PTW Canada Ltd v Smith, 2023 ABKB 56
Opinion
Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: PTW Canada Ltd v Smith 2023 ABKB 56 Date: 20230130 Docket: 2201 05725 Registry: Calgary Between: PTW Canada Ltd. Applicant - and - Brett Smith, Vital Controls Inc. and Jayson Pancoast Respondents _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Decision of the Honourable Justice C.M. Jones _______________________________________________________ I. Introduction [ 1 ] This matter came before me on October 20 and 21, 2022 (the “Hearing”).
It involved review of an Anton Piller Order (the “APO”) and an Injunction Order (the “Injunction”) that I gave on May 20, 2022 and June 27, 2022, respectively. PTW Canada Ltd. (“PTW”) had sought and received the aforesaid APO against Brett Smith. It had sought and received the Injunction against Vital Controls Inc. (“Vital”) and its agents and employees. [ 2 ] During the course of the Hearing, I directed further submissions from the parties regarding continuation of the injunctive provisions of the APO. [ 3 ] My decision on that point is reported at PTW Canada Inc v Smith , 2022 ABKB 781 .
At paragraph 1 of that decision I noted that, at the Hearing, I had determined that the APO had been properly issued at first instance. I went on at paragraph 15 of that decision to state that Mr. Smith’s conduct was sufficient to warrant the initial issuance of the APO. [ 4 ] Accordingly, the parties have been aware that the issue of whether the APO was initially properly issued has been decided. They have requested written reasons for that decision so that they may complete an Order reflecting that outcome and so that they may speak to costs. [ 5 ] These reasons respond to that request. II.
The Anton Piller Order A. Some History [ 6 ] The APO required, among other things, the production and preservation of information that might constitute evidence in support of PTW’s assertions of misappropriation of its confidential information. Subject to the observations of the Independent Supervising Solicitor (“ISS”), set forth below, the “search” element expressly contemplated in the APO had been completed by the time of the Hearing.
[ 7 ] Data devolving from that search had been secured. Records identified as a consequence of the search had been disclosed to PTW. Seized devices had been returned to Smith. Accordingly, the search and seizure purposes of the APO appeared, at least for the time being, to have been fully performed. [ 8 ] At the Hearing, the ISS advised that there were no further tasks remaining to be performed under the mandate conferred upon him by virtue of the APO.
Nevertheless, he advised that further action might be required of him, particularly if, as he anticipated, additional information about evidence for seizure became available to him. Depending on what occurred, he might seek the Court’s direction or apply for a discharge.
Accordingly, the ISS’ position, with which PTW concurred, was that his mandate under the APO had yet to be fully performed. [ 9 ] The question of whether the APO should be terminated and the ISS discharged because he has completed his tasks was separate from but related to the question of whether the APO should have been issued in the first place. The answer to the latter question depended on whether the totality of evidence before the Court at the time of the Hearing, viewed retrospectively, satisfied the following four requirements at the time the APO was issued: (
a) There must be a strong prima facie case that the object of the APO, Smith in this case, had improperly converted PTW’s property, through the unauthorized transfer of confidential information belonging to PTW. (
b) The applicant must establish the likelihood of serious damage to PTW’s contractual, business or economic relationships . (
c) There must be convincing evidence that, at the time the APO was issued, Smith had incriminating documents or things in his possession. (
d) There must have been a real possibility that Smith would destroy material before the discovery process could do its work . [ 10 ] Smith argued that, irrespective of what the ISS thinks he may still be required to do, the APO should be terminated. Arguing that his application is a de novo hearing, Smith asked this Court to review the above requirements for an APO in the context of the evidence thus far generated as a consequence of the APO. In so doing, Smith took the position that the requirements for an APO were never met and that it never should have been issued.
Had that been correct, the APO would have to have been set aside and it would not have mattered what the ISS thought he might still have to do. B. Temporal context [ 11 ] As noted above, the Court was required, inter alia , to consider, based on the evidence before it at the Hearing, if the above requirements were satisfied at the time of the original ex parte application. C. Was the APO properly initially issued?
Did the evidence before the Court at the time of the Hearing establish on a balance of probabilities a strong prima facie case that Smith had improperly converted PTW’s property? [ 12 ] The ISS advised as follows in his letter to this Court dated October 13, 2022: The final sentence of Paragraph 46 of the Anton Piller Order requires that the ISS advise whether there is clear evidence that the Defendant has engaged in any of the activities listed in
Schedule “D” of the Anton Piller Order. In response to this Honourable Court’s inquiry, I advise that it is the ISS’ opinion that there is clear evidence that Mr. Smith engaged in at least some of the activities set out in
Schedule “D”. In particular, it was discovered that Mr. Smith withheld information from the ISS (namely Mr. Smith’s disposal of the Seagate brand External Hard Drive minutes before meeting the ISS on May 26, 2022 (at paras. 7 and 8 of the ISS Affidavit #2) and that such withholding of information, combined with the evidence that Mr. Smith had used that same hard drive to make “backup copies of Jayson and his outlook accounts” (at para. 6 of the ISS Affidavit #2), strongly implied that Mr. Smith had engaged in the conversion of PTW’s property. While Mr.
Smith provided an explanation about why he had not originally disclosed the fact that he had disposed of the hard drive (at para. 8 of the ISS Affidavit #2), the ISS has concerns about Mr. Smith’s explanation (set out in paras. 30-36 of the ISS Affidavit #2). [ 13 ] My review of the evidence submitted after the issuance of the APO up to the date of the Hearing did not alter my original determination that, on a balance of probabilities, there was a strong prima facie case that Smith had improperly appropriated PTW confidential information.
The evidence, articulated at paras 42 and 43 of PTW’s brief of law filed September 30, 2022, satisfied me that Smith had accessed information created and saved as a consequence of his engagement with PTW. He claimed he had destroyed any such information in his possession but I believe that to be a triable issue. [ 14 ] The trial judge ultimately will decide if information Smith accessed, stored, transmitted and disposed of is PTW confidential information and whether any such access, storage, transmission and disposal was wrongful.
For purposes of the applications before me at the time of the Hearing, however, the evidence affirmed the existence of factual circumstances satisfying me that Smith may well have acted in contravention of his contractual arrangements with PTW and his common law duties. However, I considered it both unnecessary and improper to make further findings in this regard that might have the effect of fettering the discretion of the trial judge.
Did the evidence before the Court establish on a balance of probabilities the likelihood of serious damage to PTW’s contractual, business or economic relationships? [ 15 ] Both at the time I granted the APO and at the Hearing, I was satisfied that the potential damage to PTW’s contractual, business and economic relationships from Smith’s alleged misconduct was serious. If the APO had not been issued, PTW might have
been denied the opportunity to delineate adequately the evidentiary foundation for its case against Smith. At the Hearing, PTW could not quantify its monetary loss resulting from Smith’s alleged actions, but the evidence continued to satisfy me that: (
a) There was a likelihood that PTW would suffer damage to its contractual, business and economic relationships if Smith had appropriated its confidential information and was unrestrained in his use thereof; and (
b) That damage could have serious consequences for PTW’s contractual, business and economic relationships. [ 16 ] Both at the time I granted the APO and at the Hearing, I was satisfied on a balance of probabilities that this requirement was satisfied. It appeared to me that the business environment in which PTW and Vital operate: (
a) was very competitive; (
b) placed PTW and Vital in competition for the same customers within a limited geographical area; (
c) was very dependent upon personal relationships that have developed between key agents or employees of PTW, of Vital and their respective customers; and (
d) was such that one party’s knowledge of the other’s processes, procedure, policies and pricing could provide a significant strategic advantage. Was there convincing evidence Smith had incriminating documents or things in his possession? [ 17 ] I was satisfied originally that there was convincing evidence that Smith had in his possession incriminating documents or things. Evidence acquired as a consequence of the execution of the APO did not alter that conclusion. [ 18 ]
Schedule “D” to the APO lists various activities in respect of which the ISS was charged with advising if there was evidence implicating Smith.
Those activities included, inter alia , conversion of property, including intellectual property and electronic data belonging to PTW or its clients, suppliers, or licensors as well as dissemination of any such material to third parties. [ 19 ] The ISS was also charged with considering whether it appeared that Smith was engaged in any activity encouraging other persons to cause PTW to suffer a breach of contractual rights or to violate common law and equitable rights belonging to or owed to PTW. [ 20 ] The ISS reported that, in his opinion, there was clear evidence that Smith engaged in at least some of the activities set out in
Schedule “D”.
The ISS notes that Smith withheld information from him (specifically, the disposal of the Seagate hard drive) and that such withholding of information, combined with evidence that Smith had used the Seagate hard drive to make backup copies of his and Pancoast’s Outlook accounts, implied that Smith engaged in the conversion of PTW’s property. [ 21 ] At the time of the Hearing, I continued to be of the view that Smith’s acknowledgement regarding cloning his PTW HP laptop, emailing information from his PTW email account to his personal account, combined with his acknowledgement regarding the use of the Seagate drive to copy his and Pancoast’s PTW Outlook accounts, was evidence that he was in possession of incriminating documents and things.
Therefore, this requirement was satisfied. Was there a real possibility that Smith might destroy material before the discovery process could do its work? [ 22 ] Smith had admitted discarding the Seagate hard drive. His explanation that the stressful circumstances lead to that act did not, in my view, obviate satisfaction of this requirement for the issue of an APO. [ 23 ] This evidence was not available at the time I issued the APO.
I was concerned then that Smith’s actions (including sending his PTW email contacts to his personal email and cloning a hard drive containing PTW related information) followed shortly thereafter by commencement of services for and on behalf of Vital, created circumstances under which Smith could be strongly motivated to destroy evidence. I found that his subsequent actions validated that concern. [ 24 ] The ISS believed that Smith had been less than forthcoming in connection with evidence of what happened to the Seagate hard drive.
I agreed and found that this requirement was satisfied. [ 25 ] Taking all of the foregoing into account, I found that the APO was properly issued at first instance. [ 26 ] If the parties cannot agree on costs they may provide me with written submissions, no more than five pages in length, within thirty days of this decision. Heard on the 20 th and 21 st days of October 2022. Dated at the City of Calgary, Alberta this 30 th day of January, 2023.
C.M. Jones J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: Richard N Billington, KC Billington Barristers for the Applicant Lori Brienza and Allison Wight (Student-at-Law) Mathews, Dinsdale & Clark LLP for the Applicant Charles Osuji and Tanaaz Padania Osuji & Smith Lawyers for the Respondents , Brett Smith and Jayson Pancoast Todd M. Lee Miles Davison LLP for the Respondent, Vital Controls Inc. Oliver Ho Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP as independent Supervising Solicitor
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