Denhoed v Griffiths, 2023 ABKB 557

Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Denhoed v Griffiths, 2023 ABKB 557 Date: 20231004 Docket: 2006 00225 Registry: Lethbridge Between: Angela Louise Denhoed Plaintiff - and - Darryl B. Griffiths, City of Lethbridge, Lethbridge Police Service, and Joseph D. Kanyo Defendants _______________________________________________________ Memorandum of Decision of the Honourable Justice J.C. Kubik _______________________________________________________ I.

INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] The Plaintiff, Angela Louise Denhoed (“Denhoed”) had the misfortune of suffering two motor vehicle collisions in a span of approximately 30 minutes. [ 2 ] The first occurred at approximately 9:15 pm on April 10, 2018, when she struck a deer on westbound Highway 3 as it exits Lethbridge, Alberta. Police were called to the scene. Approximately 30 minutes later, while she was seated in the front passenger seat of

a police cruiser and providing a statement to Constable Joseph Kanyo (“Kanyo”), the cruiser was struck from behind by a 1995 GMC Sierra pick-up truck operated by the Defendant, Darryl B. Griffiths (“Griffiths”). [ 3 ] Denhoed alleges injuries and commenced an action premised in negligence against Griffiths, Kanyo, City of Lethbridge (“the City”), and Lethbridge Police Service (“LPS”). The actions against the City and LPS are premised on their vicarious liability for any negligence of Kanyo. [ 4 ] Griffiths admits his liability for the collision.

The main issue at trial is whether Kanyo, the City, and LPS bear liability for the collision and if so, how liability should be apportioned between they and Griffiths. The heart of this issue is determining the standard of care owed by Kanyo and whether he breached that standard of care. II. THE TRIAL PROCESS [ 5 ] The trial proceeded by way of

Summary Trial. No viva voce evidence was adduced. Instead, the evidentiary record consisted of witness Affidavits, questioning on those Affidavits prior to trial and read in evidence from questioning for discovery of the parties. [ 6 ] By virtue of this trial process, the reliability and credibility of witnesses could not be made through the traditional method of observing them during examination in chief and cross-examination.

While questioning on Affidavits and read ins from questioning for discovery have afforded some ability to assess credibility and reliability, I have largely relied on external consistencies or inconsistencies in witness evidence to make factual findings. [ 7 ] This is particularly so because Griffiths died of causes unrelated to the collision, prior to any evidence being adduced from him.

As a result, I have no direct evidence from Griffiths as to events surrounding the collision, including where he entered Highway 3, his lane of travel immediately prior to the collision, his speed prior to impact, his observations of the location of the police cruiser, the presence of debris or other traffic which affected his ability to react and avoid the collision, his evasive action prior to the collision or any factors which might have affected his perception and reaction.

The only evidence from Griffiths is a hearsay statement provided by way of the “Police Officer’s Narrative” to the effect that Griffiths said that he was “blinded by the lights of the cruiser”. All parties agreed to the admission of this evidence on the understanding that I would ascribe the appropriate weight to it. [ 8 ] I have also relied on the expert evidence tendered which provides a general framework for understanding the collision site.

The report of Michael Peck (“Peck”) prepared on behalf of Griffiths provides evidence of the positioning of the vehicles before and after impact and the location of impact between Griffiths’ vehicle and the police cruiser. The second report, prepared by Steven Thannhauser (“Thannhauser”) was, in effect, a demonstrative aide providing factual evidence of the sight lines on approach from either the left-hand or right-hand westbound lanes of Highway 3 towards the scene of the collision.

Thannhauser’s report included a video recording of the view afforded Thannhauser as he travelled westbound on Highway 3 towards an exemplar police cruiser with lights activated, parked in the position of the Kanyo police cruiser, in approximately the same lighting conditions as at the time of the collision. [ 9 ] It was argued by Denhoed that there were frailties in the expert report of Thannhauser because, despite being a human factors expert, he did not consider the effect of the presence of debris on the road surface, the presence of other vehicles, Griffiths’ age or other possible distractions in determining Griffiths’ view. [ 10 ] I have not relied on Thannhauser’s evidence to draw any conclusions about what Griffiths saw or did not see as he approached the collision scene.

Rather, Thannhauser’s evidence assists me in understanding the general sight lines, variations in the observability of the scene due to topographical changes and the distance at which the presence of the police vehicle in the westbound travel lanes could have been observable to an approaching driver, exercising due care and attention. Similarly, Peck’s report assists me in understanding the location of the vehicles and impact. In the absence of direct evidence from Griffiths, both of the expert reports are of limited value in assisting the determination of liability. [ 11 ] The

Summary Trial Hearing Order contemplated rebuttal Affidavits pursuant to Rule 7.5(3)(a). Denhoed has not produced any rebuttal expert evidence. Instead, she filed a response affidavit in these proceedings, in which she described her personal experience in travelling this road as a common route home from Lethbridge, as a means to rebut the evidence of Thannhauser by suggesting other factors which may have affected Griffith’s view on the night in question.

Neither Thannhauser, Denhoed, nor I can speculate on what was observed by Griffiths or factors which may have affected his ability to perceive and react on the evening in question, and as a result, this evidence is not of assistance in determining liability. III.

FACTUAL FINDINGS [ 12 ] I make the following factual findings: • Highway 3 is a divided highway providing egress and ingress to the City of Lethbridge; • Eastbound and westbound Highway 3 each consist of two travel lanes and are divided by a centre median. • The westbound travel lanes of Highway 3 are each 3.7 metres wide; the right-hand shoulder lane of westbound Highway 3 is 2.4 metres wide. • There are various junctions intersecting Highway 3 as it travels in a westerly direction out of the City of Lethbridge.

• The Bridge Drive overpass is located approximately 1.4 to 1.8 kilometres east of the collision site. • The western most entrance to Highway 3 is located approximately 700 – 800 metres east of the collision site. • A regulatory sign advising drivers that they must adhere to a maximum speed of 60 kilometres per hour when passing emergency vehicles is located 500 metres east of the collision site.

Otherwise, the speed limit in the vicinity of the collision was 100 kilometres per hour. • A sign marking the geographical limits of the County of Lethbridge is 400 metres east of the collision site. • A sign announcing the northbound exit to Picture Butte is located 300 metres east of the collision site. • The collision occurred immediately east of a sign marking the exit to Paradise Canyon Golf Resort. • The initial collision between Denhoed’s vehicle and the deer occurred at approximately 9:15 pm on April 10, 2018, as she travelled westbound on Highway 3. • Following the collision, Denhoed parked her vehicle fully in the right-hand shoulder of westbound Highway 3 such that its left- hand side was .4 to .5 metres to the right of the fog line separating the right-hand westbound travel lane from the shoulder. • Denhoed activated her hazard lights. • After the collision two other motorists stopped to check that she was okay.

Denhoed called her sister, Emma Lenz (“Lenz”) and 911. • Lenz arrived on the scene prior to police and parked behind the Denhoed vehicle. The Lenz vehicle was also fully in the right- hand shoulder of westbound Highway 3, with its hazard lights activated. • Kanyo arrived on the scene at approximately 9:19 pm, parking his 2016 Ford Taurus police cruiser behind the Lenz vehicle. • The damage to Denhoed’s vehicle as a result of the deer collision was to the front end of the vehicle. • Debris from her vehicle was present on the road surface, however there is no evidence about the location of the debris.

Lenz did not notice debris as she arrived at the collision site, however she and Denhoed both heard vehicles driving over debris while they awaited the arrival of the police.

Kanyo observed debris in and around the location of Denhoed’s vehicle. • The cruiser was parked 2 to 3 car lengths behind the Lenz vehicle, such that the left side of the cruiser protruded into the right- hand westbound lane of Highway 3 by a distance of approximately 0.5 to 0.6 metres. • Kanyo parked the police cruiser consistent with his LPS training and LPS policy in relation to conducting traffic stops. • All of the emergency lights were activated on the police cruiser.

This included the bumper and front lights, taillights, and overhead lights. • The purpose of this manner of parking is two-fold: (1) to provide a buffer zone for the police constable to work in; and (2) to force traffic away from the scene of the traffic stop. • Kanyo agreed when questioned that the police cruiser, positioned in this manner could be struck by a vehicle which did not move out of the right-hand westbound travel lane. • After arriving on the scene Kanyo spoke to Denhoed and observed and photographed her vehicle.

He then invited her into the police cruiser to provide a statement as to the circumstances of the deer collision. • Before inviting her into the police cruiser, Kanyo did not advise Denhoed that the police cruiser, positioned in this manner could be struck by a vehicle which did not move out of the right-hand westbound travel lane. • Denhoed was seated in the front passenger seat of the cruiser.

Neither she nor Kanyo were wearing seatbelts. • While they were seated in the cruiser, it was struck by a 1995 GMC Sierra, operated by Griffiths. • The Griffiths’ vehicle impacted the right rear corner of the police cruiser. The primary area of damage to the police cruiser was on the right side of the rear bumper and along the right rear quarter panel. Griffiths’ vehicle then left the highway, driving into the ditch and striking the Paradise Canyon access signpost.

His vehicle came to rest in the ditch. • The police cruiser did not move as a result of the impact. • The impact between the cruiser and Griffiths’ vehicle occurred approximately 25 minutes after Denhoed’s collision with the deer. Multiple vehicles successfully bypassed the initial collision scene before Kanyo’s arrival, as noted by both Denhoed and Lenz. Vehicles continued to successfully bypass the collision site after Kanyo’s arrival. This is confirmed by the evidence of Denhoed, Lenz and Kanyo.

In particular, Denhoed testified at questioning that after Kanyo’s arrival, traffic was slowing and safely passing in the left-hand westbound travel lane. • There is no reliable estimate of Griffiths’ speed. Kanyo momentarily observed Griffiths’ approach from his rearview mirror and estimated his speed at 80 kilometres per hour prior to impact.

• After the impact Kanyo reported the collision to LPS and Sgt. Riddell (“Riddell”) was dispatched to the scene.

En route to thescene, Riddell first observed the emergency lights of the police cruiser approximately 1 kilometre east of the collision site. • The evidence of Peck and Thannhauser also confirms that the emergency lights could be observed approximately 1 kilometre eastof the collision site. • At a distance of 1 kilometre east of the collision site an oncoming driver would not discern whether the police cruiser was in theeastbound or westbound travel lanes. • At a distance of 700 – 800 metres east of the collision site an oncoming driver would have a view of the cruiser which wasunobstructed by any topographical features. • At a distance of 300 – 400 metres east of the collision site an oncoming driver’s view of the cruiser would not cross the eastboundtravel lane.

At this distance an oncoming driver would be able to discern that the police cruiser was in the westbound travel lanes. • Following the collision, Griffiths was convicted of careless driving pursuant to

Section 115 of the Traffic Safety Act, RSA 2000, cT-6. • Between 2018 and 2020, LPS officers attended 2142 vehicle collisions and conducted 33,037 traffic stops. A police cruiser wasstruck by another vehicle in only one of these 35,179 stops – that being the occasion of Griffiths’ collision with Kanyo’s police cruiser. IV.

LEGAL ANALYSIS [13] A finding of negligence requires that Denhoed prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the Defendants owed her a duty ofcare, breached the standard of care and that she suffered damages as a result of the breach. [14] This case turns on the question of whether Denhoed has proven the standard of care to be met by the Kanyo, and if so,whether he breached that standard of care. A. Duty of Care [15] Kanyo, the City and LPS admit that they owed a duty of care to Denhoed, arising during their response to and investigation ofthe deer collision.

While the duty of care was not well-articulated during the trial it can best be described as a duty to ensure thatDenhoed was reasonably safe during the investigation. Three particular lapses in police conduct were alleged: 1. The manner in which the police cruiser was parked on the highway; 2. Taking Denhoed’s collision statement in the police cruiser, as parked on the highway; and 3. The blinding effect of the emergency lights on oncoming traffic. B.

Standard of Care [16] As a matter of law, the standard of care expected of a police officer exercising his duties is that of a reasonable police officerin similar circumstances: Hill v Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, 2007 SCC 41. In Hill, it was recognized that thedetermination of the conduct of a reasonable police officer in similar circumstances is factually driven and that police officers, asprofessionals, are entitled to exercise discretion in the course of carrying out their investigative duties.

As a result, the standard of caremay often be informed by expert evidence, particularly when a determination of the standard and its breach involves scientific ortechnical considerations outside of the common understanding of the trier of fact: Roy v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2005BCCA 88 , 2005BCCA 88; Camaso Estate v Saanich (District), 2013 BCCA 6. [17] In circumstances where scientific or technical considerations are not central factors, the Court can establish the standard ofcare having regard to the reasonably foreseeable risks to others created by the conduct, including an assessment of statutory andregulatory factors, any custom or approved practice, the likelihood of damage, the seriousness of the threatened harm, the cost ofpreventative measures, the utility of the Defendants’ conduct, and the emergent nature of the situation: Burbank v R.T.S., 2007 BCCA215; Radke v M.S. (Litigation guardian of), 2007 BCCA 216; Ryan v Victoria (City), [1991] 1 SCR 201. (

a) Standard of Care in Relation to Parking of Police Cruiser and Use ofEmergency Lights [18] In this case I am satisfied that I can determine the standard of care with respect to the manner of parking and the use of theemergency lights because there is ample evidence with respect to statutory requirements and policy, and an assessment of the utility ofthe police conduct, seriousness of any threatened harm and foreseeability of risk can be determined as a matter of common understandingon the evidentiary record. (

i) Statutory provisions [19]

Section 43 of the Use of Highway and Rules of the Road Regulation, Alta Reg 304/2002 places limitations on the manner in

which a vehicle may be parked on a highway outside an urban area. In particular, a driver shall not park a vehicle on a roadway when it is practicable to park it off the roadway.

Despite this a driver can park on a roadway, parking lane or shoulder in circumstances where the vehicle is incapable of moving under its own power, an emergency arises, or it is otherwise permitted by law. [ 20 ] In the exceptional circumstance where a vehicle must be parked on a roadway a person may only do so if there is both “a clear and unobstructed space opposite the vehicle for free passage of vehicles on the roadway” and “a clear view of the parked vehicle for a distance of 60 metres in both directions”. [ 21 ] Additional exceptions exist in Sections 63(4) and 67 of the Use of Highway and Rules of the Road Regulation .

These exceptions apply to the parking of emergency vehicles. Section 63(4) provides that having regard to the circumstances and when it is reasonable and safe to do so, an emergency vehicle, with its flashing lights operating, may be parked contrary to the provisions of

Section

Section 67 provides that an emergency vehicle may be parked on the highway when necessary in the circumstances to do so, as follows: (

a) to direct traffic; (

b) to give warning of hazards or of persons on the highway; (

c) to remove injured persons; (

d) to repair the highway; (

e) to inspect vehicles; (

f) to check persons operating vehicles; (

g) for any similar purpose not referred to in clause (

c) to (h). [ 22 ]

Section 67 does not permit the operation of an emergency vehicle in a negligent manner:

Section 68. (ii) LPS Protocols Regarding Safe Traffic Stops [ 23 ] LPS has developed a training protocol entitled “How to Conduct a Safe Traffic Stop”. The protocol guides officers in how to initiate safe traffic stops. Imperative in making a safe traffic stop is the officer maintaining control over the site, the stopped vehicle and the human interaction.

The protocol recommends the officer position the cruiser 10 to 15 metres behind the subject vehicle and partially intruding in the adjacent driving lane, thereby shutting down the lane in which the vehicle is stopped and providing adequate room for the officer to work. [ 24 ] The purpose of this parking protocol is to force oncoming traffic to slow or move out of the driving lane and create a buffer zone for officers exiting and entering their cruisers thereby reducing the likelihood of them or anyone at the scene being struck by an oncoming vehicle. (iii) Utility of Defendant Conduct, Seriousness of Threatened Harm and Cost of Preventative Measures [ 25 ] Highways are busy arterial travel routes which accommodate all manner of vehicles.

Officers dispatched to the scene of a collision or undertaking traffic stops are responsible for taking control of the scene and directing the unfolding investigation. Part of this task includes gathering evidence, including photographs, measurements, and statements. Police officers must exercise their discretion as to how those tasks are most effectively and safely undertaken. The traffic stop protocol as described above is part of the preventative management of safety risks at traffic stops.

So too is the use of emergency lights on police vehicles. [ 26 ] The use of emergency lights draws motorist attention to hazards in the roadway, slows traffic to allow it to safely navigate the hazard, and encourages motorists to move away from the hazard where the presence of other driving lanes allow.

Parking an emergency vehicle in a manner which also forces traffic away from the scene serves to protect not only the officer but the scene itself, including the parties to a collision and other motorists. (iv) Statistical and Anecdotal Evidence Regarding the Foreseeable Risk of Harm [ 27 ] Statistical evidence was tendered with respect to the number of traffic stops undertaken by LPS between 2018 and 2020. LPS responded to 2,142 collisions and conducted 33,037 traffic stops.

On only one occasion was a police cruiser struck during any of these stops – that being the collision that is the subject matter of these proceedings. [ 28 ] Anecdotally, Sgt. Lomness (“Lomness”) testified that in 18 years of service his police cruiser was only once rearended while conducting a traffic stop. (

b) Conclusion Regarding Standard of Care in Relation to Parking of the Police Cruiser and Use of Emergency Lights [ 29 ] From all of this I conclude that a reasonable police officer in similar circumstances (responding to and investigating a collision on a busy highway at night) would assess and take control of the scene, park the cruiser with emergency lights activated and in a manner consistent with the Traffic Safety Act , their police training and any existing protocols to mitigate the foreseeable risk of harm to persons at the scene and oncoming motorists.

(

c) Did Cst. Kanyo Breach the Standard of Care of a Reasonable Police Officer in Similar Circumstances in Relation to Parking of the Vehicle and Use of the Emergency Lights? [ 30 ] Kanyo parked his cruiser consistent with the requirements of Sections 43 , 63(4) and 67 of the Use of Highway and Rules of the Road Regulation . [ 31 ] The manner in which Kanyo parked his police cruiser was compliant with LPS protocol and his training in relation to safe traffic stops.

Kanyo’s purpose in parking the police cruiser in this fashion was to direct traffic away from the initial collision scene, give warning of the hazard to oncoming motorists, to inspect Denhoed’s vehicle and to investigate the initial collision he had been dispatched to. Given that Denhoed’s initial collision with the deer occurred on a multi-lane highway with a speed limit of 100 km/h, it was safe and prudent on the part of Kanyo to take steps to slow traffic and encourage its movement to the left-hand westbound travel lane.

The manner in which Kanyo parked the cruiser left a clear and unobstructed space opposite it for free passage of vehicles on the roadway. This included not only the left-hand westbound lane but 3.2 metres of the right-hand westbound lane. [ 32 ] Kanyo also activated his emergency lights, making his vehicle visible well beyond the 60-metre distance contemplated in

Section 43 of the Use of Highway and Rules of the Road Regulation . The purpose of the emergency lights is to alert oncoming motorists of a hazard in the roadway, encourage them to slow their vehicles and to move away from the hazard. [ 33 ] The evidence of Denhoed, Lenz and Kanyo confirms that the presence and location of the police cruiser had the desired effect of slowing traffic and forcing its movement to the left-hand westbound lane. For 25 minutes oncoming motorists safely navigated the scene.

That Kanyo’s actions at the scene had this effect is consistent with the statistical evidence that police cruisers are rarely struck during the routine business of traffic stops, whether for traffic violations or in response to collisions.

While the statistical evidence is not specific with respect to whether the police cruisers were parked in accordance with LPS protocol and cannot be broken down by location and lighting conditions, it is clear that LPS had never experienced a similar event during the two-year period surveyed. [ 34 ] I am satisfied that the manner in which Kanyo parked the police cruiser, and his use of the emergency lights met the standard of care required.

The circumstances of this case are distinguishable from the various case law submitted by counsel, a good number of which involved the absence of emergency or hazard lights or non-emergency vehicles. Eirikson v Breton , 2000 ABQB 798 , involved an emergency vehicle parked on the opposite side of the road from the accident scene, and significantly intruding into the driving lane, which left the oncoming vehicle to “thread the needle” to avoid the collision due to the known presence of other vehicles around it.

Notably in Eirikson , the emergency vehicle, while responding to the collision, was not parked to protect the collision site and could have been moved from its location. In Howell v Strutt , 2021 BCSC 92 , the tow truck in question was not in a similar position to Kanyo, who was exercising the privileges afforded an emergency vehicle by sections 63(4) and 67 of the Use of Highway and Rules of the Road Regulation .

In addition, the liability which flowed to the RCMP officer in Howell , arose from his failure to direct the tow truck operator to move his vehicle, which was parked in a manner which obstructed the free passage of traffic on the highway, in violation of the relevant British Columbia legislation. (

d) Standard of Care in Relation to Taking Denhoed’s Collision Statement in the Police Cruiser [ 35 ] It was conceded by Denhoed that up to the point at which she was invited into the police cruiser, Kanyo’s parking met the standard of care. However, she argued that taking her statement in the police cruiser as parked breached the standard of care. This implies either a different or heightened standard of care was required of Kanyo. There are two facets to this argument.

First, that Kanyo could have taken the statement elsewhere and second, that he could have moved the police cruiser fully onto the shoulder prior to taking the statement. [ 36 ] I find that there is insufficient evidence to allow me to determine what a reasonable police officer in similar circumstance would have done. [ 37 ] There is no evidence before me of any statutory requirement, policy or best practice governing how or where collision statements should be taken and the LPS policy with respect to traffic stops does not address this issue.

The absence of a statutory requirement, policy or best practice governing how this task should be undertaken demonstrates the discretion afforded an officer in the conduct of his investigative duties. [ 38 ] Kanyo testified that there was no policy or protocol which either required him to conduct the interview in his police cruiser or precluded him from doing so. Similarly, he testified there was no policy or protocol that prevented him from taking the statement in any other vehicle located at the scene, including the Denhoed vehicle, or at the roadside.

While he testified that he would not have taken the statement in a non-police vehicle, no further evidence was elicited from him as why this was the case. [ 39 ] No evidence, expert or otherwise, has been tendered to provide me with guidance in determining the standard of care associated with the exercise of discretion in these circumstances, including for example, the factors an officer should consider in exercising this discretion, and assessing and managing risk during this type of investigation. [ 40 ] While Peck opined that the position of the police cruiser created a risk that it could be struck by an errant vehicle during a traffic stop and that moving it further off of the roadway would have reduced this risk, this evidence does not inform the standard of care of a reasonable police officer in similar circumstances. [ 41 ] As a result, Denhoed has failed to prove the standard of care in relation to this particular duty.

C. Griffiths’ Liability [ 42 ] Griffiths was convicted of two offences under the Traffic Safety Act related to his use and operation of a motor vehicle on a highway. One conviction was for driving with an obstructed windshield. The other was for careless driving pursuant to Section 115(2) (

b) of the Traffic Safety Act . [ 43 ] Careless driving encompasses driving without due care and attention or without reasonable consideration for persons using the highway. [ 44 ] As a consequence of his conviction Griffiths is caught by the reverse onus provisions in

Section 185 of the Traffic Safety Act , which reads as follows: 185 If (

a) a person sustains loss or damage arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle on a highway, and (

b) that motor vehicle is operated by a person who is in contravention of or fails to comply with this Act, The onus of proof in any civil proceeding that the loss or damage did not arise by reason of that contravention or failure to comply is on the owner or driver of the motor vehicle. [ 45 ]

Section 185 creates a rebuttable presumption requiring Griffiths to prove on a balance of probabilities that the loss or damage did not arise from his contravention of the Act. [ 46 ] Griffiths cannot overcome the reverse onus based on the evidence before the court which demonstrates his carelessness. As noted by his own expert, Peck, the emergency lights of the police cruiser provided a strong visual cue to approaching drivers of the emergency situation ahead.

Based on the assumption that he was approaching in the right-hand westbound lane, and had an unobstructed view, he should have observed the police cruiser 1 kilometre east of the collision site, giving him 36 seconds to perceive and react to the collision. [ 47 ] In fairness to Griffiths, there is no evidence as to where he entered Highway 3, however a reasonable motorist, driving with due care and attention, should have observed the emergency lights in the westbound travel lanes of Highway 3 at a minimal distance of 300 – 400 metres, slowed his speed, assessed both the location of the hazard and the presence of other traffic, and followed cues as to where traffic was moving in response to the emergency.

The evidence demonstrates that a number of motorists successfully navigated the collision site. Griffiths, on the other hand, either failed to observe or react to the hazard in sufficient time to avoid the collision. There is no evidence as to why. It is difficult to ascertain the meaning of his hearsay evidence that he was “blinded by the lights of the cruiser” without any evidence which assists me in understanding his approach to the collision site and when he first observed the emergency vehicle.

Speculation about the presence of debris, other traffic impeding his movement, or the blinding effect of the emergency lights is just that, and does not prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the damage did not arise by reason of his careless driving. [ 48 ] Accordingly, the sole cause of the collision is Griffiths’ negligence and he bears 100% of the liability for this collision. V. CONCLUSION [ 49 ] Denhoed’s action against Kanyo, the City and LPS is dismissed.

She is granted Judgement against Griffiths with damages to be assessed at a later trial date. [ 50 ] The parties may speak to costs within 60 days if they are unable to agree. Heard on the June 14, 15 and 16, 2023. Dated at the City of Lethbridge, Alberta this 4 th day of October, 2023 J.C. Kubik J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: R. Travis Bissett of Stringham LLP for the Plaintiff

Don Dear, K.C./Angela Barreto of Clyde & Co. LLP for the Defendants, City of Lethbridge, Lethbridge Police Service, and Joseph D. Kanyo Jacqueline Kwok-Mejri of Intact Insurance Company for the Defendant, Darryl B. Griffiths