes the scheduling process more difficult and often results in longer delays, not shorter ones as the Defence argues here. [ 45 ] For these reasons, I am not prepared to accept Mr. Daignault’s argument that his trial could have been completed sooner had it started in January 2022 and then continued at some later date. [ 46 ] Turning to the Defence argument that the decision of the Remand Centre to not bring Mr.
Daignault to Court for his trial should not be characterized as an exceptional circumstance, I note that a similar argument was made in Mella . [ 47 ] Mr. Mella’s trial was scheduled to take place in January 2021. Those dates were lost after Mr. Mella contracted Covid earlier in January and his unit was locked down when his trial was scheduled to take place. The Defence argued the institution was negligent in its policies and practices by allowing a person to be transferred into Mr. Mella’s unit from another institution without first requiring that person to quarantine.
In other words, the Defence argued that the institution’s negligence resulted in Mr.
Mella contracting Covid and his unit being locked down. [ 48 ] Justice Graesser specifically declined to hold the Crown responsible, in the context of s 11(b), for actions taken by the institution, stating, “the sort of state action referenced in Jordan is the complacency of police, prosecution, court administration and judges, not everyone connected with both levels of government responsible for the prosecution of accused persons.” While there is a connection between the prison system and the justice system, the Court held “for a failure of some person or entity not involved in the prosecution of an accused to be considered state action for Jordan purposes... there needs to be something more than a negligent or careless act on the part of a peripheral player.” Mella , at paras 133 and 135 . [ 49 ] Justice Graesser went on to state that the institution’s policies and procedures had “nothing directly to do with the court processes or procedures or the prosecution of Mr.
Mella. They were aimed at keeping him and others safe and healthy.” The Court concluded that, in the context of managing a global pandemic and attempting to ensure the health and safety of inmates, neither the prison system nor the government health authorities should be considered “state actors” for the purposes of s 11(
b) applications. The resulting delay was caused by the exceptional circumstance of the Covid pandemic: Mella , at paras 137, 139-144 . [ 50 ] I agree that the Crown should not be held responsible for the delay that was caused when Mr. Daignault’s January 2022 trial dates were lost. The policies and decisions of the Remand Centre regarding the transport of inmates was not within the Crown’s control. The record before me amply demonstrates that all parties were made aware only on the first scheduled trial date that Mr. Daignault would not be in attendance. This was, by all accounts, an unexpected event.
The real question, for the purposes of s 11(b), is whether the Crown and Court took reasonable steps to mitigate some or all of the delay that followed. [ 51 ] When Mr. Daignault was not brought to Court for the start of his trial, all parties immediately turned to their schedules in an attempt to find mutually available dates to start the trial in January. I have reviewed in earlier portions of these reasons the efforts the Crown and Court made to reschedule Mr. Daignault’s trial.
The record reveals the Court and Crown were available between January and March, in June, and again in September and October 2022. [ 52 ] On this record, I have no difficulty finding both the Crown and Court could have reasonably mitigated most of the delay that followed the adjournment of Mr. Daignault’s January 2022 trial dates. The fact the Crown was not available in November and December does not change this finding. The Court in Jordan required the Crown to take reasonable steps to mitigate delay.
There is no requirement for the Crown to mitigate all the delay: Jordan at para 69 and 70 . [ 53 ] I have found that the decision made by the Remand Centre to not bring Mr. Daignault to Court for his January 2022 trial was outside of the Crown’s control and was unforeseen by the Crown. I have additionally found the Crown could have reasonably mitigated most of the delay that followed. With these findings, the definition of “exceptional circumstance” is met and the resulting delay must be deducted from the overall delay.
[ 54 ] Mr. Daignault’s trial was scheduled to end on January 14, 2022. The Court and Crown were available for a two-week trial starting on September 12, 2022. I have already found the delay prior to September should not be attributed to the Defence. Accordingly, the delay from January 14 to September 12, 2022, will be further deducted as an exceptional circumstance. With this deduction of 242 days, the net delay is 672 days, or 22 months and 12 days. V. Conclusion [ 55 ] Having found the delay does not exceed the 30-month presumptive ceiling, I find no breach of s 11(
b) and Mr. Daignault’s application for a stay of proceedings is dismissed. Heard on the 7 th day of September, 2023. Dated at the City of Calgary, Alberta this 22 nd day of September, 2023. Eleanor J. Funk J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: Britta Kristensen for the Crown Alyx Nanji for the Crown Andrea Urquhart for the Applicant
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