Templanza (Re), 2023 ABKB 645

Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Templanza (Re), 2023 ABKB 645 Date: 20231117 Docket: 2301 15182 Registry: Calgary Between: Rosalina Templanza Candidate Applicant _______________________________________________________ Memorandum of Decision of the Associate Chief Justice D.B. Nixon _______________________________________________________ I. Introduction [ 1 ] On November 9, 2023, Acting Chief Justice Nielsen’s office received a package of materials from Rosalina Templanza [Ms. Templanza]. Ms.

Templanza is subject to court access restrictions imposed in a March 3, 2018 decision of Neufeld J reported as Templanza v Ford , 2018 ABQB 168 [ Templanza v Ford #1 ]. The court access restrictions imposed on Ms. Templanza require her to obtain permission from the court - “leave” - prior to initiating or continuing litigation in the Alberta Court of Justice, Alberta Court of King’s Bench, and Alberta Court of Appeal. Ms. Templanza appealed Templanza v Ford #1 , but did not advance that appeal in a timely manner, and, additionally, Ms.

Templanza’s appeal was determined to have no merit: Templanza v Ford , 2019 ABCA 309 [ Templanza v Ford #3 ], panel appeal request rejected 2019 ABCA 345 , leave to appeal to SCC refused, 39034 (30 April 2020). [ 2 ] I have been referred Ms. Templanza’s documents as I am the Administrative Justice for southern Alberta. Ms. Templanza’s November 9, 2023 materials include: 1) an “Order” that the court access restrictions imposed on Ms. Templanza in Templanza v Ford #1 are “... null and Void as Unconstitutional and [Ms.

Templanza’s] rights has been gravely violated ...” [sic.], that costs awarded in Templanza v Ford , 2018 ABQB 422 [ Templanza v Ford #2 ] are “... declared Null and Void”, and that Ms. Templanza’s “... Leave to File is approved for both Civil and Criminal at all level.” [sic]; 2) a document titled “Leave To File The Above Case Rosalina Templanza-”, that takes the form of an unfiled application; and 3) an unfiled Alberta Court of Justice “Civil Claim” where Ms. Templanza sues a number of corporate and individual defendants.

[ 3 ] I conclude Ms. Templanza’s materials have two objectives. First, she is seeking to terminate the court access restrictions imposed in Templanza v Ford #1 . Second, Ms. Templanza is attempting to initiate a civil lawsuit in the Alberta Court of Justice. I will address these two objectives in reverse order. [ 4 ] Concerning the proposed lawsuit she wishes to initiate in the Alberta Court of Justice, Ms. Templanza has sent this leave to file request to the wrong Alberta court. The Alberta Court of Justice was formerly named the Provincial Court of Alberta. The court access restrictions imposed on Ms.

Templanza in Templanza v Ford #1 at para 143 (1) are specific that Ms.

Templanza must seek permission to initiate new litigation from the administrative justices of the court where she seeks to operate: Rosaline Templanza is prohibited, under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta, from commencing, or attempting to commence, or continuing any appeal, action, application, or proceeding in the Alberta Court of Appeal, Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta, or the Provincial Court of Alberta, on her own behalf or on behalf of any other person or estate, without an order of the Chief Justice or Associate Chief Justice, or Chief Judge, of the Court in which the proceeding is conducted , or his or her designate. [Emphasis added.] [ 5 ] If Ms.

Templanza wishes to pursue her unfiled Alberta Court of Justice “Civil Claims”, she must follow the process in Templanza v Ford #1 at para 143 , but direct her materials to the Chief Justice of the Alberta Court of Justice. Since that proposed litigation falls into the jurisdiction of a different court, I will make no further comment on it. [ 6 ] That leaves the question as to whether the Court should grant leave to Ms. Templanza’s request to apply to terminate the court access restrictions imposed in Templanza v Ford #1 . II. Test for Leave to Initiate Litigation [ 7 ] Concerning the efforts of Ms.

Templanza to terminate the court access restrictions imposed in Templanza v Ford #1 , “... a person subject to court access control is presumed to engage in illegitimate litigation unless the Court is satisfied otherwise. ...”: Re Thompson , 2018 ABQB 87 at para 19 , aff’d 2018 ABCA 111 , leave to appeal to SCC refused, 38204 (14 February 2019). [ 8 ] Permission to initiate litigation or continue stayed litigation both test the merit of Court activities on the same standard.

A person subject to court access restrictions must: 1) establish reasonable grounds for the litigation; and 2) depose fully and completely as to the facts and circumstances surrounding the proposed claim or proceeding. [ Re Thompson , 2018 ABQB 87 at paras 19 , 27; VWW v Wasylyshen , 2013 ABQB 327 at para 42 , aff’d 2014 ABCA 121 .] [ 9 ] This threshold, which must be established on a balance of probabilities, is not a high one. In many ways, it parallels the test for

Summary Judgment: Re Thompson , 2018 ABQB 87 at paras 19 , 26. [ 10 ] The person subject to Court access leave restrictions is expected to put his or her “best foot forward” to establish the basis to initiate or continue an Action: Re Thompson , 2018 ABQB 87 at paras 26-27 . In addition, the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Gichuru v Purewal , 2023 BCCA 345 stressed a broad and contextual evaluation of the reasonableness of proposed litigation.

To determine whether a leave request is reasonable, a court may take into account the purposes of the specific court access restrictions (para 34), economic aspects of the proposed litigation (paras 40, 49), failure to pay costs (para 47-48), and the potential the justice system will be misused (para 46). [ 11 ] The documents necessary to seek leave are an affidavit to provide evidence.

In the case of a new Action, Application, Appeal, or other litigation step, a copy of the proposed initiating filing: e.g., Re Moore , 2018 ABQB 261 ; Latham (Re) , 2018 ABQB 906 . [ 12 ] Leave may be granted in part: Latham (Re) , 2018 ABQB 906 ; Belway v Lalande-Weber , 2017 ABCA 108 at para 10 , leave to appeal to SCC refused, 37708 (21 December 2017). [ 13 ] Leave submissions to initiate or continue litigation may also be rejected.

Circumstances where leave will be rejected include the following. 1) Where the materials do not satisfy the criteria set out in the Court Access Restriction Order ( Re Gauthier , 2018 ABQB 99 ; Re Botar , 2018 ABQB 193 ; Thompson v Alberta Labour Relations Board , 2018 ABQB 220 , leave to appeal to SCC refused, 38267 (31 January 2019); Re Thompson , 2018 ABQB 355 , leave to appeal to SCC refused, 38266 (31 January 2019); Association of Professional Engineers and Geoscientists of Alberta v Drover , 2021 ABQB 511 ; Richardson v MacDonald , 2022 ABQB 274 ). 2) If the submissions exhibit indicia of abusive litigation ( ET v Calgary Catholic School District No 1 , 2017 ABCA 349 at para 12 , leave to appeal to SCC refused, 38081 (8 November 2018); Alberta Treasury Branches v Hok , 2018 ABQB 316 ; Thompson v Alberta Labour Relations Board , 2018 ABQB 220 ; Re Botar , 2018 ABQB 193 ; Trinity Place Foundation of Alberta v Templanza , 2019 ABQB 45 ; Onischuk (Re) , 2019 ABQB 229 ; Fletcher v Davidson & Williams LLP , 2019 ABQB 396 ; Ubah v Canadian Natural Resources Limited , 2021 ABQB 208 ; Knutson (Re) , 2021 ABQB 367 ; McMunn v Hok , 2021 ABQB 550 ; Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v Hayden , 2021 ABQB 985 , leave to appeal to SCC refused, 40284 (4 May 2023); Rana v Rana , 2022 ABQB 79 ; Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v Hayden , 2022 ABQB 97 , leave to appeal to SCC refused, 40284 (4 May 2023); Rana v Rana , 2022 ABQB 111 ; Rana v Rana , 2022 ABQB 114 ; Fiset v Feeney , 2022 ABQB 211 ; Hayden v Alberta Health Services , 2022 ABQB 335 ; Richardson v MacDonald , 2022 ABQB 274 ; Royal Bank of Canada v Anderson , 2022 ABQB 354 ; Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v Hayden , 2022 ABQB 498 ; Bissky v MacDonald , 2022 ABKB 774 ; Hayden v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce , 2023 ABKB 100 ; Ubah v Ubah , 2023 ABKB 111 ; Rana v Rana , 2023 ABKB 295 ; Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v Hayden , 2023 ABKB 384 ; Ubah v Ubah , 2023 ABKB 388 ; Ubah v Association of Professional Engineers and Geoscientists of Alberta , 2023 ABKB 390 ; R

v Tican , 2023 ABKB 422 ; Knutson (Re) , 2023 ABKB 589 ). 3) Where the abusive litigant refuses to provide the proposed filing ( Re Thompson , 2018 ABQB 355 ; Onischuk (Re) , 2019 ABQB 229 ; Hayden v Alberta Health Services , 2022 ABQB 335 ). 4) Where the abusive litigant provides false information or fails to provide necessary information ( Re Gauthier , 2018 ABQB 99 ; Rana v Rana , 2022 ABQB 114 ; Bissky v MacDonald , 2022 ABKB 774 ). 5) Where the abusive litigant fails to provide materials that are required to evaluate the proposed litigation step, such as a transcript of a proceeding proposed for appeal ( Alberta Treasury Branches v Hok , 2018 ABQB 316 ; Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v Hayden , 2021 ABQB 985 , leave to appeal to SCC refused, 40284 (4 May 2023); Rana v Rana , 2022 ABQB 111 ; Hayden v Alberta Health Services , 2022 ABQB 335 ; R v Tican , 2023 ABKB 422 ; Carter v Horizon Housing Society , 2023 ABKB 558 ). 6) Where the Court has no jurisdiction over the matter ( Hayden v Alberta Health Services , 2022 ABQB 335 ; Ubah v Ubah , 2023 ABKB 111 ). 7) Where the individual subject to court access restrictions does not have standing to make the leave request ( Ubah v Ubah , 2023 ABKB 388 ). [ 14 ] There is no appeal to the Court of Appeal of Alberta of a decision to deny leave to initiate or continue litigation: r 14.5(4) of the Alberta Rules of Court , Alta Reg 124/2010 ; Re Gauthier , 2018 ABCA 14 at para 8 .

A litigant who is denied leave to initiate or continue litigation by the Court of King’s Bench of Alberta may, however, seek leave from the Supreme Court of Canada. III. Analysis [ 15 ] Ms. Templanza’s November 9, 2023 materials are very direct about why the Templanza v Ford #1 court access restrictions are “null and Void”. Her cover letter and “Leave To File The Above Case Rosalina Templanza-” documents state: ... I was unconstitutionally declared Vexatious Litigant indefinitely, as plotted by the skilled one Senior Lawyer to another lawyer(s). ... ...

My rights to have access to law has been gravely violated by the absolute named lawyers and their judicial accomplices. My gravely infringed Constitutional Rights as follows: Rule of Four Access to Justice Bills of Rights 26 Bill C-59 Bill C 3.2 Charter sec. 7.14 Succumbed by their plotted illegal Cost Award in their favor by influenced aka cahoots. Their Vex Order violated my numbers of Constitutional Rights, that all named Respondents knew as Lawyers and higher Legal Court identity. ... Draft Order is hereby attached for the Honorable Justice Blair Nixon/ Hon. Justice Kenneth G.

Nielsen for consideration to annul, revoked the existing Vexatious order for good, against me as unconstitutional, and uncivil childish. ... ... I am asking back all my Constitutional Rights that has been violated by the illegally plotted Vex Order. [sic] [ 16 ] Ms. Templanza also identifies the Templanza v Ford #2 cost award as fraud. [ 17 ] Succinctly, Ms. Templanza is arguing that the Templanza v Ford #1 and Templanza v Ford #2 decisions are legally incorrect, these outcomes were illegal, unconstitutional, “uncivil childish”, and/or fraud. I reject this argument on several bases. [ 18 ] First, Ms.

Templanza is attempting to challenge final decisions of this Court. That makes this proposed step an illegal and abusive collateral attack. [ 19 ] Second, Ms. Templanza already appealed Templanza v Ford #1 to the Alberta Court of Appeal, and was subsequently denied leave from the Supreme Court of Canada: Templanza v Ford (30 April 2023), Ottawa 39034 (SCC). This Court has no jurisdiction to revisit this subject. I note that in Templanza v Ford #3 , Veldhuis JA at paras 15-18 evaluated Ms. Templanza’s conduct, and concluded that the Templanza v Ford #1 court access restrictions were appropriate: ...

I also find that there is no merit to the applicant’s appeal of the vexatious litigant order. The chambers judge reviewed the governing authorities and the applicant’s litigious history and her refusal to follow court orders. ...

... The chambers judge also reviewed the numerous unsubstantiated allegations and insults levied against the parties, opposing counsel and the court. The applicant’s materials before this Court are also replete with inflammatory language. ... ... It is notable that the applicant did not deny being vexatious before the chambers judge. If anything, her submissions before him reinforced the finding that she will continue to engage in senseless litigation regardless of the cost. ... [ 20 ] I, therefore, conclude that this Court is bound by appellate authority that Ms.

Templanza’s litigation, which led to the Templanza v Ford #1, was abusive, and that imposing court access restrictions was appropriate and lawful. [ 21 ] Third, Ms. Templanza makes no explanation at all as to why the Templanza v Ford #1 is wrong and unconstitutional. At best, Ms.

Templanza has advanced “bald allegations” ( GH v Alcock , 2013 ABCA 24 at para 58 ; Mancuso v Canada (National Health and Welfare) , 2015 FCA 227 at paras 16-20 ) which do not satisfy the “best foot forward” and balance of probabilities criteria to establish a reasonable basis for leave to file being granted ( Re Thompson , 2018 ABQB 87 ). [ 22 ] A further reason to refuse Ms.

Templanza’s request to terminate her court access restrictions is that this Court evaluates whether court access restrictions should be terminated by asking question as to whether an abusive litigant has exhibited a change in litigation conduct, so as to establish a “good litigation” record that displaces the prior “bad litigation” record: Ubah v Association of Professional Engineers and Geoscientists of Alberta , 2023 ABKB 389 at para 8 .

Put another way, when a formerly abusive litigant demonstrates different and improved litigation conduct, then court access restrictions are no longer needed or reasonable. [ 23 ] Ms. Templanza’s post- Templanza v Ford #1 conduct does not support a change in her litigation and dispute activity, but, instead, the opposite. She followed up Templanza v Ford #1 with an appeal without any merit: Templanza v Ford #3 . Ms. Templanza then sought leave to appeal an eviction after she assaulted a fellow tenant. That particular appeal was rejected because none of Ms.

Templanza’s allegations of racism and conspiracy had any support: Trinity Place Foundation of Alberta v Templanza , 2019 ABQB 45 . [ 24 ] Ms. Templanza then “forum shopped” that eviction complaint to the Federal Court, via a lawsuit that demanded she have her apartment back and receive $10 million in damages, while defendants including a tenant, apartment managers, three Calgary Police Officers, and an Applications Judge of this Court should each be incarcerated for 50 years: Templanza v Canada , 2021 FC 689 . [ 25 ] Ms.

Templanza’s Federal Court lawsuit was struck as being outside the Court’s authority, had no factual or reasonable basis, and should be terminated “... as it is not clear how the Court can regulate Ms. Templanza’s conspiratorial, wide-reaching, and inflammatory accusations”: Templanza v Canada at para 26 . Associate Chief Justice Gagné would have imposed Federal Courts Act , RSC 1985, c F-7 s 40 court access restrictions on Ms. Templanza, except that the Attorney General of Canada did not respond and provide consent when the defendants made that application. [ 26 ] In

summary, Ms. Templanza’s post- Templanza v Ford #1 litigation conduct does not support her being no longer subject to court access restrictions. If anything, her efforts to engage in collateral attack litigation and forum shopping indicates her litigation conduct has become more abusive. This “bad litigation” pattern is a further reason I reject Ms. Templanza’s request to end the Templanza v Ford #1 court access restrictions. IV. Conclusion [ 27 ] Ms. Templanza’s request for leave to challenge the Templanza v Ford #1 court access restrictions is denied.

As mentioned above, this Court takes no jurisdiction over Ms. Templanza’s proposed Alberta Court of Justice proceeding. [ 28 ] This result is final: Templanza v Ford #1 at para 143 (10). Pursuant to my obligations to provide information to self- represented persons ( Pintea v Johns , 2017 SCC 23 ) concerning their litigation options, if Ms. Templanza disagrees with this Memorandum of Decision, then her remedy is to seek leave to appeal from the Supreme Court of Canada. [ 29 ] This is the second time that Ms. Templanza has been denied leave by this Court for advancing abusive leave to file requests. I caution Ms.

Templanza that if she continues to abuse this Court’s leave processes, she may be subject to additional litigation and litigant management steps, including penalties pursuant to r 10.49(1) of the Alberta Rules of Court . [ 30 ] Ms. Templanza will be served this Memorandum of Decision by email to the address used by Ms. Templanza on her November 4, 2023 cover letter: nuevaVis235@yahoo.com. Dated at the City of Calgary, Alberta this 17 th day of November, 2023. D.B. Nixon A.C.J.C.K.B.A. Appearances:

Rosalina Templanza for the Self-represented Litigant